جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « general » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

One of the key matters in examining the scientific nature of knowledge and its methodology is the components of knowledge, that is, the subject, problems, and principles that constitute that knowledge. The subject is the central axis of the knowledge whose essential accidents are discussed in that knowledge, and the problems of knowledge are propositions whose subject is the same as the subject of knowledge or parts or instances of the subject of knowledge, and their predicate is an essential accident of the subject of knowledge. Proving the essential accidents of the subject of knowledge in the form of problems of knowledge (which is the main purpose of knowledge) is based on the principles of knowledge which are of two types: conceptual and propositional. Therefore, the principles of knowledge have a constructive role in the formation of knowledge and the proof of its problems. Because of this role and also because in today's debates regarding the nature of knowledge and methodology of science, the principles of knowledge and the clarification of its dimensions are not given serious attention, the present article focuses on the principles of knowledge and examines their role in the realization and establishment of knowledge. Of course, the contents of the principles of knowledge and the nature of each of the conceptual and propositional principles, as well as the position and method of obtaining these principles in knowledge are also explained.

Evidently the greek terms καθόλου and καθ’ ἕκαστον appeared first in Aristotle’s works as meaning respectively universal and particular. In Plato’s works καθόλου is rarely used as synonum to ὅλον, meaning “whole”, and nowhere indicates “universal” in the logical sense. To be “whole” is a characteristic of ideas, implying a very high degree in the hierarchy of unity, ordered between the One and maltitudes. Aristotle uses καθόλου in several and even inexact meanings. Sometimes it means “universal” in an exactly logical sense, but often and specicaly in criticizing Plato’s theory of ideas, it indicates “genus” and doesn’t include any universal unconditionally. He criticizes Plato for conceiving universals as separate beings, however, contrary to the common view, καθόλου in such contexts means inclusively “genus”and doesn’t refer to species or any other logical universal. In the like manner καθ’ ἕκαστον occasionally in his works implies “particular”, but criticizing Plato’s ideas, it appears often as a synonym of species. Universal and particular, at the same time have some relation to “whole” and “part” and in that regard genus and species are considered as part and whole respectively. In this article we are going to explain the logical, as well as the lexical relation between “whol” and “universal”, on the one hand, and “part” and “particular”, on the other hand, but lastly there seems to bo no relation at all.

Muslim philosophers have been influenced by the views of ancient Greek philosophers in the issue of generality (generic) and partiality, so that the essence of the views presented in the Islamic era can be seen in the opinions of Plato and Aristotle. Avicenna, like Aristotle, has denied the theory of Forms (theory of Ideas) and rejected Plato’s view about the general and partial issue. Unlike Avicenna, Suhrawardī has accepted the Platonic theory of Forms, but he has denied the Platonic generality in the issue of generality (generic) and partiality and has had a common opinion in explaining of “generic” (Arabic: کلی) with Aristotle and Avicenna, which means that he, like Avicenna, considers generality to be the same of mental concept as independently subsistent. Of course, Shaikh al-ʿIshraq (Master of Illumination) has opposed Avicenna in some minor aspects of this issue and has presented innovations. This article has explained Suhrawardī’s point of view on the issue of generality (generic) and partiality by an analytical-descriptive method and studied the reason of his tendency to Peripatetic explanation of the “generic”. Suhrawardī’s critiques of Sinavi’s approach have also been explained in this analytical study, and their impact on Mullā Ṣadrā’s critique on Peripatetic’s theory has been shown. Also, Mullā Ṣadrā’s encounter with Suhrawardī’s view on the issue of generality (generic) has been analyzed.

The purpose of the current research is to measure and compare the intrinsic motion of Mulla Sadra and Einstein's theory of relativity, and the research is descriptive and analytical. The method of collecting information was a library, which was done by referring to the relevant libraries, extracting files from Mulla Sadra's works, articles and other written works on the subject of research. The findings indicate that Einstein took the speed of light as absolute and constant and considered time as relative, and Mulla Sadra took material movement as the principle and considered time as its subordinate. Therefore, it is completed in the interweaving of matter, movement, and time in Sadra's system, although Sadra attributes originality to body and matter, but in contrast to Masha'is, this originality is dynamic in the sense that matter has a rising personality that is in every respect It is accompanied by movement. Also, Mulla Sadra does not give an independent identity to time and considers it as an extension of two extensions of the body, and the theories of relativity are faced with a fourdimensional structure called space-time, where time is considered one of the four dimensions of this structure.

There are at least three definitions in writings by Islamic philosophers for theoretical reason and practical reason. If we want to get Farabi's opinion as one of the most prominent and influential muslim philosophers in this matter, it is not so smooth and at first glance in terms of the sum of his works it may not be possible to came up with a clear answer, because the appearance of Farabi's words in this regard is sometimes inconsistent with each other. However, this article is seeks to show behind this incompatibility that Farabi's thought on theoretical reason and practical reason and their function can be interpreted uniformly and in line with Ibn Sina's view. In this regard, we examine Farabi's remarks in three discussions "The functioning of reason forces ", "How the creation of optional good and evil acts" and "What is human virtues" and obtain that, in his view, theoretical reason relates only to the domain of generals knowledge, and practical reason is the power of understanding practical details that can be possessed and created in outside by human beings and manage to create them by employing other powers, namely, sense, imagination, motivating and factor.

Analyzing the mystical interpretation methods is the subject of this paper, and its purpose is helping the seekers of knowledge to understand the hidden meanings of the Holy Quran. The question is that, how can people achieve a deeper understanding of the Quran? The concise answer is that, there are two general methods, which includes the general-technical and the special-inspirational one. The first method is based on the appearances and attention to the attached and separate indications in the verses, which is applicable to all. But the second method is dedicated to the advocates of mysticism and intuition. Using a descriptive-analytical method, while describing each of these two methods appropriately, this paper, as an example, analyzes some of the sayings of the gnostic in this respect. Several Quranic evidences show that the Holy Quran recognizes both of these two methods.

"The Human" has based on meaningful "in-dividuals" and "cases", In contrast with "instances" in natural science. hence methodological autonomy of humanities from natural science and The constitution non-positive humanities faces challenges to explain and preserve of "generality". The Emergence of the Humanities in 19th century in Germany is philosophical-historical important event. This article presents, according to Neo-kantian-Baden school- point of view, the possibility of preserving and explaining "generality" In Humanities (historical science, cultural science) based on material and methodological demarcation between natural science and humanities.

One of the issues raised in the discussion concerning the nature of cognitive of science of knowledge, especially, in the discussion of the status and classification of knowledge, is the relation of the sciences to the general knowledge contained therein, or to other words how to apply the general knowledge to the subsidiary sciences. In Farabi's view, this discussion is particularly important in relation to the practical philosophy and its underlying knowledge; because unlike other philosophers, Farabi considers practical philosophy not as several sciences but as one science, and wherever he divides practical philosophy into two classes, he refers to these two classes, not as two types of the famous types of practical philosophy that is ethics, domestic politics and politics. The present article focuses on this issue, and after addressing Farabi's statements on the types of knowledge and the type of relationship of knowledge in terms of unity, multiplicity, and how multiple sciences relate to one another, examines Farabi's view of the nature of practical philosophy and its relation to the knowledge of its subsets.

The Existence Unity Is One Of The Most Important And Complex Philosophical And Theosophical Issues Which Has Been Alwas Discussed And Consideered By Many Scholars. The Theosophists Such As Ibn_E Arabi¡Ghounavi ¡Abdol Razzagh Kashani Have acceptedin and climed its intuition and scholars like Mollasadra has proved it by rational backpround and Alle_O Dolleh Semnani has denied and challengend it. This stadyaims to investigate the view of Molla Mohammed Mehdi Naraghi on existence unity issue and his caritical presentations of unity existence ¡ especially Mollasadra,s view and other theosophists . To do so , firstly his glancing view on this issue is discussed and finally his criticisms on the views related to existence unity are specified .

Definition, as the logicians say, is a mechanism for getting the unknown part in imaginations. For knowing something truly, there is no way except resorting to definition. Now the question is where and when definition can have such a usage. Finding a part of the answer will derive us to discussion about the conditions of definition, some of which are the formal conditions. Among the most important formal conditions of definition are the composition and the way the elements of definition are formulated. However, accepting these conditions necessitates more discussions; this shows the complexity of this discussion and leads us to the fact that definition is not just a logical discussion; rather, it has a philosophical and epistemological identity as well as linguistic dimensions.

In the first pages of ‘theology’ in his Ishārāt, Avicenna claims that we may find out an abstract non-sensible thing through investigating the sensible things. By superimposing mixed quiddity over the non-conditioned quiddity, he argues that non-conditioned quiddity is free from the material accidents of mixed quiddities, hence non-sensible. This leads to misunderstanding that he regards the non-conditioned quiddity as existing out of the mind; thus, Khwāja Tūsī, unlike some of his books that regard general entities out of mind as impossible, in interpreting Avicenna’s statement says that non-conditioned quiddity, while non-sensible, is out of mind. This is in spite of the fact that Avicenna, based on his other books, regards general entities existing only in mind. It seems that in Ishārāt, Avicenna is seeking to prove that general entity in mind, i.e. non-conditioned quiddity in mind, is an abstract entity; thus, he prove an abstract being.

Examining the logical elements in the social ethics is among the subjects that Ibn Sina has done through the explanation of ethical statements and analysis of its content. He presents society as the origin of the morality and he introduces society as a background which morality derives from it and then in the same background moral virtues are groonded. In the meantime he introduces logic as an instrument for the study and grounding these affairs. The main issue in this study is to determine the moral happiness Ibn Sina pays attention to both in its rational aspects and to its ethical aspects which includes social ethics and regulates the relation of individuals in society and with each others. To specify the limits of rationality and being rational, he presents religion as the framework of law making and by an analysis of moral statements in generally accepted opinions under the topic of dialectics considers different origins for morality. Incidentally, on this basis beside the compatibility with religion, he introduces a criterion of logical appraisal for morality. For by determining the place of moral statements in logic and specifying the value of statement which have categorizal certainty, he presents the criterion for their appraisal from the same area.

Without doubt there can be found some cases of evils and destructions such as ignorance, proverty, disabilities, earthquake and torrent in this world. The why and the how of these evils in this world have been posed in human mind for ever to such an extent that they formed one of the most important concerns in different religions and schools. In theoretical mysticism, the background of the problem goes back to Ibn Arabi in the seventh century. The question of this paper runs as: how does Ibn Arabi think of evil? Is it existential or nonexistential in his view? Given the former, how may it would be in agreement with the origin of existence as the only absolutely good thing? And what would be counted as its origin? Regarding individual unity of being and the best system, he has negated evil absolutely in the system of existence in the form of simple negation positively considered. He, however, has viewed nonexistential things as essential evil with regard to specifictions; while he agrees with a kind of relative evil in natural system in existential things and with a kind of essential evils in legislative system