جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « وهابیت » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

Identity is one of the factors that has always been influential in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But the victory of the Islamic revolution made this factor more prominent. Especially, the Islamic revolution of Iran is based on the Islamic-Iranian identity with an emphasis on the Shiite factor. An identity that is in conflict with the Islamic-Arabic identity of the Saudis with an emphasis on Wahhabism. In addition, the political identity of the Saudis is defined in closeness and unity with the West, but the Iranian identity is introduced with the unity of the Islamic world and in conflict with the West. Therefore, the question is raised, what are the consequences of the different political-social identities on the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia after the victory of the Islamic Revolution? The findings of the research indicate that different political and social identities are influenced by the ideology of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, centered on the Shiite religion in confronting the domination system and striving for a culture of resistance, and Saudi Arabia, centered on Wahhabi thinking, in cooperation with the domination system and in opposition to The culture of Islamic resistance has led to the adoption of confrontational policies by both sides in bilateral relations, regional crises and international competitions. The research method of this article is descriptive-analytical and the data collection tool is library-documentary.

One of the phenomena that can be seen throughout the history of Islam is the phenomenon of Takfir(Excommunication). From the Khawarij in the first century A.H to people like Ibn Taymiyyah and later Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab to movements like Al-Qaeda and ISIS under the title of Salafi and Takfiri groups, despite the fact that they appeared at different times, it seems that commonalities and similarities between their beliefs and actions can be Found. These commonalities are the subject of discussion in this article and the goal is to examine and extract the similarities and commonalities between these movements using a library findings including a review of existing historical and verbal reports and documents. What is obtained from the comparison of these two groups and the examination of sources and documents is that these two are similar and agree in beliefs such as formalism, rejection of esoteric interpretation(ta'wil), taqiyyah(Precautionary Dissimulation), recourse and calling them polytheism and excommunication of other Muslims, which is caused by rigidity, petrification and misunderstanding and its roots go back to ignorance and incomplete understanding of religion and perhaps some satanic soul faculties.

Introduction :

 Each Islamic denomination follows its respective beliefs to forge connections with other Islamic denominations and even non-Islamic religions. Religion plays a pivotal role in shaping their comprehension of Self, Other, and the approach towards communicating with others, ranging from acceptance to excommunication. In other words, religious beliefs constitute a foundation that governs the relations between different religions. A precise and nuanced understanding of diverse Islamic denominations is essential for avoiding the one-size-fits-all perspective that may see the diverse groups in the same way.  Such an understanding paves the way for recognizing historical, religious, and social distinctions, facilitating more informed and effective approaches to interact with different religious groups.The teachings of the Quran and the prophetic tradition prohibit sectarian conflicts, underscoring the unity and convergence among followers of different Islamic denominations. The empathy and convergence seem to be crucial, especially considering the constant efforts by the Western world to sow discord and division within Islamic countries. For example, the establishment of ISIS in the Middle East involved the Muslim nations, with the ultimate aim of ensuring security for Israel. Recently, the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan has made it essential to reassess their foundational beliefs, laying the groundwork for fostering more symbiotic relations with them.The Deoband school of thought is considered one of the influential Islamic denominations in the recent developments of the region. Deobandis adhere to the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and Maturidism as a school of Islamic theology. TheDeobandi movement emerged with the purpose of opposing the British East India Company. Due to their concerted efforts, Deobandis rapidly spread across the Indian subcontinent, later establishing a significant base in Pakistan and Afghanistan and founding religious schools and educational centers there. The Taliban group is one the movements developed out of the adherence to the religious beliefs of the Deoband school of thought. Against this backdrop, the present research aimed to examine three key issues: the fundamental religious beliefs of the Taliban, the distinction between the Taliban and Salafism, and suggestions for Iran’s strategic foreign policy towards these groups with an eye to their religious beliefs.

Literature Review:

Authored by Khalil Ahmad al-Saharanpuri, the book Al-Muhannad 'ala al-Mufannad [The Sword on the Disproved] not only provides responses to the inquiries posed by Wahhabi scholars but also elaborates on the beliefs of the scholars from Darul Uloom Deoband. The book unveils the conspiracies of adversaries and elucidates the true teachings of the venerable figures of Maturidism. The collection of essays titled Maghalat Al-Kawtheri [Kawtheri’s Essays] includes miscellaneous essays written by Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari. The collection contains some essays that oppose the Wahhabi thought. While dismissing Wahhabism, al-Kawthari delves into the core beliefs of the Deobandi school of thought. In the article titled “Taliban and Deobandism” (2018), Mohammad Bagher Hassani examined the relationship between the Taliban and the Deobandi school. The author compared some Deobandi concepts with Wahhabism and other Sunni sects, highlighting their shared aspects as well as distinctions. Hassani’s descriptive–analytical research also focused on Islamic groups, such as the Taliban, which are recognized for their adherence to the theological doctrines of Maturidism.In addition to comparative studies, there are also reference works on the theological beliefs of Maturidism and Wahhabism. A notable work is Kitab al-Tawhid [Book of Monotheism] by Abu Mansur al-maturidi, considered the canonical source for followers of the maturidi school of theology. Abu Mansur al-Maturidi refers to imitation in belief and faith as a wrong approach, focusing on the logical and narrative-based examination of the theological foundations of Maturidism. The book Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah [The Path of Sunnah of the Prophet] was written by ibn Taymiyyah, a prominent Hanbali scholar considered as a founder and iconic figure of Salafism. The book deals with religious beliefs as well as several jurisprudential opinions and fatwas of Ibn Taymiyyah, including his unconventional views on refraining from visiting graves, and resorting to blessings and supplications. In addition, the article titled “Investigation of the Factors Affecting the Change in Iran’s Political–Defense Approach Towards the Taliban” (Parizad & Shahrestani, 2022) examined Iran’s foreign policy strategies concerning the Taliban group, highlighting the role of environmental factors and global structures.

The present study used the library method to collected and analyze the data.

According to the research results, the Taliban originated from Maturidi theology and Deobandi religious centers in Pakistan, and Salafism has its roots in the Wahhabi theology. Despite common origins, there are fundamental differences between the Taliban and salafism, manifesting in salient theological and religious issues such as monotheism in worship, intercession, and the stance towards the shia. Notably, the Taliban, in contrast to Salafism, exhibits a broader, universalist approach to acceptance of and interactions with other groups, particularly the Shia. According to the religious teachings, unity and convergence are not merely tactical considerations but fundamental principles of the Islamic faith. Therefore, the foreign policy strategy of Islamic states should be aligned with religious teachings. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as an Islamic state, seems to have anchored its foreign policy on this principle. Considering geopolitical borders and ideological considerations, Iran has established positive relations with the Taliban group, showing tolerance in border conflicts and water disputes. Iran’s foreign policy towards the Taliban is characterized by Iran’s concern about the formation of Salafi and Wahhabi groups in Afghanistan. Therefore, given the doctrinal differences between these groups, Iran views the relations with the Taliban as appropriate to prevent the establishment of Salafi groups in its eastern neighbor. Moreover, Iran’s foreign policy can pursue cooperation and relations with the Taliban against a common adversary, namely the United States.

A comprehensive understanding of Islamic intellectual and religious schools is crucial to reach an accurate interpretation of the foundations of Islam. Knowledge about different schools of thought can offer a better understanding of religious teachings, facilitating a more accurate interpretation of religious doctrines and beliefs. Moreover, as indicated by the findings, such an understanding can aid in devising foreign policy strategies in dealing with diverse religious groups.

A movement known as "Al-Sahwa Al-Islamiyya" progressively emerged in Saudi Arabia with the entry of Muslim brothers in the 1960s and 1970s. Sahwa's theoretical foundations combined Wahabi views with the political Islam of Muslim brothers. It was able to broaden its membership in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, an examination of its activities from the time of its founding until the 1990s shows that it never formed a collective action to challenge the Saudi regime—rather, its activities were restricted to the cultural, social, and educational spheres. This essay aims to provide an answer to the issue of what conditions or elements contributed to its development until it emerged in the political arena and began to undermine the Saudi Kingdom's religious and political legitimacy. The core argument of this study is that Sahwa's emergence cannot be attributed solely to US forces' presence during the Gulf War; rather, several factors, including the war itself as the most important one, allowed Sahwa to mobilize its forces and eventually transform into a social movement. Thus, using seven variables, an examination of the intricate complex of internal and external elements contributing to Sahwa's growth was conducted. From the standpoint of political sociology, in fact, a complex of these factors caused the distinct religious and political spheres as well as two different social groups, namely Sahwi ulema and intelligentsia, through forming a fragile coalition, to mobilize social forces against the Saudi regime and express their demands through several petitions to inform Malek Fahd.

In contemporary period, various currents such al-Qaeda and ISIS have been able to attract many followers by using the ideology of Salafism and Takfir. Issues such referring to the Salafe Saleh and the sanctity of words such caliphate, jihad, martyrdom and support of countries like USA are the most important reasons for the spread of Takfir. the purpose of this study is to investigate the role of Saudi Arabia in spreading the idea of takfir. the question is what role has Saudi Arabia played in the spread of the idea of Takfir in the Islamic world? Considering that the approach of Salafism and Takfir has been supported and propagated by various individuals and groups, and this approach in the form of Wahhabism has formed the official religion of Saudi Arabia, the hypothesis is that the spread of Takfir means the spread of the official ideology of Saudi Arabia and is therefore supported and propagated by this country. The present study has used the constructivist approach and descriptive-analytical method to the role of Saudi Arabia in spreading the idea of Takfir.

The need to discover the relationship between Wahhabism and separatism among some Arab people of Khuzestan after the imposed war, considering the importance of the issue and the different ethnic and religious conditions governing Khuzestan, gave enough motivation to the researchers to use Weber's understanding analysis method to empathetically understand the developments of the phenomenon and The described conditions with an interpretive approach and qualitative strategy and the use of contextual theory based on the Strauss-Corbin paradigm model including causal conditions, contextual conditions, intervening conditions, strategies and consequences, fill the existing theoretical gap by purposefully collecting data through in-depth interviews with 34 people from People who have changed their religion and become Wahhabis and have Tablighi and Salafist thoughts and 6 knowledgeable and opinionated experts.The different state of changing the ethnic and religious identity of the Khuzestan Arab people indicated that the change of religion of some Khuzestan Arabs is in the "Wahhabi-Shia" dual and not "Sunni-Shia" and is completely different from the common patterns of takfiri among the Sunnis, which is in four layer and takes place in a period of 6 months to 3 years, which the researchers interpreted as "self-representing multilayered identity" by drawing a pyramid on four levels. The identity built in these layers becomes more complicated and deeper by moving from the base to the top of the pyramid and includes four stages: "Hesitant towards Shi'ism", "Wahhabi", "Tablighi-Takfiri" and "Salafi-Jihadist".

The outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978 changed the political and security equations of the Middle East in general. One of the most important changes was the confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia as two powerful and influential countries in the region, which had previously had relatively friendly relations and coordination at the regional level. In this study, an attempt is made to investigate the impact of religious ideology (ideological rivalry) on the tense relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia; In the following, the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the form of Shiite ideology versus Salafi-Wahhabi ideology after the Islamic Revolution and then in the rivalry between the two countries in Syria and Yemen are examined. According to the findings of this article, religious ideology was one of the most important factors of tension between the two countries, which has been significantly evident in the developments of the last decade in Yemen and Syria.

The Islamic movement of Dagestan is one of the affecting players in the social developments of this region, which is influenced by the religious-cultural environment of Chechnya, and consists of two broad schools, traditional and Salafi. Despite the armed struggle against foreign colonial powers, the predominance of Tariqati and Sufi tendencies among Dagestani Islamists has caused the Islamic movement to take a tolerant attitude internally since the 18th century, but since the 1980s, especially with the collapse of the Soviet :union:, Salafi teachings and ethics have been promoted by the support of extra-regional powers. Considering the significance and position of Islamist parties and groups in the contemporary developments of the North Caucasus, the main question of the current article is what is the nature of the Islamic movement of Dagestan among contemporary Islamic movements? The authors have tried to answer the question by adopting a descriptive-analytical approach and collecting library data. The findings of the research reveal that the tendency of the majority of Dagestan's society towards Sufi schools and the growing awareness of the threats of Salafist beliefs in the region, traditionalism will continue to dominate the Islamic movement of the region in the upcoming decades. Therefore, the Islamic groups of Dagestan seek to concentrate on social and religious activities instead of formal-structured political engagement.

Looking at the philosophy of law, one of the main functions of law is to regulate social relations at every level, which individuals must harmonize with the laws and regulations of the subject. Therefore, those who violate these basic legal rules in any way must be held accountable at every level. In addition to this issue, we come to two-dimensional responsibility, that one dimension of which is the aspect of civil liability of some legal entities (such as governments) in the second place; Sometimes we have to obtain criminal enforcement guarantees for individuals (involved in the case); Why one of the basic principles of criminal law, whether domestic or international, is the need to be accountable for actions and behavior. In this research, according to the description presented with a descriptive-analytical approach, we are looking for a convincing answer to the question that some interactions formed contrary to the rules and order and international peace, which seriously endangers it, should not have reached a level in the world today that reached a level where it can hold such individuals, both real and legal, accountable for their actions, regardless of political issues, by identifying legal responsibilities be questioned?

Islamism in Saudi Arabia, which is based on the Wahhabi reading of Islam, forms the maximum spectrum in Saudi society. Despite the minimal spectra, like the Shiites and other Sunni sects, there are in Saudi Arabia, but due to the rule of the royal family and Wahhabism in the political and social spheres of society, in practice, such currents in society are not allowed to emerge and manifest their identity policies. Hence, the Islamist identity policies in Saudi Arabia are based on the reading of Wahhabi Islam and its currents, like official Wahhabism, Sahihs and jihadists. The main question of the article is what are the characteristics of Islamist identity policies in Saudi Arabia?

The method of this research is documentary analysis and data collection is in the form of library and interview.

Islamism in Wahhabi reading is one of the main foundations of Saudi Arabia's identity and the royal family derives its legitimacy from it. In this area, everything is exclusively in the hands of Wahhabism, and the phenomenon of religious pluralism and pluralism in Saudi Arabia has been prevented. The hallmarks of Islamist identity policies stem from currents such as official Wahhabism, Sahihs, and jihadists.

After examining the backgrounds, components, goals, challenges and obstacles of Islamist currents, the characteristics of Islamist identity policies were identified, which are: legitimizing the actions and decisions of the Saudi government, opposing Western culture and themes, takfir and jihad against polytheists, discriminatory measures against Shiites and depriving them of basic rights to life, strict laws against women and their anonymity, opposition and opposition to liberals and secularists, educational system and legal system based on the teachings of Wahhabism, opposition to democracy and denial people's political participation, the spread of Wahhabism, the emphasis on traditionalism and opposition to modernity.

With the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the spread of discourses such as the establishment of a world Islamic government, the export of the revolution, the Umm al-Qura of the Islamic world, and subsequently the invitation of Muslims to join the Shiites, rival, alternative and alternative discourses were formed. The first example was Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. A country that, with its traditional position in maintaining the status quo, was opposed to the Islamic Revolution by the Islamic Revolution, which wanted to change the status quo. Saudi Arabia sought to secure its leadership in the Islamic world by updating its religion, Wahhabism, as the ideological rival of the Islamic Revolution. But ISIL's rival and Wahhabi model has risen up against this political Islam and is showing its part-time government in Iraq and Syria. This article compares the political beliefs, political ethics and political behavior in the political systems of Shiites and ISIL during the years 2011-2016.

After independence as an Islamic country, Pakistan sought to use Islamic th o u g ht as an identifying factor. An important issue that can affect Iran-Pakistan relations is fundamentalism in Pakistan. Based on structural theory, this article tries to examine the impact of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan on the re l a t i o n s between this country and Iran between 1991 and 2020. The main question is what effect has Islamic fundamentalism had on the relations between the two countries? The hypothesis that will be proven in this study is that the activities of fundamentalist political parties and currents are due to the co n t r a st between the principles of Pakistani Sunni fundamentalism and the religious spirit of Shiite thought in Iran and the incitement of interventionist powers have b e c o me a powerful factor of divergence in Relations between the two countries have changed. In the present study, a descriptive-analytical method has been used.

The subject of the Wahhabi Salafi current is one of the most complex intellectual topics in the field of research, which,due to its connection with the government of Al-Saud, has become increasingly widespread in the world, including North Africa. Wahhabism in Algeria has a more distinct history than neighboring countries such as Tunisia and the Maghreb, and entered Algeria more than a century ago.The Wahhabi Salafi movement in Algeria has always faced various ups and downs over the decades. The study of political Islam in general and its internal attitudes in particular is constantly a controversial topic.Among these views, the issue of the Wahhabi Salafi movement is one of the most complex intellectual issues in the field of research,which, thanks to its connection with the Al-Saud government, has become increasingly widespread in the world, including North Africa. Wahhabism in Algeria was promoted before other neighboring countries for various reasons,including the actions of Abdelhamid Ben Badis. The main activities of Salafi currents in the Shazli period are the new Ben; Because during the almost long period of Boumediene, all the activities of the Salafi currents were suppressed and controlled.This descriptive-analytical article analyzes the content and critiques the contexts and consequences of the presence of Wahhabism in Algeria after independence from1962 to 1990; The main question is: what are the conditions and reasons for the emergence of Wahhabism and the perspective of Wahhabism in Algeria?

This article is aimed at examining the relationship between Saudi Arabia’s political system and its religious establishment. Such a study can help better understand Saudi political and social policies in both domestic and foreign arenas. Through the study of the power and influence of religious scholars in Saudi Arabia at the official and social levels, I discuss the approach with which the political system acts towards demands of youth, women, minorities, as well as international demands and pressures for the advancement of reforms. The question I seek to answer in this article is how and why the relationship between Saudi Arabia’s political system and the religious establishment has changed over time. The hypothesis is that the relationship between the two has dramatically shifted over the past century due to the gradual decline in the religious establishment’ independent character as well as the political system’s desire to control it, giving way to the replacement of the traditional “Wahhabi state” with a "quasi-Wahhabi state" that uses Wahhabism as a tool (legitimizer) against its rivals and opponents. In other words, this relationship has gradually benefited the political system, and the religious establishment has become a dependent institute of the political power. This process was consolidated during the reign of King Salman in a way that intensified the religious establishment’s adherence to the political system and making it passive like never before.

The purpose of this study is the pathology of conversion in Khuzestan province. The research method is qualitative analysis with inductive strategy. University and Howzeh professors, cultural experts in Khuzestan province and individuals are subject to cultural identity change are Statistical population. Using intentional and judgmental sampling method, 25 members of the statistical population were selected as the sample size of the study. Data collection is free (in-depth) interview. Excerpts from interviews were analyzed using MAXQDA2018 software. Finally, 9 main categories and 39 sub-categories were identified from the analysis of the findings. The most important causes of the occurrence and prevalence of this emerging phenomenon are the underlying factors (Such as unemployment, poverty, poor transmission of religious teachings, rural-urban migration, marginal growth), Structural factors (such as weakness and inefficiency of cultural management models and quality of performance of influential institutions) and intervening factors (such as the role and influence of dissidents including foreigners and opposing currents in creating and fueling this phenomenon). The possibility of exploiting and abusing of the people who are inclined to Wahhabism in Khuzestan by separatist, takfiri and terrorist counter-revolutionary currents (like ISIL) In persecuting and subversive acts, will be one of the most important threats.

This article intends to examine the role of the Republic of Turkey with secular ideology and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with Wahhabi ideology in the production and intensification of Takfiri extremism in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the post-1991.

The research method of the present article is descriptive-analytical and the study of the subject is comparative in the framework of the theory of "security complex" of Bari Bouzan. The necessary information has been collected using the library method and by referring to books, articles, and domestic and foreign publications.

The findings show that the competitive polarity of Turkey and Saudi Arabia has manifested itself in different ways in Central Asia. The Turks have promoted Gulenism within the framework of Pan-Turkism, and the Saudis have spread Wahhabi ideology in the region within the framework of public diplomacy.

Central Asia, as a security complex after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been exposed to the competition of major regional powers, and these powers have been effective in various ways in securing the region. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as two major poles of the Islamic world, have provoked the fault lines of fundamentalism in this region and have seen their interests in fueling extremism. The ideological competition between the two countries has made a difference in role, level, purpose, strategy and fruit. Although the Turks and Saudis have acted differently, their work has been similar in intensifying Takfiri extremism in Central Asia.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia are important countries in the turbulent Middle East region. The fields of conflict and conflict in the two countries' relations go back to the past decades. But in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, and especially in the last decade, the pattern of identity-based conflict has been ruled by the two countries. The critical centers of crisis in the two countries' relations lie in the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi-Arab conservative identity on the one hand and Iran's revolutionary-Shiite identity on the other. Identity has shaped the interests and security structure of the two countries in relation to each other. In Iranian-Saudi relations, along with other subjective factors such as culture, ideology, and objective factors such as geopolitical competition, energy, and identity, it is important. The role of the structure of the international system and the policies of the great powers in intensifying the identity conflicts between the two countries are also prominent. The research method in this study is qualitative in nature and in terms of fundamental and descriptive methods. This study, with the theoretical framework of constructivism, shows that the lack of a shared identity as a critical focus of the crisis lies in the two countries' relations and is an identity conflict that exacerbates and perpetuates other sources of tension and inequality between the two countries.

Wahhabism has been acted as an identical and religious key factor to maintain the political and legitimacy of the Saudi's government. On the later of 1980-1990s, in response to a number of dissatisfaction as well as internal and external factors, the Islamist opposition movement have been arisen which finally, led to the skepticism in the religious foundations of the Saudi’s political legitimacy. With the occurrence of Arab Spring as well as the implementation of (initial draft of) 2030 Plan, critical Islamist divisions to the Saudi government were intensified as well as alliance between the government and the Wahhabi scholars were faced the initial divisions. The present study attempts to answer the two following questions through using explanatory and analytical methods 1.What have been the most significant political challenges of Saudi government with the Islamist critics such as Islamist awakening movement (ASSAHVEH), Ikhvan and Jihadists since 1990s, especially in the Arab spring era? 2. What will be the political consequence of the 2030 Plan for the political legitimacy of Saudi Arabia government? The hypothesis confirms the research findings. The findings indicate that modernization in various fields, especially education, leads to the rise of the critic and reformist Islamist groups. These groups were emerged in the response to the government supports for the US-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, political obstruction as well as socio- political dissatisfactions took a critical stance on the government which this situation was gradually exacerbated by the Arab Spring. However, the aggressive ambitious and destructive reform plan against the religious institution stipulated in the 2030 Plan (Document), especially concerning social freedoms and women's rights, as well as scholars were neglected by Ben Salman led to the major challenges between the Wahhabi scholars or Wahhabi Supreme Council and the Saudi government which are likely exacerbated in the future.

In the history of Islam, extremist ideologies such as Wahhabism, under the influence of violence and extremism, have consistently labeled others as heretics and pagans. They have consistently been trying to expand their realms through waging war, bloodshed and plundering. The contemporary extremist groups share great similarities with Wahhabism in terms of ideology and demonstration of violent behaviors. Today, The ISIS and Al-Qaeda which operate under such ideologies are primarily run by Egyptian and Saudi nationals and as such these individuals have Muslim Brotherhood-Wahhabi convictions. Relying on Wahhabism with roots in Ibn Taymiyyah and Muslim Brotherhood, their followers have drawn upon extremist ideas of Sayyid Qutb and have joined hands to make a bitter concoction from Islam. Contemporary researchers generally refer to contemporary extremist groups as Wahhabi-Takfiri, Salafi or extremist (radical) Wahhabi. Employing historical and available resources as well as utilizing historical and comparative methodologies, this research attempts to recognize Salafi-Wahhabi theoretical and practical similarities among the contemporary extremist groups.

Following the outbreak of the Islamic awakening in West Asia (the Middle East) and North Africa, a new approach was established in the relationship between regional powers, especially between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although the relationship between the two countries had previously been based on a kind of mistrust and close political, geopolitical and ideological rivalries, the important characteristics of this era was the change of power and politics in the West Asian region, especially since 2012. From 2012, the region countered major regional security and political challenges, placing the two countries far away from each other.  This research is an attempt to answer the question of what causes made two countries go back to previous mistrust in their relationship. Furthermore, what are the possible scenarios for the continuation of the two countries relationship? The findings, based on the theory of political constructivism and derived from written and virtual sources as well as the combined methods of historical and futuristic sociology, indicated that the major causes of backward movement in the relationship between the two countries can be categorized as soft and hard factors. The hard components include the development of heavy military and weaponry contracts and the militarization of West Asia (the Middle East), the attempt to develop terrorism in the political geography of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the effective role of Riyadh in the Syrian crisis, Saudi’s pragmatic positions in the Iraqi crisis, the military aggression against Yemen and Ansarollah movement, and Riyadh's standpoint on the Palestinian issue and the repression of the Saudi Shiites. Soft components include the expansion of security coalitions with the Zionist regime, Saudi’s hostile position towards Iran's nuclear dealing (JCPOA), and splitting the Shiite resistance front focusing on Iraq.