جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « State Building » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

The need to establish a new state in post-conflict and unstable contexts is essential after overcoming that period. These contexts usually cannot create a new state on their own and require financial and non-financial support from organizations and institutions, both domestic and often foreign. However, the approaches of these supporters to state-building projects, lack any gender analysis. While the relationship between the state and citizens is weak in most cases, this is more evident when it comes to women citizens. Therefore, this process can provide a new opportunity to reconsider power patterns and political systems to include women and other marginalized groups. This article presents findings from a research project by FRIDE ODI that examines the impact of state-building on women's citizenship. The project includes research in 5 post-conflict countries: Burundi, Guatemala, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. The project addresses three main questions: What role do women play in state-building? How do state-building processes affect women's political participation? How do state-building processes affect women's rights? The research findings have shown that post-conflict contexts provide new opportunities for women's mobilization. However, their ability to influence the state-building process is limited due to structural barriers and the opposition of societal elites. It seems that gender inequality is inherently linked to political issues such as power balance. Therefore, it is important for supporters to consider gender as a fundamentally political issue.

Ideal governance and the theory of the revolutionary system is an idea that seeks to guide governments and the administrative and political structure in general in a direction that causes the least corruption and internal damage. The goal is to examine the degree of compatibility and efficiency of these two together and to find out the relation between the two. The research method of this research is content analysis, and the main question of the article follows as: What is the relationship between an ideal governance and revolutionary theory in the Supreme Leader's thought, and the how to achieve them? It seems that the concepts and components contained in the theory of ideal governance and the theory of the revolutionary system do not conflict with each other in the thought of the Supreme Leader, and the way to reach it will be possible through self-development, community building d state building.

"State building" is a concept that in the middle of the Qajar era, by Mirza Malkam Khan Nazim al-Dawlah, was applied to the efforts to leave the "old" rule to the "new" one. In this research, this concept is the main basis of knowing the experience that is based on observation and comparison of various political crises in Iran: Experience of modern state building. This research, considering Spriggans' theory as a theoretical framework and working method, raises the question: "What was behind the political crisis of Qajar era Iran, on the basis of which the modern state building experience can be understood based on it?" Based on this, we can hazard the assumption that, with the beginning of the new system in Tabriz, everything in governance gradually became old and the new was standing at the threshold. Departure from this old was done by observing the widespread political crisis, understanding it as a problem and transferring it to modern action as a treatment and formulating an ideal called constitutionalism. The era of Naseri formed an important part of the experience of modern state building in the form of regulations and its accessories and the theoretical experience of constitutionalism.

In this research, the aim of the authors is answer to this question: "What does the challenges and opportunities Taliban's strategic model in the second state-building in Afghanistan? And what are the challenges and opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran? The research method is mixed. The statistical population of this article was the elites and researchers in the fields of political science, regional studies, international relations and geopolitics, who were interviewed in-depth with 40 experts using the theoretical and purposeful sampling method until reaching theoretical saturation. Quantitatively, to evaluate the model, a researcher-made questionnaire with available sampling method was distributed among 90 people from the samples. The data were analyzed in the qualitative part with the qualitative method of database theory and MAXQDA10 software, and in the quantitative part with the method of structural equations, partial least squares algorithm with SMART PLS software. The findings indicated that the strategic model of the Taliban in the second state-building period in Afghanistan has 11 components and 35 indicators as follows: Causal conditions (1. The presence of American and NATO forces, 2. The failure of the state-building process in Afghanistan) Background conditions (3. Emphasis on the realization of an Islamic state 4. Efforts to strengthen the social and popular base) Strategic conditions (5. Efforts to realize a moderate Islamic state 6. Efforts for ethnic unity in Afghanistan 7. Efforts for an alliance with the Republic Islamic Republic of Iran) and intervening conditions (8. International coalition's renewed attack on Afghanistan 9. Intensification of confrontation between Taliban and ISIS), consequences (10. Opportunities of the Islamic Republic of Iran 11. Challenges of the Islamic Republic of Iran)

Revolution is an event with fundamental and usually violent changes that disrupt the current course of affairs and seek to launch a new plan and establish a new system. One of the consequences of revolutions is the negation of existing political structures and revolutionaries usually establish their desired institutions after the revolutionary fervor has subsided. However, over time, the confrontation between revolutionary ideology and the administrative and executive structure resulting from the revolution has become one of the most challenging issues for revolutionaries. The present article argues that beyond case-specific conflicts, the root of this issue lies in the issue of "state-building." In fact, due to their sensitivity to the values of the revolution, revolutionaries are reluctant to accept the nature of the state in its true sense and with its inevitable requirements including the concentration of executive power in the government and the originality of the logic of public interest. They have a reductionist view of government, which causes even revolutionary governments to gradually lose an important part of their legitimacy and acceptance in this difficult situation. To this end and to show the importance of this issue as a structural matter and not just a specific person and government, we focus on the two governments of "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad" because the discourse of this government and its supporters, at least initially the coming of that revolutionary state was depicted, but the problem of the incompatibility of revolutionary act and the logic of action in the form of government in these states also manifested itself in a tangible way.The issue emphasized in this article, i.e. duality in revolutionary institutions and the established political structure, is an issue whose its history and background even goes back to the threshold of the Islamic Revolution; As with the transfer of executive power from the Shah to "Bakhtiar", dual sovereignty was keyed in the country and Imam Khomeini first formed the Revolutionary Council from exile and immediately after returning to Iran, the interim government headed by Bazargan was specified in the Imam's message that the installation Bazargan, while paying attention to their faith in the "Holy School of Islam" and also based on their fighting records, and at the same time "without considering party relations and depending on a particular group". Such an interpretation implicitly indicated the difference between the revolutionaries and the professional technocrats of politics, such as the national-religious forces, and also introduced some dualism in the post-revolution period. This dual situation is understandable in terms of the confrontation between the revolutionary regime and the political system before the revolution (Bakhtiar's government) and perhaps its existence at the beginning of the revolution is also justified, but the issue here is that such dual confrontation has continued in the post-revolution era for some reasons. Discourse disputes are usually made from floating signs at the level of society, but all of them immediately tend to reach the political power and have the upper hand in the government. Therefore, the gap and opposition between the revolutionary discourses and those who are on the opposite spectrum and are referred to by various titles such as moderate, moderate and sometimes harsh terms such as compromiser and even traitor, in its obvious form. shows at the government level. Of course, tension occurs not only in the institution of the government, but also in everything that leads to the government, for example, skepticism towards party activity or at least caution about it is a clear manifestation of this issue, and revolutionaries, including in Iran Due to the concern of the unity of the different classes and spectrums of the people, they have been worried about the multiplicity caused by the activities of the parties even among the aligned currents. This situation has intensified with the appearance of external threats and everything that is classified as coups, conspiracies, internal unrest and protests, etc. Ahmadinejad's coming to power was the result of the rise of fundamentalist, revolutionary and of course populist discourse. In particular, the important beginning of this movement was the victory of fundamentalists on the 28th of February 2003 in the second term of the Tehran City Council elections, which they achieved a decisive victory by organizing in the form of a coalition of Islamic Iran settlers. They were the result of an organization known as the "Coordinating Council of the Islamic Revolution Forces" which was influenced by two fundamentalist organizations "The Party of Islamic Revolution Martyrs" and "Islamic Society of Engineers" and finally Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as one of the activists of these two currents as the mayor of Tehran Selected. During the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa around 2011 onwards, Ahmadinejad used the term "human awakening" instead of the term "Islamic awakening" and tried to explain this phenomenon beyond a mere issue related to Muslims and Islam. This issue showed a non-ideological implication for describing such movements. Such themes in the philosophical literature and human sciences are not so unfamiliar interpretations, but the revolutionaries could not accept that such interpretations emanate from the speech of the government attributed to them, especially with all the costs they had paid materially and non-materially for the establishment of this government. In fact, just as once upon a time the rational explanation and interpretation of Islamic teachings by streams such as religious intellectuals were interpreted by neglecting some religious foundations, the belief of the spring ring in the reinterpretation of contemporary developments also meant ignoring a part of the revolutionary speech. The justification of the mentioned statesmen regarding the need to emphasize the commonalities between religions or to go beyond the appearances of the Sharia to reach its innermost meaning, because it required ignoring the authority of the revolutionaries, especially the clergy, as the intellectual and administrative authority of the discourse of the revolution, and at the same time, the specific and special dimensions of the discourse of the revolution could not be accepted by this group of supporters of the revolution.

The essence of politics and political sociology is based on how to regulate the unequal power relations between the rulers and the ruled. This is exactly what justifies the existential necessity of the political order and its continuation or overthrow. Therefore, the institutional construction of the state and its political stability, based on whether it has the necessary political legitimacy or not, plays a prominent role in its continuation or overthrow. In this regard, the current research emphasizes that state-building in the first Pahlavi period was established in conflict with democracy, and as a result, it suffered from a lack of legitimacy and its political stability was fragile; Therefore, in this research, the institutional structure of the government and its relationship with the institutions of democracy are examined as the most important component of legitimizing unequal power relations And it tries to answer the question why the political order did not have the necessary political legitimacy during the first Pahlavi period? The hypothesis of the research is based on the answer that the desire of the government in the first Pahlavi period towards illegitimate power through the conflict between personal and impersonal interests came into conflict with political institutionalism, and as a result, the regime was incapable of reproducing political legitimacy and the political order was deteriorating. The lack of legitimacy was faced. The data has been collected through the library-document method and data analysis has been done using Thomas Nigel's "Conflict of Interests and Values Theory".

One of the obstacles to achieving the goals of Iran's 20-year vision plan is the actions of the ISIS in Iraq as a member of the Resistance Front. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to identify ISIL's behavior patterns in Iraq until 2025. The findings of this research based on analytical-pragmatic and futuristic research indicate that the contradictory performance of ISIS with its stated aims (assassination and excommunication against the state-building) did not conform to the specific social and political realities of Iraq. The terrorist group does not seek to build the political and social structures of the "state" or "caliphate". Incomplete state-building is the specific function of the ISIS Takfiri group to further bolster Islamophobia. These two patterns of behavior (incomplete state-building and terror and excommunication) are exactly in line with the goals of Western powers to contain "political Islam" by "radical Islam". In the light of ISIL's behavior patterns, it is impossible for ISIL to create a caliphate in Iraq until 2025 due to internal developments and support from the resistance front. And possible Scenario is the geopolitical containment of the Resistance Front (Iran, Iraq, etc.) due to the creation of secret networks and terror.

Government-making is one of the strategic issues that has received serious attention in Iran in recent years. Addressing this issue in the Islamic Republic becomes even more important when the newly established country of the Republic of Azerbaijan with a majority Shiite population is on the way to this process and directly affects the security of the Islamic Republic. This study seeks to answer the fundamental question of what is the role of foreign actors in the process of state-building of the Republic of Azerbaijan so far and what strategy should the Islamic Republic adopt in this regard? The findings of the analysis of the research hypothesis in a descriptive-analytical manner will show that the main failure of this country in the process of state-building, in addition to internal issues, is strongly influenced by external factors that strengthen the security dimension. And the fibrous system is constantly intensifying internal disruptive factors and unbalanced development. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran, by adopting a foreign policy based on dignity, wisdom and expediency based on friendship with its neighbors, has tried to manage tensions in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and despite repeated emphasis on the rights of the Republic of Azerbaijan In this region and facing the Islamic Revolution, especially in the media, in the form of pan-Turkish mischief, he has been accused of supporting Armenia against the Muslim nation of Azerbaijan and has not been able to turn his goodwill into strategic and stable relations with the government.

The process of state-nationalization is not a new issue, but it was not developed in developing countries during the years of World War II onwards, and became widespread in the Third World. Countries that do not have a single, strong central government have always been a threat to world security and can be a good safe haven for the growth of terrorism and international terrorism. Afghanistan, as a collapsed country after the Taliban regime between 1996 and 2001 and after the withdrawal of US troops in 2021 and the collapse of the Afghan government and the re-establishment of the Taliban, was no exception to this rule. Therefore, in this article, the method of data collection is library and an attempt has been made to examine the role of the Taliban government in nation-building after the 2021 developments in Afghanistan. From the available studies and evidence, it can be concluded that due to the presence of the United States and NATO countries in the region for two decades and the numerous conflicts with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, as well as traditional ideas, fear of austerity and punishment. The Taliban's ethnicity and the public's distrust of the Americans have always posed a number of challenges to the nation-state process, leading to another Taliban dictatorship.

The challenge of building an efficient Islamic state is in the second step of the Islamic Revolution.

The main question:

What is the challenge of building efficient employment in the second step of the Islamic Revolution? Sub-questions: Why? What is? How?

Default:

efficient government building in the second step of the Islamic Revolution, the top challenge, Iranian Islamic modeling of progress, strategy and modern Islamic civilization, is the vision of the second step of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

Hypothesis:

"The Challenge of State-Building Efficient Employment in the Second Step of the Islamic Revolution; "The strategic role is a special task with the policy-making and policy-making functions of the government." Explanation of Hypothesis: Government and State Employment The implementation of the balanced and middle model of the two conflicting models is one and on the one hand the government is the minimum operation of liberal capitalism and the policy of non-interference and on the other hand the conflicting state is the maximum socialist employment.

The challenge of state-building is to implement economically, politically and culturally efficient in the second step of the Islamic Revolution, the model of the Iranian architect of Islamic modeling is the development of the public and private sectors.

Text and content analysis of the most important works and opinions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the document of the Iranian Islamic model of progress and the statement is the second step.

The main purpose of this study is a comparative study of the position of Iranian teachers in the political systematization of the Islamic Caliphate and the specialized administrative and organizational cadres before the revolution in systematization in the first decade of the Islamic Republic of Iran. have been. The purpose of this article is to compare the two historical periods and their systematization patterns to show how the continuation of the political tradition can maintain the administrative-bureaucratic structures of society or cause functional disorders in society by interrupting political traditions and institutions. The approach of the article is historical-comparative and the documentary method is used to collect data. The article concludes that the process of state-building after the revolutionary developments required some structural continuities that were not possible in their absence. On this basis, the establishment of a new political order was not possible except by applying the political experience of specialized cadres of institutions and organizations of the modern government, which could be used with the insight and careful consideration of the intellectuals of the revolution, including Imam Khomeini. Undoubtedly, in the absence of such a possibility, the process of developing political order in post-revolutionary Iran would be flawed and would probably create unexpected and unresolved crises.

The main question of the present article is that what effect did the structure of the international system in the Cold War era have on the state-building process in Iran during the second Pahlavi period? The hypothesis of the research is that the characteristics of the structure of the international system in the Cold War era, caused the second Pahlavi in order to maintain the existence of the country and the survival of his regime, seeking security in the form of alliance and coalition on the agenda. Iran's foreign policy, in other words, because of the strong military aspect of security during the Cold War on the one hand and the regime's lack of legitimacy and dependence on the United States after the 1953 coup, on the other hand, "national security" is mostly narrow. "Government security" or "regime security" was defined, and as a result, the state-building project in the second Pahlavi era deviated from its original path and took a military-security direction. To explain this issue, a combination of structural neo-realist theory and state-building theory has been used. Findings show that Iran's sensitive geopolitical position and structural requirements for playing an active regional player in the US global defense strategy in the Cold War bipolar order, fear of Soviet communism and radical Arab nationalism, the most important and obvious factors influencing the structure of the international system are the security-militarization of the state-building policies of the second Pahlavi regime

The terrorist group of ISIL, as one of the most modern and up-to-date terrorist groups in the world, has a social body of all kinds, both male and female. The role of gender and its functions in such a self-proclaimed state has always been attended by the leaders of the Islamic State, in order to achieve its main goal, the realization of the Islamic state (Islamic caliphate). Accordingly, what is supposed to be in this regard is the belief that ISIS has used both male and female gender roles in its struggle strategies, but what is the gender of women and men in fighting strategies? In addition, what function did they have for the Islamic state? It is a question to be answered in this research with an analytical-explanatory approach and using library and internet resources. In this study, by using the Talcott Parsons functionalism theory in response to the question, the attempt has been made to the hypothesis of the practice community It is covered in the ISIL Takfiri terrorist group that gender is based on its function, and both sexes are based on gender, propaganda, state-building, nation-building, military, and so on. They have been active in the realization of the Islamic State and only in times of emergency (such as escape and lack of fighters man and so on) have witnessed the interference of ISIL's gender activities in some activities as well.

This paper seeks to explain how the oil revenues affected the state-building process during the Pahlavi era?Oil as the most important strategic commodity has never been isolated from the history of the world, but rather could shape it from the very beginning, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. The role of oil in various economic, political, and social aspects is considered common knowledge, the most influential of which is probably the state-building process. One of the most extensive experiences of the state-building in Iran was formed during 1300-1320, namely, the period of the Pahlavi regime, the experience that the past rulers failed to succeed in spite of their attempts to achieve it. When Reza Shah came into power, the oil price rose significantly, oil revenues along with other resources facilitated and accelerated the state-building process in four areas of the establishment of discipline, development of bureaucracy, institutionalization, and developmentalism for the poor country of Iran. However, Reza Shah failed to create the necessary logical balance between various areas of the state building due to his autarchy. The present research which is based on both the political economy and political sociology seeks to explain.

This paper seeks to explain how the oil revenues affected the state-building process during the Pahlavi era?Oil as the most important strategic commodity has never been isolated from the history of the world, but rather could shape it from the very beginning, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. The role of oil in various economic, political, and social aspects is considered common knowledge, the most influential of which is probably the state-building process. One of the most extensive experiences of the state-building in Iran was formed during 1300-1320, namely, the period of the Pahlavi regime, the experience that the past rulers failed to succeed in spite of their attempts to achieve it. When Reza Shah came into power, the oil price rose significantly, oil revenues along with other resources facilitated and accelerated the state-building process in four areas of the establishment of discipline, development of bureaucracy, institutionalization, and developmentalism for the poor country of Iran. However, Reza Shah failed to create the necessary logical balance between various areas of the state building due to his autarchy. The present research which is based on both the political economy and political sociology seeks to explain.

Islamic awakening in Egypt and the fall of the dictatorial regime of Husni Mubarak as a strategic partner of Britain and the United States have changed the North-African region's political-security arrangements. The overthrow of Mubarak and the taking of the government by the Muslim Brotherhood led the British authorities to review their policies towards Egypt. Therefore, this article is written to answer this key question that “How does Britain manage, direct or control the Islamic movements and Islamic awakening to protect its national goals and policies?” The results of this study show that British policy towards the Islamic awakening is based on the neo-colonial approaches that seek the revival of powerful dependent states. For this reason, the state-building by the United Kingdom in Egypt is based on two foundations of "education and networking." In the first step, the Egyptian elite, in line with the British policies, take over the power, a role which is played by the Egyptian army right now. In the second step, the training and rebuilding of military and security institutions are on the agenda. The last step is the education of the media, women and youth, and simultaneously, entrepreneurship and development. It also reinforces feminism and the development of journalism and political education within the framework of secularist ideas, which is essentially aimed at curbing the emergence of Islamist currents in Egypt.

Nearly two decades have passed since the fall of the Taliban regime and the presence of US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Since 2001, the international coalition forces have embraced Afghanistan's political, economic, social and security developments. The Taliban's defeat, the first project, and then the formation of a new government and the reconstruction and structural reforms in the political, security, economic and social fields were the main pillars of the policy of the international coalition led by the United States and some international forums in this country.Most of these axes have been implemented since the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan is still in a volatile situation in 2019 and after about 18 years since the fall of the Taliban and spending a lot by governments and international as well as international coalition forces. So the question of the article is that what has happened since the fall of the Taliban by the international coalition and other international fora in Afghanistan, and with what opportunities and challenges are faced?The paper, in a descriptive analytical manner, believes that the measures taken to rebuild Afghanistan are inadequate and that, due to the conflicting interests of domestic, regional, and transnational actors, there are numerous barriers to resolving various crises in Afghanistan, whose ambiguities are ambiguous.

After the fall of Saddam, active participation of the Shiites and Kurds along with the minimal and passive participation of the Sunnis led to the formation of a new structure based on democratic principles. At a time when it was thought that Iraq will find peace by eliminating one of the biggest dictators of history, the country experienced political and security crises emerging one after another. It disrupted democratic process of state-building and dragged Iraqi government into the abyss of despair. Using exploratory method, library tools and interviews, the paper is to answer the question "what are the obstacles to the process of state-building in Iraq?" In order to answer the question, it was hypothesized that “social gaps activated by ethno-sectarian distribution of the population in Iraq and the lack of infrastructure required for democratization, as well as the tribal and nomadic structure of the country, obstructed state-building process in Iraq”. Besides confirming the hypothesis, the results showed that consensus democracy as a dominated pattern of political system, not only exacerbated social gaps but also led to the ineffectiveness of the political system of Iraq and it is one of the barriers to state-building in the country.

State building is a long, complicated and challenging trend everywhere. Iran’s revolution as a most populist revolution in 20thcentury, heavily changed the fundamental aspects of political order in the country and helped to set new institutions in power and state structures after revolution. These institutions were helpful in harnessing extreme domestic and foreign crisis that were emerged soon after the revolution. The article tests this claim as a hypothesis that Iranian revolutionary movement showed its high capabilities in institution building from down and that helpedemerged power vacuum, as a result of collapsed former state and absence of a revolutionary party, was filled easily. Building new state and managing crisis affected heavily from this kind of state building. The article studies making some new governmental institutions and revolutionary organs and emerging new political behavior in first years after revolution and searches the causes of their successful functions in managing crisis and sustaining new emerged political order.

National resources and revenues are always one of the most important and vital tools for the development of modern government and the advancement of the state-building process in any country. However, the extent and manner of utilizing these resources by the elites and policymakers can have positive or negative consequences for national development. During the Mohammadreza shah Pahlavi’s dynasty, oil revenues found a significant place in Iran's politics and economy, and accounted for most of the government's budget and spending. By this description. The basic question of the current study is “what effect’s have the reliance of the state on oil revenues on the state-building process and, more precisely, on the nature, structure, function and capabilities of the modern state at that time? The main hypothesis of the research is that the government's dependence on oil revenues and the way these revenues are used in the development policy-making process, the state-building process in this period faced with major challenges in terms of security, institutionalization, national independence and ... .Addressing this historical issue is important because after more than half a century of dependence of development plans on oil revenues, the government in Iran has continued to deal with the harmful consequences of this decision (in the domestic and international arena) and failed It will rid itself of these challenges. To illustrate this, a combination of state-building and Rentire state theories has been used in this research.