جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « khajeh nasir » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The situation in Iran at the end of the 8th century of Hijri was accompanied by events that had an impact on the cultural and intellectual issues of that time. With the establishment of the Safavid government, Shiism was declared as the official religion and entered the social currents, and Shiite scholars and intellectuals also came out of the passive state. With the introduction of rational thought into these currents, new opinions emerged among sages and theologians. In the tenth century, divine wisdom faced fundamental changes, and Islamic philosophy, which was based on Shia teachings, was created by Mulla Sadra and inspired by the thoughts of mystics. And the previous sages entered a new era. By introducing new issues in philosophy, Mulla Sadra founded a new school called Hekmat al-Mota'aliyeh, and with this school, the process of making the intellect legitimate was put on a new path and ended the differences between rationalists and esotericists about religion. Mulla Sadra resolved disputes with a new style. Using his philosophical method, he tried to explain, consolidate and defend beliefs and created a kind of philosophical discourse, and in this way, using the reasoning methods of Masha, the personal experiences of mystics, and with new interpretations of the verses of the Qur'an and the foundations of belief. He was able to create a new way of philosophical theology, that is, philosophical theology, after him, his students continued this path. And each of them played an important role in the flourishing of Mulla Sadra's philosophical theology. This research, while examining different approaches and periods of theological science, has pointed out the important position of Mulla Sadra in bringing this approach to its peak and explained this problem with a descriptive-analytical method

Farabi is the first Muslim logician to define conversion in his works. Ibn Sina, by borrowing from him and adding the adverb "survival of falsehood", has defined the conversion as follows: " Displacement of the subject and predicate along with the survival of the quality, truth and falsehood.". The logicians after Ibn Sina, led by Tusi, have found several inaccuracy in this definition and have tried to provide an accurate and consistent definition with the logical system. In this research, while measuring and evaluating these problems and answers, the historical course of definition of conversion by Muslim logicians has been studied. For this purpose, the evolution of the definition of conversion has been studied and by mentioning the problems of the definitions of logicians such as "Farabi", "Akhavan Al-Safa", "Fakhr Razi", "Ibn Sahlan Savi", etc., we have been led to the conclusion that "Khunji" and his contemporaries definition ("Tusi", "Ermoi", etc.) is a suitable and correct definition.

Seeking for Happiness in Islamic Philosophy and its goal, it can be seen a literal and unanimous answer in philosopher words which reflects combination of worldly(secular) and otherworldly(sacred) happiness that it can prepare temporal and eschatological happiness. But in a deeper investigation we can ask: what is the main purpose? mortal or final dimension of happiness? As a result of the text, it seems that from Al- Kendi to Al- Rāzī the otherworldly happiness is considered as a result of worldly happiness. After Al- Farabi to Al- Tusi the flow of thinking tends to combine worldly and otherworldly happiness. After Al- Tusi and under the influence of him in Nasirian Ethics (Akhlaq-i Nasiri), the changed version of philosophical Islamic Ethics supports eschatological happiness and supposes the worldly happiness as a primary and elementary level which must be considered as healing of mortal life. Matching with this view, it seems that worldly happiness is Abolished, because it changes the balance between and worldly and otherworldly happiness, and also it week the social development instead of increasing individual happiness.

The cognitive and non-cognitive basics and fields determine formation methods and fundamental methodology of theories and thoughts of scholars. Khajeh Nasiraldin Toosi, have explained the most expanding arguments regarding the house planning following Avicenna; though he never dealt directly the cognitive and method basics of such planning. This research aimed at explaining Khajeh Nasir’s methodology in house planning as well as to answer this question that on what cognitive methodology Kahejh Nasir had relied for house wisdom? The method Khajeh Nasir took in this planning discusses the fundamental methodology where a set of orders, musts and must not’s and duties are given for organizing prosperous and ideal life emphasizing various basics and methods including religion, civilization, wisdom, ethics ,and goal orientation and traditionalism and sentimentalism. His cognitive methodology is a decisive aid for guiding family and achieving the worldly and hereafter prosperity and emphasizes Islamic and traditional lifestyle. This research investigates Khajeh Nasir’s method in house planning through an analytic- descriptive method and points out its influence on the lifestyle.

Aristotle, Aquinas, and Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi are representatives of the three periods and the worlds of thought, and all of them have played an important role in establishing or consolidating their ethical attitudes. In this essay, it was attempted to identify and analyze the highest virtues and the worst ethical vices from the perspective of each of these three wise and expert philosophers. For Aristotle, the highest virtue is justice and greed and the worst vice is oppression to friends. For Aquinas considers Caritas as the highest virtue of and the worst vice is the disappointment. Khajeh Naseer regards grace as the supreme ethical attribute and stinging as the worst, although envy and anger can also be considered as the worst vice in a rather vague interpretation. Comparing the results of the work, firstly, suggests that the views of Khajeh Nasir and Aquinas are close to each other, and secondly, Aristotle's has more sophisticated view to ethics and ethical virtues than two other thinkers.

In this paper, through exploring the problem of equivocal types and its historical roots in Islamic Peripatetic school, we will explain the differences between Khajeh Nasir’s approach to equivocal types and Avicenna’s one; and show that such differences result from Sohrevardi’s criticisms and his belief in the priority of essence.
On the one hand, Khajeh Nasir embraces Sohrevardi’s criticism of Avicenna, and on the other, he never could accommodate modulation and gradation of essence in the framework of Peripatetic school. Thus, he considers the equivocal types as required common accidental of their tokens. In this paper, it has been shown that, firstly, Khajeh Nasir borrows this idea from the matter of the relation of genus and differentia and of accident and Aristotle’s accidental categories. Secondly, to embrace such idea epistemologically results in inconformity between subject and object form Peripatetic point of view. Furthermore, from theological point of view, it paves the way to Ibn Kamooneh’s doubt.