جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « علم الهی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The widespread development and increasing capabilities of artificial intelligence have led some scientists to believe in the dominance of artificial intelligence over human intelligence and intellect. However, considering the verses of the Quran (Al-A'laa: 1-2) and (Al-An'am: 102) and many other verses that identify God as the sole creator of the universe, as well as God's infinite knowledge (Al-Baqarah: 29) (Al-An'am: 101) of which human knowledge is a mere reflection, and the verses of human dignity: verses that speak of God blowing His spirit into man (Al-Hijr: 29 and Sad: 72) and appointing man as His vicegerent on earth and creating the creatures of the earth for man (Al-Baqarah: 30, Sad: 26, Fatir: 39, Al-An'am: 165, Yunus: 14, Yunus: 73, Al-A'raf: 69, Al-A'raf: 84, Al-Naml: 62), and philosophical arguments that view the universe as a reflection of God's will to be and a cause that is the very essence of dependence on its absolute cause, and considering the verses that identify man as the greatest creation and the most perfect of them (Al-Sajdah: 7) and (At-Tin: 4) to the extent that he is introduced as God's vicegerent on earth (Al-Baqarah: 30), human achievements are the result of human action and man is their efficient cause and the effect of the Most High as the absolute cause, an effect that derives all its power from the sole creator of the universe. Therefore, artificial intelligence, which is a product of man and human achievement, cannot be superior to human intelligence, which is a creation of the Lord of the Worlds. The research method is qualitative and comparative, and the results indicate the invalidity of the superiority of artificial intelligence over human intellect.

In the past, there has been a deep discussion among philosophers and theologians regarding the different aspects of the Divine will. This paper aims to first provide a detailed report and evaluation of Allameh Tabataba'i's theories, and then, in comparison with the ideas of eminent thinkers of transcendental theosophy, a new formulation of this interpretation will be presented based on the reductionist approach, how much they consider the attribute of the Divine will to be essential or action. According to the research method of each of the philosophers, Allameh Tabataba'i, considers God’s will to be debatable in the form of Divine actions and considers it difficult to carry it on the Essence in such a way that it is considered an independent concept, we will consider in the framework of anti-reductionism. We consider On the other hand, Imam Khomeini, who considers the Divine will to be one of the attributes of Essence and considers it to be constant in all levels of existence and one of the attributes of perfection, a minimalist reductionist, and Mulla Sadra, who refers the essential Will to other Essential attributes such as knowledge, love, or pleasure, we formulate maximal reductionist.

The present article aims to examine and analyze the views of Sohravardi as a representative of the Platonic tradition and Aquinas as a representative of the Aristotelian tradition regarding God’s knowledge of the creatures, and to express their points of commonality and difference; The findings of the research are that regarding the connection between divine attributes and essence, Sohravardi and Aquinas believe in identity. Regarding God’s knowledge of the creatures, both philosophers prove the knowledge of the Almighty God, but Sohravardi does not mention God’s knowledge of the creatures before creation, and Aquinas does not distinguish between before and after creation. Sohravardi does not have a significant discussion about God's knowledge of evil, but rather discusses the place of evil in the system of existence and its relationship with the goodness of the system, but Aquinas discusses more about how God knows evil and believes that Almighty God knows evil according to the system of existence. Regarding God’s knowledge of the variables, none of the two philosophers believe in change in the divine essence.

One of the fundamental questions in the field of philosophical theology is whether God has the knowledge of particulars. Some philosophers have tried to either demonstrate or deny the divine knowledge of particulars regardless of the term “God”, which is a controversial issue. In a philosophical tradition that began with Plato and Aristotle and was advocated by Ibn Sīnā, the divine knowledge of particulars is denied. However, within the framework of the same philosophical school, Thomas Aquinas, as a theologian, demonstrates this knowledge for God. In Ibn Sīnā’s view, there is a fundamental difference between quiddity and existence as two different levels of being. The Necessary Being is the cause of granting existence to quiddities and, thus, cannot know them in terms of their particulars, as they lack “existence” in separation from Him. However, Ibn Sīnā does not deny the divine knowledge of particulars through their “existence”. In Aquinas’ theological concept of God, as a personal God, the denial of the divine knowledge of particulars defaces the divine power. Moreover, in case of denying this Knowledge, Man, who is created by God, will be placed at a higher level than their Creator because they can gain the knowledge of particulars. Aquinas, who speaks as a theologian here, ignores the borderline between philosophy and theology and objects to Ibn Sīnā by stating that some universals such as “animal” and “human” cannot function as the distinctive features of a particular such as “Socrates” in comparison to others. The present paper provides a comparative analysis of the views of these two philosophers regarding God’s knowledge of particulars.

So far, extensive research has been done on the theology of Amirul Momineen Ali, but there are still many unsaid angles among Islamic scholars. What is examined in this article is a different view of his theology. How can the imamate of Hazrat Ali be proved in a logical and logical way through religious theology?The proof of science consists of three premises.First: Proof of the divine religious knowledge of Amir al-Mominin based on authentic texts.Second: Not granting divine knowledge to the false claimant of Imamate.Third: Only Hazrat Ali had divine knowledge and claimed Imamate.The first premise is proven by Quranic and narrative evidence, and the second premise is certain based on a rational judgment.According to the preliminaries, the research hypothesis has been proven with the usual narrative, descriptive-analytical methods.

A scrutiny of Fārābī’s works reveals that one of his major concerns and a key philosophical problem in his view was God as the origin of other existing entities as well as His attributes and His relation with the world of being. As a founder of Islamic philosophy, in his efforts to establish the intellectual system of Islamic philosophy, Fārābī not only takes the study of God as a metaphysical problem, but also considers it as a key central problem in metaphysics. Indeed, in most of his works, he defines metaphysics in terms of God (the First Existent: al-mawjūd al-awwal) as the study of the First Existent and the study of other existents in that they are caused by the First Existent. Accordingly, in Fārābī’s view, the First Existent is an entity on which other existents depend in their existence, and in fact, other existents deserve to be studied in metaphysics just in virtue of their relation to it. For this reason, it is the most significant and central issue in the study of Fārābī to research into the First Existent and its attributes as well as its relation with other existents. A scrutiny of Fārābī’s view of the First Existent will give us an understanding of the main metaphysical problem in his philosophy, which is crucial to an understanding of other problems of metaphysics as well as the entire system of his intellectual doctrines. Additionally, a major offshoot of this is a more accurate understanding of the relation between Fārābī’s theology (study of God) and Avicenna’s theology, which results in an enhanced study of Avicenna’s philosophy. Accordingly, the main problem tackled in this article is an analysis of Fārābī’s view of God and His attributes.In this way, the article is chiefly concerned with a study of God as the First Existent and His attributes from Fārābī’s perspective. However, since Fārābī’s theological studies largely appear in his Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila (Opinions of the citizens of the virtuous city) and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya (Urban politics), this article focuses on these two works, although it also reviews the rest of Fārābī’s works when they involve a reference to the problem at hand. It is necessary to note that this article overviews and analyzes Fārābī’s views in terms of his own intellectual context and only draws on the jargons prevalent in the works that are attributed to him beyond any reasonable doubt.

In many parts of his works, Fārābī discusses theological issues, but a large part of his theological studies appears in two of his works: Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila (Opinions of the citizens of the virtuous city) and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya (Urban politics). The jargons Fārābī uses to refer to God include the “First” (awwal), the “First Existent,” and the “First Cause” (al-sabab al-awwal). Unlike Avicenna, he does not believe that God is the essentially necessary existent. Fārābī ascribes several names and attributes to the First Existent, in particular its being immemorial and the most perfect. These attributes encompass other divine attributes. Indeed, other attributes ultimately refer to these two. Fārābī explains that although multiple names and attributes apply to the First Existent, this does not add up to the multiplicity of the First Existent, because it includes all those attributes in its essential unity. In Fārābī’s view, when common names are predicated of the First Existent and other existents, they are not predicated by way of univocity (or a common meaning: al-ishtirāk al-maʿnawī). Moreover, because of a resemblance and relation between the First Existent and other existents, the predication is not by way of equivocity (or a vebal commonality: al-ishtirāk al-lafẓī) either. It is indeed a different variety of predication by which common names are predicated of the First Existent and other existents not as univocal, but by virtue of a sort of relation and resemblance and in terms of priority and posterity. This resemblance or relation between the attributes of the First Existent and those of other existents provides us with some kind of knowledge about the First Existent, by which we apply positive attributes to it.Fārābī explains the relation between the First Existent and other existents in terms of the theory of emanation (fayḍ). While he was influenced by neo-Platonic philosophers, particularly Plotinus, and despite his ample influence on Avicenna, there are significant ways in which Fārābī can be distinguished from them to the extent that the theories of emanation put forward by each had better be treated as three separate views. Fārābī’s theory is distinguished from Plotinus’s mainly by his introduction of heavenly spheres into the flow of emanation, the multiplicity and number of intellects, and the possibility of human knowledge of the First Existent and the First Existent’s knowledge of other existents. Furthermore, his theory is discriminated from Avicenna’s by his rejection of accommodating essential necessity and essential possibility in his theory of emanation. Since Fārābī did not even consider the principle of essential necessity and possibility, he does not account for emanation in terms of essential and non-essential necessity or possibility. Although Avicenna was influenced by Fārābī’s theory of emanation, his view is far away from Fārābī’s because he explains emanation in terms of necessity and possibility. It should be noted, however, that Avicenna’s theory is so dominant that, at first sight, it seems impossible to be able to explain emanation without the key elements of necessity and possibility. The main contribution of the present research is the study of Fārābī’s authentic views of God based on the works that are attributed to him beyond any reasonable doubt, and without any mixture with dubious works attributed to him. Accordingly, it turns out that, despite his great influence on Avicenna, Fārābī’s view diverges from Avicenna’s on many key issues such that it seems that they present two distinct intellectual frameworks.

Fārābī believes that God is the origin of all existents, hence His appellation as the First, the First Existent, and the First Cause. In Fārābī’s view, the First Existent is not only an entity on which other existents depend in their existence, but also an entity in relation to which they deserve to be studied in metaphysics. A scrutiny of the First Existent and its attributes as well as its relation to other existents is a major research question in the study of Fārābī’s philosophy. Since there are doubts about the attribution of some works to Fārābī, and those works provide a distinct intellectual framework relative to his definitive works, this article aims to derive and overview Fārābī’s authentic views. According to definitive works by Fārābī, God is not a necessary existent, and the theory of emanation he puts forward as an explanation of the relation between the First Existent and other existents is not based on essential necessity and possibility. For this reason, his view of God is fundamentally different from that of his successor Avicenna.

The question of evil is one of the most difficult and controversial theological-philosophical discussions. Many thinkers have given in the “Nizām Aḥsan” (the best system) theory to respond to this question. The “best system” means the best and most complete system created by God. John Hospers has opposed this theory. In this article, his theory is examined and criticized in the two fields of “human” and “global” at three levels of “inability of God,” “ignorance of God,” and “non-benevolence of God.” Moreover, the responses made to his views are discussed in “posteriori” and “a priori” layers. The main purpose and premise of the article is criticizing Hospers’ arguments at three levels with regard to the “Best System” theory. The necessity of such an article came from the lack of attention to Hospers’ arguments against the “Best System” theory by previous researchers. The data was collected through the library research using the existing sources about the works of John Hospers, which was then analyzed through intellectual analysis, critical analysis, and content analysis. The most important result of the first level of analysis was “the appropriate, wise endowment of freedom to human” and “the difference between the essences of the material world and the otherworld.” Moreover, “the informed, wise, and non-cruel will” is among the findings of the second level. Finally, “the excellence of spirit” and “evils as sources of goodness” are the results of the third level.

Perhaps it can be claimed that fewer philosophical and theological issues such as the issue of divine knowledge can be found about which this extent of different and sometimes contradictory opinions exist and it is due to these very differences of views that Shaykh Tusi states the following regarding the discussion of divine knowledge in his commentary on al-Isharat [Remarks and Admonitions]: Some people have completely denied divine knowledge and in this regard, Avicenna’s view as the chief of the Peripatetic philosophers in the Islamic world has kindled extensive disputes. So much so that Shaykh Tusi, a commentator of the book of al-Isharat, who at the beginning considers himself to be committed to the commentary of al-Isharat, does not stay loyal to this condition in the discussion of divine knowledge and follows Shaykh Ishraq in this issue.This issue has gained so much popularity that Avicenna considers divine knowledge of existents before their creation to be in the form of imprinted forms.Many books and articles have been written about divine knowledge in general and Avicenna’s view specifically and that which distinguishes the present study is that apart from a critical view of the author regarding the accuracy and reliability of the attribution of imprinted forms to Avicenna, the author, through analytical study and reflection on the expressions of Avicenna and the explanation of his foundations, believes that Avicenna must be considered the innovator of the theory of “Perfect Integrated-Comprehensive Knowledge” and in the first step of this study, after acknowledging the excessive difficulty of the issue of divine knowledge, the problem statement and point of conflict and Avicenna’s view regarding God’s knowledge of existents before their creation is explained and it is claimed that Avicenna must be considered the innovator of Perfect Integrated-Comprehensive Knowledge by citing his assertions and benefitting from all his other philosophical foundations. After indicating the nature of knowledge and by mentioning two essential features of imprinted forms in the Peripatetic system, the attribution of the theory of imprinted forms is analyzed and through presenting Mirdamad’s view regarding the circumstances of the attribution of imprinted forms to Avicenna, a solution has opened up before researchers. And in confirmation of the rightness of Mirdamad’s claim, Avicenna’s statements clearly show that there are serious challenges in the dogmatism and indisputability of those who claim the attribution of imprinted forms to Avicenna. In continuation, by explaining the compatibility of perfect integrated-comprehensive knowledge with Avicenna’s foundations, the difficult path to arriving at the reality of divine knowledge is smoothed to some extent and the ambiguities from the views of the most well-known philosopher of the Islamic world can be removed. Addressing Mulla Sadra’s doubts regarding Avicenna’s statements in al-Shifaʾ [the Book of Healing] along with his answers to them shows that according to Avicenna the divine realm is free of any type of acquired knowledge even actualized acquired knowledge and while refuting all types of multiplicity the idea that the divine essence is adorned and envisioned with the forms of existents is certainly not right and the three terms, essence, God’s knowledge of His essence, and God’s knowledge regarding others, are all expressing a single reality which is the essence of God. and in precise scientific and technical terms, the basis of the words of the claimants to the attribution of actualized acquired knowledge arises from this false idea that they consider the rationality of the forms to come after their existence whereas Avicenna’s statements, rational laws, and foundations assert that the existent that is simplex from all aspects possesses all the perfections at the essence level and all the acquired existents (immaterial existents) and contingent existents (material existents) are present for Him in the divine realm due to the rational existence they possess.Avicenna’s emphasis and assertion on the selfsameness of essence and attributes in the denotative and conceptual sense consider God’s essence to be free of all types of multiplicity even the multiplicity of aspects and in contrast to Mulla Sadra’s view, which considers that the multiple assumptions presented in al-Shifaʾ regarding the reality and depths of the essence show Avicenna’s confusion and helplessness regarding the topic of divine knowledge, it must be considered a sign of strength and philosophizing and, ultimately, it is worthy of attention and Mulla Sadra himself considers Avicenna’s assertions and admonitions regarding divine knowledge to attest to perfect integrated-comprehensive knowledge which is, in reality, another expression for comprehensive knowledge along with detailed revelation.

There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. Another group of verses of a similar vein are those concerning “treasuries of Allah” (khazāʾin Allāh). The predicament is that people tend to collect valuable things in treasuries only because they have a limited power and cannot have what they want whenever they do, but this is not true of God, because of His unlimited, unconstrained power and knowledge. According to Quranic exegetes, there are two types of “divine treasuries”: Worldly treasuries Otherworldly treasuries (those of the absolute hidden world) There are different views of the nature of “divine treasuries” proposed by exegetes of the Quran and Muslim philosophers. We begin with views propounded by Quranic exegetes in philosophical-theological exegeses of the Quran. Major views of this sort have been offered in the exegesis of verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr in the Quran. These views might be classified into four: Rains Material elements and occasions of creation Divine predestinations Divine knowledge In a number of his exegetical and philosophical works, Mullā Ṣadrā has presented his account of “divine treasuries.” In line with his philosophical principles, he construes divine treasuries as intellectual entities; that is, as a particular stage of divine knowledge (after that of divine grace or ʿināyat), which mediates the emanation of divine blessings or grace to creatures—a stage in which the forms of everything inheres in an intellectual way. A systematic, rational rendering of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of divine treasuries requires a proper elaboration of his philosophical principles associated with divine knowledge, including the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd), gradation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), objectivity of knowledge and existence, etc. The following are the questions we consider in this paper: How do theological exegeses of the Quran account for the notion of “divine treasuries”? What problems do they face? What are Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles underlying his account of divine treasuries? How does his account treat the problems faced by other accounts? What other account of divine treasuries might be yielded, which is still compatible with the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy? To answer these questions, we begin with a literal definition of “treasuries of Allah” and then overview the accounts provided by exegetes and their problems. Next, we offer a detailed account of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles as preliminary to a proper account of “divine treasuries.” Articles have been published about “divine treasuries,” including “Divine treasuries” by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ḥishmatpūr (2005), “A critical analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of treasuries in light of structural semantics” by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2018) and “A critical application of the theory of conceptual mixture in al-Mīzān’s reading of divine treasuries” again by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2017). We conclude that, of the four accounts outlined in this paper, the first three suffer from numerous problems, and thus they fail to yield an adequate account of the Quranic notion of divine treasuries. In our view, the fourth view—that is, Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical account—has failed to offer a full-fledged account of instances of divine treasuries. Accordingly, we propounded a fourth view, which is an extension of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account. We argue how a proper, reasonable account of the notion of divine treasuries can be made possible by an elaboration of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles concerning divine knowledge and its degrees, and by drawing on characteristics of divine treasuries as outlined in the Quran, particularly verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr. We show that this revised Sadraean account is immune to the objections raised against other theories. On this account, divine treasuries suggest God’s knowledge of the measures of everything before its descent; that is, its creation. Moreover, on Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles, treasuries are of two sorts: worldly and otherworldly, where the latter is of two kinds in turn: objective and subjective (or cognitive). Objective treasuries are entities existing in imaginal (mithāl) and intellectual (ʿaql) worlds, and subjective treasuries are entities existing in the world of divine names and attributes. This is an “existential account of divine treasuries,” which might apply to all degrees of existence and creation.

In his treatise Tuhfa al-ashab fi ma’rifa rabb al-arbab, Zayn al-Din Kashshi adopts a stance similar to Avicennan theosophy and suggests that God has presential knowledge of His own essence and has detailed acquired knowledge of the phenomena before their appearance. At the same time, he takes a view similar to that of Oriental theosophy and suggests that God’s knowledge of the creatures before their appearance is non-detailed and after their creation is non-detailed presential, and all creatures are present for Him with their objective existence. Of course, God’s knowledge of things is free from the mediation of rational forms. In fact, based on the comparative approach toward the two foregoing stances, Kashshi takes God’s knowledge as presential in which the very existence of the known is present for the knower, unlike the acquired knowledge in which the quiddity of the known is known to the knower. Therefore, we might say that taking into account the comprehensive meaning of knowledge that denotes the presence of the known for the knower, Kashshi takes God’s knowledge to be only presential, because this type of knowledge is free from any defect and fault. Moreover, adopting a converging combination of the opinions of his precedent thinkers, Kashshi uses various ways of proving God’s knowledge. In fact, it seems that he indirectly has paved the ground for the advent of a new viewpoint in the future.

Discussion about the divine attributes has a long term history in theology and philosophy. Among all of the divine attributes, “knowledge” has received more attention because of its effectiveness in determining all of the verbal issues related to interpretation of this divine specification. Avicenna and Duns Scotus are representatives of the two main theories about the Gos’d knowledge among the Islamic and Christian philosophers whom I have studies and compared in this research. The main difference between these two philosophers in divine knowledge can be recorded as Scotus’ God is a purposeful actor (fa’el-e bel-qasd), however, Avicenna introduces the God as the wise and single-minded actor (fa’el-e-bel-enayah) justifying the creation based on the grace. While there is this big difference, there are many similarities between these two opinions; such as, both of them consider God as a cause for creation. Both believe in existence of creatures in divine knowledge before their real creation without considering reasonable forms or platonic parables as separated creatures. Both of them believe that God has no other purpose except for his essence for creation of universe or human.

The question of the role of knowledge in the realization of the known is crucial to philosophical and mystical theological studies. Mystics and Sadraean philosophers have adopted different views of the efficacy or inefficacy of knowledge in the known as well as their account of how knowledge affects the known. The goal of this research is to uncover the view of Islamic mysticism and Transcendent Wisdom concerning the issue.

This research draws on the method of analysis and comparison to provide an analytic comparative consideration of the mystical and Sadraean view of the issue. Moreover, it was carried out based on library data.

When it comes to the semantics of the relation between knowledge and the known in the mystical approach, we might discern three different positions in the words of mystics. First, the known is not made by knowledge in the sense that God’s knowledge does not play a role in how Immutable Entities (al-a‘yān al-thābita) are. Indeed, God knows such entities as they are, without making or changing them. By an analogy of our knowledge of the impossible, Ibn ‘Arabī explicates the notion of knowledge being subordinated to the known, in that it is not our knowledge that makes it impossible, nor can it stop it from being impossible. The second notion of subordination is the correspondence between knowledge and the known. That is, what is original is the known entity as it is present an Immutable Entity, and it is knowledge that corresponds to it, although the ontological subordination of the known with respect to knowledge is a well-acknowledged fact in Islamic mysticism. This remark by Fanārī is in obvious conflict with the first view concerning the semantics of the subordination of knowledge with respect to the known according to which the former is posterior to the latter. Such differences in the semantics of subordination indicate that there is no consensus over the notion of knowledge being subordinated to the known, as it shows that the dispute is not merely verbal. The third notion of subordination refers to that of the relation to its relatum. Moreover, on the Sadraean view, knowledge’s subordination to the known is accounted for in the third mystical sense. To illustrate, we should note that by the known here we mean the essentially known, which consists in the Immutable Entity or the epistemic form. Accordingly, for knowledge to be knowledge it needs to belong to a known entity, where belonging is a relation that needs, and is posterior to, its relatum, although the posterity is hierarchical rather than temporal, and thus it does not lead to the occurrence of events in God’s essence. Furthermore, when he deals with the problem of knowledge’s subordination to the known, Mullā Ṣadrā often distinguishes active and passive knowledge, tethering the response to the question of knowledge’s subordination of the known to the varieties of the distinction. That is, since knowledge is the origin of the instantiation of the external known entity, it cannot be posterior to the known, but in passive knowledge as such, the knowledge in question is necessarily posterior to the external known entity. What is more, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn provides a significant research concerning the differences between the views of Muslim mystics and Mu‘tazilī theologians, in which he notes the differences between the two views, referring to epistemic and objective (concrete) obtainment (or immutability) as two varieties of obtainment. He accounts for the view of Muslim mystics that Immutable Entities obtain prior to their concrete or objective existence in terms of epistemic obtainment. In this connection, he also points to the mode of existence of Immutable Entities. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, since such entities exist by God’s existence, they are not created by God, which is unlike the existential condition of existential objective entities that are made and created by God.

In Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, knowledge’s subordination of the known corresponds to the third mystical sense. Moreover, relying on his principle of the primacy of existence, Mullā Ṣadrā tends to believe that the known is not made by knowledge, with knowledge not contributing to the known. Sadraean and mystical accounts agree over the idea that Immutable Entities are essentially determined, non-made realities, which is why the divine knowledge does not affect such entities in God’s essence.

One of the most important and most complicated discussions in theology is the divine knowledge rooted in God's essence and extending to His attributes and actions. We have investigated this issue under the title of the orders of divine knowledge in the transcendental philosophy and concluded that those orders are four. They are as follows: (a) Grace (ʿināyat) with fifteen features, the most important among which are knowledge, causality and divine eternal consent of the best system; (b) Divine Decree (qaḍāy rabbānī) which includes rational and general forms of all beings in the universe in divine domain with features of collectiveness, synopticness, simplicity, and innovativeness; (c) Providential Knowledge (qadar ʿilmī) which includes minute and detailed forms of all beings in the world of celestial souls; and (d) External Providence (qadar khārijī) including the minute forms in the external matters. The Grace has no position, and the Providence and Decree have [certain] positions. The position of Decree is the Sublime Pen and the Preserved Tablet, and the position of Providential Knowledge is the non-sublime pen and the Effacement and Affirmation Tablet. And the position of the External Providence is the material world. Due to regarding both the immateriality of 'the known' and the immateriality of 'the knower' as [necessary] condition in knowledge, Mulla Sadra does not consider the external providence as the last order of divine knowledge, except through the scientific providence, which is free from objections for some thinkers.

Suhrawardi believes that God is the agent of "satisfaction" (bel-Rez); According to this view, divine knowledge is the source of all beings in terms of the general system in the whole world, and the disabled person never has a separate identity from the identity of his science, and this dependence is the same as the relation to the cause. This article seeks to explain the role of the system of Suhrawardi concepts - that is, the rational divisions of the first and second - and "how to carry mental concepts on real matters" in a descriptive-analytical way in explaining Noor Al-Anwar's activity and then his philosophical view on Criticize the activity according to the principle of his thinking. The main question of the present study is whether Suhrawardi's view on the activity of Noor Al-Anwar is compatible with his statements about the system of intellects and its proposed rules or not? According to the results of this article, the lack of separation of secondary logical and philosophical concepts and intellects in Suhrawardi's philosophy and the criteria it provides for the validity of concepts and how they are carried over to real matters, seriously undermines the explanation of "divine knowledge". Therefore, Suhrawardi's view of activity in the pleasure of God can not have a convincing and correct explanation according to his philosophical system.

Paying attention to the early views on the definition of knowledge, Mulla Sadra offers an existential definition based on his existential foundations that are the turning point in the epistemology of transcendent wisdom. In this view, knowledge is a kind of existence of one thing for another. This definition and its consequence have led to a new explanation by Mulla Sadra about divine knowledge. This explanation has a terrific contribution to shaping the epistemological geometry of divine knowledge in Islamic philosophy. These are some of the angles of this geometry: non - redundancy of divine knowledge to God's essence; the intuitiveness of divine knowledge; the denial of any forms in divine knowledge; the acceptance of God's detailed knowledge of individuals; The immediacy of what God knows; the union of knowledge, knower and the known in God; God's knowledge of Himself, and the identification of His non-detailed knowledge of others with the detailed revealing of others. The study reveals that paying attention to Mulla Sadra's existential explanation of knowledge allows understanding the way of forming his theory, its innovative aspects, and its distinction from others in the field.

The divine knowledge is among the important issues in the sphere of theology, whose analysis has been disagreed upon by various thinkers and numerous views have been presented in explaining it. In this regard, Abul-Barakat Baghdadi – in his famous book entitled al-Muʿtabar fil-Ḥikma – has reviewed and analyzed Avicenna's view. From this inquiry, it becomes clear that these two thinkers share the view of accepting God's intuitive knowledge of His own essence as well as His knowledge of existing immaterial things; however, they disagree on the divine knowledge of non-existent things (knowledge before generation) as well as knowledge of material mutable things. Here, we have dealt with explanation and evaluation of both views.