جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « game theory » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In the bargaining process, most people follow their usual procedures when faced with issues and disputes and seek to find a solution that satisfies the interests of the parties. But in this process, problems such as lack of effective interaction, instability of decisions, lack of clarity in the understanding of parties and specialties are often seen. Bargaining and negotiation in the supply chain are essential components of decision-making processes that have wide-ranging implications for various individuals engaged in the global business landscape. With increasing emphasis on achieving fair outcomes and efficient allocation of resources, the application of game theory, especially the Nash negotiation solution, has attracted more attention in the field of supply chain negotiations. As global markets become more complex and intertwined, understanding the dynamics of supply chain negotiations is essential for organizations to optimize their operations. In dealing with complex issues and a large number of people and different aspects, Nash negotiations allow the parties to reach agreements that satisfy all parties in the shortest possible time. The Nash negotiation solution developed by Nash (1950) provides a powerful framework for analyzing negotiations and incorporates the concept of "fair sharing" between the parties involved. This tool has proven to be valuable for modeling and understanding negotiation processes in supply chains. By considering individual preferences, relative negotiation power and feasible agreements, Nash's negotiation solution tries to establish optimal and fair results. Understanding the application and implications of the Nash negotiation solution in supply chain negotiations can provide valuable insights in reaching mutually beneficial agreements and enhancing cooperation between supply chain partners. However, in the field of negotiations and bargaining, there have not been enough studies and researches regarding the use of the "Nash" negotiation solution; Therefore, the main purpose of this research is to use the solution of "Nash" negotiations to improve the bargaining process, so that by examining the effects of "Nash" negotiations on the quality of decision-making, the psychology of people and the agreements reached, a pattern of improvement and improvement in the bargaining process in the supply chain can be obtained.
From the perspective of the research strategy, this research is a qualitative method, and from the perspective of the paradigm, it is classified as an interpretive paradigm. In this method, the researcher uses the method of qualitative data analysis, which is specifically used in this research, to make patterns. The meta-synthesis research method is one of the types of meta-study methods and is considered a qualitative research method. In fact, meta-synthesis is a type of qualitative study that uses the information of findings extracted from other studies in the field of a related topic. In the meta-synthesis method, the researcher combines the secondary data of the results of other studies to respond to the results of his study and obtains new results. The current research includes two primary stages: initial planning and implementation of a systematic review, followed by reporting and publication of findings, and finally a model that shows the improvements that can be made in the supply chain bargaining process by adopting Nash's approaches with the meta-synthesis is presented. In order to achieve the goal of the research, the seven-step method of Sandelowski and Barroso was used. Sandelowski and Barroso's method is a structured model for qualitative text analysis and extracting concepts. This method uses a seven-step model for document analysis. The main method of data collection is also library studies.
 In order to evaluate the reliability of the interview, the within-subject agreement method was used with a two-pass code, in which a researcher colleague (coder) who was a PhD student registered. Collaboratively, the researcher and research associate coded the four articles and subsequently calculated the percentage of within-theme agreement, indicating the agreement between the two transfer codes. To facilitate the coding process and save time, a checklist containing two values (yes/no) was used to cover the entire task or all necessary items. When the opinions were obtained through the formula presented below, the kappa coefficient of agreement was calculated, a numerical value between 1 and +1. A rate close to 1 indicates high reliability, while a rate close to -1 indicates disagreement and a rate close to zero indicates no reliability. A kappa coefficient between 0.6 and 0.8 indicates good reliability. In the context of the current research, a part of the article was presented to two professors and based on their evaluation and comments, the kappa coefficient (K) was calculated using the P0-PE formula divided by P0-1, and its value was 0.84. The results showed that there was a total of 6 dimensions, 18 components and 90 indicators that showed changes in terms of repetition and frequency.
The findings of this study showed that Nash negotiations are effectively able to form agreements that support a fair balance between the negotiating parties. This equality resulting from Nash solutions, in addition to strengthening long-term cooperation, also plays a role in reducing potential negotiation tensions. Structuring the negotiation based on the theoretical framework of Nash negotiations paves the way for the development of more favorable and insightful relations between the parties. Psychologically, Nash techniques can help reduce negative emotions and increase mutual trust. Negotiators who feel their interests are properly understood and established are more willing to cooperate and enter into long-term contracts. This issue not only affects the individual relationships between experts, but also has an effect on the entire structure and performance of the supply chain. Nash solutions also improve the quality of decisions. By focusing on sustainable and win-win outcomes, parties are more motivated to explore innovative and progressive solutions. Innovative perspectives can lead to improved processes, reduced costs, and increased efficiency and effectiveness. At the theoretical level, the application of Nash solutions in this study has benefited from the realistic simulated dynamics that we have achieved a more accurate understanding of the complex dynamics of supply chains. Understanding these complexities has enabled researchers and managers to implement more insightful strategies to guide negotiations and find efficient and successful agreements

Today, the world is involved in complex issues and many dangers. The existence of increasing competition, diverse and conflicting cultures, power struggles and economic inequalities indicates that different actors have different goals and objectives. In fact, one of the main reasons for the growth and increasing activity of different terrorist groups can be seen as the lack of global coherence and convergence in counter-terrorism policies. This article seeks to explore the fundamental question of what is the rationale for global convergence in the fight against terrorism? This article believes that there is a strategic logic for convergence and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, which can be seen from the approach of theories such as ancient Chinese wisdom, game theory and also in the theory of moving target and pursuing global counter-terrorism goals. Emphasizing the various strategic advantages of global convergence in the fight against terrorism, this paper seeks to conclude that countries need to reach a point of strategic understanding where mutual cooperation is a priority for mutual benefit. In other words, if there is no global convergence and cooperation to deal with terrorism, terrorism in the world will find an opportunity to attack more and create more dangers. Finally, the main solutions through which international security algorithms can improve the efficiency of advanced algorithms will be proposed.

ethical and cultural factors in the auditing field; due to the property of being invisible; They are not easily observable, and for this reason, asymmetric information appears and the company and the capital market move out of their optimal balance, which means market failure. Based on this, moral and cultural factors affect the interests of auditors and company stakeholders. The purpose of this research is to investigate the role of cultural factors and professional ethics of auditors on the interests of companies in the form of dynamic game theory.

The current research is of developmental type. In the present research, the game theory approach has been used. The first actors were the managers and board members of the top 50 capital market companies. The second community is the trusted members of the trusted auditing institutions of the Stock Exchange Organization. A questionnaire was used to collect information.

In this research, three neural network approaches of support vectors, Bayesian and Crossberg anti-propagation were used to repeat the game and create Nash equilibrium. Based on the results of Crossberg's anti-diffusion method, it has higher accuracy in modeling the behavior between players.

The results showed the fact that the increase of cultural and ethical indicators have a negative effect on the price and a positive effect on the company's sales. As a result, the improvement of cultural and ethical indicators increases the interests of all stakeholders and actors active in the capital market.

Contribution:

Deviation from cultural and ethical indicators by auditors increases inefficiency in the company and reduces the level of interests of the beneficiaries.

One of the key challenges that can affect the country's economy is the banking crisis. This issue has a direct impact on the financial and credit stability of banks, as well as public trust in the banking system. Using game theory and the graph model, the present research deals with the detailed analysis of the interactions between the different actors in the Iranian banking system and helps to outline their interactions and mutual effects in the banking crisis issue. The results of the research emphasize the importance of understanding the mutual interactions of stakeholders in the management of the banking crisis and provide solutions to reduce risk and improve the efficiency of the banking system. Using the graph model, financial rescue measures of the government and the central bank, the change of taxpayers' attitudes, the adaptation of investors' strategies, and the desire of customers for alternative options have been investigated. Also, the importance of adapting the strategies of financial institutions and policymakers to the changing conditions for the effective management of the banking crisis has been emphasized. In fact, the current and future situation of the actors of the banking crisis has been examined. The findings indicate that in order to reach an ideal and desirable situation that is in harmony with the long-term goals of the society, there is a need to adjust the preferences of actors and the active intervention of policy makers to realize the desired situation.

abstract (for journal site)Today, it has been established that if countries can employ proper policies in line with the benefits of international trade, they can then prevent related crises in the field of trade, such as payment balance crises. This article models the behavior of monopolists and countries based on possible strategies for each player by presenting a static game between the players. Initially, a scenario is considered in which two countries are indifferent to each other. Then, in the second scenario, two countries are considered to be rivals (enemies), and in the third scenario, three countries are assumed, with one being a rival and the other being indifferent. The results show that in all three scenarios, the dominant strategy for the monopolist is to supply products domestically. However, for the government in the first scenario, the dominant strategy is a zero import tariff (consumer support). In the second scenario, where there is also a rival country, there is no dominant strategy for the government, and equilibrium occurs where the government imposes high tariffs (supporting the monopolist). In the third scenario, the dominant strategy for the government is to impose high import tariffs (supporting the monopolist). In summary, if imports occur from non-rival countries, the government supports consumers, and in the case of imports from other countries, the government supports the monopolist. In short, if the imports are from non-competing countries, the government supports the consumers, and in case of imports from other countries, the government supports the monopolist.

Uncertainty in the supply chain is considered as a fundamental and important issue in order to make appropriate decisions for supply chain managers and designers. In this article, in order to deal with this issue, a three-level supply chain under random demand is proposed using two decentralized and coordinated models, in which the profit increase of each actor in the chain (supplier-manufacturer-retailer) considered. In the decentralized model under the scenario-based stochastic demand, the retailer and the manufacturer separately decide on the order quantity and investment by considering the scenario-based stochastic CSR-sensitive demand. A wholesale price contract with two adjustable levels is proposed to persuade three levels to enter into a coordination scheme. According to the comparisons made between the results of the algorithms, it was found that the coordinated model performed better than the other algorithm in reducing chain costs and increasing profits. In particular, it can be acknowledged that the coordinated model performed better than the decentralized model by about 144.39% and was able to increase the profit of the chain.

This article aims to describe and explain the strategic behavior of managers and shareholders in the interactive conflict environment of joint-stock firms using the tools of game theory, specifically through signaling games. Managers, considering the quality of internal controls, engage in both deceptive and informative earnings management strategies. Shareholders then respond with strategies involving high or low capital costs and opt for either high or low-quality audit services. The findings of the research outline the theoretical conditions necessary for establishing balance in strategies such as deceptive earnings management with high capital costs and deceptive earnings management with high-quality audit services in environments characterized by weak internal controls. Additionally, it highlights the conditions required to establish equilibrium in strategies like informative earnings management with low capital costs and informative earnings management with low-quality audit services within environments boasting strong internal controls.

In the current study, the place of artificial intelligence in foreign policy strategy, the amount of investment and use of artificial intelligence in the field of international relations and future wars of the United States of America were analyzed in the framework of game theory. The type of research is theoretical-applied. The statistical community of professors and experts who are active in the field of artificial intelligence and American studies with specialized doctorate and postdoctoral degrees; They were selected by snowball sampling. In addition to referring to existing books and documents, the tool for data collection was using a closed questionnaire on a Likert scale.The data was analyzed in spss software.The obtained results show that the United States, seeking to improve its economic situation, has considered one of the main goals of artificial intelligence development. On the other hand, the improvement of scientific and research capacities as well as the improvement and development of technical and data infrastructures have also been considered.Overall, all US strategies in artificial intelligence have seven themes:Financing of research and development, regulation and regulation and development of standards, culture building, training, consulting services, networking, support for cooperation and ecosystem and stimulation of market demand.

Implementing the "Vendor-Managed Inventory" strategy and sharing inventory information among retailers and manufacturers play crucial roles in reducing holding costs, shortage costs, transportation costs, and excess inventory costs. This leads to enhanced coordination in the decision-making processes of supply chain members. Therefore, this research delves into the investigation of the supply chain coordination mechanism by combining the vendor-managed inventory strategy and revenue-sharing contracts. Additionally, in the developed model, the demand function incorporates a multiplicative factor of elements influencing the profit function, such as retail price, retailer, and manufacturer advertising investments.
 

In this article, we study the coordination in a two-level supply chain including one manufacturer and multiple retailers under a revenue-sharing contract, where the pricing and advertising investment strategy of each member of the supply chain is implemented despite vendor-managed inventory in a centralized supply chain. Subsequently, in the decentralized state, we employ the Stackelberg game with manufacturer leadership to determine the optimal variables for both manufacturers and retailers. Finally, to reach coordination and achieve the maximum benefit of the supply chain, we proposed a revenue-sharing contract so that the retailer compensates a part of the costs incurred by the manufacturer by sharing a proportion of the revenue.
 

A numerical example is presented to show the implementation impact of the revenue-sharing contract on the profit of the chain members. Costs and profit functions are calculated in the Iranian Rial and this system is planned for one year. In this example, it is clear that this contract has been worked successfully and the profit of the supply chain in the coordinated state is equal to the profit under the centralized state. The sensitivity analysis of the model showed that the profit of each member of the chain in a coordinated state is more than their profit in a decentralized state. In addition, advertising investment increases the profits of manufacturers and retailers significantly. As a managerial insight, it is recommended that both levels of the chain place special emphasis on investing in advertising activities.
 

This research was conceived based on a real-world scenario, where a single manufacturer engages with multiple retailers within a market. The findings of this study have broad applicability across various retail industries, including but not limited to fruit and vegetable markets, grocery stores, protein supply chain outlets, health and beauty product suppliers, drugstores, pharmaceutical supply chains, as well as industries such as automotive and petrochemical. The results of this research proved that the vendor-managed inventory strategy increases the interaction between manufacturers and retailers and helps manufacturers access the retailer information to charge products as soon as possible and also avoid excess production.

Designing a multi-level supply chain network with efficient product flow management is an important issue in supply chain management. Determining the price of products, which can be affected by different factors such as environmental uncertainty, will have a significant impact on the strategic decision of designing the supply chain network. In recent research on dynamic pricing, the majority focused on two-level supply chains, exploring the impact of advertising on the supply chain. In this study, the levels of the supply chain are upgraded to three levels, and the advertising and inventory variables as well as the pricing issue in the supply chain are investigated. Hence, the overarching objective is to scrutinize the coordination of a supply chain involving three variables: advertising, warehouse inventory, and a comparison between static and dynamic pricing. Given the accelerated expansion of e-commerce, dynamic pricing emerges as a potent strategy for profit augmentation within the supply chain, an aspect that has received comparatively less attention. The supply chain in this research includes three levels: producer, supplier, and retailer. In addition, many sources, including Chen et al, 2018, have indicated that dynamic pricing is being used in many innovative businesses, that 60% of market development managers around the world are familiar with dynamic pricing methods, and that 35% of CEOs and business managers plan to base all their pricing models on dynamic pricing methods in the next three years. This research initially aims to provide a stable model for dynamic pricing and compare it with static pricing in multi-level supply chains using a game theory approach. Secondly, it examines the theoretical foundations, thirdly, the research methodology is presented, and fourthly, the discussion and conclusions are discussed.

The present research falls under the category of applied research. It considers discount-oriented models to examine the planning horizon, the use of dynamic pricing in some actors at one level of the chain from the concept of dynamic pricing, and the use of static pricing by others at the same level and considering the demand in a non-deterministic (stable) manner. Finally, the use of Stackelberg’s game is presented to examine the core of the game and the Nash equilibrium point. The robust optimization model is presented by Malloy et al. Initially, the model introduces symbols: x as the vector of design variables, and y as the vector of control variables. Parameters A, B, and C are coefficient parameters, while b and e are parameter vectors. Values for A and B are predetermined, and B, C, and e involve uncertainty. A particular understanding of the parameter is called scenario uncertainty, which is assigned the symbol s, and its probability is specified by ps. K retailers operate in the supply chain, and each retailer supplies the desired product from only one manufacturer. In general, the outcome for each retailer is the disparity between their income and expenses. In such a situation, the retailer faces ordering, holding, and marketing costs for each product. The profit margin of each retailer is the difference between the price paid to the manufacturer for the bulk purchase and the selling price to the customer. It is worth noting that considering that the final product of each manufacturer is sent to only one retailer, the number of manufacturers and retailers is equal. For data analysis, a genetic algorithm, particle accumulation optimization, and MATLAB software were employed. Initially, the model underwent analysis in static mode, followed by dynamic mode analysis using Games software. Ultimately, the outcomes of the two pricing methods were compared.

This article introduces the development of a stochastic demand function utilizing genetic algorithms and particle optimization. It presents two distinct single-period models designed for a competitive environment. In the first model, retailers have only an intermediary role and do not decide on pricing or optimal order quantity. In the mentioned model, it is assumed that retailers transfer the demand exactly and to the same extent as it is from the customers to the suppliers. Based on the amount of their production, suppliers face shortages and excess supply. The purpose of this model is to determine the optimal and desirable amount of production as well as the price for each supplier. In addition, routing costs are approximated. The results indicate that the presented approximation is very accurate and evaluates the equilibrium point in much less time than the original model. In the second model, retailers are assumed to incur shortage or maintenance costs according to the number of orders they send. Here, the suppliers determine the final price, and the goal of the retailers is to determine the optimal amount of the order. In this model, it is assumed that suppliers’ production is customized, and inventory costs are considered only for retailers. A noteworthy aspect of this model is the emphasis on dynamic pricing—an inherently crucial and intricate element within the domain of supply chain dynamics theory

The results underscore the substantial efficacy of the proposed combination in addressing the multi-level supply chain network design model with both dynamic and static pricing. The sensitivity analysis of the manufacturer’s profit showed that the changes indicating an increase in the market base of a manufacturer will lead to an increase in profit for both manufacturers. The graph of the change in the producer’s profit compared to the change in the costs showed that a decrease in the production cost leads to an increase in the profit for the producer, while the profit of the next producer decreases in these conditions. Like the producer’s profit, the distributor’s profit also increases with the market base. Expanding the market base not only leads to an increase in the distributor's profit through collaboration with producers but also occurs through two distinct mechanisms. Firstly, there's a profit increase due to raising retailer prices. Although wholesale prices increase with the expanded market base and heightened demand, the distributor, to maintain balance, can elevate retail prices at a higher ratio. Consequently, the value of the pi-wi term increases. Secondly, there's a profit increase resulting from boosting sales volume. The distributor's profit is positively influenced by the increase in sales volume, thereby reinforcing the overall financial outcome.

The aim of this research is to design scenarios based on cooperative game theory models to investigate the observed rewards and penalties resulting from knowledge sharing or non-sharing among companies. The research population includes managers and experts from 30 top private companies active in the field of oil and gas projects. The research methodology is based on Kumar's classification, which is applied, interpretive, exploratory, and includes both quantitative and qualitative aspects. This study underscores the importance of efficient knowledge sharing as a means to foster collaboration among investors in the portfolios of the National Iranian Oil Company to compete with foreign competitors during sanctions.Upon reviewing the results of four scenarios derived from the game, it is observed that the rewards perceived by companies from knowledge sharing depend on the behavior resulting from knowledge sharing by other companies. The more capable an organization is in the influential factors of knowledge transfer and higher innovation, the greater the returns companies will obtain through cooperation. Sensitivity analysis regarding the costs of project cooperation, which arises due to the difficulty of implementing joint projects, shows that as costs increase, companies shift from a cooperation strategy towards a retaliation strategy and then towards a non-cooperation strategy. These strategies are determined based on aligning the results of the profit equation designed with three interrelated cooperative games: the prisoner's dilemma, the hawk-dove game, and assurance game.

 Managers and shareholders engage in Financial information quality and conservatism in order to maximize benefits and maintain collaboration. Or for whatever reason (perhaps morally) they refrain from doing so. The purpose of examining this conflict and cooperation between managers and shareholders of listed companies using game theory is to find a balance point in which the manager and the shareholder are satisfied as the main elements of the game in order to maximize their interests. Accordingly, this study seeks to find a strategy to maximize the equilibrium benefits of managers and shareholders by applying strategic features of accounting information and accounting conservatism. The method of data collection is the method of document mining during the period (1391-1391) and the method of data analysis is inferential and the software used to prepare the data and estimate the models is SPSS. The test results of the research hypotheses show that the combination of high conservatism strategies - high reporting quality and low conservatism - low reporting quality - are the equilibrium points (Nash equilibrium) in the game between the manager and the shareholder. The results show that game theory plays an important role in the relationship between managers and stakeholders; and finding the equilibrium points of the game can play an effective role in the decisions of the game parties (managers and shareholders). In this way, it informs the parties of the game of the strategy that has been most desirable and beneficial for them.

In all human behavioral spectrums, Politics is the most difficult behavior that can be automated. Politics is inherently complex, reflecting the complexity of human behavior both as an individual and in the social dimension. This complexity seems much more real at the level of international relations. Artificial intelligence is an influential and pervasive field that scope is not only related to technical and engineering issues, but also includes the fields of humanities, especially international peace and security. Using game theory as part of artificial intelligence in the field of political science and international relations is concentrated in common areas such as equitable distribution, political economy, public choice, war bargaining, positive policy theory, and public choice theory. In each of these areas, researchers have developed game theory models in which player models are often represented in the form of voters, governments, special interest groups, and politicians. Therefore, in this research the role of game theory in international relations will be investigated.

Based on an implicit general agreement, employee satisfaction and commitment are affected by full rewards, so managers' perceptions of the appropriate and effective use of rewards programs are necessary to increase efficiency. But one of the most important problems in this field is the inability to properly separate the types of labor based on their productivity during the distribution of bonuses, which causes that in many cases the labor force with high and low productivity receives the same reward. The current research tries to show that in some cases, even the distribution of inappropriate rewards can go beyond the equality of rewards for all types of labor force, so that the labor force with lower productivity is paid more reward than the labor force with higher productivity. Therefore, in this research, the relationship between managers and workforce was investigated through game theory. For this purpose, managers' strategy was designed in five modes and employees' strategy was designed in three modes. The results showed that at the equilibrium point, the strategy of managers will be to distribute continuous and equal rewards to employees with higher productivity, and employees will also choose the strategy of more effort to increase productivity (and therefore receive rewards). Finally, it is suggested that in order to create more motivation and effort for employees and as a result to increase their productivity, the distribution of bonuses among employees with higher productivity should be continuous and equal.

It can be stated that at least in the three recent development programs in Iran (fourth, fifth, and sixth), there is a consensus among experts regarding the lack of full enforcement- or the expected enforcement- of legal provisions. It appears that one of the most crucial reasons for the nonenforcement of the program rules is ignoring or not paying enough attention to the enforcement requirements in the process of drafting and approving the legal provisions. The excessive increase of laws is based on the questionable and criticizable belief or assumption that the law represents reality and that the law's approval is a prelude to enforcement. While merely approving the law cannot change the relationships and balances of real relationships; Rather, the law must be approved in accordance with reality and be compatible with the capacities and capabilities of the law enforcers. On the other hand, the expected and definite role of the law is merely to give enforceable character to a document that is prepared on the basis of previous deep and detailed reviews and evaluations, not necessarily changing the behavior of the audience or related relationships. In this article, the requirements of law enforcement were discussed first. Then, taking advantage of Kaushik Basu's comments and within the framework of game theory, some points about the role and contribution of law in reforming the economic spheres are proposed. The success of any law requires taking into account considerations that cannot be provided and available in the traditional theory of the rule of law, as well as the theory of law and economics. In this invitation to rethink the role and contribution of the law with the focus on "research enforcement", several instances of the program laws’ provisions are mentioned, emphasizing on the law of the sixth development program. There are serious doubts about the necessity of approving many legal decrees and the effectiveness of using legal tools to achieve development goals in Iran, and in this sense, a fundamental revision should be made in the formulation and approval of the Future Development Plan (Seventh) Law.

Financial imbalances and imbalances between resources and expenditures in Iranian pension funds have made the need for fund reforms inevitable. Today, the share of government aid in public government expenditures to the two Civil Servants and Military pension funds has increased from about 11 percent in 2013 to about 19 percent in 2021, and this trend has been increasing in recent years. However, despite the perception of the crisis by various actors in the pension system, these reforms have not been implemented. In this regard, the present study seeks pathology and finds a solution to solve the crisis of the Iranian pension system during the years 2013-2021. Due to the existence of different actors and stakeholders, one of the non-quantitative methods of game theory models, called the graph model, was used to resolve conflicts. This model is a good tool for modeling and analyzing complex problems, expresses the most likely consequences of various problems in the world, and finally provides guidelines for its improvement. The modeling results of the retirement crisis show that the fourth mode of the model, ie the state of reform, is more likely to occur. Therefore, the current situation is not a stable situation for all players, and they are motivated to leave it. According to the results, limiting government support, changing the pension system, and carrying out structural and parametric reforms will improve the current situation.

After the American withdrawal from the Comprehensive Joint Action Program (BJAM) and the non-fulfillment of the West's commitments, our statesmen adopted a new step-back strategy before the West agreed, in the case the West failed to fulfill its obligations. Against this backdrop, the United States and three European countries have threatened to take action against Iran's policy. The question that arises in public opinion is "What will be the end of this confrontation?" Possible options must be considered to answer this question. Iran's favorable choices, and America's and Europe's, especially the ones most likely to be. Although it is believed that the US and the West are eager to reinstate sanctions and new resolutions, this will not be the case if our country adopts clever measures and will be at a low level of efficiency. What is most sought after by the West and the United States is the diminishing fear of Iran's commitment to domestic and global public opinion, thus forcing Iran to stop in this new direction. In this study, the main question was asked which state is the best option for the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue its presence in BJAM using game theory? Based on the evidence, evidence, and findings of this study, we concluded that the continued presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in BJAM is a dynamic game with complete and complete information. In this research, the game number tree of Iran's options was outlined and examined, and then, the answer and solve the game using the payback method, the result of which came to the option of taking decisive steps for reducing the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Supply chain management is a modern organizational management mode that organizes and plans information, capital flow, and business partnerships in the supply chain and requires complete business and market information (Quinn et al., 2012). However, the cost of acquiring supply chain companies and product information by traditional methods is very high. Information technology provides the power for companies to implement supply chain management and share the supply chain easily, and all companies in the supply chain can create value through information management (Shawaki et al., 2023). The utilization of intelligent approaches to predict prices and demand quantities enhances supplier delivery performance. It also refines demand forecasting accuracy, improves factory planning precision, forecasts demand for new products, and minimizes supplier risks, transportation costs, inventory, operational expenses, and time (Tirklai et al., 2021). In supply chain management, accurate forecasting of demand reflects the price. It is a critical issue that can reduce inventory costs and achieve the desired service level (Zouqaq et al., 2020). Intelligent supply chain pricing approaches can help supply chain companies to adapt the quality of their product offerings in supply chain management according to the knowledge gained (Kotsiopoulos et al., 2021). Identifying and modeling steel market fluctuations is very important in the steel industry and supply chain management. Considering the vertical chain in this industry and the interaction between the players of this industry, game theory has been used to model the optimal price. Neural network models were employed to replicate the game, as interaction and repeated gameplay are required for achieving balance among players. Taking into account Iran's unique circumstances, notably its confrontations with substantial sanctions in the metal industry, the sanctions variable was integrated as an adjusting factor in the pricing model for this sector.

This is a practical study. The research time frame for predicting steel prices and calculating the sanctions index spans from 2011 to 2020, with quarterly data. The MATLAB software was used.

Three Bayesian neural networks, support vectors, and Grassberg's anti-diffusion were used to predict the price of steel. The results showed that the Grossberg anti-diffusion model is more accurate in predicting steel prices. Next, the predicted price entered the game theory process and the Nash equilibrium point of the model was determined. According to the country's specific conditions, the sanctions variable was introduced in the game theory model. The results showed that the inclusion of sanctions in the model led to price increases and production reductions within the steel industry. The present study delved into price fluctuations resulting from shifts in supply and demand, particularly in the context of sanctions. The findings reveal that a reduction in supply coupled with escalated sanctions led to substantial price hikes, surpassing the impact of supply changes. Consequently, steel exhibits a heightened susceptibility to input constraints, where any disruption in its supply chain triggers significant price spikes, thus unsettling the market. This amplifies the sensitivity of supply chain management for steel. Consequently, a systemic and dynamic approach is essential for market regulation policies, raw material supply, transportation strategies, and warehousing considerations. It should be noted that the use of intelligent approaches and machine learning can play a significant role in coordinating such issues.

Considering that Stackelberg's approach was used in the current research, the sequence of players' entry into the game holds significance with respect to the Nash equilibrium. The development of market entry monitoring rules and regulations in this industry should be investigated because the steel industry is one of the industries that face high entry and exit costs. As a result, Policymakers and industry managers should monitor the entry and exit of players within this sector. They should endeavor to establish norms and regulations governing interactions among market participants to foster a structured and well-defined competitive environment.