جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « علم حصولی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has explicitly stated in his various works that "acquired knowledge reduces and refers back to the knowledge by presence". Based on his different words and statements, two readings of this reduction of acquired knowledge to the knowledge by presence can be presented: 1. According to one reading, the source and origin of the abstraction of any acquired knowledge is considered to be knowledge by presence. 2. According to another reading, it is emphasized that acquired knowledge is figurative and compulsorily subjective, and thus, every acquired knowledge is actually knowledge by presence. In this paper, after explaining both readings, an attempt is made to provide a new interpretation of this theory by reconciling these two statements through finding a common point. In this reconciliation, the second reading is considered primary, and the first one is construed in its light. The result is that acquired knowledge is both subsequent to knowledge by presence (as presented in the first reading) and is in reality the same as knowledge by presence (as presented in the second reading). Although this reconciliation might initially seem contradictory, a closer examination reveals that the subsequence of acquired knowledge to knowledge by presence is of the nature of "subsequence of figurative to denotative."

Intuition is one of the important aspects of the geometry of religious knowledge and one of the sources of acquiring knowledge. The question of objectivity of associate the mystical experience is one of the basic questions raised in this field. In response to this question, some accepted the theory of essentialism and others believe in structuralism (contextualism). The essentialists consider the associate of mystical experience to be the supreme essence and truth. Proponents of the theory of structuralism, while denying the narration of the mystical experience of a single essence, consider these experiences as a result of a person's culture, belief and intellectual background. Studying and comparing the views of Allameh Tabatabai and Fakhr Razi in the field of realism and objectivity of the associate of the mystical experience is one of the goals and the subject of this article. The study method is descriptive and analytical, relying on their works. The findings of the research show that Allameh Tabatabai, by dividing knowledge into two types of presential knowledge and acquired knowledge and returning the acquired knowledge to presential and accepting the principle of unity of the knower and the known, considered mystical experiences to be the type of acquired and presential knowledge that in both types, Essence experience is realized. From Fakhrazi's view, in the shadow of inner cultivation and self-purification, and reaching mystical states and discoveries, a person reaches a level where he understands the truths with direct knowledge. Therefore, these situations are the experience of the essence and cognitive knowledge. In fact, essentialism is the common feature of Allameh and Fakhr

Explaining Ali-Qoli-bin Qarchaghaaikhan's point of view about "acquired knowledge" and "knowledge by presence" with a critical approach Abstract Ali-Qoli-bin Qarchaghaaikhan is among the not so famous philosophers of the Safavid era. Although many of his works have not been undergone the process of correction, his book The Revival of Wisdom, that actually contains many of his philosophical opinions, has been corrected and printed. Among the innovative theories of this sage is the innovative classification that he presented of "acquired knowledge" ('ilm-e-hosuli, علم حصولی) and "knowledge by presence" ('ilm-e-hozuri, علم حضوری). On the one hand, Qarchaghaaikhan introduces different types of acquired knowledge and knowledge by presence, some of which are unprecedented in the history of Islamic philosophy, and on the other hand, he considers the truth of knowledge to be accidental and added to the speaking self (nafs-e-naatteqeنفس ناطقه،). In fact, with the analysis he gives regarding the issue of the union of knowledgeable subject with the reasonable object, he considers knowledge as an attribute that is added to the adjective, namely the speaking self/subject. This essay, at first, expresses his point of view and initiative on this matter in detail, and then criticizes by using an analytical-comparative method. Keywords: accidentality, Ali-Qoli-bin Qarchaghaaikhan, acquired knowledge, Knowledge by presence, the speaking self.

 Knowledge by presence (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) is a problem explicitly discussed by Suhrawardī (Shaykh al-Ishrāq). This issue has since become a significant topic in Islamic epistemology. More recently, Allameh Tabatabai has examined this problem and drawn noteworthy conclusions. According to him, knowledge by presence is an existential concept, and is detached from matter. He establishes the existence of such knowledge by appealing to human self-consciousness, which manifests the presence of the existence of our own selves to us. In his view, the criterion for knowledge by presence consists in the real presence of something (the known) to another thing (the knower). Accordingly, he broadens the instances of knowledge by presence to encompass self-knowledge, a cause’s knowledge of its own effects, the effect’s knowledge of its cause, an effect’s knowledge of other effects of its cause, and human knowledge of his own sensory impressions. As for the reduction of knowledge by acquisition (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī) to knowledge by presence, Allameh Tabatabai believes that each instance of the former is indeed an instance of the latter. In fact, knowledge by acquisition always involves knowledge by presence. It follows that all human knowledge is by presence through and through. This is because it is always an instance of knowledge by presence that turns into an instance of knowledge by acquisition. This transformation is done through the imaginative faculty, which he dubs the faculty of transforming knowledge by presence to knowledge by acquisition. According to Allameh Tabatabai’s view of knowledge by presence and its transformation into knowledge by acquisition, the soul has an effective agential role with respect to epistemic forms or images, obtaining both universal and particular epistemic forms via “unification.” This implies that the process of perception consists in the “strengthening of the detached (immaterial) existence of the world” and its unification with the intellectual level of existence. Another corollary of his view is that, since knowledge is in fact something existential that cannot be subsumed under any of the quiddity-based categories, it cannot be characterized as corresponding or failing to correspond to the reality, whereas knowledge by acquisition can be thus characterized. Furthermore, his view of knowledge by presence implies that knowledge by acquisition is restricted to the material world, since material entities can neither know, nor be known. Of course, material entities involve immaterial dimensions such as change and ignorance in virtue of which knowledge applies to them.

 This research was carried out with the library-analytical method.

 The main conclusion to be drawn from Allameh Tabatabai’s discussion of the nature of knowledge by presence and its corollaries is that it can be used to determine the ground of distinction between real (ḥaqīqī) and constructed (iʿtibārī) perceptions and how they relate to knowledge by presence. Since an instance of knowledge by presence is involved in any instance of knowledge by acquisition, it follows that when knowledge is divided, what is actually divided is knowledge by presence. That is, there are two types of knowledge by presence: pure knowledge by presence and knowledge presence that can be transformed into knowledge by acquisition. Moreover, given the account of the process through which the former is transformed into the latter and how constructed perceptions emerge from real perceptions with the aid of the estimative (wahmiyya) faculty, it can be concluded that the criterion for the division of perceptions into real and constructed, on Allameh Tabatabai’s account, is the same criterion depicted in the distinction between knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition. In other words, just as the mind draws on the activities of the estimative faculty to transform knowledge by presence into knowledge by acquisition for purposes of convenience in ordinary life, it utilizes the same activities to derive constructed perceptions from real perceptions.

 According to Allameh Tabatabai, it is knowledge by presence that is transformed into knowledge by acquisition through the activities of the imaginative faculty. The activities of the estimative faculty concerning real entities result in the formation of constructed perceptions. The criterion proposed by him for the division of perceptions into constructed and real is the one depicted in the distinction between knowledge by acquisition and knowledge by presence.
This clarifies the ground of the distinction between real and constructed perceptions, as well as its relationship with knowledge by presence. The ground of real perceptions is pure knowledge by presence, while the ground of constructed perceptions is the type of knowledge by presence that can be transformed into knowledge by acquisition. The distinction between these two kinds of perceptions lies in the difference of the knowledge by presence involved in them.

In contemporary epistemology, sense-data signify direct sense-perception reported by the first person singular and in the present time. The most important issue about it is whether one can justify its content. The justification for sense-data is challenged by a dilemma that makes the issue spin over whether it is conceptual or none-conceptual.In their paper, the authors have first demonstrated that some part of the dispute comes from the ambiguity of the application of the term and that its ontological position is not clear nor is it agreed upon. Then, relying on epistemological principles of Mulla Sara's philosophy, they have argued that the none-conceptualized contents of sense-data are the necessary prerequisite for the realization and fulfilment of the cognitive role of concepts. Since this content is not conceptualized and is thus presential knowledge -other than conceptual knowledge-, the outcome view would be an instance of none-conceptualism. In this view and in order to come free from strong skepticism and to defend rationality of empirical knowledge, we have resorted to an introspective definition of justification in which sense-data play a major role in representing the outside world. In the end, we have shown that such imperfect knowledge is far from absolute ignorance as to the world outside and from solipsism.

As a semi-Peripatetist semi-illuminationist philosopher, Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (1200-1273 AC/ 597-672 AH) was well acquainted with Suhrawardī's philosophical thoughts (hikmah al-ishraq) such as idea of intuition and his illumination science; so that some scholars have called him a pure illuminationist. Nevertheless, the influence of Suhrawardī's theory on the issues of perception and cognition is not seen in his works. In other words, Al-Tūsī does not accept illuminative-based knowledge of presence ('ilm hudurī) emphasizing that the acquired knowledge agent is something other than himself. On the other hand, unlike Avicenna's approach (980-1036 AC / 370-428 AH), and also other peripatetic philosophers, in explaining the theory of Absār, Tūsī considers the theory of "radius departure" (khurūj al-shu'ā'), as an autonomous theory. He also introduces rational perceptions through the process of "Impresion" (Inṭibā') rather than "abstraction" (tajrīd). In this article, by examining the various logical and philosophical works of Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, we try to show that in the matter of knowledge and perception, Tūsī has not been an imitating philosopher, either imitating Peripatetic philosophers, or illuminatist ones. Rather, he has taken a new approach in this field. Therefore, his point of view can be examined from two aspects: First, the negative aspect, in which Tūsī denies the "knowledge of presence (al-'ilm al-huzurī)." The second is the affirmative aspect, which expresses the theory of the impression (intibā') of rational perceptions.

Every philosophy, or more precisely every philosophical system, has a system on which the basic principles of that philosophy are based. Meanwhile, the Philosophy of Illumination is not out of this rule. This philosophy is based on principles, the most important of which is the element of "intellect and intuition". This article intends, after defining philosophy and philosopher, knowing the two is not unrelated to knowing the intellect and intuition, examine the intellect and intuition, according to the content of the article, separately, according to the illumination data in the Philosophy of Illumination, and then explain the position of these two elements that make up the Philosophy of Illumination, based on the works of Master of Illumination’ (shaykh al-ishraq), and then draw the main position of these two elements in philosophy, then I explain how the interaction between intellect and intuition in structuring the Philosophy of Illumination, and briefly examines it according to the capacity of the article.

One of the most fundamental discussions of epistemology is the discussion pertaining to the conceptions and notions. In this article, we are seeking to investigate how we acquire concepts, whether specific or general. This is the main concern of this study. According to the selected view, the theoretical concepts are taken from the self-evident concepts, but all the self-evident concepts are taken from the intuitive knowledge. In the first part of this claim, i.e. taking the theoretical concepts from the self-evident ones, there is no considerable disagreement. The second part, however, is not so and many theories have been presented there. Nevertheless, after explaining the selected theory and stating the scope of the self-evident concepts, we face this fundamental question: "how are the self-evident concepts taken from the intuitive knowledge?" After acquiring the right solution for the fundamental issue of this article, we will investigate and evaluate the way of acquiring the self-evident concepts through the intuitive knowledge and, at the end, the most important difficulties facing it.

The Philosophers’ opinions on the truth of the acquired knowledge can be divided into two types: some regard it to be the presence of the quiddity of ‘external known’ in the minds; and consequently, the acquired knowledge is reserved for the quiddities. This group has resolved the issue of correspondence of the knowledge with the known using this view. In contrast, other (earlier) philosophers consider the acquired knowledge as the instance and ghost of the external known. The issue of the ‘mode of the knowledge suggesting the known’ has produced these discussions. According to the former view, knowledge of the mental quiddity can be knowledge of the external quiddity; but the view related to the ghost considers suggestion of the suggested as an essential element of knowledge, and regards no need for a relationship and some sort of unity between the knowledge and the known. Here, the discussion of the relationship between the knowledge and the knower is posed, about which there are two basic views: some believe in the existential unity between the knower and the knowledge; and in contrast, the earlier philosophers have depicted a concrete relationship between the knower and the knowledge. In this article, the arguments presented by the adherents of the aforementioned views have been investigated; and finally the views of those who believe that the knowledge is a ghost and that there is a unity between the knowledge and the knower have been defended. According to that view, the acquired knowledge is the very existence of the knower, which is suggestive of the known.

The division of knowledge into “notion” and “assertion” is one of the foundational discussions. Knowledge, in its general sense, is divided into knowledge-by-presence and acquired knowledge. Acquired is either notional that is not judgment or notional accompanied by judgment. The former is “notion” while the latter is “assertion.” The two problems of this division are as follows: 1) “failure to comply with the criteria of rational division” which includes the instances of “unity of the divider and divided” and “lack of contrast between the types; 2) “the contrast of two categories in one quiddity.” Thinkers have replied to the first problem by considering the different validities in division, that is, the divider is unconditioned, notion is negativity conditioned, and assertion conditioned to something. In response to the second problem, they have said that judgment is necessary to assertion and is tantamount to the differentia, and the companionship of notion and judgment is mental. Apart from asserting the composition of assertion and explaining its parts, Fakhr Razi believes in the logical requisites of composition as well. According to him, assertion is the collection of notions of object and predicate and copula and judgment. Its problem is the acquirement of assertion from definition dues to the self-evidence of judgment; or it is from both definition and argument due to the acquiredness of judgment. As it were, the acceptance of the acquirement of judgment is incompatible with Fakhr Razi’s foundation in considering notions self-evidence. Another problem is the incompatibility with the unity and simplicity of knowledge. In his view, we cannot eliminate the first problem by considering the different validities in the divisions and divider because firstly, the type of these conditions is mentally-posited and they cannot be the differentia for real matters. Secondly, these validations explain the manner of presence of the divider in the divisions and their relationship to each other and is not specific to notion and assertion. Similarly, using judgment as the diffrentia of assertion cannot be a reply to the second problem because no differentia has been mentioned to conceive a part of assertion to make it acquired and distinct. Moreover, because Fakhr Razi’s basis has a problem in the composition of assertion, answers and requisites based on it will also be problematic. Therefore, his view does not appear to be successful in solving the problems. In the explanation of the views of the philosophers, Nasir al-Din Tusi considers assertion to be judgment. “Meaning” is the divider of notion and assertion. Notion is really knowledge and assertion is knowledge of it reverts to notion. In reality, assertion is judgment and judgment has two aspects: 1) it is an action of the soul; 2) conceptualization of this action of the soul by the soul. According to the second aspect, judgment is one of the instances of notion. The main point in this view is to consider notion as the basis; however, limiting knowledge to notions results in the denial of the share of argument in the two parts of logic. As it were, the division of knowledge into two parts makes the division figurative and indulgent. However, if one seeks the different in the philosophical and logical aspects in Khwaja Nasir’s view, then from a philosophical perspective, assertion is judgment and reverts to notion and this results in the exclusiveness of knowledge to notions. Therefore, there are essentially no divisions for knowledge. However, the concept of notion and assertion is one of the issues of logic. From this perspective, knowledge is figuratively divided and since it is in the beginning of logic and is in the position of education, such a matter is allowed. Therefore, by defining “meaning” as a divider, Khwaja could answer the first part of the first problem. As it were, considering assertion to be the same as judgment is both its second part and also the second problem which is an existential and ontological discussion would essentially not be applicable.

The explanation of sense perception constitutes a few principles necessary for the harmonious system of “Islamic epistemology”. Sense perception is the primary bridge between us and the world outside. Here, Mulla Sadra’s views on the issue ought not to be overlooked, for he has promoted innovations and considerable ideas about it. His ideas are sometimes articulated explicitly easy to spot such as that sensible forms are created by the soul or the Giver of forms, and sometimes implicit to be inferred from his other principles such as that sense perceptions are either husuli (indirect and through impression) or huduri (direct and by presence) and that sense perceptions by essence belong to imagination i.e. they are partially incorporeal. There are other examples, too. In their essay, the authors have challenged some of these ideas. One important outcome of such challenges is that sense perception is not husuli (indirect and through impression).

The principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity are the main bases of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy and his particular theories. On the other hand, he has not provided a clear and accurate picture of these two theories in his philosophical system and has referred to quiddity using different terms. Each of the contemporary commentators of the Transcendent Philosophy have interpreted quiddity and existence in a way based on their own views and theoretical principles and have tried to predicate it on Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory. However, given the fundamental role of quiddity and quiddative concepts in gaining acquired knowledge, disagreement in the interpretation of quiddity will affect the quality of explaining acquired knowledge. Hence, following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study aims to provide a correct interpretation for quiddity from the viewpoint of contemporary commentators of Sadrian philosophy and, then, investigate whether our acquired knowledge of existents, which is attained through quiddative concepts, is positive or negative. Accordingly, the authors have examined and criticized such commentators’ interpretations of quiddity and the way it explains existence. A short answer here is that, apparently, based on the correct view, which belongs to Professor Javadi Amuli, quiddity is the manifestation of determined existence, and quiddative concepts speak of limited existence, which is clearly a positive rather than a negative and purifying statement.

Avicenna and Suhrawardi have brief and scattered discussions about the issue of pleasure in their various works. One of those topics is the views of the two thinkers on the quiddity of pleasure. Thus, the purpose of this paper is a comparative study of pleasure from viewpoints of the heads of the two schools of Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophy and according to their epistemological and ontological bases. The problem of pleasure is a small part of the epistemic network of the two schools of Peripateticism and Illuminationism. Therefore, to get a better understanding and a deeper perception of the issue, it is necessary to review other aspects of the network, such as the basis of their philosophy. One of the implications of this study is to understand the reason that Ibn Sina distinct between transcendent and human pleasure, while there is no such distinction in Suhrawardi's philosophy, due to their difference in the issue of existence and perception of quiddity in their philosophical systems. Another implication is that although 'perception' and 'appropriate'(agreeable to one's nature) are consistent and repetitive terms in definitions of pleasure, given the epistemological and ontological differences of the two schools in their explanation, we come to a different understanding of pleasure. The most important of these differences are: from the epistemological perspective in Peripateticism, the emphasis is on knowledge by acquaintance. According to Illuminationism, however, the perception is based on the knowledge by presence. Also, the basis of ontology in Peripatetic philosophy is existence, but in the philosophy of illumination, the basis is light.

AbstractRumi's thought about acquired knowledge and presence and his reliance on the passage of external knowledge and reaching intuition and seeing the facts of the world, led the author to refer to titles and evidence of argument, confirmation and insistence of the two pillars of Islamic mysticism on the originality and legitimacy of presence. And intuition in the conduct to ..., pay special attention to Rumi's narrow thinking on the subject of esoteric secrets and optical wisdom. In this article, Rumi's views on the characteristics of face-to-face science, through behavior, perception of jokes and truths, the contribution of my struggle in discontinuity and self-purification, reflection on the novel system of creation, ascension to the world of light, radiance of light on the hearts of seekers are discussed. And has been referred to as evidence in proving Rumi's belief and reliance on sacred and present behavior in esoteric perceptions.

In this research, the views of Professor Fayyazi have been analyzed. Sadr-ol-Mote'allehin, according to the rule of indivisible entity and by proving the existential perfections of possible beings in the essence of the Almighty Supreme Being, explaining the knowledge by presence of God (immediate apprehension, intuitive knowledge) in the position of essence. Professor Fayyazi believes that this view has its drawbacks. The basic drawback is that Mulla Sadrā’s interpretation of the systematic ambiguity of existence becomes contradictory and the structural drawback with this, is that, this view is incapable of proving God’s knowledge of the contingent things which annihilated (nonexistent) and the impossibilities capable soul. For each of the two theories, there is evidence in his works. The most important result of accepting the activity of the soul, according to the rule of “the doer (producer) and the giver of the object, that does not lack it”, is the acceptance of the possession of forms by the soul in the rank before issuance (emanation) and activity. Such a conclusion leads us to a similar theory but more accurate in the field of soul perception, which is the mystical theory of soul development (unveiling). On the other hand, talking about the capability of the soul in relation to illusory and sensory forms leads us to have the power (potentiality) of the soul, its departure from the power to actuality in the process of perception consequently, the materiality of the human soul and also the materiality of sensory and illusory perceptions. The results which are inconsistent with some of Ṣadra’s other principles. Therefore, it seems that the first theory in partial perceptions is closer to the correct opinion and has more acceptable philosophical results.

Some of the contemporary advocates of Islamic Philosophy believe that the view of the modern Islamic philosophers regarding knowledge by presence can solve some of the issues present in the theory of knowledge. The origins of this belief are probably two popular theories: Allama Tabatabai’s view that acquired knowledge comes back to knowledge by presence and Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi’s view regarding the reference of basic axioms to knowledge by presence. According to the first view, all acquired knowledge is rooted in knowledge by presence. The main issue is regarding sensory beliefs and the circumstances of the justified relationship between sensory experience on one hand and sensory beliefs on the other; however, in this theory, no explanation has been provided regarding how knowledge by presence can be converted to acquire knowledge which has been derived from it. Therefore, this view does not help in solving that important issue. Similarly, according to Ayatollah Misbah’s view, the guarantee of the validity of basic axioms is because they are based on knowledge by presence. However, various reasons show knowledge by presence cannot provide the validity guarantee for basic axioms.

Instituting the culture of critical examination of the treasured scientific legacy of the past, this essay goes to attain novel achievements. Using library reference, rational study, and comparison among the views of Shiekh Ishraq Khwaja Nasir and Mulla Sadra, the author tries to explain and study Lahiji’s views on “What is knowledge?”, “What is the criterion of it?”, “What is the criteria of knowing and being known?”, “What is the criteria and instances of knowledge through concepts and those of knowledge by intuition?”, “That conceptual knowledge is fundamental and primary”, and “That it is impossible for the knower to know things other than him through intuition”. Through well-founded reasoning, the author has called into question Lahiji’s ideas such as, “That knowledge is accident”, “The difference between knowledge and perception”, “That knowledge is not concomitant with existence”, “That knowledge is exclusive to the rational one”, “That incorporeal being is exclusive to independent ones”, “That incorporeal beings are exclusive to the immaterial intellects”, “That incorporeity and independent existence is necessary for intellection”, and “That mental forms must be incorporeal and free from matter in the process of intellection”. The author then proceeds to demonstrate that intuitive knowledge is primary and prior to the conceptual knowledge since all cases of knowledge are primarily of intuition in themselves though they might be regarded as conceptual ones only in comparison to other things (those things known through something else). Still contrary to his view, we are of the view that it is possible to know things other than the knower by intuition like the creative cause that intuitively knows its effect.

As a problem statement, it must be indicated that the subject of soul has been the centerpiece of many philosophers’ attention which has led to the creation of diverse concepts about it. In this article, Farabi and Ibn Sina are referred to as the representatives of Masha Philosophy and Suhrawardi as the representative of the Philosophy of Illumination.  This research, in the first part, describes Farabi's and Ibn Sina's views on definitions, and then describes Suhrawardi's critique of the Masha Philosophy in this regard, and at the end he explains the point of view of Suhrawardi; since soul -cognition and its manifestations are the foundations of creatures’ cognition. As a necessity, it can be asked how our soul gains cognition? Mashayeans claim that they are capable of object cognition through its limitations, an idea which is criticized by Suhrawardi, believing such definitions to be incorrect while providing his own point of view regarding world cognition based on the light. In his opinion, soul is a manifestation on its own for its nature of light, and the brighter the light is, the more soul -cognition it will possess. He believes that Reasoning methods are not sufficient enough for gaining cognition and Intuitive knowledge is required instead. He furthermore supports his theory by holding soul and light equal to one another.

Knowledge in Sadra’ philosophy, is merely presence of something near Percipient. The most perfect sense of “presence” under this school, is intuitive knowledge of human being about “self” within which knowing and known have unity. Hence, From Sadra’s view, “knowledge” of “self” has a very high rank position in philosophy. However, what is described as " intuitive knowledge to self" in transcendental wisdom, From Kant’s view is not intuitive knowledge ; but this knowledge is also a kind of our empirical knowledge where is obtained through mediation of “subjective form” which is called “appearance” by Kant. But Kant believes that other than this “empirical ego” assigned to “transcendental ego” He believes that it cannot, as Nomenon, be placed in the center of the human experiential vision. Therefor, he neither believes knowledge of self as an acquired knowledge nor as intuitive one. In this article, we explains this problem of why Mulla Sadra considers intuitive cognition of self. This problem is embedded within a more general problem : Whether that ego which comprehends itself belongs to knowledge ? In this paper, we will show that the “knowledge” of “self”, unlike Kant's conception, cannot be explained except by the existential attitude, because intuitive perception is a kind of presence in existence and for existence.

The theory of the reference of conceptual knowledge to the intuitive knowledge is rooted in the views of philosophers such as Mulla Sadra and has been developed in the works of later thinkers such as Mesbah Yazdi. The purpose of this article is to explain the epistemological part of this view based on the Mulla Sadra’s works. This will be done by designing four questions and answering them. These four questions have focused on the four basic characteristics of basic self-evidents and their origins (three of these four characteristics) in the context of the presence sciences. The first feature is the realization of basic self-evidents, the second feature is their totality, the third one is the necessity of the first theorems, and the fourth characteristic is the basis of these cases. We must find the roots of these four features in the context of the intuitive knowledge, which is a personal reality and apparently lacking in necessity. So that what we say is not the kind of argument and inference, otherwise we do not observe the fourth characteristic (basic axiomatic) of the basic self-evidents.