جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « هاشمی رفسنجانی » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

This article examines the policy, performance, and social base of the Construction Agents Party of Iran and seeks to answer the question, what is the social base, performance, and policy of the Construction Agents Party of Iran? As a hypothesis, it should be said that the Party of Construction Agents is a government-made party, arising from the thinking and discourse of the construction government, and its social base is among the technocrats who believe in technocracy and in their policy and practice on the free market and minimal government. And they emphasize the priority of economic development over political development. On the other hand, this party benefited from the comprehensive support of Hashemi Rafsanjani's government; As a result of its modernization and infrastructural and development changes, especially in urban areas, it was able to open its place among the modern urban middle class and attract the support of this class. Economic development is the most central concept in the performance and policy of this party. This article has used the descriptive-analytical method and has collected its data through documentary and library methods.

The constant tendency to focus on the people in the political arena can be seen among various groups in contemporary Iran, including the revolutionary leaders and groups focused on mobilizing the masses to confront the previous regime during the revolutionary movement, the rival revolutionary forces during the power struggle of the early years of the Islamic Revolution, and the leaders of the established government arising from the Islamic Revolution with the purpose of advancing their own domestic and foreign objectives and policies in the post-Revolutionary period. The main components of populism include the belief among political forces and leaders in the authenticity and righteousness of the unorganized masses and their direct mobilization in the field of politics as well as the appeal or pretension to redistribute resources among the masses. Thus, the question arises as to whether these components are only specific to some forces and leaders in the post-Revolutionary Iran, or more or less visible among all leaders and forces, regardless of the obvious differences in their political and ideological tendencies.
According to Dorraj (1990), Islamic populism is characterized by its religious character and  authoritarian, messianic, millenarian, and monistic nature coupled with revolutionary zest. Abrahamian (1993) refers to the non-religious and authoritarian populist nature of the state in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Kianpour (2006) views Ahmadinejad’s populism as a result of political representation suffering from the representativeness, or more precisely, a result of the problematic of impossibility and costliness of representing different political identities. Using Dornbusch and Edwards’ model, Farzanegan (2009) examines Ahmadinejad’s populism and finds it to be in accordance with the model. Having analyzed Keyhan and Etemad-e Melli newspapers, Zibakalam et al. (2013) conclude that Keyhan, more readily than Etemad-e Melli, pays attention to the categories supporting the populist discourse. For Farati (2013), populism originates from liberalism. Abdi (2014) considers populism to be a response to the short-term demands of people and a result of the contextual conditions and the increase in oil prices in Iran. Sarzaim (2016) views Ahmadinejad’s populism as the main reason for the lack of development during his presidency. Darvishpour (2022) considers the theory of contradictions of the populist revolution—which is based on critical theory, text analysis, discourse analysis, and post-structuralism—a useful theory in the evaluation of the Islamic Revolution.

The Purpose of Research:

Attempting to investigate populism and politics in Iran during the post-Revolutionary years of 1989–2017, this research tries to show the common and distinctive features the political discourses, produced by various forces and in different periods, as manifested in the presidential speeches.

The technique of documentation and the qualitative content analysis were used for data collection and data analysis, respectively. For the purpose of content analysis, several stages were followed: determining the content, determining the categories, determining the unit of analysis, coding, and conducting an analysis. The study considered the paragraph as the unit of analysis. The statistical population of the research consisted of all the speeches addressed by the presidents during their presidency. The sample population was also determined on the basis of systematic classification.

Concerning the political dimension of populism, 18, 16, 36, and 26 codes were identified in the speeches addressed by Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinjad, and Rouhani, respectively.  The most frequent code in Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s speech was related to militancy while participation of the marginalized masses, insufficiency of the political systems based solely on representativeness, consideration of himself as the real representative of people, simplicity and avoidance of political complications, and denial of the institutional mechanism were observed as having the equal weight in coding. Anti-elitism is the only component absent from Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s speeches. Concerning Khatami’s speeches, the political dimension of populism was mostly represented in the following components: participation of the marginalized masses, insufficiency of the political systems based solely on representativeness, simplicity and avoidance of political complications, consideration of himself as the real representative of people, and militancy. Anti-elitism and denial of the institutional mechanism were not observed in Khatami’s speeches. Militancy and simplicity and avoidance of political complications were, respectively, found to be the most and least frequent components in Khatami’s political populism. The political dimension of populism in Ahmadinejad’s speeches encompassed all the components, with militancy being the most frequent followed by simplicity and avoidance of political complications, denial of the institutional mechanism, and consideration of himself as the real representative of people. Rouhani also represented all these components, except anti-elitism. In the dimension of cultural populism, all the presidents used the component of admiration for national and religious values and heritage. All the components of the economic dimension were most frequently used by Ahmadinejad, except the component of distrust towards capitalist institutions and procedures. After Ahmadinejad, Rouhani frequently represented the economic dimension, but neither distrust towards capitalist institutions and procedures nor emphasis on income redistribution were found in Rouhani speeches. Among the five components of the economic dimension, Khatami and Hashemi-Rafsanjani only referred to the component of  fault-finding in the economic status quo. Concerning the social dimension of populism, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani used all the relevant components, yet Khatami was found to have put no emphasis on the integration of society but on social pluralism.

Owing to the nature of the Islamic Revolution that involved the masses in the political and social arenas, the politicians who came later to the scene had no choice but to tend towards the masses— though with varying degrees of intensity. The political society in Iran has experienced a kind of misunderstanding about populism for several years. This research worked well to show the inaccuracy of the dominant narrative in Iran, proving that populism is a spatiotemporal entity that differs from one society to another. Political leaders in Iran consider people wise and virtuous, and express it by various articulations. Yet the otherness figures differently among the presidents, depending on the circumstances of the time. Framing his articulations within the framework of Islam, Hashemi-Rafsanjani considered the right of the masses from the economic perspective by referring to the component of not encroaching on their rights. The otherness is depicted to be the hypocrites, the Pahlavi regime, and the administration of Mir Hossein Mousavi inside Iran, and the evil non-Islamic states outside the country. People were important to Hashemi-Rafsanjani in an unorganized way, and he considered the participation of the masses as a symbol of real democracy, thus showing little faith in institutions

Although citizenship was born in the ancient world, both in the West and in the East, what is meant today by social scientists and urban planners and thinkers is its new role, function, rights and duties in the modern world. . Citizenship has a dual social and political nature. Social nature refers to how citizens should interact with each other. The Impact of Globalization on the Evolution of the Concept of Citizenship in Hashemite to Ahmadinejad Governments is the subject of this study. What was concluded as a result of this study: The collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced these needs because the globalization of the "new order" promised the defeat of the "communist" camp, the uniqueness of the international "capitalist" order. Khatami's government, the discourse of expediency Hashemiism reached its peak and established the best international relations of the governments of the Islamic Republic, but with the approach of Ahmadinejad's government, the return to anti-Western idealism in foreign policy and the acceptance of the necessities of globalization was on the agenda. In the ninth and tenth governments, we are witnessing the disintegration of the distinctions and distinctions emphasized by political modernity. This point shows that the system of the Islamic Republic, due to its intellectual foundations, can not move towards the establishment of modern civil rights.

After World War II, due to the devastation caused by the war, the maximum government took control of the affairs of the people with all the economic affairs of the countries in hand. But from the early 1980s onwards, which coincided with the early years of the Iranian revolution, the economic administration of countries reduced governments to a minimal organization. And after that, with the awakening of the nations of the Third World, and the demand for their human rights, the powers will inevitably move towards good governance. In this article, using the author-centered hermeneutic method, we examine whether Hashemi , as the first executive person of the country during the his presidency and then the chairmanship of leadership and expediency experts, is in line with these policies and accepts the theory of good governance, we see that good governance from Hashemi's point of view is based on the Islamic-Shiite tradition, especially the political life of the Prophet and the Imams, and the use of human experience and achievements in governance, especially through the institutionalization of the party system.

The state and the bazaar have experienced variable relations as the two political and economic institutions in contemporary Iran, especially during the Islamic Republic. In the first decade , the state tried to decrease the bazaarc's influence and power in the political and economic spheres in the framework of centralized economic system. But with the arrival of the second decade and the beginning of the presidential term, Hashemi Rafsanjani, these relations have changed greatly. This change was influenced by the Taking the economic adjjustment policies by Rafsanjani in his first government, which provided the grounds for the empowerment and domination of the traditional right wing and the market in the major institutions and institutions of power and authority of the country. But gradually, since 1993, it created the grounds for a dispute between his state and the faction of the bazaar and led to confrontation between them. This article's main question is that how the economic policies influence the interaction between government and bazaar in the Hashemi Rafsanjani's first and second state. The authors' hypothesis is that although in the Hashemi' state first, with the implementation of liberalism policies, commercial and traditional capitalism in the context of the government was able to secure its own interests. But the new economic policies of the second state, the formation of the industrial capitalist class, the entry of foreign investment into the country, inflation, the change in the distribution system, and the creation of chain stores caused a dramatic change in the relations between the state and the bazaar.

From the 1820s onwards, parties emerged as a way to achieve democracy and played a role in governing countries. In Iran, following the constitution, parties began to operate. But to the circumstances, their role in governance was different. In this article, with the author-centered hermeneutic method as a step in the evolution of research on the position of parties in Iran, we study the attitude and role of Hashemi Rafsanjani as one of the active elements in the struggles before the revolution and from the foundations of the government after the revolution as a central question. After examination, we see that he believes in organizational and civic work as well as the party, and is one of the founders of the Society of Fighting Clergy and the Islamic Republic Party and the Construction Agents Party. He considered the possibility of partisanship to be subject to the political conditions and understanding of the society and encouraged the new party system in Iran.

A comparative study of the developmentlism in Sazandegi ‘s state and compare it with the developmental process of South KoreaAbstractSouth Korea and Iran, the countries that in order to achieve economical development, enterprise to developmental policy –makin., Despite the adoption of developmental policies in two countries, in practice each reached different conclusions . Less than four years after the start of economic development, Korea become one of the top economies of the world; While Iran couldn ‘t reach to the determinate goals . This study seeks to answer the question that the reasons for the success of Korea in the aftermath of the Second World War and the frustration of Sazandegi ‘s state in achieve the development what is? To response to this question, our hypothesis is that to exist a Developmental state in South Korea , and the lack of such State in the age of the Sazandegi in Iran is the main factor in the success of Korea and frustration of Iran .The method used in this study , descriptive and analytical with the use of library resources , the formal statics and documents have been made .

This study aims to investigate the origins of Iran's foreign policy approach from idealism to pragmatism relying on comparing the first and the second decades of the Islamic Revolution by using discourse analysis. Due to the nature of the Islamic revolution and taking over of the sovereignty by the Islamists, expressing idealistic slogans and the dominance of idealism in the field of internal and external discourse in the early years of the revolution seemed commonplace. But the war and the destruction of the Iranian economy, international situation and the isolation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the global arena and also the circulation of political elites in 1368 and the rise of pragmatic economy –driven of Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's foreign policy shifted from the approach of idealism in the first decade of the Islamic Revolution to pragmatism in the second decade.

Seeking development has always been one of the top priorities of developing countries. For this reason, various governments have tried to follow relevant policies as one of the politico- economic priorities. In Iran, given that after eight years of Holy Defense, many industrial, economic and agricultural infrastructure were destroyed, the pursuit of development-oriented policy became one of the main slogans of the government of the time to an extent that the government of Hashemi Rafsanjani called itself the Sazandegi (constructive) Government. Considering that achieving development requires cooperation in both domestic and foreign policies, the aim of the present paper is to show the requirements of foreign policy in order to realize the development-oriented policy in Sazandegi Government. In particular, the paper seeks to answer this question: What changes took place in Iran’s foreign policy for adapting itself based on the development-oriented policy? The main hypothesis refers to a changing of foreign policy priorities of Iran and its compliance with internal and international contexts. Thus, Iran, in addition to changing the tone of its speech in the region, attempted to demonstrate new figures to attract foreign investors.
Design/Methodology/Approach: This paper is formed and based on the theory of economic liberalism with the descriptive-analytic method. The research data is collected from hard and electronic sources such as papers, books, journals etc.
Findings: The research findings show that in the state level, Iran, for détente in its foreign relations, improved its relations with the EU, China, Russia and neighboring Arab countries. In regional and international levels, Iran followed the policy of strengthening and revitalization of eco-organization, de-politicization of OPEC, use of the capacity of the Organization of Islamic Conference, and more interaction with the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. To achieve this purpose, Iran reduced its ideological propaganda and changed its tones on export of revolutionary ideals in Middle East. At this time, creating an Islamic Japan was considered the gateway of exporting of the Islamic revolution and the government attempted spend all its energy to improve the economy. On this path, the government even embarked upon reforms in the foreign ministry. Although adjustment instances of Iran’sgovernment in some areas of foreign policy could help to achieve a development-oriented policy, such changes were insufficient and the enforcement of new sanctions against Iran challenged its policy of détente and attraction of foreign investment. In the economic aspect, Iran merged adopted global economy and moved away from the Islamic economic model. The implication of this policy was the growth of liquidity level and the spread of poverty and injustice in the society.
Originality/Value: Trying to introduce the measures of Iran’s government in foreign policy for adapting itself with the development-oriented policy is the first criterion that distinguishes the present paper from other research. Also, the article has concentrated on economic indexes of development-oriented policy, and, in this way, distinguishes itself from other research efforts. Besides these two issues, the paper does not have a black and white viewpoint to successes and failures of the government of Hashemi Rafsanjani and tries to explain the effect of world economy on some politico-economic decisions of the government.

The reconstruction peroid is one of the important periods in the history of the Islamic Republlic of Iran. In this period, the framers of Iran’s foreing policy by adopting a pragmatice approach while adhering to revolutionary idealism had a constructive interaction with outside world. The adoption of this policy was for this reason that the public opinion which was under the influence of post-war conditions were not prepared to accept changes like the restoration of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, there was a need to prepare the public opinion to accept these changes. Taking into consideration the above circumstances, what were the foreign policy changes during the reconstructin period and how Hashemi Rafsanjani as the then president made use of Friday prayers sermons to prepare the public opinion to accept these changes. The present article by a descriptive analytical method wants to examine the above issue. The finding of the study shows that the foreign policy of Iran underwent a fundamental change and Hashemi Rafsanjani made use of the Friday prayer tribune to prepare the public opinion for the above changes.

Islamic revolution of Iran in 1357 united many groups,social castes and associations with different beliefs which all were oppossed to the Shah’s regime. Islamic revolution of Iran like other revolutions did not preserve this coalition and after wining the revolution, this coalition did not continue. According to the teories of Kerin Berinton, after a revolution’s victory, moderates come to work. But after while, they are accused of patoromizing the old regime and wing the revolutionary methods by the radicals. Consequently, the radicals win over moderates and take full control of the new system. Islamic revolution of Iran is not the exception. The events that occured between Bahman 22, 1357 until Tir 1360, have been the exact reflection of revolutionary struggle in the process of Islamic revolution of Iran. According to this theoretical frame, this study would focus on Banisadr as the last of moderates and Islamic Republic association as Islamicist revolutionaries in favor of drastic and faot changes, and these two interaction.Subsequently this struggle would end is the victory of radicals over Banisadr and the total elimination of them from the power discourse.