سید حمید طالب زاده

Heidegger in Being and Time, following Kant, who considered transcendental logic as a condition for the possibility of empirical science, considers historicity as a transcendental condition of historiography. He turns the epistemological and methodological question of the historical sciences into an ontological question; that is, instead of asking “under what circumstances can the objectivity of the historical knowledge be confirmed?” he asks, “what kind of existence Dasein have that allows him to care about himself and the world, and understand the meaning of his past?” “And how is there such a thing as history at all?” In order to understand the importance of historicity in the general outline of the book, we should consider its relation to the main question of the work; “What is the meaning of Being?” Hence, this article pursues two goals; First, it tries to show the place of historicity in the whole work, in such a way that is clear how Heidegger first starts from the pre-theorical understanding of Dasein as “existence”, ang then moves toward the discovery of the main structure of existentials as “concern”; Then he introduces “temporality” as a transcendental structure of concern; And finally, it comes to this that the concrete form of temporality is “historicity”. The second goal of this article is to reinterpret this debate with regard to the question of “the meaning of Being”. In this regard, I try to explain that historicity, as a concrete form of temporality, shows the openness of Dasein as the scope of the emergence of the meaning of Being and beings is a close event, which has its beginning and end, as standing on the possibilities it is thrown to them and it takes from its heritage. From this point of view, Heidegger, following Kant’s tradition, considers meaning- giving as a finite process, but unlike Kant, who considered this finitude in terms of the dependence on sensory intuition of being in the world, and thus as the ontic, he considers it as an ontological. He Knows that it arose from the special way of existence of Dasein. Being and Time finally reaches the point that the meaning-giving process which, as the verb “temporalizing” and “hisoricizing” is expressed in trads of past, present, future, or in the other words, heritage, fate, destiny. So, historical finitude reveals the concrete form of temporal finitude. The terms of heritage, fate and destiny each confirm the finitude od Dasein, and in this way, the finitude of the meaning-giving event. In its powerlessness, Dasein in undertakes its heritage in an authentic way. Dasein cannot be its own foundation, but is thrown to its possibilities.

Søren Kierkegaard (1803-1855), nineteenth century Danish thinker, is mostly known for his deliberation on individual human life in connection with Christian faith. However, next to this context, Kierkegaard also gives an account on social or civil life, although his account on this issue is less known in comparison to the former one. The present paper is trying to investigate Kierkegaard's account of civil life, from a particular point of view. First, an account will be given of the phenomenon of envy and its various kinds, as it is treated in Kierkegaard's literature. then, the way in which, Kierkegaard considers the whole route of western philosophy - from the beginning of the New Age to the Hegelian System - as a representation of what he calls "the Age of Reflection", and opposes to "the Age of Revolution", will be pointed out. Also this will be shown that how Kierkegaard - in opposition to Hegel - does not consider "speculation" as a way out of reflection, but in fact, its completion. Finally and by focusing on the phenomenon of envy, Kierkegaard's critique of the Age of Reflection will be explained, and his account of the two sides of this particular age, i.e. its threatening and liberating sides, will be studied.

According to the critical Kant, the idea of God is a transcendental idea of pure reason, i.e., theoretical reason cannot, after considering its limitations, make an argument against or for it. In the pre-critical period, however, in a treatise called "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God" he tried to prove the existence of God by means of the theoretical reason. The significance of this treatise is that, on the one hand, contrary to what the critical Kant believes about the limits of human reason, he endeavors to theoretically prove the existence of God, and on the other hand, contrary to the Wolfian-Leibnizian tradition, he proposes a natural-theological argument instead of a cosmological argument. Concentrating on the concept of possibility in formulation of an ontological argument, he criticizes the former formulations, especially Descartes’, and presents a new version of it. In this paper, we intend to first explain Kant's argumentative reasoning for proving the existence of God based on "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God", and second, we try to show that the alleged conflict between the title of the book (only possible argument...) and its content (the acceptance of two natural-theological arguments and ontological argument), which led some of Kant scholars to believe that Kant is incoherent is false and comes from a mistake in translation of the German term ‘Beweisgrund’

Upgrading the epistemic context of modern science from mechanism to organism in German idealism allows Émile Durkheim to establish academic social science in France. The philosophical formulation of necessity and freedom (from Kant's dualism to Schelling's and Hegel's philosophy of nature) evolves in German idealism to the extent that it is possible to legalize the social affairs in the essential field of positivist science. Basic concepts and ideas of Durkheim's sociology, such as organic solidarity and division of social work, can be realized with the features of an organic approach such as a priori unity, internal consistency, and the necessity and legitimacy of the organic affairs, in a way that a prerequisite for understanding Durkheim's fundamental difference with English social science, as Durkheim repeatedly states, is to understand the quality of his thinking within the German tradition. Moreover, ethics, which prior to Durkheim, are independent sciences, are based on the organic approach to positivist science; therefore, the ethics of science is established with Durkheim.

Necessarily each epistemic set follows a method and logic. Weber, one of the founders of social science, claims that he uses the developmental logic for this science. On the one hand, he is considered to be a neo-Kantian thinker, so the main question of the article is how Kant's transcendental logic has been reconstructed in the developmental logic. To answer this question, a descriptive-analytic method has been used. The results show that as the relationship between the a priori thing, that is, philosophy, and the a posteriori thing, i.e., empirical science, in the Kant's logic, is concomitant, that is to say, that philosophy provides the possibility of empirical science, this is also the case in Weber's logic, with the conceptual transformations that have undergone in Weber's logic. Science is laden with value. Values make a part of the reality meaningful. Below the evaluating ideas, the ideal type is formed, as in the case of the Kantian noumena, determines the limits, so that the above thing is realized, through the notion of objective possibility from the perspective of generalized knowledge, sufficient; rather than the metaphysical necessity.

The question of relation between God and Universe Throughout the history of philosophy always have been an important and vital one. Sometimes this relation is a serious, connected one and in every moment but sometimes it is Disconnected and secular. In this essay, is tried on the base of Hegel’s philosophy of religion, an important philosopher who reinterpreted the Christianity, the relation between God and The universe have been explained. What is the position of God in the universe?
For this, after discusses the binary opposition between the transcendence and immanence in the interpretation of Protestantism, and then, defines secularism to explain these concepts, and finally elaborates on the concept of Trinity, an important Christian doctrine, which is a significant concept in Hegel’s philosophy of religion. This doctrine, according to Hegel’s own interpretations, constitutes the basis for the subject-object dialectics, and he interprets dialectics with trinity. At the end the relation between God and The universe explained in the Hegel’s view from the point of view of the binary opposition between the transcendence and immanence.

Abstract: Here, I will introduce a totality of a view about “the concept of an object in general” in the Critique of Pure Reason. In order to do so, I will articulate an article under the title of Generality of Kant’s transcendental logic since the article has presented the view adequately and in an uninterrupted way. Alongside with this articulation, I will purpose a consideration about this totality: As we will see, the fundamental characteristic of the totality of this view is to concentrate on determining the status of “transcendental logic sensu stricto” as (1) a necessarily “non-formal logic” that (2) still stays “universal”. Thus, transcendental logic can be proposed as a transcendental “universal ontology” which its subject matter is “the concept of an object in general”. based on this view, in order to set these two conditions, we must abstract transcendental logic from any relation to any level of “transcendental aesthetics in general” and “intuition in general”. The hint to this abstraction is the principle that “transcendental logic sensu stricto” can only be achieved at the level of “reason in general” and any reference to the level of “critique” of “reason in general” would already dysfunction the transcendental logic itself. Through a consideration, I will attempt to discuss this subject that to what extent the abovementioned view, with its omitting of the level of “critique of pure reason” from transcendental logic, stays loyal to “the idea of a transcendental logic” in Critique of Pure Reason.

Hegel has frequently used the Absolute and its synonyms such as absolute spirit and absolute idea and refers to them as the foundation of the unity of being and knowledge or concept and reality. But there are two main approaches in interpretation of absolute: Is absolute a metaphysical entity that describes the structure of reality (metaphysical interpretation) or refers to absolute spontaneity of the subject (non-metaphysical interpretation). By reviewing the formation of separation of being and knowledge (skepticism) in the modern age and the dichotomy of knowledge and thing in itself, this paper shows the conception of each interpretive approach about the reception of Hegel’s from Kant Philosophy. After careful examination of Hegel's criticism of Kant's philosophy, it is shown that Hegel's absolute is the foundation for explaining the objective reality. So without accepting the metaphysical interpretation, Hegel explanation will be unsuccessful.

According to Kant, men need a system of their own intellectual knowledge united under one Idea for reaching science. All parts and their relations of the system are determined a priori. This organized unity grows from within. Different a priori concepts of the system, leading to dual legislative realms, are natural concepts and the concept of freedom. The system itself unites this dualism to keep its unity .The transcendental ideas of reason have a role in this task. This essay wants to show it.

For Hegel unknowability of thing in itself in Kant's philosophy is equivalent to skepticism and he quests the reason of this failure in the critical method; For Hegel the failure of critical method lies in the pre-evaluation of possibility of knowledge, so this method of critique presuppose the subjectivism and so the impossibility of absolute. This article will argue that how Hegel with phenomenology recognizes the legitimacy of critical method and how he proposes an alternative for it which does not have the defect of subjectivism. In interpretation of phenomenology as an argument against skepticism three rival interpretation has been proposed. Two of them interpret phenomenology without any ontological commitment and the third interpret phenomenology as an argument for an ontological entity called absolute idea. By critical examination of three alternative interpretations of phenomenology, this article demonstrates that the final result of phenomenally is an ontological principle i.e. absolute idea, because the truth cannot be based on the immediate certainty of consciousness. So this new method of critique will be transitional (like platonic ascent) i.e. will be an ascent from immediate certainty of consciousness to truth of absolute Idea as an identity of indelibility and being.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, one of the Kant's followers and founders of German idealism, claimed that is the only philosopher that found the spirit of Kant's philosophy. Despite this claim, he is opposed to Kant in some of the most important issues. One of them is the problem of intellectual intuition. Kant explicitly disputes the intellectual intuition, whereas Fichte bases the consciousness on it and even he proves that without the intellectual intuition the knowledge is impossible in human kind.
He asserts that intellectual intuition in his opinion is something different from Kant's and itsname is the only common factor between them. He also says that Kant agrees with him and even this point is the spirit of the first critiques.
This assay is to study this issue and clarify the subject matter, then it turns out that in the point of intellectual intuition, spite common denominator between them, Fiche disagrees Kant. There is a difference of opinion in respect of "transcendental I". In this case what Kant explicitly denied is the same as Fichte proves.

Human beings through history have made a big deal of attempts to get to know their hazardous surroundings. People and societies have always construed all events and phenomenon as having meaningful relations, which has been mostly interpreted according to feelings and mental images. In the recent paper the relation and coordination between mystical knowledge and hazardous phenomenon has been considered. The main question here is why divers cultures have adopted diverse approaches and interpretations towards human and natural hazards. Mystical approach is distinct from scientific or intellectual one in that it is based on the past history and stories, or notion based on them. However, such an approach is not past itself and the modern world has its own myths which like those of the past are shaped according to our humane wishes, desires and anxieties.

In the present article, the effect of value on knowledge has been discussed. This can be challenging in its relationship to “objectivity of knowledge” on the one hand, and in its relationship to the indigenous and/ or religious knowledge. Nevertheless, any progress in this domain is contingent to precisely specifying the meeting points and assumed mutual effect of knowledge and value. The definite question of this article is as follows: “is knowledge value-laden?” The article’s answer to the question has been presented with the following approach: no single prescript can be issued on this subject. It means that the answer would be different from one case to the other, and part of this difference is related to the typology of values.

The emergence and establishment of modern social sciences in Western societies is explained as an “epistemic disembodying” which resulted in change in the metaphysics in the West. The views of Immanuel Kant have had a determining role in this process by providing the “possibility conditions” for the modern social sciences. By altering the conception of man from a “heteronymous being” to an “autonomous being”, as well as positing religion “within the boundary of mere reason”, Kant brought about dramatic changes into the metaphysics of the West .In comparison, Allameh Tabatabaee, as a prominent representative of the contemporary Islamic thought in Iran, has prepared a similar ground for the transformation of Islamic metaphysics. By suggesting the concept of “e’tebariyat” and a rational understanding of Islamic theology, Allameh Tabatabaee provided a general but introductory outline of a paradigm shift in understanding man and his relation with God in the Islamic metaphysics. However, by considering human reason as deficient, Tabatabee defines man not as an autonomous being but as a creature which is in need of an external support, namely, revelation. In this paper, it is argued that the consequence of this view is an understanding of society as a non-self-sufficient and non-self-founded, but founded on reason and revelation, simultaneously. The article concludes that although Allameh Tabatabaee provides some preparations for the “possibility conditions” of a new tradition of social sciences", he stands merely at the beginning of a long path which yet to be followed and completed by his students.

Wilhelm Dilthey, a German philosopher, is one of the founders of the continental philosophy of humanities. Following Kant, he regards his intellectual project as the critique of historical reason. This project expresses itself along two main axes: negative and positive. In the negative section, although Dilthey accepts that his project is Kantian and acknowledges Kant’s conception of the nature and function of philosophy, he criticized Kant’s positions on unhistorical epistemology, subjectivity and categories. For him such Kantian positions have no efficiency in the philosophy of humanities. In the positive section, Dilthey, by two steps, proposes psychology and the hermenutics of socio-historical life as the philosophical foundations of humanities. He, rejecting positivism and historism, makes use of objectivity, taken from positivism, and historicity, taken from historism, as the strong points of them. He seeks to prove the objectivity of humanities through a process of applying Hegel’s objective spirit to an empirical-historical context, and of explaining lived experience, life expressions and objectifications of life.

In the problem of the yardstick of effect's need to cause it is well-known that the pre-Sadrian philosophers believe in the essential possibility of effects, that is to say they held that the non-requirement of essence of effect in relation to being and non-being is the factor of effect’s need to cause. In contrast, Sadr al-Mutaallihin on the basis of fundamental principle of principality of existence and non-reality of contingent beings not in their quiddity and therefore believes in the theory of existential poverty. With further investigations and tracing the roots of this theory, in some of Ibn Sina's works it can be said that he also has paid attention to the theory of existential poverty. Ibn Sina by distancing himself clearly from Aristotelian tradition on the problem of causality and attention to divine agency, regards the cause as giving existence to effect and with different statements declares that the poverty of need of effect to cause lies in his existence. Therefore, besides rejecting the view of theologians who considered temporal contingency the yardstick of the need to cause, in comparison to previous sages says who regarded the yardstick of the need to cause in the nature of the non-requirement of effect, Ibn Sina goes a step further and in some statements explicitly states that the factor of effect's need to cause is the reason of its dependant existence which is the very reality of the effect. However, giving the scattered and different statements of Ibn Sina on the yardstick of effect's need to cause he can not be regarded as supporting the theory of existential poverty. But by tracing the indications of this theory in his works it shows that he can be regarded as the precursor of this novel Sadrian theory.

Any discussion of apophatic and kataphatic theologies as two opposite trends which have, throughout the history of philosophical though on God, attracted great thinkers, sheds light on one of the most important aspects of God-human epistemological relation. The present paper investigates Meister Eckhart’s viewpoint on these two approaches to theology. First, his definitions of apophasis and kataphasis are studied. Then, some suggestions are made to narrow the gap between the two definitions. Later in the paper, the two definitions are recognized as proper and discussed in detail. The paper ends with a study of Eckhart’s intellectual fount which aroused his interest in the two opposing trends of apophasis and kataphasis.

Arthur Schopenhauer، in Four Aspects Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason، criticized Kant’s interpretation of causality، which is written in the Second Analogy contained in the section of Principles of Pure Understanding. These criticisms express themselves along three main axes. By considering these criticisms، this article seeks to defend Kant’s account and to show that Schopenhauer didn’t understand properly the arguments that Kant has given. In this article، on the one hand، Kant’s position، in contrast with Schopenhauer’s view، is confirmed، but on the other hand، it is argued that Kant distorted the genuine meaning of causality and meant causality so that it was not consistent with the main aim that philosophers have taken at establishing causality، hence the criticism of this article of Kant’s explanation of causality.

Historiography of philosophy is intermediate between philosophy and History and Historians of philosophy are inevitably to apply Interdisciplinary approach. Étienne Gilson، contemporary French Neo Thomistic philosopher share substantially contribution in the expansion and development of the Historiography of religious philosophy، especially Christian philosophy. In addition Gilson''s philosophical Writings like as Foroughi، Will Durant، Russell and Copleston''s Histories of philosophy are the sources of Iranian Occident study and Has Shaped their understanding of Western philosophies. In His various writing Projects methodological Principles of Historiography of philosophy and apply Interdisciplinary Approach to Historiography of philosophy (By keep together philosophy، religion and History Simultaneously). Although claims a version of Objectivity in Reconstruction of History of philosophy، However as Will indicate، Gilson couldn''t transit from Thomistic and Eurocentric (Hegelian) assumptions of Historiography.

The first conceptions of intellect are a beign and an essence، we must begin exploring how they are related to each other. Everything that receives something from another is potential with regard to what it receives and what is receives in it is the actuality. Thus St. Thomas returns to the doctrine of potency and act of being to explain the relation of a being and an essence by developing in their meaning to be no longer confined to the concept of motion St. Thomas is doubtful between equivocal meaning of being and univocal meaning of it and therefore he uses the term analogy. This article tries to criticize doctrine of existentialism of St. Thomas.

To know human soul has been thought in Islamic teachings to be a principle for knowing God. Sadr a-Din a-shirazi, from the 11th H., and Allamah Tabatabaei, from the 14th H., the former being the founder and the latter a deputy of the transcendental philosophy, have dominantly focused on the problem. Both philosophers, being of the same epistemological goal, differs in approach. For Sadra, human soul is the creator of idea and, therefore, an example for God, the real Creator. Allamah, however, knows it as an existentially depended being leading directly to the existence of its self-subsistent Creator.

Anthropology is the comprehensive aspect of Kant’s thought and it can be considered as the product of critical thinking and practical aspects of his thought. In anthropology, Kant tries to explain human nature from pragmatic point of view, and not essentially. Kant ties human nature to his social aspects such as civilization, sociability, education etc. Kant tries to provide a comprehensive explanation of social and individual aspects of human being. Therefore, anthropology can be defined, from Kant’s point of view, as a global empirical science and practical philosophy which would like to recognize, by prudential reason and observation method, human nature with pragmatic approach. In addition, this philosophy wants to educate persons who can not only acquire speculative knowledge but also be considered as a citizen of the world.