جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « cause » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The inappropriate use of "cause" in the translation of Aition and transferring the conceptual and metaphysical content of active cause to other causes, especially the ultimate cause, has caused misinterpretations and misunderstanding of this concept. If the relationship between cause and explanation is not taken into account, there will be confusion between the meaning of cause in the new philosophy and Aitia, which is caused by not taking into account the difference between "view to fact" and the mind, or the distinction between proof and evidence. In this article, the why and how to enumerate the Aristotelian causes and the ontological and epistemological strains of the relationship between cause and explanation are discussed from his point of view. The reason for Aristotle's fourfold classification of causes and the understanding of the causal relationship should be found based on the category of change and movement or the relationship between the creator and the artifact. The role of change and movement can be considered as the foundation of the natural analysis of causality based on the teachings of physics and metaphysics, in parallel with Aristotle's theory of causality in secondary analyzes based on the concepts of the middle ground of evidential analogy and general causal innateness. It is possible to consider the cause as a type of explanation or as a part of the explanation known as the causal explanation in such a way that it is both an explanation and an explanation of the cause.

Causality as an existential cause serves as a basis for Avicenna’s philosophy and is one of the vital principles of philosophical and rational problems. As a rationalist philosopher, Avicenna has proposed some new insights including the idea that causality is based on existence. Proposing the distinction between existence and essence, he has provided a new model for the God-world relationship. He believes that the relationship between the creator and the created can be explained by examining the causality relationship. Among different causes, he prioritizes the efficient cause (Agent) which makes things exist out of nothing. As to the God-world relationship explanation, he argues that God governs the world of beings as the cause of causes. As for its existence and non-existence, the Being as the effect and the possible (non-aseity) needs a preponderance (Murajjih) that is the cause of causes. Avicenna believes that God’s essential aseity entails God’s necessitated existence. Not only he defines the dependency of the caused on the cause as “the necessity by virtue of another” (Wujub Bilghair) or existential possibility in Sadra’s words, but he emphasizes the existential relationship between the caused and the cause. Then he opens a clearer horizon towards the primacy of being which had a great impact on Islamic philosophers as well as Western philosophers like Thomas Aquinas.

Regarding the necessity or non-necessity of the ultimate cause, there are two views: the first view is that in generation of the material beings, the existence of the four types of causes is necessary; and in generation of immaterial beings, just the existence of agentive and ultimate cause is sufficient. The second view, while distinguishes the aware and unaware agents, just considers the existence of ultimate cause in the action of the aware agent as necessary. Thus, the existence of the ultimate cause is not necessary in generation of possible beings; rather, the existence of material, formal and agentive causes are necessary for generation of material beings, and the presence of the agentive cause is enough in generation of immaterial beings. Since the right worldview is based on proving the cause and effect relationship, it is necessary to discuss the causality. Discussing the necessity and non-necessity of the causes and the ultimate cause for the effect is one of related discussion on causality. The present article explains the two aforementioned views, and investigates and reviews the arguments of the two parties to conclude that the third view, i.e. non-necessity of the ultimate cause, is right. In this study, we have used the descriptive-analytical method.

Aristotle discusses “Unmoved Mover” and “thought thinking” in theology and there are features for that, including substance and immateriality and pure actuality. Al-Kindi uses “cause,” “activity,” and “creation” in his discussion of the concept of God. The point of intersection of the two philosophers is their definition of philosophy. Reforms and concepts such as “truth,” and “cause”, and “first cause” have been proposed in the definition of philosophy by both. These concepts are reflected in al-Kindi’s conceptualization of God. The question is, given Aristotle and al-Kindi’s definition of philosophy, is the possible for them to study the conceptualization of God? That is, does the definition of philosophy allow them to conceptualize God and study it? How is the possibility of conceptualizing God explained to al-Kindi and Aristotle? In this article, using Aristotle’s Little Alpha and Lambda, both of which have been considered by al-Kindi, we examine the concept of God. In the first part, we examine the definition of philosophy by Aristotle and al-Kindi, and express the terms and concepts contained in this Definition; And in the other section, using Lambda and the first philosophy and the concept of “eternal,” we state that Without using the definition of philosophy and with natural principles, Aristotle introduced a metaphysical deity  (theology in a special sense) and Kindi based on the definition of philosophy and its end and indirectly using the Aristotelian metaphysical principles  (four causes and faculty and Actuality) Introduces a metaphysical-theological god.

The principle of “One” (Al-Wahid) is one of the most famous philosophical principle admitted by philosophers, but theologians such as Ghazali and Fakhr Razi did not accept this principle and tried to refute it. The most important proof is provided by Avicenna, and efforts have been made after him to strengthen these proofs and respond the criticism of it. Mohammad Husayn Gharawi Isfahaani ( the theologian and philosopher of 20th century), who has accepted Al-Wahid's principle, has argued and propounded some arguments that by using The” Necessity by something else”,” Essential possibility” and” Existential possibility” give clear explanations of it. By referring to necessity and possibility he concluded that multiplicity of these things result in the multiplicity of the essence of cause and effect and their respective aspects, and in contradiction with unity. The purpose of this essay is to provide a clear explanation of his arguments.

From Mulla Sadra's point of view, the existence of a disabled person is the same as that of a relative and has no independence and is one of the levels of existence of a cause. The effect of radiation from existential expansion is the real cause. In Sadra's intellectual paradigm, all causes are related to the real cause. The extension of existence is limited to the essence of the burden, and other causes come from the channels and mediators of grace. It is not only the existence of the active agent that is documented in him, but all his affairs are also documented in the real agent, and each of them extends the existence and all the existential affairs to the agent, because the agent's agent is the same as belonging to him. By analyzing Mulla Sadra's views and relying on the rule of substantial motion, some of the consequences of this type of attitude are: ultimate happiness and moral perfection, a sense of closer closeness and face-to-face knowledge of God, responsibility and moral duties as much as existential dignity, expansion of dignity. Inherent in all creatures, attaining existential freedom. This descriptive-analytical article seeks to examine the moral consequences of the objective view of the existence of a disability based on the views of Mulla Sadra.

One of the issues that occupied the minds of many thinkers in ancient times was the issue of change, generation and corruption, and the role of principles in these processes. The positions of some early philosophers led to contradictions such as the denial of motion and any stability in existents. Aristotle, however, considers nature to be subject to motion, and although he considers matter and form as the source and main cause of any creation and change, he also considers a third element called "non-existence" necessary for change and generation and corruption in nature. In this way, he solves the old puzzle above. As it is well known, matter and form are among Aristotle's four causes; but in spite of the explicit statements about non-existence, it is not considered as a cause, while the study of its role shows that it can also be considered as a kind of cause, because it provides the basis for the creation and change of objects. In this article, by examining the role of non-existence in nature, we try to show that without it, creation and change in existents is not possible and in fact it is a kind of cause.

Causality is at the center of several natural relationships which are studied in empirical sciences. Presently, it is the basis of the discovery of scientific laws. Moreover, the applications of different laws in various sciences, including all the laws related to individuals, societies, and other natural realms, in relation to fauna, flora, and minerals or inanimate things, have causality at their center. Here, the author has tried to examine the validity of the principle of causality from the viewpoints of two Islamic schools (Mu‘tazilah and Ash‘ariyyah) and two schools of Islamic philosophy (Peripatetic and Transcendent – from Ibn Sīnā to ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī). This paper consist consists of an Introduction, three detailed reports, a summary of findings, and a conclusion.

According to the principle of “impossibility of the knowledge of effect without the knowledge of cause”, it is not possible to attain any certain knowledge of an effect prior to attaining the knowledge of its cause. Based on logicians’ reading of this principle, it is only our acquired knowledge, which is obtained through reasoning, that conforms to this principle. Nevertheless, Mullā Ṣadrā provides an innovative analysis of the mentioned principle and, in contrast to logicians, concludes that it applies to all types of knowledge, whether acquired, presential, axiomatic, or theoretical. Some commentators of Mullā Ṣadrā’s works do not agree with his new interpretation of this principle and maintain that it is defective. However, the present study reveals that his perception is compatible with his own ontological principles, and the criticisms advanced by his commentators originate in their lack of attention to them.

The scientific explanation is usually defined as finding the cause. For some reasons, this has been a subject of doubt, however, it seems that, both in common sense as well as in philosophical approach, the mainstream still support the very Idea of explanation something as introducing its cause. But cause searching and cause finding are not so easy tasks. This Article is for corroborating the idea according to which the essential tension in scientific research is derived from the practical difficulty of distinguishing a complex netting of causes, not from the theoretical disfunction of causality. Multiplicity, variety, interaction, and dynamism of causes and factors intervening in a causal process constitute oftentimes a perplexing netting in which it is difficult, sometimes practically impossible, to distinguish, dissociate, evaluate, and calculate vectors effective on final resultant and explain or predict the output or the effect the process in question has. Not paying enough attention to it leads mistakenly to doubt about causality itself. The problem is pragmatic, not paradigmatic.