جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "game theory" در نشریات گروه "علوم انسانی"

The extended approach of the legislator in accepting the repentance of the perpetrator in extreme crimes, although it has provided a possibility to reform the criminal through his voluntary reformation, but it leads to challenges regarding the repetition of the crime. The purpose of this article is to examine the question of how the use of the institution of penitence in sexual crimes of violence and reluctance has been in the context of game theory and deserving justice, and considering the criticisms of this legal provision, how should the institution of penance be. This article is descriptive and analytical, and has investigated the mentioned question by using the library method. The findings indicate that violent and involuntary sexual crimes are among the crimes that affect the order and Violent sexual crimes cause serious harm to women in the society in such a way that the victim is directly harmed by this crime and the society is indirectly harmed. It is for this reason that this crime, contrary to the prevailing opinion and the opinion of the legislator in Article 114, should be considered as a rightful crime and therefore repentance should not be accepted in it. It is suggested that the legislator amend Article 114 of the Islamic Penal Code and its note two, which is about fornication..

The purpose of this research is to model the behavior of the government and the contractor in the early termination of BOT projects for the construction of suburban pedestrian bridges, using game theory. The case study includes BOT projects for the construction of pedestrian bridges in the Tehran-Semnan highway. By applying game theory and analyzing the behavior of the parties in the form of a bargaining game, the consequences of the decisions of the government and the contractor in the conditions of early termination of projects have been investigated and a model has been presented to predict these behaviors and their economic results. The data used in this research were extracted from the experts of the General Department of Highways and Road Transport of Tehran and the managers of BOT projects, as well as related documents. The proposed model provides three key features for the analysis of parties' behaviors, and using a practical example, these features have been calculated and verified. The results show that the amount of compensation and the decisions around it are directly related to the behavior of the government and the contractor; High compensation could lead to a government counteroffer or construction of a new bridge, but may delay negotiations, while low compensation would cause the project to continue inefficiently and harm the public interest. Finally, managed anticipated behaviors in the public and private sector and reaching an agreement on compensation is suggested as a suitable solution to reduce behavioral conflicts and maintain public interests.

During the last decades, the strategic interaction between the monetary authority, i.e. the central bank, and the financial authority, i.e. the central government, has attracted the attention of many economic policymakers, in both developing and advanced countries. A method that plays an important role in the analysis of the strategic confrontation between these two institutions is analysis based on the game theory. This theory has wide applications in various branches of science, including economics, engineering, biology, political science, and military science. The behaviour of each person or player is not only affected by the individual’s own decisions, but also it depends on the behaviour and decisions of other players.The government aims to foster robust economic growth through budgetary expenses, while the central bank aims to maintain the stability of inflation through interest rate mechanisms. Studies show that the different goals of the central bank and the government are a challenge for the economic stability of a country. The optimal solution for officials is to coordinate their actions and decisions, because coordination improves the situation of the decision makers in both arenas. In Iran's economy, the issue of coordination or lack of it in the implementation of macroeconomic policies is of particular importance for monetary and financial authorities. Therefore, in this study, the interaction between these two groups of authorities is investigated through the game theory in normal forms.

Regarding policy coordination between the government and the central bank, there are two types of strategic interaction, which are very useful and important in the analysis of equilibrium solutions. One includes non-cooperative games between two officials, and the other includes cooperative games. The games in which joint action contracts are applicable are called cooperative games, but the games in which such joint actions are not possible and individual participants must be allowed to act in their own interests are called non-cooperative games.To establish equilibrium in this game, three concepts are used, including Nash equilibrium, Berge equilibrium and Greedy Scaler equilibrium. In a Nash case, each player individually and self-interestedly seeks to maximize his profit. Conversely, in Berge equilibrium, players exhibit altruistic behaviours versus their opponents. In Greedy equilibrium, however, players engage in a semi-cooperative game, striving to advance their shared interests through the formation of coalitions. Also, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been investigated for the strategic confrontation of the two groups of policy makers. This game is a classic cooperation and choice problem based on the assumption of selfish human motives. Blinder (1983) designed a policy decision-making problem in the framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

The outcomes of this game reveal that, in a two-strategy situation, the Nash equilibrium occurs when both the government and the central bank adopt contractionary policy strategies. In this game, the economy does not enter into the prisoner's dilemma, but it is the Pareto optimal. Conversely, in the Berge equilibrium, the scenario arises where the government pursues an expansionary fiscal strategy while the central bank implements a contractionary monetary strategy. In addition, many situations of Greedy equilibrium include both Nash and Berge equilibria. The results for Iran's economy show that the implementation of a balanced and optimization Nash policy by the government and the central bank (contraction fiscal and monetary policy) brings the most benefits for the government. The implementation of an optimal Berge policy by the government and the central bank involves the most benefits for the central bank. However, the results show that, in the first scenario, based on the reviewed information, there are two Greedy equilibria, Nash equilibrium and Berge equilibrium. The first Greedy equilibrium corresponds to the Nash equilibrium, and the second one corresponds to the Berge equilibrium. Therefore, if the government and the central bank follow a semi-cooperative game, both Nash and Berge equilibria can be reached. The equilibrium extracted from the second scenario is more beneficial than the one from the first scenario. Also, in the semi-cooperative game, a more favourable balance can still be achieved. So, the government and the central bank seek the highest profit by forming a coalition and cooperating with each other.During the first development plan, the Nash equilibrium brings the most economic growth for the government, and, during the third and fourth development plans, the central bank faces the lowest inflation in the Nash equilibrium. However, in the Berge balance, the government experiences the highest economic growth in the third development plan. In this situation, the central bank sees the lowest level of inflation in both the third and fourth development plans. In addition, in the optimal Nash equilibrium, compared to the other equilibria, the government achieves the maximum result, and, in the optimal policy of the central bank, it will achieve the lowest inflation.

Conclusions and policy implications:

 It is suggested to the policymakers to pay attention to the type of game designed in adopting their policies. So, if these authorities seek to achieve a non-cooperative game, they should follow the strategy of contractionary monetary and financial policies. Also, to reach an altruistic equilibrium and mutual support, the central bank should follow a contractionary monetary policy, and the government should follow an expansionary fiscal policy. For future studies, it is suggested that the role of a third actor, such as speculators or parliament (legislature), be seen in the game between the government and the central bank.

In the current era, the competition between organizations has also been transferred to the supply chain. The stability of the supply chain is a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of companies. The most basic condition for the sustainability of an organization is its profitability. Therefore, the aim of this research is to present a mathematical model based on game theory in order to maximize profit in the closed loop supply chain. The main goal in the closed loop supply chain is to eliminate waste and optimize the consumption of products in such a way that the products are separated into two groups, new product and used product, and there is the possibility of returning used product and reproduced products in the consumption cycle. has it. However, all members of the chain benefit. But the fact is that it is not clear which factors can maximize the benefits of the closed loop supply chain members. For this purpose, in the current research, a mathematical model based on game theory is designed in which cooperation between upstream and downstream members occurs. Finally, it is clear what effective factors such as demand, returned products, recycled products and remanufactured products have on the profit of the chain members. In other words, how can the total profit of chain members and the share of individual members be increased and under what conditions this increase is achieved.
The general results from the analysis of this research show that demand is a factor that can increase the profit of all members of the chain, and returned products have a positive effect on the profit of all members, while recycled products and remanufactured products, in If it increases, it only increases the profit of the reproducer and recycler and reduces the profit of other members significantly at different levels.
In this research, the profitability of the closed loop supply chain has been investigated using game theory and the parameters of demand, returned products, recycled products and remanufactured products affecting the profitability of the closed loop supply chain have been simultaneously investigated. Therefore, the innovation of this research includes the simultaneous examination of demand, returned products, recycled products and remanufactured products affecting the profitability of the closed loop supply chain.

Among the renewable energy sources, using the energy of water resources to run small electric power plants is very important. However, the government's limited ability to execute projects correctly, on time, and with quality has caused the use of new models of private and public sector participation to be emphasized. Based on the reviewed studies, no comprehensive method was found to model and analyze the results of disputes in PPP contracts. Therefore, an attempt was made to provide a comprehensive model with game theory techniques (symmetric game) to investigate the results of information asymmetry and secrecy of the private party in providing correct income information and as a result of the occurrence of contractual conflicts in these models. The project of the hydro-power plant on the water transmission line from Shirindara dam to Bojnord City using the PPP method was selected as a case study. The results showed that the best game mode for the public sector is when there is no pre-evaluation study plan, there is secrecy and periodic inspection, in which the NPV will be equal to 30,165 million Rials. The best game mode for the private sector is when the study plan does not have pre-evaluation, there is secrecy and no periodic inspection (26,794 million Rials), which in this case The IRR of the plan will be 17%. In the most logical case, i.e. when the project has pre-evaluation studies, there is no concealment and no periodic inspection, the IRR of the project for the private sector was 15% and the NPV of both parts is the same.

One of the fundamental challenges of Iran's banking system is the activity of unlicensed technology companies. With the emergence of new technologies and the redefinition of banking, this issue has become more significant. Achieving desirable goals is impossible without considering the actors in the banking technology sector. This study employs content analysis and expert interviews to identify the needs and necessary actions. Using game theory and graph models, the equilibrium among key actors such as traditional banks, financial technology companies, customers and users of banking services, the government and regulatory bodies, and investors and market analysts is examined. The equilibrium state among these actors was identified through interviews and determining their preferences regarding the game states. Evolutionary path analysis determined the movements of actors from the current state to the equilibrium state. The results indicate that the current equilibrium is not desirable for society and policymakers, and changes in the actors' preferences are necessary to achieve the desired equilibrium. Reverse game analysis revealed that the government and regulatory bodies need to formally recognize this sector and implement stringent laws and regulations. This research helps policymakers gain a better understanding of the dynamics and interactions among actors and design more effective policies for managing stakeholders in the regulation of banking.

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In the bargaining process, most people follow their usual procedures when faced with issues and disputes and seek to find a solution that satisfies the interests of the parties. But in this process, problems such as lack of effective interaction, instability of decisions, lack of clarity in the understanding of parties and specialties are often seen. Bargaining and negotiation in the supply chain are essential components of decision-making processes that have wide-ranging implications for various individuals engaged in the global business landscape. With increasing emphasis on achieving fair outcomes and efficient allocation of resources, the application of game theory, especially the Nash negotiation solution, has attracted more attention in the field of supply chain negotiations. As global markets become more complex and intertwined, understanding the dynamics of supply chain negotiations is essential for organizations to optimize their operations. In dealing with complex issues and a large number of people and different aspects, Nash negotiations allow the parties to reach agreements that satisfy all parties in the shortest possible time. The Nash negotiation solution developed by Nash (1950) provides a powerful framework for analyzing negotiations and incorporates the concept of "fair sharing" between the parties involved. This tool has proven to be valuable for modeling and understanding negotiation processes in supply chains. By considering individual preferences, relative negotiation power and feasible agreements, Nash's negotiation solution tries to establish optimal and fair results. Understanding the application and implications of the Nash negotiation solution in supply chain negotiations can provide valuable insights in reaching mutually beneficial agreements and enhancing cooperation between supply chain partners. However, in the field of negotiations and bargaining, there have not been enough studies and researches regarding the use of the "Nash" negotiation solution; Therefore, the main purpose of this research is to use the solution of "Nash" negotiations to improve the bargaining process, so that by examining the effects of "Nash" negotiations on the quality of decision-making, the psychology of people and the agreements reached, a pattern of improvement and improvement in the bargaining process in the supply chain can be obtained.
From the perspective of the research strategy, this research is a qualitative method, and from the perspective of the paradigm, it is classified as an interpretive paradigm. In this method, the researcher uses the method of qualitative data analysis, which is specifically used in this research, to make patterns. The meta-synthesis research method is one of the types of meta-study methods and is considered a qualitative research method. In fact, meta-synthesis is a type of qualitative study that uses the information of findings extracted from other studies in the field of a related topic. In the meta-synthesis method, the researcher combines the secondary data of the results of other studies to respond to the results of his study and obtains new results. The current research includes two primary stages: initial planning and implementation of a systematic review, followed by reporting and publication of findings, and finally a model that shows the improvements that can be made in the supply chain bargaining process by adopting Nash's approaches with the meta-synthesis is presented. In order to achieve the goal of the research, the seven-step method of Sandelowski and Barroso was used. Sandelowski and Barroso's method is a structured model for qualitative text analysis and extracting concepts. This method uses a seven-step model for document analysis. The main method of data collection is also library studies.
 In order to evaluate the reliability of the interview, the within-subject agreement method was used with a two-pass code, in which a researcher colleague (coder) who was a PhD student registered. Collaboratively, the researcher and research associate coded the four articles and subsequently calculated the percentage of within-theme agreement, indicating the agreement between the two transfer codes. To facilitate the coding process and save time, a checklist containing two values (yes/no) was used to cover the entire task or all necessary items. When the opinions were obtained through the formula presented below, the kappa coefficient of agreement was calculated, a numerical value between 1 and +1. A rate close to 1 indicates high reliability, while a rate close to -1 indicates disagreement and a rate close to zero indicates no reliability. A kappa coefficient between 0.6 and 0.8 indicates good reliability. In the context of the current research, a part of the article was presented to two professors and based on their evaluation and comments, the kappa coefficient (K) was calculated using the P0-PE formula divided by P0-1, and its value was 0.84. The results showed that there was a total of 6 dimensions, 18 components and 90 indicators that showed changes in terms of repetition and frequency.
The findings of this study showed that Nash negotiations are effectively able to form agreements that support a fair balance between the negotiating parties. This equality resulting from Nash solutions, in addition to strengthening long-term cooperation, also plays a role in reducing potential negotiation tensions. Structuring the negotiation based on the theoretical framework of Nash negotiations paves the way for the development of more favorable and insightful relations between the parties. Psychologically, Nash techniques can help reduce negative emotions and increase mutual trust. Negotiators who feel their interests are properly understood and established are more willing to cooperate and enter into long-term contracts. This issue not only affects the individual relationships between experts, but also has an effect on the entire structure and performance of the supply chain. Nash solutions also improve the quality of decisions. By focusing on sustainable and win-win outcomes, parties are more motivated to explore innovative and progressive solutions. Innovative perspectives can lead to improved processes, reduced costs, and increased efficiency and effectiveness. At the theoretical level, the application of Nash solutions in this study has benefited from the realistic simulated dynamics that we have achieved a more accurate understanding of the complex dynamics of supply chains. Understanding these complexities has enabled researchers and managers to implement more insightful strategies to guide negotiations and find efficient and successful agreements

In the fight against money laundering, the banking system requires collaboration with a diverse set of stakeholders, including regulatory and legislative bodies, banks, international organizations, technology companies, and customers, each with distinct objectives. These stakeholders have been identified through content analysis and interviews with banking industry experts utilizing theoretical saturation sampling. Employing game theory and graph models, interactions among these groups have been analyzed to achieve equilibrium in both the current and future states. Evolutionary path analysis has elucidated pathways to equilibrium, highlighting the role of technology companies in pioneering supervisory innovations and the efforts of international organizations in implementing global standards. The findings indicate that the current equilibrium state does not align with policymakers' ideals. Therefore, reverse game analysis has been employed to explore intervention strategies aimed at adjusting stakeholders' preferences. The ideal state encompasses stringent enforcement of laws by regulatory bodies, enhancement of internal systems by banks, and active cooperation of customers with the imposed limitations.

Charles Dickens’ Little Dorrit incorporates an appealing realistic treatment of social and institutional secrets. Realism is characterized by its attention to details beyond the story world. This article proposes that Dickens portrays social and institutional secrets as unfair game systems, controlled by dominant authorities and represented by upper-class characters. This study builds on game theory in an effort to spot the game system Dickens utilizes to reflect the unfair interactions resulting from social and institutional secrets. It is concluded that Dickens’ artistic skills as a realist are not limited to faithful narrativity and mere accurate storytelling of events, rather it extends to utilizing systematic and very detailed structural representations of the contest between authorities hiding information and their victims in works like Little Dorrit, reflecting the exact system that underlines similar social, institutional, secret-based situations that Dickens observed in the world around him.

Today, the world is involved in complex issues and many dangers. The existence of increasing competition, diverse and conflicting cultures, power struggles and economic inequalities indicates that different actors have different goals and objectives. In fact, one of the main reasons for the growth and increasing activity of different terrorist groups can be seen as the lack of global coherence and convergence in counter-terrorism policies. This article seeks to explore the fundamental question of what is the rationale for global convergence in the fight against terrorism? This article believes that there is a strategic logic for convergence and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, which can be seen from the approach of theories such as ancient Chinese wisdom, game theory and also in the theory of moving target and pursuing global counter-terrorism goals. Emphasizing the various strategic advantages of global convergence in the fight against terrorism, this paper seeks to conclude that countries need to reach a point of strategic understanding where mutual cooperation is a priority for mutual benefit. In other words, if there is no global convergence and cooperation to deal with terrorism, terrorism in the world will find an opportunity to attack more and create more dangers. Finally, the main solutions through which international security algorithms can improve the efficiency of advanced algorithms will be proposed.

ethical and cultural factors in the auditing field; due to the property of being invisible; They are not easily observable, and for this reason, asymmetric information appears and the company and the capital market move out of their optimal balance, which means market failure. Based on this, moral and cultural factors affect the interests of auditors and company stakeholders. The purpose of this research is to investigate the role of cultural factors and professional ethics of auditors on the interests of companies in the form of dynamic game theory.

The current research is of developmental type. In the present research, the game theory approach has been used. The first actors were the managers and board members of the top 50 capital market companies. The second community is the trusted members of the trusted auditing institutions of the Stock Exchange Organization. A questionnaire was used to collect information.

In this research, three neural network approaches of support vectors, Bayesian and Crossberg anti-propagation were used to repeat the game and create Nash equilibrium. Based on the results of Crossberg's anti-diffusion method, it has higher accuracy in modeling the behavior between players.

The results showed the fact that the increase of cultural and ethical indicators have a negative effect on the price and a positive effect on the company's sales. As a result, the improvement of cultural and ethical indicators increases the interests of all stakeholders and actors active in the capital market.

Contribution:

Deviation from cultural and ethical indicators by auditors increases inefficiency in the company and reduces the level of interests of the beneficiaries.

abstract (for journal site)Today, it has been established that if countries can employ proper policies in line with the benefits of international trade, they can then prevent related crises in the field of trade, such as payment balance crises. This article models the behavior of monopolists and countries based on possible strategies for each player by presenting a static game between the players. Initially, a scenario is considered in which two countries are indifferent to each other. Then, in the second scenario, two countries are considered to be rivals (enemies), and in the third scenario, three countries are assumed, with one being a rival and the other being indifferent. The results show that in all three scenarios, the dominant strategy for the monopolist is to supply products domestically. However, for the government in the first scenario, the dominant strategy is a zero import tariff (consumer support). In the second scenario, where there is also a rival country, there is no dominant strategy for the government, and equilibrium occurs where the government imposes high tariffs (supporting the monopolist). In the third scenario, the dominant strategy for the government is to impose high import tariffs (supporting the monopolist). In summary, if imports occur from non-rival countries, the government supports consumers, and in the case of imports from other countries, the government supports the monopolist. In short, if the imports are from non-competing countries, the government supports the consumers, and in case of imports from other countries, the government supports the monopolist.

One of the key challenges that can affect the country's economy is the banking crisis. This issue has a direct impact on the financial and credit stability of banks, as well as public trust in the banking system. Using game theory and the graph model, the present research deals with the detailed analysis of the interactions between the different actors in the Iranian banking system and helps to outline their interactions and mutual effects in the banking crisis issue. The results of the research emphasize the importance of understanding the mutual interactions of stakeholders in the management of the banking crisis and provide solutions to reduce risk and improve the efficiency of the banking system. Using the graph model, financial rescue measures of the government and the central bank, the change of taxpayers' attitudes, the adaptation of investors' strategies, and the desire of customers for alternative options have been investigated. Also, the importance of adapting the strategies of financial institutions and policymakers to the changing conditions for the effective management of the banking crisis has been emphasized. In fact, the current and future situation of the actors of the banking crisis has been examined. The findings indicate that in order to reach an ideal and desirable situation that is in harmony with the long-term goals of the society, there is a need to adjust the preferences of actors and the active intervention of policy makers to realize the desired situation.

Uncertainty in the supply chain is considered as a fundamental and important issue in order to make appropriate decisions for supply chain managers and designers. In this article, in order to deal with this issue, a three-level supply chain under random demand is proposed using two decentralized and coordinated models, in which the profit increase of each actor in the chain (supplier-manufacturer-retailer) considered. In the decentralized model under the scenario-based stochastic demand, the retailer and the manufacturer separately decide on the order quantity and investment by considering the scenario-based stochastic CSR-sensitive demand. A wholesale price contract with two adjustable levels is proposed to persuade three levels to enter into a coordination scheme. According to the comparisons made between the results of the algorithms, it was found that the coordinated model performed better than the other algorithm in reducing chain costs and increasing profits. In particular, it can be acknowledged that the coordinated model performed better than the decentralized model by about 144.39% and was able to increase the profit of the chain.

This article aims to describe and explain the strategic behavior of managers and shareholders in the interactive conflict environment of joint-stock firms using the tools of game theory, specifically through signaling games. Managers, considering the quality of internal controls, engage in both deceptive and informative earnings management strategies. Shareholders then respond with strategies involving high or low capital costs and opt for either high or low-quality audit services. The findings of the research outline the theoretical conditions necessary for establishing balance in strategies such as deceptive earnings management with high capital costs and deceptive earnings management with high-quality audit services in environments characterized by weak internal controls. Additionally, it highlights the conditions required to establish equilibrium in strategies like informative earnings management with low capital costs and informative earnings management with low-quality audit services within environments boasting strong internal controls.

Implementing the "Vendor-Managed Inventory" strategy and sharing inventory information among retailers and manufacturers play crucial roles in reducing holding costs, shortage costs, transportation costs, and excess inventory costs. This leads to enhanced coordination in the decision-making processes of supply chain members. Therefore, this research delves into the investigation of the supply chain coordination mechanism by combining the vendor-managed inventory strategy and revenue-sharing contracts. Additionally, in the developed model, the demand function incorporates a multiplicative factor of elements influencing the profit function, such as retail price, retailer, and manufacturer advertising investments.
 

In this article, we study the coordination in a two-level supply chain including one manufacturer and multiple retailers under a revenue-sharing contract, where the pricing and advertising investment strategy of each member of the supply chain is implemented despite vendor-managed inventory in a centralized supply chain. Subsequently, in the decentralized state, we employ the Stackelberg game with manufacturer leadership to determine the optimal variables for both manufacturers and retailers. Finally, to reach coordination and achieve the maximum benefit of the supply chain, we proposed a revenue-sharing contract so that the retailer compensates a part of the costs incurred by the manufacturer by sharing a proportion of the revenue.
 

A numerical example is presented to show the implementation impact of the revenue-sharing contract on the profit of the chain members. Costs and profit functions are calculated in the Iranian Rial and this system is planned for one year. In this example, it is clear that this contract has been worked successfully and the profit of the supply chain in the coordinated state is equal to the profit under the centralized state. The sensitivity analysis of the model showed that the profit of each member of the chain in a coordinated state is more than their profit in a decentralized state. In addition, advertising investment increases the profits of manufacturers and retailers significantly. As a managerial insight, it is recommended that both levels of the chain place special emphasis on investing in advertising activities.
 

This research was conceived based on a real-world scenario, where a single manufacturer engages with multiple retailers within a market. The findings of this study have broad applicability across various retail industries, including but not limited to fruit and vegetable markets, grocery stores, protein supply chain outlets, health and beauty product suppliers, drugstores, pharmaceutical supply chains, as well as industries such as automotive and petrochemical. The results of this research proved that the vendor-managed inventory strategy increases the interaction between manufacturers and retailers and helps manufacturers access the retailer information to charge products as soon as possible and also avoid excess production.

In the current study, the place of artificial intelligence in foreign policy strategy, the amount of investment and use of artificial intelligence in the field of international relations and future wars of the United States of America were analyzed in the framework of game theory. The type of research is theoretical-applied. The statistical community of professors and experts who are active in the field of artificial intelligence and American studies with specialized doctorate and postdoctoral degrees; They were selected by snowball sampling. In addition to referring to existing books and documents, the tool for data collection was using a closed questionnaire on a Likert scale.The data was analyzed in spss software.The obtained results show that the United States, seeking to improve its economic situation, has considered one of the main goals of artificial intelligence development. On the other hand, the improvement of scientific and research capacities as well as the improvement and development of technical and data infrastructures have also been considered.Overall, all US strategies in artificial intelligence have seven themes:Financing of research and development, regulation and regulation and development of standards, culture building, training, consulting services, networking, support for cooperation and ecosystem and stimulation of market demand.

Designing a multi-level supply chain network with efficient product flow management is an important issue in supply chain management. Determining the price of products, which can be affected by different factors such as environmental uncertainty, will have a significant impact on the strategic decision of designing the supply chain network. In recent research on dynamic pricing, the majority focused on two-level supply chains, exploring the impact of advertising on the supply chain. In this study, the levels of the supply chain are upgraded to three levels, and the advertising and inventory variables as well as the pricing issue in the supply chain are investigated. Hence, the overarching objective is to scrutinize the coordination of a supply chain involving three variables: advertising, warehouse inventory, and a comparison between static and dynamic pricing. Given the accelerated expansion of e-commerce, dynamic pricing emerges as a potent strategy for profit augmentation within the supply chain, an aspect that has received comparatively less attention. The supply chain in this research includes three levels: producer, supplier, and retailer. In addition, many sources, including Chen et al, 2018, have indicated that dynamic pricing is being used in many innovative businesses, that 60% of market development managers around the world are familiar with dynamic pricing methods, and that 35% of CEOs and business managers plan to base all their pricing models on dynamic pricing methods in the next three years. This research initially aims to provide a stable model for dynamic pricing and compare it with static pricing in multi-level supply chains using a game theory approach. Secondly, it examines the theoretical foundations, thirdly, the research methodology is presented, and fourthly, the discussion and conclusions are discussed.

The present research falls under the category of applied research. It considers discount-oriented models to examine the planning horizon, the use of dynamic pricing in some actors at one level of the chain from the concept of dynamic pricing, and the use of static pricing by others at the same level and considering the demand in a non-deterministic (stable) manner. Finally, the use of Stackelberg’s game is presented to examine the core of the game and the Nash equilibrium point. The robust optimization model is presented by Malloy et al. Initially, the model introduces symbols: x as the vector of design variables, and y as the vector of control variables. Parameters A, B, and C are coefficient parameters, while b and e are parameter vectors. Values for A and B are predetermined, and B, C, and e involve uncertainty. A particular understanding of the parameter is called scenario uncertainty, which is assigned the symbol s, and its probability is specified by ps. K retailers operate in the supply chain, and each retailer supplies the desired product from only one manufacturer. In general, the outcome for each retailer is the disparity between their income and expenses. In such a situation, the retailer faces ordering, holding, and marketing costs for each product. The profit margin of each retailer is the difference between the price paid to the manufacturer for the bulk purchase and the selling price to the customer. It is worth noting that considering that the final product of each manufacturer is sent to only one retailer, the number of manufacturers and retailers is equal. For data analysis, a genetic algorithm, particle accumulation optimization, and MATLAB software were employed. Initially, the model underwent analysis in static mode, followed by dynamic mode analysis using Games software. Ultimately, the outcomes of the two pricing methods were compared.

This article introduces the development of a stochastic demand function utilizing genetic algorithms and particle optimization. It presents two distinct single-period models designed for a competitive environment. In the first model, retailers have only an intermediary role and do not decide on pricing or optimal order quantity. In the mentioned model, it is assumed that retailers transfer the demand exactly and to the same extent as it is from the customers to the suppliers. Based on the amount of their production, suppliers face shortages and excess supply. The purpose of this model is to determine the optimal and desirable amount of production as well as the price for each supplier. In addition, routing costs are approximated. The results indicate that the presented approximation is very accurate and evaluates the equilibrium point in much less time than the original model. In the second model, retailers are assumed to incur shortage or maintenance costs according to the number of orders they send. Here, the suppliers determine the final price, and the goal of the retailers is to determine the optimal amount of the order. In this model, it is assumed that suppliers’ production is customized, and inventory costs are considered only for retailers. A noteworthy aspect of this model is the emphasis on dynamic pricing—an inherently crucial and intricate element within the domain of supply chain dynamics theory

The results underscore the substantial efficacy of the proposed combination in addressing the multi-level supply chain network design model with both dynamic and static pricing. The sensitivity analysis of the manufacturer’s profit showed that the changes indicating an increase in the market base of a manufacturer will lead to an increase in profit for both manufacturers. The graph of the change in the producer’s profit compared to the change in the costs showed that a decrease in the production cost leads to an increase in the profit for the producer, while the profit of the next producer decreases in these conditions. Like the producer’s profit, the distributor’s profit also increases with the market base. Expanding the market base not only leads to an increase in the distributor's profit through collaboration with producers but also occurs through two distinct mechanisms. Firstly, there's a profit increase due to raising retailer prices. Although wholesale prices increase with the expanded market base and heightened demand, the distributor, to maintain balance, can elevate retail prices at a higher ratio. Consequently, the value of the pi-wi term increases. Secondly, there's a profit increase resulting from boosting sales volume. The distributor's profit is positively influenced by the increase in sales volume, thereby reinforcing the overall financial outcome.