جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "دیالکتیک" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Man and his type of encounter with existence have a very high importance and place in Shariati's thought. Basically Shariati's ontology and anthropology are in strong connection with each other. Therefore, we can ask what view Shariati's ontology presents about man and his relationship with "other"? The result is reaching the duality of monotheism and contradiction, as the most important unsolvable problem in Shariati's ontology. This issue cause’s dialectics to prevail over Shariati's thought. The centrality of the dialectical movement in Shariati's ontology forces him to equate man with rebellion and encounter with popular religion and the modern world, and this subject of "being in the world" puts man under the shadow of the passion for liberation and destroys the possibility of the desirable encounter with “other”. Shariati sometimes provides discontinuous possibilities that indicate the human subjectivity and a favorable attitude towards "the other", But in the whole of his thought system, these possibilities collapse and in the best situation, the ideal encounter with the other will be an unformed situation in his thought.

Heidegger and Gadamer return to Plato to find a way out of the meaningless crisis of Western civilization. Heidegger believes that Plato by proposing the doctrine of ideas is the initiator of the forgetting of Being and responsible for the crisis of the West. He returns to Plato's allegory of the cave to clarify the nature of this forgetting. In this allegory, dialectic means passing from the sensible world to the reasonable world. In his interpretation of Plato, Heidegger pays attention to this meaning and ignores other meanings of dialectic such as the method of conversation, the method of collection and division, etc. Of course, in Plato's Sophist, he connects dialectic with logos and criticizes it. In general, Heidegger considers dialectic as a problem for philosophy. Unlike Heidegger, Gadamer pays attention to the different meanings of dialectic in Plato's philosophy and considers its development. Gadamer's emphasis on conversation in Socratic dialogues, as well as the method of collection and division in later dialogues, makes him consider Plato's philosophy as a dynamic and living philosophy. According to Gadamer, dialogue and dialectic in Plato's dialogues can save us from the current crisis of the West. This article tries to investigate and explain with descriptive-analytical methods how dealing with different meanings of dialectic causes Heidegger and Gadamer to present two different interpretations of Plato.

The present article, while emphasizing the field and time leading to the emergence of analytical and continental philosophy, tries to study the main and fundamental origins of their emergence in Kant’s philosophy and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of both, to analyze the positive and efficient and the negative aspects of Kant’s philosophical heritage. To reach this purpose, at first some characteristics and differences of the two approaches are described. Then after presenting necessary introductions, through Kant’s general and strong philosophy, we get the two general outputs of analytic and continental approaches. In this way we develop from Kant’s episteme-sophia controversy to his nomen-phenomen dualism to get closer to his uninvited philosophy, i.e., nihilism so as to put into test the analytic-continental controversy. Finally, we try to present some conjectures regarding the required accompaniment of both.

The aim of the present research is to reveal Kasravi’s ontological presuppositions in History of the Constitutional Revolution of Iran and Eighteen-year History of Azerbaijan and then to criticize the epistemological results of these presuppositions in Kasravi’s historiography based on the Concept of Heidegger’s Historicity. According to this, the main question of the present research is, how and on what basis does Kasravi define the subject of his historiography? The research findings show that the subject of Kasravi’s historiography is not the Historical Matter as a Shaping Verb. Kasravi’s historiography includes the Anti-historical Concept of Repetition. The Concept of the Traditional is absent in his historiography, Hence, the New Matter has become something groundless and this means Kasravi has not been able to understand the Dialectic of Discontinuity and Continuity hidden in the Historical Matter and to discover the Concept of Historicity. In other words, Kasravi has no basis for define the subject of historical question and research.

In Plato’s philosophy and Islamic gnostic tradition, the world and Man enjoy two corporeal and spiritual dimensions. Man’s spiritual dimension can have ascending and descending journeys in the worlds of being. In Islamic gnosis, going through the levels of being – the five divine presences – has been explained by resorting to the four-fold journeys, which include moving from the creature to the truth, traversing the truth, moving from the truth to the creature and, finally, travelling with the truth in the creature. The spiritual journey in Plato’s philosophy can be explained by using the dialectical wayfaring, analogy of the divided line, and the allegory of the cave. Plato generally dealt with this spiritual journey and did not intend to classify its levels. However, his views can be formulated in a way to conform to these four journeys. In this way, spiritual journey in Plato’s philosophy will include the following four stages: moving from shadows to the world of Ideas, traveling through the Ideas, moving from the world of Ideas to the world of sensibles and, finally, traveling with the Ideas in shadows. Therefore, given the differences between these two schools of thought regarding their views of the highest levels of being and the perfect Man, the first, second, and fourth journeys can be more clearly matched with each other. The third journey can also be matched with one of them but not as clearly as the other three. Gnostics’ religious views, their emphasis on ascetic practice and purification of the soul, and the long time interval between these two systems of thought have resulted in a number of great differences between them.

Martyr Ayatollah Beheshti, a contemporary thinker and philosopher, in his anthropology, has introduced the human being as a moving and continuously “becoming” being that can be on the course of growth and follow the path of perfection. There are various theories on the origin of motion and becoming in ontology, and Hegel’s dialectic theory can be considered as one of the most prominent theory. . On the other hand, Islamic thinkers have refuted this theory, and Martyr Beheshti has adopted the law of contradiction, attraction and healing. According to this theory, man evolves when he faces contradiction and tends towards one of the contradictions, and this continuous evolution is the very motion and ‘becoming’ in the eyes of Beheshti. This law has a clear manifestation in his anthropology, and originates from anthropology in human social systems, such as political, legal and educational systems. In the present study, through the descriptive-analytical method, while explaining and criticizing Hegel’s dialectic theory, we have discussed Ayatollah Beheshti’s viewpoint about the agent of motion in metaphysics, we have made use of this viewpoint in explaining the ‘becoming of a human being’, and we have pointed out its effects in Beheshti’s educational and political thoughts.

Eros, the Greek god of love, in addition to its different meanings in the pre-Socratic mythological and philosophical history, has been used in Plato’s philosophy in different senses. This diversity has misled its interpreters in translating it into erroneous meanings such as love. The present paper examines the meaning of eros in Plato’s two Dialogs of Symposium and Phaedrus and then explores its relationship with philosophy and techne. In the dialog of Symposium, after being used in some different meanings, Eros is used in the sense of the longing and desire for observing absolute beauty, which is the same philosophy. This is because in Plato’s philosophy, the difference between the Idea of the good (philosophy is a motive for viewing it) and the Idea of beauty is mentally-posited. In other words, the Ideas of the good and absolute beauty are the same truth that is viewed from two points of view. Now that dialectics – an activity in which multiple details are recognized from the one and the one from multiple details – is introduced in the dialog of Phaedrus as an instrument of techne, it can be concluded that the Platonic lover, and the philosopher cannot perceive the Idea of beauty (or the good) unless through techne. The major problems in this paper are discussed based on the views of two interpreters of Plato, Gregory Velastos and Martha Nussbaum.

The Socratic Method known as elenchus is the method used in Plato’s earlier dialogues namely Socratic dialogues. This method was a response to the sophists’ claim about the teaching of the virtue. Socrates used this method to disclose their ignorance. Through questioning and answering, he tried to make others aware that the searching for knowledge and virtue is achievable in a dialectical process and in relation to the other. The Socratic Method is not a simple method of dialogue, but it also points to the finitude of human understanding and, consequently, to the nature of philosophical thinking. From Socrates’s viewpoint, philosophy means the love of knowledge, and the claim on absolute knowledge is nothing more than an illusion. Through question and answer, Socrates tries to challenge other’s claim of knowledge and put them on the path of searching for knowledge. Thus the Socratic Method can play a powerful role in teaching. In Socrates’s thought we observe the interconnectedness of elements, all of which are understood in relation to each other. The doctrine of recollection, elenchus, dialectical art, question and answer and so on are among these elements. In this paper, while paying attention to these elements we will try to examine the nature of the Socratic Method.

Dialectics in philosophy was first used by the philosophers of ancient Greece and was changed by philosophers throughout the history of philosophy, and there is a strong use of analogy in the works of Plato. In Plotinus, dialectics is discussed in the third treatise of the first Enneads, and analogy is also discussed in different cases, especially the fifth Enneads. In studying the language of theology in Plotinus, one can trace dialectic and analogy, as well as negative methods and silence. Much has been said about Plotinus’ negative theology, but the discussion of dialectic and analogy in Plotinus’ theology has been neglected. The question is, what is the place of dialectics and analogy in Plotinus’ theological discussions? Can a connection be made between dialectic and analogy and Plotinus’ theology? In this article, we try to answer the question of the role and position of dialectic and analogy in Plotinus’ theology by elaborating on “dialectic” and “analogy.” No research has been done on the dialectic and analogy of Plotinus, especially on the theology and language of religion.Dialectic has been used in various meanings, and the purpose of this article is to address the dialectic in Plotinus’ theology and the language of religion. Plotinus deals with dialectic, examining it both as a method and as a science, which pays attention to “truth” and “supreme reality” in both dialectical meanings. In addition to dialectic, he uses the analogy of “king”, “fire”, and “sun” in describing the One. To him, dialectic is the highest part of philosophy and not a tool.In Plotinus’ theology, dialectics and analogy are used to explain the One in such a way that it discovers both transcendental and ultimate reality and shows the way for the soul to reach that ultimate reality by distinguishing between reason and sensory perception and appealing to and paying attention to reason. This One isread with different names such as the first cause or “first good”, “final reality”, “transcendence”, and “beyond-thought.” In this way, a re-reading of the negative and positive methods is combined. Negative, either removes positive things that are specific to the stages below the One from the One in a detailed sense and places the One in the highest order; or, negative in itself has a positive meaning for “One” means both negative and positive. Negatively, the One is nothing but itself. The One in a positive way as existence is in a hierarchically distinct from sensible and tangible beings. Thus, in the dialectical method and analogy, both a negative description can be given in a detailed sense for the existence and meta-thought of the One, and a positive description of the One in “cause”, “analogy”, “goodness”, and “perfection” can be obtained. With dialectical and similar reading, the negative (positive) and positive descriptions of the One are not opposed to and are in line with each other.

The focus of this article is on the position of myth in Plato's dialogues. With a descriptive-analytical approach, this article addresses the issue of what are the characteristics of Plato's dialogues in different periods? And how did Plato's approach to myth change in the Introductory, middle and final dialogues? In this way, we first examine the dialectical challenge in Socratic dialogues and then how Plato used myth in different periods, explaining that the use of myth in Socratic dialogues differ from other periods in order to add a religious dimension or mythological and And finding solutions to important philosophical problems. In those dialogues, it takes place in order to bring the mind closer and express the allegory. Finally, by dividing the myths of later periods into two general categories, eschatological and non-eschatological, we explain the specific subject and content of  myths and the reason for their use.

Although Bakhtin and Hegel's ideas are not very clearly related at first glance, and especially since Bakhtin is critical of Hegel and his dialectical method in his explicit statements, yet, Bakhtin's principles let us have an intertextual reading of his texts and his dialogism, as a framework of his thought, based on Hegel's dialectic. This intertextual reading consists of three parts: In the first part, the dialectical moments, which are "in-itself", "for-itself", and "in-and-for-itself" are identified in Bakhtin's dialogism. The second part is devoted to a review of Bakhtin's dialogism with the help of the logical concepts of "universal", "particular", and "individual" from Hegel's philosophy. In the third part, Bakhtin's claim that Hegel's dialectic is monologic is examined. As a result of this intertextual reading, although Bakhtin's hidden dialogue with Hegel is revealed, this dialogue does not yet mean that his thought is in complete agreement with Hegel's..

In the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, anthropology takes precedence over any other subject. Sartre's approach to some elements of existentialism, such as freedom and alienation in Existence and Non-Existence, differs from that in Critique of Dialectical Reason. The method of work in this article is descriptive-analytical and the most important findings are related to the change of Sartre's attitude in his philosophical works from individual and abstract freedom to confined and limited freedom in social structures. In this book, Sartre tries to find a way for people to transcend this situation by the fact that human beings have been deprived of their power of freedom and alienated from their structures and necessities. He demonstrates this with the human dialectic and social and historical structures. In his previous research, Sartre, by emphasizing the role of the conscious and free agent in changing social and historical structures, creates a bridge between existentialism and Marxism, which helps to understand the book "Critique of Dialectical Reason ". One of the important points of the book "Dialectical Reason Critique" is Sartre's attention to the concept of alienation. Also, Sartre gives a new meaning to history due to his transcendental role in making his world, which is criticized by his contemporary structuralists.

Conflict, meaning disturbance and incompatibility, has always attracted the attention of human beings and they have faced the question of why there is some kind of war and conflict and even numerous differences between the parts (components) of the universe. The present article seeks to make a comparative study of this issue from the perspective of two philosophers of East and West, Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and to express the similarities and differences between their views. This is explained by their intellectual, theoretical and philosophical foundations. In such a way that Ṣadr al-Muta'allehin considers contradictions and conflicts to be due to multiplicity; because wherever there is multiplicity, there is no escape from contradiction. He considered contradiction as a necessity of the world of possibility and has a graded unity that reaches its maximum in the material world, and then there is the realm of archetypes (archetypal realm, mundus imaginalis, world of archetypal images) and intellects, in which contradictions are minimized due to the intensity of ontological status and appear as differences. Hegel considers it as something in the nature of objects that takes place during the dialectical movement by stating the principle of contradiction as the most important principle of dialectical principles and imagines it as something in the nature of things that takes place in the course of dialectical motion, and a sign of the potential for the emergence of absolute thought, which is thought to move by moving from lower categories to the absolute image and has interpreted this as a dialectical course of contradiction.

In this paper, we will try to reconstruct Hegel’s logic and metaphysics through the modern logic. Graham Priest has claimed that we can read Hegel’s logic with the paraconsistent approach to logic, specially Dialetheism; he calls Hegel a Dialetheist. At first, we report Priest’s account on Hegel’s dialectic and his notion of dialectical contradiction; also, we try to analyze Priest’s argument for calling Hegel a Dialetheist. To achieve the proper comparison between Hegel’s logic and Dialetic one, we explain, non-technically, the simple semantics of a Dialetic logic. And finally, we establish a criticism of Priest’s account in order to reopening the question about Hegel’s being Dialetheist.

The concept of philosophy is closely intertwined with the concept of intellectualization. Moreover, the way of transmitting thought from the realm of subject to the realm of object has been the inevitable concern of thinkers. A question may arise in our mind as to how can we express our ideas so that to be perceivable to the lovers of philosophy? On the one hand, the technique of choosing proper terms, the way of chapter wising and referring to philosophical ideas, all acknowledge the close relationship between art and philosophy. On the other hand, in the program of “philosophy and children” the way of developing stories and rising questions as well as the style of speaking of teachers indicate the use of a kind of art in this field. Dialectic or conversation in the program of “philosophy and children” is one of the basic principles and if we succeed to apply exactly the art of dialectic to attain exact definitions of philosophical concepts then we can concede our relative success in implementing this program. The present work, by reviewing the pattern of critical thinking and giving a brief account of the program of “philosophy and children”, intents to explain the place of the art of dialectic in the program of “philosophy and children”.

Plato and Plotinus, both as the two of the most influential philosophers of the classical period, had a special attention to intuition. Given the different approaches to the different philosophical issues that they have, it requires us to doubt on their unique visions upon intuition. The exact matter of the present paper is to consider what it means “intuition” to each of these two philosophers? By what method to be achieved? What are its characteristics and what things belong to?The response to the question, which will be clear in the end, is that the intuition for both of them is an immediate manifestation that is happening to human intellect; though both Plato and Plotinus, in order to achieve intellectual intuition,recommend activities to the Seekers which are primarily of two types of intellectual practice and self-purification activities.Also at the end we will be led to the conclusion that, regardless of significant differences between the two philosophers on the philosophical line and the way they interpret the issues, they both apply the intuition in a single meaning that can be achieved with respect to both theory and practice.

Hegelian interpretation of Marx's thought is a common interpretation in the humanities and their commonality in the use of dialectical methods is the main reason for this treatment. Without denying Marx's influence on Hegel, attention to Kant's philosophy will lead us to another account of Marx's thought that would be far removed from Hegel's thought. If Marx's method is read with dialectical tolerance, it differs from Hegel's dialectic more than the inverted position of consciousness and matter. Hegel's dialectic consists of three multiplications, the third multiplication coming from the sum of the contradictions between the first and the second multiplication, but Marx's dialectic, like Kant's dialectic, is two-fold and so-called "negative", because the post-revolutionary situation, especially the classless one, It is not the sum of the a priori stages of societies and has a fundamental and qualitative difference with the past form of human life. Moreover, just as a critique of Kant's thought means examining the a priori conditions for the realization of things, so Marx in his critique of political economy seeks to find the a priori conditions for the realization of the Classless situation and does not provide a clear picture of the Classless situation. Give. With this view, the Classless situationin Marx's thought would become Kant's regulatory idea.

This paper aims to explain the Plato’s viewpoint concerning the quality of knowledge of Forms (Ideas) of Good through the process of dialectic. In order to achieve this goal, author has analyzed the Plato’s works and his commentators regarding the quality of relation between dialectic and Forms (Ideas) of Good and the role of dialectic in the process of human’s epistemology to Forms (Ideas) of Good. The achievement of the paper represents that based on Plato’s idea the knowledge of human enjoys some stages and with every stage one recognizes the step of equal of being. Forms (Ideas) of Good is the origin of being and knowledge and it is in the highest stage of being and knowledge. The philosophy of Plato is to seek the soul of truth by the highest level of human’s knowledge, that is intellect. Intellect is the divine glance of the world of truth and human knows the world of ideas and Forms (Ideas) of Good. Dialectic is Plato’s philosophical method in order to perceive these worlds which possesses two intellectual-conceptual and intellectual-intuitive dimensions. Based on Plato’s philosophy, the author tries to explain the process of knowledge of Forms (Ideas) of Good so that it enjoys both an inner solidarity and a logical development.

One of the problems in Christian theology that ignites long-lasting debates is the explication of the relation between two realms of existence (mundane world) and essence (divine world). Because of its capacity to give us a way out of the crisis of meaninglessness and nihilism, finding a solution to this problem is of importance to us. The lost meaning of the world should be restored the interaction between God and existence, therefore the dialectical relationship between these two seemingly separate realms can perform simultaneously two functions: giving meaning to and saving the world. According to Barth’s suggestion, the chiasm that separated the mundane and divine realms is unbridgeable relying solely on human reason and potencies, hence God himself with his omnipotence should intervene and save the world. Conversely, Tillich believes that the very system that initiates the creation, opens up the possibilities of redemption and these two procedures cannot be unrelated. Saving the world doesn’t require the negation of creation and bestowing meaning to it from beyond. Accepting that our world is not devoid of meaning, one can affirm it considering its positive side, while the necessity for negating the ambiguities and oppositions of the fallen world remains undisputed. In this essay, besides the investigation of Barth’s theory of dialectics and Tillich’s critiques thereof, it will be shown how Tillich apply the Nietzsche’s idea of affirmation to develop a positive dialectics.