جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Democracy » در نشریات گروه « اقتصاد »

Theories of institutional economics emphasize the importance of the method of political governance as a determinant of financial market development. In the economic literature, based on theoretical perspectives, there are two completely different and contradictory perspectives on the impact of democracy on financial development. In fact, in theory, democracy may have a positive or negative effect on financial development. Therefore, empirical studies should be performed on a specific sample to determine the positive or negative relationship. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between democracy and financial development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) using the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) model during the period 2002-2021. In this study, a two-regime model with a transfer function and one threshold was determined and the results of estimating the first and second regimes show that democracy in both regimes has a negative and significant effect on financial development and since increasing the numerical values of the democracy index in this study means that the level of democracy is deteriorating, so the results show that improving the level of democracy leads to promoting financial development.

The destructive effects of corruption on the economic, social, and political development of countries have invigorated numerous studies to identify the determinants of corruption and to attempt to provide strategies to fight and control this issue. Accordingly, the present study attempts to estimate the impact of electoral cycles (including election year, government's ideology, coalition, and minority government) on corruption in two groups of selected democratic countries during the period 2003-2018 using panel data and the generalized moment models (GMM) method. The first group includes the countries with a positive average of the democracy index for the period under review, and the second group consists of countries with a negative average. The results showed that the effect of the election year on corruption in the second group countries was positive and significant, but in the first group, it was negative and significant. The effect of the government's ideology on corruption in the second group countries is positive and meaningful and in the first group countries, it has been meaningless. The influence of the coalition and the minority government on corruption in both groups is negative and meaningful. Also, the effect of control variables including per capita income, E-government, and democracy on corruption in both groups of selected countries has been positive and meaningful. However, the impact of natural resource rents on corruption in the second group countries has been positive and meaningful, whereas it was meaningless for the first group countries.

Based on theoretical foundations, the effect of arms trade on defense spending is ambiguous and influenced by various strategic, security and political factors. One of these factors is democracy. In this regard, this paper investigates the threshold effects of arms trade on defense spending in 30 selected countries for the period of 1995 to 2018, using the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) model as one of the most prominent regime-switching models. For this purpose, democracy net is used as a transition variable. The linearity test results indicate strongly nonlinear relationship among variables under consideration. Moreover, considering one transition function and one threshold parameter, as a two-regime model, is sufficient to specification of nonlinear relationship among variables. The results indicate that threshold value is 4.75 percent and the estimated slope parameter is 0.61. In the first regime, the arms import has a positive and small effect on defense spending; that after crossing the threshold level and entering the second regime, this positive effect has decreased. Also, arms export has a positive effect on defense spending in the first regime; But after crossing the threshold level, in the second regime, this positive influence changes its sign and becomes negative. Based on other results, after crossing the threshold level of democracy and being in the second regime, the positive effect of the variables of GDP, population, income from natural resources and the conflict index, decrease (while maintaining the sign) and the negative effect of the health spending variable increases. These results show that the level of democracy plays an important role in the effect of the arms trade on defense spending and in general the effect of the variables included in the defense spending function.

In recent years, human development has gained great importance among the countries over the world. Achieving higher human development requires identifying the factors affecting it. Economic freedom and democracy are among the effective factors discussed in this research. In this paper, using panel data, the effect of economic freedom and democracy on human development in selected OPEC countries is investigated over the period 2005-2020. For this purpose, Generalized Least Squares (GLS) econometric method has been used. The estimation results show that the variables of democracy and economic freedom have a positive and significant effect on human development. In addition, the variables of population, employment of women, and employment in industry have a positive and significant effect, and the variable of urbanization has a negative and significant effect on the human development index.In recent years, human development has gained great importance among the countries over the world. Achieving higher human development requires identifying the factors affecting it. Economic freedom and democracy are among the effective factors discussed in this research. In this paper, using panel data, the effect of economic freedom and democracy on human development in selected OPEC countries is investigated over the period 2005-2020. For this purpose, Generalized Least Squares (GLS) econometric method has been used. The estimation results show that the variables of democracy and economic freedom have a positive and significant effect on human development. In addition, the variables of population, employment of women, and employment in industry have a positive and significant effect, and the variable of urbanization has a negative and significant effect on the human development index.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of political regime types, including democracy and dictatorship, on the quality of economic institutions as the main variables in the formation of the economic growth process. The political power is distributed among a wide range of interest groups in mature democracies, while it is concentrated in the hands of the elected executive in initial democracies in a way that other groups are unable to participate in political power. In initial dictatorships, the political power is vested in one individual as well, but in mature dictatorships, it is divided among the members of the ruling group and the leader is limited in removing other members of the ruling coalition. The empirical results indicate that the economic institutions enjoy better quality in mature democracies and dictatorships compared to the initial democracies and dictatorships. Moreover, the economic institutions’ quality in mature dictatorships and democracies is not significantly different. The mature dictatorships have better protection of property rights compared to the initial democracies, despite the fact that they lack free elections. The results are robust to change the dependent variable, control variables, the sample, and using the instrumental variable approach.

In the past few decades, the harmful effect of dependence of governmentson the income of abundant oil resources in the economy of developing countries has received a lot of attention; So that the discussion about its results, such as the wealth of abundant oil resources, can negatively affect the governance and state of democracy of a country has been raised. The political and economic inefficiency known as "curse of oil" is a complex and structural phenomenon which is mainly caused by poor management or poor investment of oil revenues by the governments of oil producing countries. The purpose of this research is to compare the relationship between oil revenues and tax revenues on democracy in oil-dependent countries with medium income and also oil-dependent countries with high income using the Systemic Generalized Moments (SYS-GMM) approach. For this purpose, data related to the dependent variable of democracy and independent variables, oil revenues, tax revenues, economic growth, GDP per capita and population for 10 countries with high oil income and 21 countries with medium oil income including Iran during the years 1980 to 2018 was analyzed. In summary, the results of the study and estimation of the model showed that with the increase of oil and tax revenues in countries with high oil income, the level of democracy has improved; While for countries with medium oil income, the increase in oil and tax revenues leads to a decrease in the level of democracy and the phenomenon of oil curse is confirmed.

Political and social stability is an important component of optimum management in the public sector economy and, in turn, a key element in good governance. This key component of good governance and the basic element of optimum management of the public sector economy have a significant relationship with education and health in different societies. At the same time, education and health are fundamental elements for creating human capital and human development. Political and social stability provides a pacific environment for economic progress. This is because these elements encompass the conditions under which the law is ruling, sufficient security is prevailing in different societies, and economic activists benefit from enough freedom. As social and political stabilities are not separable, they are used interchangeably in this article, and, for brevity, they are referred to as political stability. In other words, political stability in this article means political-social stability. Not surprisingly, countries that benefit from more political and social stability do possess more economic progress. As there is a significant relationship between political and social stability on one hand and human development on the other, reinforcing human development and human capital can have an influential role in promoting political and social stability. Consequently, governments can redirect their welfare expenditures to improve health and education that eventually provide enough ground for better political and social stability. Accordingly, one main goal of this article is to investigate the impact of public expenditure in education and health on political and social stability.

By using econometric and statistical methods, this study analyzes the factors affecting political and social stability through human development. It investigates the impact of public expenditure on welfare (especially those expenditures devoted to health and education) and political and social stability for selected countries. The selected countries include 34 developed countries, so-called OECD countries on one hand and 17 Middle Easten and North African countries, so-called MENA member countries. The MENA countries include Iran as well. The time period for this study is 1998 through 2020. By using a simultaneous equation system, this article explores the outcome of public expenditure in health and education on political and social stability in the mentioned countries. Moreover, and for a more realistic analysis, the other variables which influence political and social stability are addressed too. These variables include inflation rate, unemployment rate, inequality, and per capita income. Meanwhile, the role of democracy is discussed. For more scrutiny in this work, the negative correlation of investment and property rights is taken into consideration in the final analysis. Before econometric analysis, the dependency of some of the above variables on one hand and the political stability on the other are investigated statistically.

The result of the analysis in this study stresses some basic issues. It firstly, indicates that there is a positive and significant relationship between the welfare expenditures of the government, especially those dedicated to health and education, and political stability. Secondly, inflation rate, unemployment rate and inequality have negative and significant relationships with political stability. This paper presents the claims of new public sector theories versus the old public sector theories. The former claim is that the role of investing in health and education on political stability is much greater than concentrating on military power and security-oriented power to create political stability. According to the old theories of the public sector, however, the military power and concentrating on security orientations create political stability.

The significant relationship of the welfare expenditure of government devoted to health and education with political stability is the main finding of this research. The negative relationship of inflation and unemployment with political stability is another paramount finding of this work. By taking into consideration the first finding of this article, governments can improve health and education and create a significant amount of political stability. Also, by targeting a low inflation rate and decreasing the unemployment rate, they can promote the political and social stability. They can eventually boost the welfare of their citizens in the long run.

The purpose of this article is to examine the effect of political power on rule of law as a basis for economic development. Political power consists of two key components: power transition and power distribution. Power might be centralized in the hands of a small group or distributed among different groups. Power transition is also distinguished by democratic or non-democratic power. In the present study, the application of descriptive-analytical approach provides evidence that centralized political power leads to the violation of citizens’ rights by the politicians. Conversely, decentralized political power restricts the politicians and consequently, prevents the violation of legal rights. Then, the application of an empirical approach and the analysis of 102 countries’ data reveal that intensification in political power concentration will reduce the rule of law quality. In addition, the results indicate that controlling the power distribution effect will remarkably reduce the power transition’s effect on the quality of rule of law. Sensitivity analysis also demonstrates the results’ stability after changing the dependent variable, adding other control variables and using the instrumental variable method.

Examining how economic developmentaffect democracy is one of the most controversial issues in development. This issue can be more important for countries like Iran, which are in the early stages of their economic development. The present study tries to examine the theory of modernization from a new perspective in OPEC countries during the years 2000 to 2018, using the method of principal component analysis and developing a quantitative index for economic development. For this purpose, the variables of per capita income, urbanization rate, Access to education and industrialization have been used. The results of GMM model estimation show that the above variables alone do not have a significant effect on democracy. However, if economic development enters the model using a composite index, the positive and significant effect of economic development on democracy is evident.

Financial development is one of the important issues that has always been of particular importance to the economy of any country. It is impossible to achieve economic growth and development without efficient financial institutions and adequate financial resources. The determinants of the level of financial development in countries include qualitative factors including political environment, institutional, legal and information infrastructures, regulation and supervision. Although there are many factors affecting financial development and there are many studies and theories in this area, what has been the least considered is the impact of qualitative and institutional factors on financial development. The main purpose of this study is to investigate a group of important non-economic and qualitative factors on financial development. To this end, we examined the impact of the average of 3 indices ICRG as an indicator of quality of institutions, the POLITY IV index of democracy, and the property rights, on banking indices as an indicator of financial development for 27 developing countries in Eurasia during the years 1999-2015. Based on this, a panel data econometric model was defined and estimated by the GMM method. The results of this study indicate that high quality of institutions, higher democracy and protection of property rights have a positive and significant effect on financial development in the countries studied.

The purpose of this research is to study the effects of democracy and corruption on attracting foreign direct investment in West and East Asia. To do this, a dynamic panel model and generalized method of moments are employed over the period 2009-2018. The results of the estimates for the 13 countries of the West Asia Group indicate a positive and significant relationship between the democracy and foreign direct investment and the existence of a significant negative correlation between corruption and the consumer price index with the foreign direct investment. Also, in this group of countries, the effects of the degree of trade openness, democracy and real exchange rate on foreign direct investment were positive and significant and the effects of corruption and consumer price index were negative and significant. Besides, according to the results of this method for 15 East Asian countries, the corruption and consumer price index had negative and significant effects, and the democracy, corruption, trade openness, economic growth and real exchange rate had positive and significant impacts on foreign direct investment. Therefore, regarding the effect of democracy on attracting foreign direct investment, Jensenchr('39')s theory was approved in both groups of countries, but regarding the effect of corruption on FDI, in East Asia the theory of helping hand of corruption and in West Asia the theory of destructive hand or the corruption was confirmed. According to the results, the impact of these variables on foreign direct investment in the East Asian group was greater than the West Asian group.

The theory of comparative advantage based on the opportunity cost imply that international trade can shift the factors of production and Stalper-Samuelson's theory states that trade can be affected by factor prices. From one side, democracy can emphasize the importance of privatization and private sector and on the other hand, according to the middle voter theory, attention to the workforce importance. The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of democracy and trade on the proportion of production factors in Iran during 1357-1397. The research method is using econometric models, GLS and GMM. The research results show that the effect of the degree of openness and FDI on the wage-to-interest ratio variable is positive and significant. The effect of democracy on the wage-to-interest rate variable is positive and significant too. Also the interactive effect of two indicators of democracy and degree of openness (or FDI) on the wage to interest rate is positive and significant. These results are consistent with Stalper-Samuelson's theory and empirical studies. JEL Classification: F16, J24, P16

Reducing inequality, adjusting incomes, and redistributing issues become the biggest goal of development economics and the most difficult task for policymakers when viewed in conjunction with economic growth. Because achieving high growth rates, in addition to its own difficulties, also raises the concern that providing accelerated growth may lead to disruptions in income distribution. Therefore, explaining the causal relationship between growth and income distribution and how to determine the relationship between these two variables and then applying optimal growth and distribution policies has particular importance.Numerous studies have been conducted in different societies in this field, which is mainly based on Kuznets (1955) hypothesis of "income growth and distribution". In his studies, Kuznets observed a parabolic relationship between per capita income and income inequality and explained this relationship as follows: In the stages of economic development, the lowest and highest values ​​of per capita income with low inequality and the mean values ​​of per capita income with degrees More of the corresponding inequality. Using statistics from the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States, he empirically estimated the impact of economic growth on income distribution and observed that income distribution inequality increased during the first stages of economic growth, and then It balances and eventually declines during the final stages of economic growth. However, the results of empirical studies show that the Kuznets hypothesis has not always been confirmed and the relationship between economic growth and income inequality is not predictable, and depending on which country (or group of countries) this issue is examined, the relationship Positive, negative, meaningless or nonlinear will be obtained.For this reason, a new approach to the issue of economic growth and income inequality in macroeconomics has emerged among some economists, especially since the early 1990s. Attitudes that mainly believe that contrary to Kuznets, who considered only economic factors in explaining this relationship, the relationship between these two elements is endogenous and in addition to economic factors, is also a function of social and political factors as a result of developments. Politically and institutionally, societies are affected. Therefore, researchers are looking for variables that provide a more comprehensive understanding of patterns of growth and income inequality, and at the same time can achieve economic growth and income distribution at the same time. In this regard, the purpose of this article is to investigate the effect of democracy on the relationship between economic growth and income inequality in Iran. Theoretically, it is expected that the establishment of a democratic culture in society, in addition to providing suitable conditions for productive economic activities, will lead to reduce income inequalities and class conflict through the process of public participation and the expansion of justice for all. The side should be reduced in the shadow of democracy. But in fact there is no clear connection between this, and the effect of democracy on economic variables depends to a large extent on the actual distribution of power.Political elites can increase investment in real power (through control of local actors, mobilization of non-governmental military forces, political lobbies, and other means of controlling party rule) under certain circumstances that threaten the rule of law democracy. It is natural that in such an environment, democracy will have little effect on the redistribution of wealth and the reduction of inequality and economic growth. In addition, the democratic process may be limited by institutions such as the constitution, conservative political parties, judges, the real threat of a coup, and even widespread tax evasion, and as a result its economic effects diminished. So there is no exact relationship between democracy and the variables of growth and inequality, but this does not mean that basically any relationship is ruled out, but it is most likely due to the complex and different relationships between democracy and economic variables that pay attention requires more comments on this article.Theoretical explanation of the relationship between economic growth and income distribution can answer one of the fundamental questions of economic planners, especially in developing countries. Because these countries have always suffered from low levels of per capita income and wide income gaps. It can be said that eradicating poverty and reducing income inequality, when combined with economic growth and institutional and political reforms, becomes the biggest goal and the most difficult task of economic policy makers in developing countries.In the case of a country like Iran, of course, how the development process can be effective in the relationship between growth and income distribution. For this reason, in this article, the effect of democracy as a political variable on how this relationship is examined to clarify the effect of the expansion of democratic institutions on the problems of economic growth mismatch with income inequality at the same time and not by leaving one in favor of the other.

This research is causal and the data are extracted in the form of a library (general information and required data from the World Bank website, time series statistics published by the Statistics Center of Iran, the Central Bank and reports related to the policy project). The population studied in this research is Iran in 1971-2018.Due to the nature of the data, Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) method has been used to estimate the model. Excel, Microfit 4.1, Eviews9 software packages have been used for this purpose.The research is organized in such a way that after stating the introduction, the literature is briefly reviewed and the research model and variables are identified. Then, the model estimation and econometric tests necessary to check the accuracy and stability of the coefficients and results are performed, and at the end, we summarize the conclusions and present some suggestions.

According to the results of the research model (political economy of Kuznets curve), although Kuznets hypothesis (relationship u form of income inequality and economic growth) in Iran is not rejected, but considering the effect of the political institution of democracy has reduced the negative impact of growth on inequality Also, the inclusion of the variable of democracy in the model shows the opposite and significant effect of growth associated with democracy on income inequality, meaning that inequality is destructive and changes in the political regime (expansion of democracy) lead to redistribution. In fact, based on the theoretical foundations of this model, the Kuznets hypothesis is formed, but increasing inequality in society causes the masses of ordinary people who are dissatisfied with the current situation to form organizations and institutions for the realization of rights. Therefore, politicians who feel threatened have to put reform programs and redistribution policies on their agenda in order to avoid the risk of coup and revolution. As a result, it can be said that political reforms and democratic measures reduce inequality while increasing economic growth.

Based on the results of the estimation model:1- Kuznets hypothesis has been accepted with a high percentage of confidence in the research period. Economic growth has an increasing effect and squared Economic growth has a decreasing effect on income inequality and the intensity of these effects is greater in the long run. This confirms that tolerating a percentage of inequality in society to achieve a certain level of growth for economic development is inevitable, that with increasing the level of development, the effect of growth on inequality is reversed and the possibility of growth with proper income distribution Will be provided.2- Inflation has a direct and significant effect on income inequality, which means that increasing inflation widens the income gap of society. This result is consistent with the studies of Abu Nouri (2006) and Georgia (2008).3- The ratio of oil revenues to production has had a direct effect on income inequality. Thus, rising oil revenues have fueled severe inequalities. This result is consistent with the rentier government hypothesis in the Iranian economy that stakeholders are trying to gain as much share of oil rents as possible by influencing the budgeting and allocation process. Give. Therefore, it seems that increasing oil revenues by increasing access to foreign exchange resources and importing more consumer goods, provides the basis for unproductive activities and increasing income gaps.4- The inclusion of the Democracy Index in the model has reduced the negative effects of economic growth on inequality to an acceptable level (although the Kuznets hypothesis is still valid). Under democratic conditions, it is possible to achieve both components of economic growth and reduce inequality at the same time, but in the empirical analysis of these results, it is necessary to consider that the nature of the institution of democracy may prevent an immediate effect in this regard. The lower coefficient of this variable in the short run compared to the long run also confirms this.It should be noted that in order to ensure the accuracy of the results of econometric model estimates, tests of classical assumptions and to check the stability of the model, Cumulative Sum Of Recursive Residuals and Squares Of Recursive Residuals tests wereperformed for the specified model, the results of which indicate the establishment of Classic assumptions as well as model stability. Given the growing impact of growth on inequality in the early stages, it is likely that pursuing growth-oriented policies, regardless of their distributional consequences, will lead to a worsening of the income distribution situation in Iran. Therefore, in order to achieve both important development goals, namely economic growth and income distribution, it is necessary to consider growth strategies combined with redistributive policies.

The relationship between democracy and crime has long been considered by social scientists. The relationship between these two variables has been studied based on the three theories of conflict, civilization and modernization. The civilization perspective predicts that the rate of violent crime will decrease along with the effects of civilization from democratization. In contrast, the conflict perspective predicts that the rate of violent crime going to increase along with the brutalizing effects of inequality in market economies. The modernization perspective, however, predicts that with the transition to democracy, the rate of violent crime will initially increase, but as democracies mature, this rate will eventually decrease. This study examined the effect of democracy on violent crimes and property crimes during the period 2008-2017 for 88 countries using the Dynamic Panel Threshold Model (DPTR). The results of the estimates indicate that democracy will have an incremental effect up to the threshold and then a significant decreasing effect on crime. Thus, in the process of democratization, first, the crime rate will increase and then, as democracy matures, this rate will decrease, which is along with the predictions of the modernization perspective.

Inflation caused economic instability and has undesirable effects on economy performance such as economic growth, consumption, investment and other economic variables. On the other hand inflation affected several factors such as monetary and fiscal policy and political factors. Political situation is one of the element that noted by many of researches especially democracy situation. Many researchers had used political business cycle to explanation of inflation and democracy relationship that Nordhaus (1975) was progressive researcher in this subject. Thus the aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between democracy and inflation rate in selected countries of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region by panel data approaches over 2000-2016 periods. The results of fixed panel data estimation showed that democracy has negatively and significantly effects on inflation in selected countries of MENA. Also gross domestic product has negatively and significantly effects on inflation, too. On the other hand liquidity and government size have positively and significantly effects on inflation but trade have positively effects on inflation but not significantly.

Generally Speaking, investment is the heart of economic growth and development. Financing investment, on the other hand, is one of the major economic challenges, and yet, this is a very crucial issue in developing countries. Investment is made in the form of domestic and foreign investment, and therefore foreign investment is affected by economic and political conditions. Therefore, in this study, the effect of democracy on direct foreign investment has been done among two selected groups of countries including those with high and those with low level of democracy from 2001 to 2015 using panel data method. The results showed that democracy has a significant and direct impact on FDI in countries with high and low democracy, while the effect of democracy on FDI in countries with low democracy is much greater than in countries with high democracy. Besides, fixed capital formation, economic growth rate, literacy rate, exchange rate, trade and government size have direct and significant effects on FDI in countries with low democracy. However, in countries with a high level of democracy, exchange rates and government size have a significant negative impact on foreign direct investment.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of political stability and democracy on economic growth in member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). This study estimated panel regression using a Generalizes Method of Moments (GMM) framework, on a sample of 34 OIC member countries for the period of 1986-2014. In this research, a composite indicator of Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Military in Politics, Ethnic and Religius Tensions Religion in Politics has been used to calculate the political stability index using the principal components analysis method (PCA). The results of the research show that political stability and democracy have a significant positive role in the economic growth.

Corruption is a historical and global phenomenon, which exists in both developed and developing countries. Various cultural, social, economic and political factors affect corruption. Among these, security of property rights and democracy influence financial corruption. In this study, using a panel data system and generalized least squares method, the interactive effects of democracy and security of property rights on corruption are examined in 59 selected developed and developing countries during 2005-2014. The findings of estimations with various indicators of democracy (Polity2, FH, and Political Rights) show that whereas protection of property rights reduces corruption in any political environment, the presence of democracy in society cannot reduce corruption alone. Democracy should be accompanied by high levels of security of property rights in order to affect financial corruption negatively. In addition, while protecting property rights reduces corruption in any political environment, it is more effective against corruption at high levels of democracy.