جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « strategic culture » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

Despite the existence of many issues in the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States, the crisis of 2022 in Ukraine is one of the important axes that during the recent period not only caused Washington and Moscow to face each other again, but its scope has gone beyond the national territory and has become an important issue in regional interactions and International has made a converter, the authors of this study have tried to answer the question of what effect the components of strategic culture have on the behavior patterns of Russian statesmen with a qualitative method and a descriptive-analytical approach. And the American in response to the crisis in Ukraine 2022? The hypothesis raised in front of the mentioned question points out that the conflict between the two countries in the Ukrainian scene can be considered strongly influenced by the cultural, value, geopolitical and historical foundations of the two countries, and based on this, war, resort to force, deterrence and strategy Meaning has been found. The findings of the research indicate that in the Ukraine crisis, the dream of great power and the return to the glory of the empire, geopolitical issues, negative attitude towards the intentions of rival activists, traditions related to the Orthodox Church and Russian nationalism, in contrast to the belief in the absolute power of the United States in the field of politics and International relations, and the continuation of the war until the unconditional surrender of the enemy have been placed

The Persian Gulf has created a kind of security interdependence between countries and regional players. The Persian Gulf is one of the most important regions in the world from a geostrategic and geoeconomic point of view, which can be considered as a regional security complex. In the sense that various factors have created a kind of security interdependence between countries and regional actors. Therefore, this research seeks to achieve a practical goal through the study of different theories of common security and security in Islam and the approach of culture in the Persian Gulf. Since the work of policymaking is to organize affairs and security policymaking is considered as a vital and basic necessity for governments, this research after examining the approaches, authorities and drivers of security policymaking in the Persian Gulf region aims to provide a security model based on common security. , security in Islam and the approach of culture in order to transition from national security to human security in this region, which is carried out quantitatively on experts, managers, experts, activists in the field of security in 1401.
This research aims to present a security model based on common security and a strategic culture approach in order to transition from national security to human security in the region, which was conducted quantitatively on experts, managers, experts and activists in the field of security in 1401. The research question is, what is the relationship between Iran's strategies and the approach of strategic culture and common security in the Persian Gulf? This research was conducted based on quantitative and qualitative research methods and descriptive analysis of correlation method; In this way, the research was conducted using questionnaires and interviews about the regional security system. In this research, the structural equation model (SEM) was used to develop the model. The findings of the study showed that common security has an effect on the realization pattern of Persian Gulf security. The path coefficient between two variables is 0.42, which has a significance level of 25.36, which is desirable because it is greater than 1.96, so the existence of a significant effect is confirmed. Also, the study showed that the theory of strategic culture approach has an effect on the realization pattern of Persian Gulf security. The path coefficient between the two variables is 0.68, which has a significance level of 16.745, which is desirable because it is greater than 1.96, so the existence of a significant effect is confirmed.
Since the goal of providing a security model with an emphasis on the common is security in Islam and culture, it is practical in terms of its purpose and descriptive and analytical in terms of its approach, and its results are clear and objective, and its results are in meeting needs and solving problems. and its application in solving specific problems in the organization, society, etc. is. It is also small in terms of information gathering. According to the type of study, the statistical population of the research includes experts, managers, experts, activists in the field of security in 1401. The number of these people was estimated to be about 500 people. Based on Morgan's table, for a community of 500 people, the number of samples is 217 people, which was carried out on 217 people in this study. The current research is a survey data collection method, which means that the present study is a descriptive survey and is discussed and investigated by reviewing scientific sources and theories in the field of research and comparing them, conducting an interview and designing a researcher-made questionnaire based on the results of the interview. In order to collect and analyze the data and information required for this research, various methods and tools have been used, which are described below according to the different needs of the research model. To collect information related to theoretical foundations, library research and study of various books and articles and scientific sites have been used. The main tool for collecting information in this research is a questionnaire, and a researcher-made questionnaire based on theoretical principles will be used to develop the questionnaire, so that the components extracted from the interviews will be evaluated, and the answers will be designed as a five-item Likert scale. In this research, the structural equation model (SEM) was used to develop the model.
The findings showed that there is a significant relationship between common security and the security of the Persian Gulf. The path coefficient of this relationship was found to be 0.717. To evaluate the significance of this effect, one should refer to the significant number of t-Value, which is 2.269, which is more than 1.96, and also the P-Value is 0.000. The findings also showed that there is a significant relationship between the approach of strategic culture and the security of the Persian Gulf. The path coefficient of this relationship was found to be 0.68. To evaluate the significance of this effect, one should refer to the significant number of t-Value, which is 2.949, which is more than 1.96, and P-Value is 0.022. Also, there is a significant connection between security in Islam and the security of the Persian Gulf. The path coefficient of this relationship was 0.529. To evaluate the significance of this effect, one should refer to the significant number of t-Value, which is 2.456, which is more than 1.96, and the P-Value is 0.000. Therefore, the desired hypothesis is confirmed at the 95% confidence level and there is a significant relationship between security in Islam and the security of the Persian Gulf.
There is a significant relationship between common security, security in Islam, the approach of strategic culture and the security of the Persian Gulf.

Strategic culture is one of the new concepts in international relations literature which has been used by Jack Snyder for the first time. Scientific studies regarding the effects of strategic culture on Islamic Republic of Iran’s behavior have been mainly conducted during the two recent decades and specifically after the rise of crises regarding the nuclear power case and ballistic missile program. The main question of the present paper states: how the strategic culture has been shaping the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy regarding Afghanistan from 1358 to 1398? Our provisional answer to this question is that strategic culture, through shaping strategic and consistent behaviors, has led the Islamic Republic of Iran to adopt a consistent and ultra-discourse policy towards Afghanistan from 1358 to 1398, unlike the political and discourse-related developments within the country. The present paper is descriptive-analytical and the researcher gathered the necessary data through library resources, social media and interview with Iran’s foreign policy authorities who have been responsible for Afghanistan issues.

Due to the increase of China’s power in the International arena and the non-compliance of China’s behavior with realistic theories on one hand and the existence of long-standing strategic traditions and China’s cultural continuity during the past millennials on the other, studying the cultural elements is of central importance for understanding China’s foreign policy. Due to the importance of cultural elements in China’s foreign policy, the main question of the present research states: how China’s strategic culture has affected China’s foreign policy regarding South China Sea conflict. China’s strategic culture is a dual culture in which there is a tendency for using military and non-military means simultaneously; this means that China’s strategic culture is not absolutely pacific or belligerent. Before the dawn of Xi Jinping’s leadership, the need for a low tension environment for advancing economic development led the Chinese leaders to resort to Confucian slogans such as peaceful development; after the start of Xi Jinping’s leadership, military and economic power gained same importance in China’s foreign policy. This new approach has been evident regarding this conflict due to the increase of China’s military mobility in South China Sea.

This paper, by studying the nature of "cultural security", will explain this concept theoretically from the perspective of the conceptual relationship between culture and security. The assumption of the article is that cultural security cannot be understood as a concept or even a phenomenon, unless you recognize and represent the different layers of the conceptual relationship between "culture" and "security". In response to this main question, the conceptual processing of this article shows that the elements and components that form and constitute security are mainly cultural. Elements and components such as mental, linguistic, semantic, discursive, conceptual, perceptual, emotional, psychological and moral aspects of security are among these and without them, the development, change and continuation of security will be impossible. In this article, after defining the concepts of culture and security in the introduction, the author will discuss the different aspects of the conceptual relationship between culture and security with an emphasis on culture as an independent variable. As a result of this processing, the author, as the hypothesis of the article, in four specific proportions; like "culture as one of the dimensions and parts of security"; "Culture as a referential subject of security"; "Culture as the shape of the security environment" and "Culture as a source of security threats" have been mentioned.

After two decades of controversy over Iran’s nuclear program, and despite the genuine development of the program, it is still non-weaponized. The International Atomic Energy Agency has frequently stated that Iran has sufficient material and capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but there is no information to prove that Iran intends to produce such weapons. Western intelligence agencies including United States, have also a similar assessment. From the viewpoint of realism, the motivation behind Iran’s program is security. However, the important question is that why its nuclear program has not been weaponized, especially considering that the world has experienced the states that have produced nuclear weapons after achieving the necessary capacity. The hypothesis is that the strategic culture in Iran has two important elements which expalin why the nuclear program has not been weaponized. The first element is that the concept of power has remained undeveloped and simplified which has not led to the development of the basic concepts of realism such as nuclear deterrence, and the balance of power in a sense that the world powers has understood and experienced it. On the other hand, Iran’s experience of threat and survival is still at the traditional level, that is Iran has never been under the direct or imminent nuclear threat like the US, the Soviet, China or even Pakistan. And as a result, despite the appearance and development of Iran’s program based on security concerns, the strategic decision-makers have never been under the pressure to complete it. In addition, Iran’s

In late 2021, Western intelligence services began issuing warnings about Moscow's readiness to invade Ukraine, although Russian elites, including Putin, denied the claim. But to the dismay of observers and the concern of Western nations, he ordered an invasion in February 2022. At first, this action was supposed to be a short and decisive operation with the aim of overthrowing the Zelenskyi government. But the field calculations were wrong and Moscow admitted that every war has its own path and does not necessarily follow the pre-planned path and the plan of the military commanders. The 2022 Russian war on Ukraine sparked different and even contradictory analyses. Some believe that because of NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's desire to join this security alliance, the Kremlin is opposed to any option except war. Other scholars believe that Putin attacked Ukraine because of Moscow's strong desire to be recognized and respected as a "great power" or because of elements of Russia's strategic culture. Other studies have focused on Putin's personal characteristics and ambitions as the main source of the attack.  This article examines the role of Putin's perceptions and miscalculations in relation to the issue of war. 

The key question of the study is: How have Putin’s misperceptions affected his policy towards Kyiv? There are also a few minor questions, such as: How Putin understands the international position of Russia and its relations with other countries, and how he perceives the intentions of other great powers.

This study hypothesizes that Putin's misperceptions of Russia's military might, Ukraine's will and power to resist, his misperception of Ukraine's intentions and his misunderstanding of the reactions of third parties critically contributed to and precipitated his decision to go to war.

To determine the main variables of the research, a conceptual framework, based on the findings of some key scholars of the psychology of International Politics, namely Jack Levy and Martin White, has been adopted. According to the conceptual framework, 3 main categories of misperceptions play an important role in leading countries to war: 1) Misperception of oneself and enemy’s military capabilities; 2) Misperception on the enemy’s intentions and the degree of its animosity, and 3) Misperception on the intentions and reactions of the third parties. The second tier of the conceptual framework includes two key elements of Russian strategic culture, “fear” and “arrogance” which according to Martin White, are the main elements of a war. All of these factors could pave the way for a costly and all-out war. To investigate the role of these factors in the 2022 war in Ukraine, the research method of qualitative content analysis has been used. Directed qualitative content analysis, unlike conventional inductive approaches, is a comparative research approach.  In this method, the researcher uses the existing theory and literature to determine the key concepts and variables. Based on those concepts and variables, the researcher begins to collect, code, decode and analyze the data. In the current study, according to the variables of the conceptual framework, the author has directly and indirectly pointed out Putin's views in this field in order to extract his possible misconceptions about Ukraine crisis. In collecting information related to Putin's words, the writer has referred to the interviews and documents published by the Russian Foreign Ministry. To strengthen the reliability of the research, the findings of the existing literature have also been examined. The collected data has been coded, decoded and analyzed in the conceptual framework.

Cognitive and psychological factors have played a significant role in creating the ground for the war in Ukraine. There is some evidence that highlights the role of the misperceived Russian elites, mainly Putin, in the war against Kyiv. These misconceptions are: 1) Misunderstanding of Ukraine's own and military capabilities, a) overestimating Moscow’s military capabilities and b) underestimating Ukraine's military capabilities 2) Misperception on the intentions of Kyiv; including a) Overestimating the animosity and evil intentions of Ukraine, and b) Underestimating the enemy’s will and courage to resist and 3) Misunderstanding of EU and US response to ongoing events, mainly underestimating their harsh and long-term response. These misconceptions, combined with two key elements of Russian strategic culture, fear and arrogance, led Russia to escalate the crisis into an all-out war. These findings contribute to the literature by articulating a meaningful conceptual framework.  Combining cognitive factors with elements of Russian strategic culture can be useful for explaining some fascinating and illusory issues of Russian foreign policy.

Russia invaded Ukraine for a variety of reasons. Geopolitical, geo-economics, geo-strategic and even geo-cultural factors played a role in pushing Moscow on the path to war. These factors had taken roots for a long time and didn’t appear suddenly. The findings of this paper help to explain why Putin chose the war path despite previous restraints. Elements of Russia's strategic culture highlighted Moscow's perceived threats and called for an immediate response. In the process of orchestrating a credible and decisive response to threats, elements of this misperception helped significantly to convince Putin that the time had come for a military strike. The role of these misconceptions in the form, tactics, and objectives of the initial mobilization of Russian forces is quite clear. In short, Putin and other military elites’ misperceptions, along with fear and arrogance, paved the way for his war in Ukraine.

For constructivists, strategic culture is the product of norms and culture-bearing units such as norm entrepreneurs. They believe that the United States invaded Iraq to replace the dominant strategic cultural norms under the logic of the Cold War with a new approach, i.e., democratic regime change through preventive war. However, during the Iraq War, the proposed paradigm, advocated by neoconservative norm entrepreneurs and traditional conservatives in the Bush administration, could not take the place of the Cold War-era strategy for multilateral containment. This norm was a part of a larger revolutionary strategy that advocated the policy of preventive war and the hegemonic paradigm, promoting the US hegemon of democracy through force. The US sought to spread this new view by piloting it in Iraq in order to prove the viability and effectiveness of preventive war. New international groupings such as “coalitions of the willing” and the national security strategy of 2002 provided the documents legitimating these new policies. However, the publishing of these documents encountered strong opposition at domestic and international levels. Therefore, the American strategic culture and national security policy briefly worked with the proposed opposing neoconservative paradigm, but presently they are returning to a version of the Cold War normative paradigm. In constructivist view, the Iraq War not only was not able to show the validity of a new vision of American strategic culture, but also undercut the paradigm it was supposed to underpin.

The concept of strategic culture has been used in the field of international relations, foreign policy and national security. There are several definitions of strategic culture but there is still no agreement on a definition that is universally accepted by researchers and policy makers. However, in most definitions, it is agreed that strategic culture is the product of a country's geography, history and shared narratives that shape its dominant worldview and guide its response to challenges and threats.Strategic culture has emerged as an alternative perspective in international relations due to the inability of realism and neorealism theories to explain the behavior of governments during the Cold War. In its development, there are three generations of strategic culture thinkers that have different understanding of this concept. In the first generation, strategic culture is a perspective to analyze how a state behaves in the face of threats. In the second generation, strategic decisions are based on the attitudes and beliefs of leaders whereas the third generation, strategic decisions are based on the system of symbols that develop in a state. The perspective of strategic culture believes that internal factors such as geopolitical situation, historical experiences, political culture and ideology determine the performance of a government and response to challenges. Although it is closely related to the military aspect, the perspective of strategic culture explains the government's behavior in response to the new nature of threats that have arisen because of globalization, including terrorism and cultural conflicts. The purpose of this article is to analyze the strategic culture of Iran and Russia and its effect on the relations between the two countries.Russia's strategic culture comes from the intersection of political, military and economic culture. It is rooted in the geographic and spiritual parameters of Russian history. Geopolitics, authoritarianism, pragmatism and global responsibility are sources of Russia's strategic culture. Political behavior and military strategy of Iran is shaped by its strategic culture which is influenced by that country’s religious and political ideology, geography, historical roots and international / regional environment. Specifically, Shi’ism is an important component in Iran’s foreign policy decisions. Historical experiences dating back to centuries ago left a legacy of a deep sense of strategic isolation and foreigners had repeatedly invaded insecurity for Iranians, as their land. The final strategic goals of Iran are to maintain national sovereignty, achieve long-term cultural, political, economic and military development and strengthening its role and influence as a regional and global power considering Iran's size, capabilities and historical experience.Research Question: What effect has strategic culture had on bilateral and regional relations between Iran and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union?Research Hypothesis: The strategic culture has prevented the creation of a model of stable interaction and strategic relations between Iran and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This article examines Iran-Russia relations in the framework of theoretical foundations of strategic culture with Qualitative method and in-depth analytical approach.

A key element of Russia's strategic culture is its long history of war and troubled relations with the West. The revivals of Eurasianism, near abroad policy and increasing its military power have been a response to its perceived vulnerability in the world and towards the West in particular. Strategic ambiguity, deterrence and pragmatism are the basis of Iran's actions in the framework of strategic culture. Geopolitics, pragmatism, historical experiences and deterrence against the West are common components of the strategic culture of Iran and Russia. In order to understand the strategic culture of the two countries, military and foreign policy doctrines, as well as the attitude of their leaders and officials should be taken into consideration. Analyzing the relations between Iran and Russia in the framework of strategic culture provides the possibility of pathology of relations and formulation of a comprehensive strategy and regulation of neighborhood policy to ensure national interests and security.

According to the strategic culture components of Iran and Russia, the two countries have different perceptions of strategic relations. Relations between Iran and Russia have been described as a rapprochement based on cautious partnership. Contrary to Iran’s strategic culture, Russia's strategic culture is aggressive in nature. The threat of the West has provided the basis for the rapprochement of the positions of Iran and Russia, but the anti-American positions do not create a basis for the cooperation of the two countries. According to the discourse of the Islamic Revolution, establishing strategic relations with Iran creates a challenge for Russia's interests in the Middle East. Russia's priority is relations with countries that take advantage of their geopolitical position and political and military capacity to interact with the West. Therefore, Iran and Russia consider each other as temporary allies in order to achieve their goals, interests and repel threats. Realism and separation of interests is a prerequisite for creating a model of sustainable interaction between the two countries.

Strategic culture as a cohesive system of symbols that creates long-term and pervasive strategic preferences through the formulation of concepts and maps and the effectiveness of military forces in political affairs between states. In view of this hypothesis, the authors of the present work seek to answer the fundamental question of how China's strategic culture appendages build constructive convergent and divergent policies in the East Asian country by studying and evaluating Chinese criteria, sources, and documents related to the category of strategic culture. Has it affected Iran?

The Syrian crisis 2013 - 2020 has become one of the most acute crises in the Middle East. It has various levels, including its domestic roots, the role of regional actors, and global powers. Israel is one of the regional powers that has set unique and distinct goals compared to other powers. The purpose of this article is to explain the cultural foundations of the regime's involvement in the various stages of the Syrian crisis. The paper's main question is: "what basis has Israel been involved in the Syrian crisis 2013 - 2020?" The paper's hypothesis is as follows: "Israel's strategic behavior in the Syrian crisis is due to its strategic culture components such as seclusion in the security environment, survival under threat, and confrontational dogmatism." The article's findings show that the components of strategic culture have shaped the strategic behaviors and then Israeli strategic practices in Syria. Accordingly, it has carried out widespread preventive and pre-emptive attacks to balance military advantage in the Syrian sovereignty, particularly against the goals of its Syrian allies, including the Islamic Republic of Iran. The data of this article were collected in a library manner and processed by the qualitative method.

Turkey's increasing tendency to pursue strategies independent of Western its allies and its proximity to Eastern powers in securing and defensive goals, as well as its active regional involvement in challenging the security preferences of Western powers, has raised the question of whether Turkey's international orientations are on a pivotal path or just looking to rebuild its foreign policy in a new international and regional environment? This paper, by conceptualizing Turkey's strategic attitudes and providing a framed picture of the new developments in the country's strategic culture and national security doctrine, rethinks the prevailing ideas of a pivotal turn in Turkey's macro-foreign policy orientation. In this regard, the new strategic culture of Turkey, with emphasis on the principle of self-help and national capabilities, increasingly seeks to ensure strategic independence from Western allies in the context of the international system transition. This does not necessarily mean leaving the transatlantic alliance, but rather balancing relations with the West and the East in order to consolidate Turkey's strategic position as an independent international actor.

The concept of strategic culture has its roots in constructivism; on the other hand, it strikes a blow at "rational choice theory". The question raised in this study is to what extent it is possible to establish strategic relations between the two cou nt ri es? This study uses a constructivist approach to understand the building blocks of the strategic culture of Russia and Iran, to examine the potential of strategic relations between Tehran and Moscow. This article argues that given the charac te ri stics of Russia's strategic culture, which is based on hard power, not only is there little potential for strategic relations between the two countries, but the two countries compete in many areas, such as the Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the energy sector. In this research, electronic and written sources are used. The present research is descriptive in nature and the information has been collected by library method.

The strategic area of Central Eurasia is one of the most important regions in the post-Soviet space, accepting the rivalry between the Russian Federation and the United States, and has introduced itself as a mirror of international politics. Regarding the strategic culture of Moscow’s foreign policy, it can be said that since the Russian Federation does not want to fully maintain the basic rules of the international system, nor does it seek to make extensive changes to the rules of this order, hence the idea of “reformist” activism Comes to mind. Reform activists are actors who pursue different motives and methods than other actors in international politics. The Russian Federation, as a reformist power, has on its agenda the two principles of peaceful coexistence and the creation of a multipolar world in its new foreign policy. In this context, the Russian Federation, on the one hand, does not reject any change in the status quo and intervention abroad (Central Asia, South Caucasus, Black Sea, and Baltic), and on the other, is dissatisfied with the current state of the international system and wants a complete transformation. It is not in the rules that govern it either.As for the United States’ movements in the geographical territory of Central Eurasia, it can be said that Washington generally seeks to sign bilateral and multilateral military agreements with Georgia, Ukraine, Romania, and the Czech Republic, following political intervention and attempts to bring the republics of the region under its security umbrella. In this regard, Poland is trying to move forward and most importantly, is building several anti-missile defense systems in the frame of NATO expansion. Although the White House has claimed that the purpose of the missile defense shield is to protect the United States and NATO members from North Korea’s threats and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ballistic missiles, nevertheless the Kremlin sees it as a serious threat to its national security. Moscow is very serious and determined in its position and constantly declares that the justification of the United States for the establishment of a missile defense shield is a mere excuse for the blockade of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation considers the United States moves in this regard an attempt to achieve “strategic superiority” and to play with the result of a zero-sum game, which is targeted at the same time as weakening strategic depth, geopolitical contraction, and Moscow’s exclusion from European arrangements. From the above-mentioned points, it can be concluded that the main issues affecting the political-security relations between the Russian Federation and the United States are mutual threats and suspicions, successive and endless cycles of de-escalation, and involvement of various internal and external variables in the current process between the two countries which shows the complexity and multi-layered nature of this conflict.The Main Question is: what impact has the strategic culture and its components had on the actions of the Russian Federation and the United States in the Central Eurasian region in the last two decades?The Hypothesis posed by the above-mentioned question is that strategic culture serves as a driving force behind Moscow’s post-Soviet actions, including components such as strategic expansionism, the spread of Orthodox identity and the Russian nationalist discourse, and the consolidation of national power in the environment. In contrast, the United States has developed a special strategic culture to promote a culture of liberal democracy, establish a superpower position and create regional balance.The method used in this research is explanatory-prescriptive and the type of the research is fundamental. The nature of this writing is also qualitative. The data collection has been through the library method, the use of internet resources, articles, and documents.Analyzing the strategic behaviors of political units through the components of strategic culture has advantages the most important of which is the possibility of understanding the actions of the actor in question and predicting the behaviors arising from it. The theory makes it possible for researchers to understand how countries view strategic issues and what reactions they emit in a variety of situations, even in emergencies. Regarding strategic culture, it should be noted that this component is the product of the historical experience of countries. On the other hand, because experiences are different among governments, different actors have different strategic cultures. In this way, it can be said that the strategic culture acts as a magnifying glass through which the type of relationship between the international goals, motives, and actions of the Russian Federation and the United States can be evaluated and examined in the management of international crises.As mentioned at the beginning of the research, the most important components of the Russian Federation’s strategic culture include geopolitical features and a development view, the idea of great power and regional hegemony, dominant authoritarianism, Russian nationalist discourse, and Slavic-Orthodox identity, and the notion of threat. They have left a deep impression on the strategic decision-making and foreign policy of the Russian Federation. In other words, it can be said that Moscow, in articulating its foreign policy discourse and strategic decision-making, has relied on the above-mentioned components. Accordingly, the Russian Federation in the field of foreign policy has strategies such as selective interaction, soft balance and an emphasis on multilateralism, the great normative modern strategy, eastward policy, confrontation with fundamentalism and terrorism, and Russian-oriented political and security institutionalism in the region which has made the headline of its work. Regarding the strategic culture of the United States, it must be acknowledged that to achieve the goals that have been formed under the influence of its strategic culture, it seeks hegemony and consolidation of its power in the world. In this regard, the United States has a mission to lead the world and is committed to global governance. In the meantime, if the country resorts to military force, it will inevitably use it. As a result, it can be said that the components that shape the strategic culture of the United States are aggressive, which is effective in pursuing its aggressive foreign policy in the strategic context of Central Eurasia.

Afghanistan is one of the important cornerstones of the international great game among important regional and international powers. There are tense debates on the causes of instability and crisis in Afghanistan. What is common in all these ideas and factors, is Pakistan's role as a neighboring country with numerous ethnic, cultural and religious commonalities of which the Army has played a very prominent role in different political and social spheres of Afghanistan during last four decades.  While inspecting differnet elements of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture. This article tries to answer the question of what/ how has Pakistan's strategic culture been guiding its foreign policy toward Afghanistan? The hypothesis of the article is that the Pakistani military has institutionalized its strategic culture in this country’s foreign policy in such a way that it sees its national security and survival in controlling and influencing Afghanistan. The findings of the paper suggest that Afghanistan and India are two key elements in Pakistan's strategic culture that Pakistan needs to manage due to its characteristics and shortcomings since its inception. This article is explanatory and the required data is collected by library method. The theoretical framework of the article is based on the concept of strategic culture.

With the domination of the International System and Western civilization since 1500 AD, the ancient Eastern Civilizations have had similar experiences of marginalization.The reproduction of similar elements in the Strategic Cu lt u re of these civilizations has led to a common demand to return to their former role and place in the International System. The main question is what factors led to the rapprochement of the ancient revisionist Eastern civilizations and the formation of the Eastern Historical-Civilizational Bloc in the international system?The overall result of the study shows that the war of ancient civi li z a ti o n, marginalization and similar strategic culture between Iranian, Chinese and Russian civilizations has led to the formation of the historical-civ iliz a ti o n al bloc of the East, which seeks to create Eastern and Western Bounded Order against the Western International Order. The method used in this paper is de s c riptive-analytical and its theoretical framework is based on the theory of the C lash of Civilizations by Samuel Huntington and the Critical Theory of Robert Cox.

Political elites of different strategic cultures, in similar situations in the international arena, practice different foreign policy behavior. In fact, different norms in the strategic culture of governments cause different perceptions of similar realities. Accordingly, the norms that shape the strategic culture of the Iranian political elite influence the foreign policy behavior of the country. The question, however, is how the foreign policy behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran is affected by strategic culture. The main question of this article is how has the political culture of the political elite influenced the foreign policy of Iran? The researchers hypothesize that the specific norms of the political elite's strategic culture have shaped the national role of the mission-oriented state for the IR, and accordingly, have followed the behavioral indices of independence, transnationalism and revisionism in Iranian foreign policy. The theoretical framework of this paper is a combination of constructivism theory and strategic culture approach and has used qualitative deductive content analysis to understand the strategic culture of the IRI political elite.

Among the factors influencing the construction and the way of the political life of a nation, the culture and approach of strategic culture as one of the components of human ecosystems are among the factors and issues that have been considered in recent decades in texts related to international relations, security studies, and international economics. The main theme of strategic culture is to explain the cultural factors affecting the decisions, strategies, and orientations of the security and foreign policy of the countries and examine how to use force. In this study, with focusing on the United States as the most influential international actor, we are trying to answer the question of which sources of US strategic culture are? And how did these sources affect the security and foreign policy of the United States? Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explore the resources that make up the strategic culture of this country and thus explain the role of the components emerging from it in US foreign policy and security.

The Syrian crisis is one of the most important crises in the Middle East that has experienced the arrival of regional and non-regional actors since 2011. One of the most important non-regional powers that showed effective participation in the Syrian crisis was Russia. Russia's military intervention in the Syrian crisis since 2015 has been Russia's first post-Soviet campaign outside of its privileged interests, altering the equations of the Syrian crisis and showing that Russia is and should not be an important player in the region. Less or ignored. Therefore, paying attention to the Russian model of behavior in the face of the international crisis in Syria is one of the most important issues that has been considered. Given the importance of the issue, the present study seeks to answer the important question of what Russia's behavioral pattern is in the Syrian crisis and what factors influence this pattern. In response to this question, a hypothesis is proposed that Russia's behavior pattern in the Syrian crisis has been influenced by the four factors of the structure of the international system, strategic culture, decision-making structure and geography, as a model of cooperation and competition.