جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « فارابی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

In the history of political thought, the concept of security and protection of the political structure and its stability has been as important as the establishment of the political government. This concept has also been taken into consideration in Farabi's political thought, and in various works such as al-Siyaseh al-Madaniyya, the opinions of the people of Madinah al-Fazlah, etc., after explaining the logic of the development of the ideal politics, Farabi has tried to consider how to maintain Medina and its security. had. The main problem of this article is to study security as the most fundamental political component in Farabi's political thought and analyze the logic he uses in the stability and protection of utopia based on Farabi's philosophical system. According to him, since the establishment of the utopia is dependent on the concept of happiness, morality and virtue, the method of protection, stability and continuity of the utopia policy is also possible depending on the aforementioned three concepts. In order to explain the relations of political security, he places the philosopher-shah as the authority of security, and instead of deriving the logic of security from a dominant power, he relates it to the structure of the universe through the intellect of the philosopher, and the logic of establishment and continuity. It explains political-security from within the existential and rational structure of the objective world that it obtains from the active intellect.

The classification of sciences is a fundamental topic in epistemology and has a significant impact on determining the position, role, and function of each branch of knowledge. Considering the centrality of wisdom (ḥikmah) and Islamic law (shariʿah) in Islamic thought, the classification of sciences has sometimes been structured around these two principles. This paper investigates the relationship between philosophy and jurisprudence, or ḥikmah and shariʿah, as articulated in the classification systems of Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. It examines the foundations, implications, and consequences of their approaches within their respective philosophical frameworks. The research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology. The findings reveal that both philosophers acknowledge the compatibility of philosophy and religion, but their prioritizations differ. Al-Farabi prioritizes philosophy, placing jurisprudence and theology under practical wisdom, which is subordinate to theoretical wisdom. In contrast, Ibn Sina prioritizes religion, considering shariʿah as an independent science within practical wisdom, distinct from human sciences and with a divine origin. Ibn Sina views shariʿah as an independent science alongside political science, not as a branch of it. By granting shariʿah an independent identity, Ibn Sina lends it credibility and creates conditions for its potential substitution for practical wisdom in the trajectory of Islamic philosophy. He lays the groundwork for the two sciences of usul al-din (theology) and furuʿ al-din (jurisprudence). It appears that Ibn Sina perceives the realization of philosophy in the Islamic society of his time in the Islamization of philosophy and the validation of religious sciences. Therefore, compared to Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina is more concerned with the Islamization of philosophy and seeks to harmonize the philosophy of his predecessors with his own society.

In Islamic tradition, man is defined as an intermediary and liminal being, situated between the animal and the angel, with the constant potential for ascent or descent to either of these ontological spheres. This paper endeavors to provide a philosophical interpretation of this intermediary and liminal position of man based on the concept of the imaginative faculty in the philosophies of Al-Farabi and Kant. The central question of this essay is to examine how, in the works of these two philosophers, epistemology serves as a platform for offering an ontological interpretation of man's liminal position. This paper represents an initial exploration of this topic. Given the prominence of the imaginative faculty in Kant's philosophy, particularly in his discussion of transcendental deduction, this paper will begin by tracing the trajectory of transcendental deduction, highlighting the role of the imaginative faculty and its two levels of productive and reproductive imagination. It will then proceed to examine these two levels of imagination (productive and reproductive) in Al-Farabi's thought, without resorting to simplistic comparisons or equating the two philosophers' perspectives. Employing an analytical approach, the paper will seek to establish an anthropological foundation for the imaginative faculty in the philosophies of both thinkers. The intermediary role of imagination in the realization of knowledge in the works of these two philosophers provides the basis for such an endeavor.

One of the important and key issues in the discussion of practical philosophy is to identify its place in the classification of sciences because it provides a broad and clear picture of the position of this science. In view of the special role that Farabi has in showing the identity, method and function of practical philosophy through its scientific investigation, the present article describes the classification system of sciences and the place of practical philosophy in this system and the relationship of this philosophy with its branches in Farabi's view and in this regard, by examining his writings, tries to prove the existence of these three ideas in Farabi's works: 1. Practical philosophy is a deductive knowledge and is different from non- deductive and purely practical sciences (crafts and techniques and types of art). 2. Practical philosophy is an argumentative deductive science and it is different from non-philosophical deductive sciences that do not use the method of argumentation, i.e. polemics, sophistry, rhetoric and poetry. 3. Practical philosophy has two components: ethics and politics and what is meant by ethics is not the knowledge that examines only individual ethics, but it is the knowledge that examines human ethics in all areas of human voluntary life, and what is meant by politics is also the community knowledge, including small and home communities.

The understanding of humans in any philosophical school influences their ultimate purpose, affecting their way of life and how they resolve conflicts. Building on the foundation of humanistic psychology, Maslow posits the theory of self-actualization, asserting that transcending basic needs related to deficiency allows for the full manifestation of innate talents to their highest potential. Fārābī, a philosopher of happiness with a special focus on the functions of the mind, thought, and aptitudes, links human perfection in material life to perfection in the afterlife, offering a comprehensive theory on perfection and happiness within the realm of the mind through the flourishing of innate talents governed by the bestowing of intellects. Despite their different worldviews, both thinkers ultimately regard human perfection and happiness as aligned with the blossoming and utilization of innate talents. This perspective redefines primary human experiences, such as suffering and transient pleasure, replacing them with satisfaction and happiness. This paper presents an analytical-comparative study of these two philosophers’ views on the definitions of perfection and happiness. It addresses how humans resolve worldly conflicts and problems and examines their solutions within physical, relational, emotional, intellectual, and meaningful perfection.

Thoughts and theoretical reflections about “governance” in Islamic society, whether theorizing about the desired structure of government or describing the characteristics of an ideal ruler, is one of the most important topics studied in the field of political thought and philosophy in Islam, to which great names such as Farabi, etc. are connected. In this context, this research, through a comparative approach, seeks to examine and analyze the views of Farabi and Sohrawardi about the ideal ruler from the perspective of a judicial approach. Based on such an approach, a philosopher like Farabi considers the different ways of connecting to the active intellect as the separation of the theoretical intellect from matter and the connection to the active intellect, and a divine sage like Sohrawardi also speaks of the separation of the theoretical intellect and the separation of the power of imagination, which is manifested in a prophet. In the eyes of both thinkers, human reason has the ability to overcome material existence. This type of excellence is a condition for achieving complete metaphysical knowledge and theoretical perfection. The ultimate happiness is the achievement of the active intellect. “The Absolute First Leader” and “Quṭb (Imam or pole)” have both achieved this position.
The ideal government and ruler, in the system of Islamic philosophy, are based on the approach of philosophers to wisdom and their opinions and ruling foundations. The philosophers’ approach to wisdom and intellect in the system of Islamic philosophy has changed and developed from Farabi to Sohrawardi and later. Based on this change in the method and approach to wisdom of the sages, philosophical issues and topics including the issue of government and the ideal ruler, have also undergone changes and transformations.
Despite the significant evolution of Islamic philosophy in the two Peripatetic and Illuminative systems, it seems that the ideal ruler in Sohrawardi’s philosophy, which he refers to as “the pole/Imam (quṭb),” is compatible with the first leader of al-Farabi’s utopia. The problem of this research is to investigate the characteristic features of “Qutb” and “First Leader/Philosopher” in the Peripatetic and Illuminative systems of philosophy based on Sohrawardi and Farabi’s approach to wisdom and its types.
“Qutb” in Sohrawardi’s thought
In the wisdom of enlightenment, the perfect human being and the “Qutb” to whom the position of caliph belongs, is perfect in intuitive and argumentative wisdom, and in other words, he is both adept in reflection and adept in discussion.
In Sohrawardi’s thought, the rulers must know wisdom as well be practical wayfarers, that is, they must possess a combination of theoretical and practical wisdom. On the one hand, Sohrawardi’s theory is influenced and consistent with Plato’s theory, both of which emphasize the “ruling sage,” and on the other hand, it is influenced by the Iranian tradition and the benefit of the ideal kings from wisdom and intellect, and “Khurra-yi Kiani”[1] and the approval of God, which is in the interpretation Religious and close to Sufism and Shiism, it is interpreted as Qutb and divine sage. A Qutb or an Imam is one who is connected with the active intellect, receives grace from the higher realm, and spreads goodness, prosperity, knowledge, justice, and virtue among religions with a divine plan.
“The First Leader” in Farabi’s thought
The First Leader is someone who does not need the guidance of another human being; rather, all sciences and knowledge are obtained by him in esse and he is able to infer appropriate actions and behavior from general reasoning. He can also best guide others to perform these meritorious deeds; the same actions and actions that bring a person to happiness. These abilities are realized in people of great and outstanding nature by connecting to the active intellect. Such a person, in fact, in the eyes of the ancients, is a king and ruler and worthy of revelation. The rule of such a person is the first rule and his leadership is the first leadership, and the rule of others that is through his rule will be the subordinate rule, and people under the rule of this leader and leader are virtuous people, the chosen ones, and the fortunate ones.
In examining and comparing the two viewpoints, it should be said that a philosopher like Farabi considers the different ways of connecting to the active intellect to be the separation of the theoretical intellect from matter and the connection to the active intellect, and a Godly sage like Sohrawardi also speaks of the separation of the theoretical intellect and the power of imagination, which manifests itself in a prophet, where we witness detachment from matter and the ability to remove the soul from the body.
In the eyes of both thinkers, human reason has the ability to overcome material existence. This type of excellence is a condition for achieving complete metaphysical knowledge and theoretical perfection. The ultimate happiness is the achievement of the active intellect.”First Leader”and “Qutb” have both achieved this position. Based on this, the complete transcendence of material existence is possible for certain people.

In his book "al-Shifā" (The Healing), Avicenna distinguishes between the concepts of possibility and probability and presents three approaches to differentiate these two concepts, although it is evident from the conducted studies that he did not specifically and independently address the issue of probability. In this study, we investigate the distinction between possibility and probability based on the Avicenna's works. The findings suggest that the distinctions which Avicenna made between possibility and probability are rooted in their specific historical contexts. Although most logicians maintain that probability is subjective and possibility is objective, they cannot draw a precise distinction between the two concepts. The second distinction is, in fact, between the future-possibility and the probability of occurrence of an event in the future, which reflects the difference between Avicenna's future-possibility and Al-Fārābī's future-possibility. The third distinction also seems to be a confusion between the meanings of the words 'probability' and 'narrowest-possibility', which has its roots in the translation of Aristotle's works.

The relationship between term-subject and subject in the attrebutive theorem is (‘عقدالوضع’-Aghd Al-Vaz). According to Al-Razi pruport, the modal of that relationship in Al-farabi’s viewpoint is contingency but Al-Tousi says Al-Farabi’s viewpoint is possibility modal. So at last, two of them don’t accept Al-Farabi’s holistic view. On the other hand both of them say that Avicenna, however, accepts actuality modal for ‘Aghd Al-Vaz’ in every theorem and this is the true modal. So Al-Farabi doesn’t talk about the modal of Aghd Al-Vad completely but it is understood that he looks at the relationship as a kind of theorem which accepts modals. Therefore, Avicenna doesn’t accept actuality modal for all theorems. So in this article, first of all we are going to check that possibility modal and contingency modal as a modal of Aghd Al-Vaz is accepted by both Al-Farabi and Avicenna; in the second step we are going to show that the critic of Al-Razi and Al-Tousi in Al-Farbi is not seemed true.

Republic and Statesman demonstrate the limitations of the city in distinct yet comparable ways. The first work reveals the impossibility of philosophers ruling, while the second work proves the necessity of the rule of law. Consequently, both dialogues establish foundations for addressing the question of the ideal political order based on its compatibility with the city's nature. However, formulating the best principles for the city falls within the domain of laws. This particular work held significant importance for Leo Strauss, which can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, Strauss' last work, "Argument and Action in Plato's Laws," focuses on the study of "Platonic Political Philosophy" and explores the tension between philosophy and politics through the final resolution of the problem. It represents the culmination and complete expression of theological-political thought. Secondly, in the introduction to "What is Political Philosophy," Strauss considers Laws to be Plato's most political work, if not the only one, as it features the Athenian stranger, along with his companions, describing a set of rules for an imminent city establishment. In contrast, Socrates constructs a city in the Republic solely through words and not in practice. Understanding how Strauss interprets Plato's Laws is of paramount importance. To comprehend his approach, we must first become acquainted with his elucidation of Farabi's interpretation of Talkhis-e-Navamis then, delve into his own interpretation to uncover similar motivations.

For Farabi as a philosopher and Syed Morteza as a rationalist theologian, reason has an incomparable role; For this reason, in order to compare the political philosophy of Farabi and the political theology of Syed Morteza, a comparative study of the role of reason becomes necessary. By examining the works of Farabi and Syed Morteza, this article has discussed the role of reason and its function in the political thought of Farabi and Syed Morteza and has clarified that Syed Morteza and Farabi agree on the value of reason, but their point of departure and direction in rationality is different. In Syed Morteza's political thought, reason is free from philosophical foundations and based on definite revelation and is busy processing to achieve worldly and hereafter happiness under the truth of Shiite Imamate, and reason according to Farabi is based on the foundations of Greek philosophy and with the intention of theorizing the Platonic philosopher-king and with a view It is transcendental and mixed with mystery and paying little attention to external realities, in reaching knowledge from the active intellect and lacks a fundamental view of the fundamentals and Shia Imamate.

Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of Muslim philosophers from Fārābī to Mullā Ṣadrā. It has even been used in responding to some kalāmī inquiries. Since the very beginning, Muslim philosophers have continuously devoted some of their studies to the investigation and explanation of the whatness and howness of the concept of imagination. However, this concept has not remained immune against change and has developed a distinct meaning in each philosophical system. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the three-fold schools of philosophy (Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminationist philosophy, and the Transcendent Philosophy) have each adopted a particular and different approach to this problem. The present study intends to examine the theories of some great figures of Islamic philosophy regarding the whatness of the faculty of imagination and reveal the existing differences among them. The findings indicate that philosophers’ views of the concept of imagination have not been fixed and similar in the course of history, and each has presented a specific and innovative explanation of this concept in conformity with their own philosophical system. For example, Fārābī considered this faculty to be a material component of the soul, while Mullā Ṣadrā changed it into the world of Ideas. This study was conducted following a descriptive-comparative method using library resources.

Throughout the history of thought, the concept of war has been considered from different perspectives. Meanwhile, political philosophy can be considered as one of the most important and comprehensive perspectives on war. Farabi's opinions as the founder of Islamic political philosophy regarding war can be evaluated in this regard. Farabi lived in a time and context where the concept of war and its ideological and practical requirements were tangible. Therefore, it can be said that Farabi felt the war well and understood its importance in completing a kind of political philosophy. Farabi's theory of war is one of the theories that judge the validity and unfairness of wars to the end; And the means of the verb are placed in the next ranks of importance. The purpose of war is based on Farabi's ontology, epistemology and human ethics. In other words, a person with such philosophical aspirations sometimes uses the tools of war to achieve his true goal and happiness, so that he can guarantee the happiness of this world and the nation by reforming souls. Finally, according to Farabi, war is like a tool that, if carried by the first ruler of Madinah, becomes the staff of Moses to split hardships and injustices and preserve virtues and virtues to realize the true happiness of the people of Madinah.

The practical dimension of human existence is related to his actions; Actions that shape his personality and with the guidance of practical wisdom can be transformed into wise actions and cause human happiness. The findings of the research, which is based on the descriptive and analytical method and based on library sources, show that Farabi paid special attention to the practical dimension of human existence in his view in the field of Madina Fazeleh; So that the actions of the people of Madina, along with knowledge, are among the components that cause Madina to become virtuous and Fazeleh, and if the people of Madina have knowledge; But if there is weakness in their actions, it will not be a utopia, and according to Farabi's own interpretation, it is an immoral and Faseghe Medina. It means a Medina whose inhabitants believe and know God and goodness; But in practice, they do not adhere to their knowledge. In the same way, the analysis of the works of Allameh Muhammad-Taqi Ja'fari shows that he considers action to be the main component after awareness and knowledge to reach an Intelligible life and even believes that the reasonableness of a Intelligible life is not only through theoretical Intellect, but also includes theoretical and practical Intellect. Examining the views of two thinkers shows that they both pay attention to wise action as the main component and acknowledge its role in individual and social life.

The "the simplicity of the reality (al-ḥaqīqa) of all things and the licks of something from them" rule is one of the most important topics Theology in particular that Mulla Sadra claims that no one other than Plotinus and he found out about it. And also the development of this rule, what philosophical problems has it solved and what achievements has it brought about in Sadra’s philosophy? Considering that this rule can be understood in the realm of unity in plurality and the realm of plurality in unity, this article is based on it by proving that Mulla Sadra, in understanding the principle of this rule, is indebted to the verses, hadiths, and intuitions of mystics in both realm, has tried to expose the development of this rule among the philosophers before Mulla Sadra to criticism and analysis in a descriptive and analytical method. Therefore; Plotinus tried to express the content of this rule in both realms. But Farabi, Suhrawardi and Mirdamad played a role in the development of this rule only in the realm of plurality in unity, ignoring their foundations. Also, Mulla Sadra and his followers have used this rule in both realms in the course of the development of the Transcendent theosophy in many cases, such as the relationship between the God and its knowledge, or the relationship between the soul and its powers.

The present study provides a description and analysis of the historical development of the notion of Aristotelean-Platonic agape (love) in the philosophical thoughts of Fārābī and Khwājah Nasīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. Following a historical method, the author deals with the reasons behind this development in addition to describing it. The discussion of friendship (agape) in Aristotle’s philosophy is propounded in his Nichomachean Ethics, where some traces of Platonic notion are also observable. This discussion was transformed in Islamic Philosophy in certain respects, including the variety of the beloved (and the most beloved), individualistic or socialist aspect, and selfishness or selflessness aspect. Regarding the variety of the beloved, the discussion has moved from virtue-based friendship (agape) to the love of the Wise (God). As to its range, one can observe a change of dialog form social-political friendship to agape as an internal characteristic with individual and social effects. Moreover, it has moved beyond selfishness and selflessness and, in conformity with the principle of congruence, reached the love from Him (Godly). The influential views of such thinkers as Plotinus; the role of religion, culture, and gnosis, and the ideas of Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Miskawayh, and Suhrawardī are of great importance in explaining this development. The particular philosophical and Kalāmī principles of Fārābī and Ṭūsī as well as some of their ethical views are the most important factors in the interpretation of the underlying reasons of the mentioned development.

Fārābī, the renowned Iranian philosopher, is one of the central figures of Peripatetic philosophy in the world of Islam. The collection of his thoughts travelled beyond Islamic borders to Asian, Europe and Africa posthumously and influenced the scientific fields of Jewish, Christian, and other non-Islamic lands. The thoughts of Fārābī and two other prominent figures of this school of philosophy, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, exercised an undeniable impact on the development of the higher scientific centers of Europe of the 13-15 centuries (AD). In fact, without considering their role in the formation of the first European universities, especially the university of Paris and the process of establishing the faculty of philosophy during the conflict between the two faculties of theology and art, one cannot attain a true knowledge of the reasons behind the development and expansion of the first European universities. Relying on valid historical documents and reports, this paper explains this influential process and, at the same time, portrays one of the routes of the transfer of Muslims’ culture and philosophical thoughts to Europe and the quality of the formation of the institution of university during that time.

What is presented in this article is the explanation and confirmation of three claims about the Knowledge of religion of Muslim philosophers: First. Muslim philosophers influenced by Plato and Aristotle have considered man as a social being. This means that man continues to live and survive in the form of presence in city, and the formation and survival of city requires law. But the law they introduce for the administration of city is not a human law, but a divine law, and that law is nothing but the divine religion. Therefore, according to Muslim philosophers, the nature of religion is the law. Second. Since Muslim philosophers have considered religion as a law, they have never questioned the existence of this law; That is, they have not asked what kind of existence religion as a law has in the outside world. Third. Although Muslim philosophers have expressed ontological points under the concept of religion as words and books and the like, they do not consider religion to be ontologically authentic. They have never had a coherent, codified and independent discussion about religion from the perspective of ontology. The basic question about religion, which has been neglected in Islamic thought and culture so far, is this: How does religion exist as an entity? The difference in approach regarding the existence of religion will cause a difference in the way of encountering religion and establishing a relationship with religion. Therefore, the ontology of religion is not just a theoretical discussion and it has many practical effects.

Present article tries to review and appreciate the Persian translation of two chapters of the History of Islamic Philosophy. This book edited by S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman and printed by Routledge in 1996. Apart from editors who are experts in Islamic philosophy and culture some other Professors and researchers are present in the writing of the book. Consequently, the work of Nasr and Leaman and their contributors is a considerable activity in the subject of writing history of philosophy in Islamic tradition. Persian translation of the History of Islamic Philosophy, printed in five volumes by Hikmat press in Tehran. In Persian translation that worked by some professors and researchers, first volume has no scientific editor and because of this in some of its chapters there are difficulties. For example, in the eleventh and twelfth chapters that are on al-Kindi and al-Farabi and translated into Persian by Ruhallah Alemi, we encounter with important errors in conveying the meanings of the original text. Here we study both chapters by comparing between Persian translation and original English text of them. Reviewing of chapters on al-Kindi and al-Farabi are exercised separately but our appreciation is in the Analysis and Consequence part of the essay. Main causes of unreliable or improper translation of some parts are these: 1- lack of scrutiny on the philosophical or historical terms; 2- lack of specialization on al-kindi and al-Farabi's philosophies and their books; 3- not employing any editor by press Hikmat on translator's work. Of course, we expected that Ruhallah Alemi as a university teacher and translator, must have been reviewed his translation. Performing this duty is a necessary condition in academic activities. Other aspect of this matter is a cultural-moral one that depicts our responsibility and faithfulness in teaching and research; a responsibility of a person who is linking the writer with the reader.