جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « خطاپذیری » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

Fallibility and Certainty of mathematics in the perspective of DeductivismAbstractThis research shows that fallibility, with all the transformations it has created, is flexible to some extent, and it is possible to establish a relationship between it and the certainty of mathematical concepts. This possibility is done through the revival of analogy. The distinction between pure and applied mathematics leads to an indisputable form of mathematical fallibility, especially in pure mathematics. Moreover, this distinction fits well with analogicalism. Because according to Einstein's attitude, although it is not possible to prove mathematical certainty in reality, it is possible in pure mathematics. As a result, analogism with the aim of proving theorems and mathematical concepts can eliminate some possible errors in mathematics, and corrections are integrated into analogism, and fallibility claims are recounted in their non-controversial forms. 

The aim of this paper is to defend the following thesis: It is rational to believe that the right to life is restrictively a Divine right and not a human right; that is, only God has the (moral/legal/religious) authority to make and issue the laws surrounding life and death. This paper is structured as follows: after some introductory points are given, two arguments in favor of the above thesis will be formulated; the first argument is based on the fallibility of human knowledge and judgment, and the second argument is based on the rejection of the human right to life because of its implausible implications. Finally, some implications and advantages of the favored thesis will be explained briefly.

The subject of soft power could be studied from the viewpoint of the Holy Quran. ‎ According to ‎Quranic teachings regarding the manifestation of the soft power of the divine, “repentance” plays an important and substantial role in intra-organizational ‎relationships and Islamic management. Repentance depends on a kind of ‎awakening and internal revolution which as well as driving an individual’s decision ‎to avoid mistake (sin), make him/her perform and correct the daily deeds. Being emphasized by the words ‎of God, the mutual respect held between God and his servant after the repentance ‎shows a kind of kindness in God’s relationship with humans, and also individuals’ ‎with others. The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question: By ‎considering the manifestation of the divine’s soft power against Satan’s according ‎to Al-Baqarah 2:37, how can we evaluate repentance as a Quranic mechanism for ‎modifying the organizational behavior? The descriptive-analytic ‎method is adopted to study the manifestation of the divine’s soft power in Al-‎Baqarah 2:37. The role of repentance and its relation to educational systems used ‎by managers and employees is assessed with the purpose of modifying the ‎organizational behavior based on intra-organizational fallibility. Based on the ‎results of the study, if the fallibility is carried out based on the repentance pattern of ‎the Quran, not only the relationship between chief managers and employees will be ‎improved, but also this pattern will lead to a healthy office and organization.‎

A wide-ranging debate about the nature of unobservables, such as electrons and genes, has been occurred between scientific realists and antirealists. The main questions, at the ontological, epistemological, and semantic levels of discussion, are respectively as follows: Do unobservables exist? Is our knowledge of unobservables truthful? How are unobservables referred to? This paper theorizes about unobservables on the basis of the philosophical views of Muhammad Husayn Tabātabāī (1903–1981 AD), known with the honorific title Allāma Tabātabāī, an Iranian philosopher and Islamic thinker. These views include the ontological primacy of existence over quiddity, the fallibility of knowledge by concepts, and the theory of i'tibārīāt.

Conceptual analysis constitutes the main method of this study. The paper develops a theory about unobservables through an analysis of Allāma Tabātabāī’s philosophical views. Although the theory that is developed has not been expressed by Tabātabāī, it can be built based on his views. The approach of the paper is comparable to those of contemporary neoAristotelian philosophers of science. The paper’s argument, however, is based on the views of Tabātabāī rather than on Aristotle’s.

According to the theory of the ontological primacy of existence over quiddity, existence is external, whereas quiddity is mental. Quiddity is a presentation of external existence in our mind, or in other words, minds abstract the quiddity of things from their external existence. Relying on this view, the paper argues that an unobservable exists if it has real effects, and that the quiddity of things is constructed in our minds. Although this construction is mainly inevitable in the case of ordinary objects such as tables, the construction of scientific models describing unobservables is (partly) contingent. Furthermore, the theory of i'tibārīāt explains how mental processes ascribe the definition of, or a judgment made about, a thing to another thing. On the basis of this theory, the paper explains how assumptive and metaphorical elements contribute to building scientific models. The paper also analyzes the theoretical concepts that describe unobservables, and argues that they can be categorized neither as ordinary quiddity concepts (such as the concept of a table), nor as logical concepts (such as contraposition), nor as philosophical concepts (such as existence), nor as practical i'tibārīāt (such as good and bad). Nevertheless, they share similarities to quiddity concepts and to those of practical i’tibārīāt. Although theoretical concepts are assumptive and metaphorical, they can represent aspects of reality. After all, our knowledge of unobservables is gained by concepts, but this knowledge is different from the knowledge of ordinary objects in that theoretical assumptions and metaphors, which are the characteristics of i'tibārīāt, play a central role in the advancement of our (fallible) knowledge of unobservables.

Unobservable entities exist, and their theoretical descriptions are truthful. At the same time, several contingent factors are employed in the construction of the theoretical models of unobservables, and therefore scientific knowledge of them is fallible. The realist view of this paper takes into account the constructive and contingent features of scientific modeling. Scientific knowledge represents reality to the extent that it relies on external existence. But be that as it may, scientific knowledge is contingent because of the role historically contingent elements play in its construction.

Human being has been naturally created in such a way that has the possibility and desire to behave good and evil. This is while in education, and especially in childhood education, the good is central and evil has been marginalized. Concentrating on the good and ignoring the evil in education does not seem realistic. The inclination to evil behavior and recognizing wickedness and error in childhood requires an appropriate education. In this study, by expressing reasons for the necessity of recognizing evil and a glimpse of the verses of the Quran, the desire to behave good and evil is recognized in childhood. Considering the concept of evil and the concept of childhood as a spectrum makes sense of talking about evil in childhood. Hence, an alternative approach is proposed to childhood education, called error-tolerant education. Error-tolerant education attempts to recognize the error and wickedness in childhood to provide the possibility of an active encounter to error and thus, facilitate the path of education and truth-seeking for children. “Recognizing the child’s evil inclinations”, “encountering error actively in childhood”, and “maximum welcoming of children’s error” are some of the components of error-tolerant education in childhood

One of the most fundamental discussions of epistemology is the discussion pertaining to the conceptions and notions. In this article, we are seeking to investigate how we acquire concepts, whether specific or general. This is the main concern of this study. According to the selected view, the theoretical concepts are taken from the self-evident concepts, but all the self-evident concepts are taken from the intuitive knowledge. In the first part of this claim, i.e. taking the theoretical concepts from the self-evident ones, there is no considerable disagreement. The second part, however, is not so and many theories have been presented there. Nevertheless, after explaining the selected theory and stating the scope of the self-evident concepts, we face this fundamental question: "how are the self-evident concepts taken from the intuitive knowledge?" After acquiring the right solution for the fundamental issue of this article, we will investigate and evaluate the way of acquiring the self-evident concepts through the intuitive knowledge and, at the end, the most important difficulties facing it.

Although all Qur’ānists of the Indian Peninsula emphasize the Qur’ānism and needlessness to the sunna, they adopt different explications for this issue. Ghulām Aḥmad Parwīz, the contemporary Qur’ānist thinker of the Indian Peninsula, is one of the figures who has given in a new explication in this regard. His exposition of Qur’ānism is tied to his classification of the different types of revelation. In his opinion, the qur’ānic revelation is fixed, while the sunna revelation is repeatable. Since his theory about the repeatability of the sunna revelation is influenced by the Western intellectuals about the revelation and contradicts the Islamic theories, the study at hand aimed at examining and criticizing his theory. The results of this investigation show that Parwīz’s theory – which relies on the intellect, the qur’ānic verses, and the history of Islam – has four components. First, based on the qur’ānic verses, the orders of the Prophet (s) in the sunna realm (like those of any other human) is prone to mistakes. Second, the Prophet (s) and his Companions did not make efforts with regard to the sunna that was recorded in the form of Ḥadīths. Third, intellect, under the guidance of the Qur’ān, is sufficient in all conditions for the explanation of the details of religion. Fourth, according to some verses of the Qur’ān, the sunna revelation can be generalized to people other than the Prophet (s). However, there are some criticisms against these components. First, the verses that Parwīz uses to claim ...

Prominent mystics have always claimed the existence of an independent epistemological way of receiving facts, which some have considered its authority to be inherent and unconditional. As the founder of mystical and codified theoretical mysticism, Ibn Arabi has unique views on mystical epistemology, in particular the authority of revelation. His remarks on the infallibility of mystical revelations have given rise to the theory of the inherent authority of revelation among scholars. Researchers have been at odds over the quality of the inherent authority of revelation. Using the documentary-library method as a data collection, and descriptive-analytical method as an analysis with a developmental approach, this study seeks to reflect on the views of mystics, especially Ibn Arabi, in order to draw a consistent picture of inherent authority of mystical revelations. This article criticizes Ibn Arabi's words on the absolute authority of mystical revelations and, after stating the general rules about the possibility of proving inherent authority, will finally evaluate the most important claimed examples of the inherent authority.

Undoubtedly, the mankind's recognition of the real that various human sciences follow it, is fallible. Logics was designed and arranged from the past to block some of the error factors. But about logics and any other knowledge that seeks to correct, repel and obviate the faul, this question arises as to what knowledge can act as a criterion and the possibility of transferring to the real estate to it infallible. Reason, as the discoverer of the real, has a part that can be considered as critic of criterion. At the same time, this criterion needs help and it's complements is criterion of religion that hasn't limit and there is infallible. Religion has honored the criterion of rationality, which calls it in
argumentation observe to criterion of religion. In this article, according to a verse from God's Book, we try to show the validity of the rational criterion in all areas of human knowledge and discoveries, including intuitive knowledge and even in achieve to religious purposes.

Muslim philosophers have usually provided a negative answer to this question that whether presential knowledge, which is believed to be the building block of human knowledge, could be endowed to truthfulness and falseness and if one can find some glimmers of fallibility to it or not? The present research has analytically investigated the widely held views of wise men who believe that presential knowledge is infallible due to lack of distance and mediation. In the first phase, mystic visions and unveilings are proved to be presential and in the next step they are proved to be fallible. Likewise, the existence of errors in the presential knowledge itself signifies its fallibility which is proved in human beings however. Nonetheless, it should be taken into account that proving this issue does not lead to waiving authority and credibility of presential knowledge, but the criterion for authority in this realm of humanistic knowledge includes observing the methodological requirements and rational conducts acceptable by the scholars of such a knowledge.

Most mathematicians are reluctant to accept the visual proof as a genuine type of mathematical proof. In this paper, I paraphrase 10, common or new, objections to this type of proof and evaluate them separately and critically. On each of the objections, indeed, at least one of these central features is absent from the visual proofs: formality, symbolicness, rigority, reliability, surveyability, universality, legitimacy, self-sufficiency, uniformity, and fertility.
The paper argues that none of these objections are accurate. So the rejection of this kind of proofs is mostly due to psychological and sociological factors, especially domination of formalistic attitude among the mathematics community, rather than logical, or methodological reasons. There are not any strong reasons to reject these kinds of proofs, as a pattern of reasoning in mathematics; on the contrary, there are good reasons to accept and recognize them. An awareness of the role of this type of proof in the mathematics as a whole, no less and no more, is of critical importance.

To commentators and philosophers, it is possible for human to achieve divine knowledge. By resorting to different methods, human can obtain divine knowledge. In this regard, feeling is a way of achieving recognition and a path to face the external world. Feeling will makes human familiar with the external world and reveals the sensory secrets. Thinkers have proposed different viewpoints about the validity of feeling system; however, Quranic teachings and the reasons achieved from the verses of the Quran will guide us to the path in which feeling is considered to be valid. Presenting various valuable reasons, the Quran totally accepts the sensory cognition. On the other hand, according to the verses of the Quran, there is the possibility of mistake in feelings. Regarding the relation between soul and sensory cognition the philosophers believe that human soul is void of any wisdom in a stage before feeling but the Quran states that in the beginning, soul lacks an obtainable science and designing the issue of nature makes us to believe that the natural and unobtainable teachings are existed in soul before feelings.

Hirsch is of the belief that Gadamer’s hermeneutics theory leads to pluralism and relativism. Following romantic hermeneutic scholars، Hirsch believes the aim of reading a text to be achieving the goal of the author. Gadamer، however، believes that understanding is to reach an agreement and compatibility with the other، not to reach his or her intention. Therefore، Hirsch believes that the meaning of text is predetermined and the aim of reading is to discover this meaning. Gadamer، however، believes that meaning is produced as result of dialog between an interpreter and the text، and، therefore، there’s no such thing as a predetermined text. Based on this view، Gadamer regard language and its tools as the conditions of determining meaning، but Hirsch believes that language is merely an instrument of revealing meaning. From another point of view، Hirsch accuses Gadamer of lacking criteria. When meaning is an undetermined concept، there will be no criteria to distinguish correct interpretation from an incorrect one. In this paper، we aim to introduce Hirsch’s three main criticisms against Gadamer and also provide responses to these criticisms based on the views of Gadamer’s advocates. **. Associate Professor of Philosophy; Shahid Beheshti University E-mail: a_vaezi@sbu. ac. ir [Date Received: 02/07/1391; Date Accepted: 11/11/1393] Keywords

Regarding the mystical method which is based on gnostic intuition and intuitive knowledge, the important duty of mysticism researchers and science philosophers is to deal with the nature of ‘’mystical visions’’ and answer the questions and doubts about this ‘’method’’ of obtaining the truth. From among such issues is the possibility of committing error in mystical visions. And in case of the likelihood of the error, the ‘’criteria’’ of the infallibility should be investigated. The present study seeks to present a critique on the theory of ‘’ the Infallibility of Mystical Visions’’ and, through inspecting and analyzing the views of the scholars in this field, prove the necessity of the existence of ‘’criterion’’ for mystical visions. It is obvious that although the necessity of the existence of criterion will be proved here, evaluation of these criteria and the extent of their efficiency enjoy different perspectives and branches which should be dealt with elsewhere.

The major aim of the present article is to reason on the minimum criterion for science; the possibility of mistaking and also presenting a criterion (standard) to penmen (test and experience). The method of the research is criticizing different approaches about scientific method and required standards (criterion) for scientific knowledge in three views: logical positivism, popper falsifiable theory and structures theory and also little validity teachings of dakosta and fereng. The authors of the survey conclude although there have been a variety of criterion and standards to accept the scientific suggestions over the history; but the possibility of mistake in scientific views is considered as a pre criterion which is an accepted factor in both logical positivism and popper falsifiable theory. If we omit the mentioned pre criterion then we will not be able to distinguish experimental and scientific knowledge from other human knowledge.

This article deals with representational knowledge and its characteristics differentiating it from presentational knowledge. The author considers the division of knowledge into these two types to be deductive, and explores the question whether their differences are real or conventional. By investigating the epistemological traits of representational knowledge, he concludes that “designation” is constitutive of this type of knowledge and intrinsic to both conception and assertion. Reconciling this fact with the idea that concepts only potentially represent their signified is the next issue discussed.Different types of representational knowledge, its primary division into conception and assertion, and their realities are discovered. Another theme dealt with in this article is the difference between conception, notion, and meaning on the one hand, and between assertion and proposition, on the other, and between belief, trust, faith, acceptance, and other similar terms, on the third.