جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "necessity of being" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Mulla Sadra and William Rowe, representing divergent philosophical traditions, addressed the issue of "God's freedom" and arrived at disparate conclusions. Both philosophers concur that God's will for the creation of the world possesses an eternal necessity. However, their dissimilarity arises from Mulla Sadra's adherence to a compatibilist perspective on freedom. He believes that as in the case of man, where the necessity per aliud of the will does not conflict with the freedom, in the case of God, the eternal necessity of the will does not conflict with his freedom. Conversely, William Rowe, an advocate of the libertarian concept of freedom, posits that the eternal necessity of God's will leaves no room for His freedom. Drawing a parallel between the necessity per aliud in human beings and the eternal necessity in God, according to Rowe, is an erroneous analogy. In this article, through an examination of these philosophers' arguments, we arrive at the stance that William Rowe's position holds greater defensibility. Firstly, his viewpoint aligns more harmoniously with our linguistic and moral intuitions. Secondly, there are sound justifications for distinguishing between necessity per aliud and eternal necessiity, in terms of determinism

"Resurrection" is a theological and philosophical term that refers to the revival of humans after death in another realm, where they will receive rewards or punishments for their good or bad deeds in this world. According to Quranic accounts, some people in the early Islamic era denied resurrection entirely or rejected certain aspects of it. These deniers, along with some Jews, lacked a proper understanding of resurrection and the return to God. Their rationale for denying resurrection was based on its perceived improbability or impossibility, while some claimed special privileges for themselves, such as eternal dwelling in Paradise. In addressing these claims, the Quran employed both intellectual and transmitted methods, offering sensible and concrete examples to prove the resurrection and refute the notion of special privileges for Jews and Christians. Drawing on the Prophet’s Quranic arguments with resurrection deniers and his responses to the false objections raised by some Jews, using wisdom and the "fairest debate" (al-jidāl al-aḥsan), this research employs logical formulations through a library-based method with an argumentative and inferential approach. It relies on arguments drawn from God’s omnipotence, His absolute ownership and Lordship, and the rejection of Jewish claims to eternal paradise and their insincerity in friendship with God, to explore the possibility, necessity, and occurrence of resurrection.

The argument of possibility and necessity is one of the arguments to prove the existence of God. In addition to Muslim thinkers such as Farabi and Avicenna, Western thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz have also presented interpretations for this proof. In this article, we examine which of the existing interpretations for the proof of possibility and necessity possesses more mastery compared to the criticisms expressed. In total, sixteen different criticisms on various interpretations of the proof of possibility and necessity will be presented and analyzed. Some of these critiques can be answered based on all three interpretations, while some can only be answered based on Avicenna's interpretation. By analyzing these criticisms, it is clear that among the various interpretations expressed for the argument of possibility and necessity, Avicenna's interpretation stands out due to this thinker's reference to more accurate foundations, such as considering eidetic possibility as the criterion for the effect's need for a cause and starting the argument from the concept of possibility. This interpretation demonstrates more strength and mastery than the interpretations of other thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz. Furthermore, with Avicenna's philosophical system, we can respond to all the criticisms directed at this interpretation.

The discussion of “necessity of a divine ḥudjdjah (guide)” has been dealt with in common theological books, and evidences have been presented for it; But the discussion of “continuing the existence of ḥudjdjah” has been neglected to some extent and a clear analysis of it has not been presented. Despite the fact that the Imāmiyyah scholars agree on the continuity of divine ḥudjdjahs, they did not try to mention the reasons for this belief which is derived from the Mutawātir (frequent) hadiths; Therefore, in this article, in a descriptive-analytical way, we will make it clear that the theologians’ rational arguments in proving the “necessity of ḥudjdjah” are not enough to prove the “continuity of ḥudjdjah”; Unless one concludes the continuity of the existence of the ḥudjdjah through the connection between the necessity of the existence of the ḥudjdjah and its continuity.

According to Marx's interpretation, in the Democritean system, atoms move in a vacuum according to a blind necessity. Applying the word "accidental" to the Democritus system does not imply the unpredictable or causeless movement of atoms; rather, it indicates the absence of a prior plan or specific end in the creation of the worlds. It's as if the atoms are moving in one direction, the end of which is the creation of worlds. Epicurus, unlike Democritus, does not believe in the existence of an inviolable necessity in the movements of atoms and includes the declination of the atom from the straight line as a sign of accidental movement in his atomistic system. It is with declination as an accidental movement that basically the creation of worlds begins. So the basis of the creation of worlds is chance. Epicurus believes in the accidental movement of atoms, and in the process of creating the worlds, he does not assume any prior plan. Epicurean chance indicates both the negation of the end and the accidental movements of atoms in declination from a straight line.

The primary focus of this research centers on the analysis and critique of Moritz Shclick's perspective concerning the "relationship between free will and determinism." Its objective is to demonstrate the inadequacy of his proposed solution in a descriptive-analytical manner. According to Shclick, the purported dilemma surrounding free will and determinism is a pseudo-philosophical quandary stemming from a conflation of key concepts. He contends that disentangling these concepts through differentiation of terms in common sense, such as "normative law" from "descriptive law," "causality" (representing determinism) from "compulsion," and "non-causality" (indeterminism) from "freedom," will naturally dissipate this pseudo-problem. Shclick posits that "compulsion" falls within the realm of normative concepts, while determinism and the principle of causal necessity reside in the domain of descriptive concepts, thereby rendering any connection between "compulsion" and "determinism" non-existent. In this study, I illustrate through three innovative examples that: a) "compulsion" and "freedom" possess at least two distinct meanings in common sense, and Shclick's claim succumbs to the fallacy of reductionism. b) The crux of the issue surrounding free will revolves around the secondary meaning of these terms. c) Shclick's definition of freedom encompasses not only humans but also extends to animals, thereby not impeding others. These three critiques collectively demonstrate the untenability of Shclick's compatibilist perspective.

In the field of religious knowledge, several arguments have been presented to prove the necessity of religion from a theological and philosophical perspective. The present article examines and analyzes the arguments for the necessity of religion from the perspective of wisdom and grace from the viewpoint of some scholars. This study, more like the theologians' method, while defining the concept of prophet with a logical structure, presents two arguments, the first of which is an argument based on the wisdom of God, stating that the purpose of human creation was expediency and benefit to human beings. In this regard, some scholars believe in the legislative will, and some believe in the divine generative will, and some return the ultimate cause to the efficient cause, and some to the will of the Prophet and the guardian. That is, the wills occur in the soul of the prophet and the guardian since the will of God is not the place of events that need the legislative will. In other words, there are wills about human beings in the soul of the prophet or guardian, but they belong to the interests of the people themselves and go back to them in terms of duties and prove the necessity of religion and prophecy through the necessity of fulfilling the interests in God's wisdom. The second argument is the argument based on grace, which considers revelation to include grace in intellectual duties and to be a condition in auditory ones. This argument, after examining two propositions about the grace of revelation in intellectual duties and its condition in auditory duties, explains and proves the necessity of religion and the prophet.

Freedom in Hegel is defined in terms of the determining power of subjectivity, i.e. by the rule “to be with oneself in the other”. Free is the one who moves in his thoughts and actions completely in accordance with the absolute thinking that has been freed from its finitude, meaning that it has become identical with being. Freedom presupposes the elevation to the “absolute” standpoint and conforming to it. Thus, it is tied to the concept of identity. Free is someone who lives (thinks and acts) in accordance with the “absolute” subjectivity. Therefore, the individual is not free as far as he/she is an individual, but only to the extent that he/she is a universal individual (absolute subjectivity). Schelling calls this position on the “absolute” simply “negative”, for it defines the “absolute” as identity-in-difference of thinking and being in accordance with absolute subjectivity or thinking. Being, what Schelling calls the positive, is supposed to be explained away according to thinking, the negative, which means that contingency should be included under necessity.Schelling, on the other hand, emphasizes that contingency takes precedence over necessity, just as Kant’s freedom takes precedence over cognitive thinking. Therefore, in Schelling, thinking sould be based on freedom. Furthermore, heunderstands freedom in relation to the divine. In this article, we will first explain the development of the Hegelian “absolute” in connection with its history in German idealism; Then we will unpack its implications for freedom. After that, we will point out Schelling’s criticism of the Hegelian “absolute”, and finally give a perspective of a non-Hegelian model for freedom.

According to Avicenna’s exposition of ‍the demonstration of necessity and possibility based on the evidence of the subsistence of reality, an external being either is existent by necessity because of its nature, or has no necessity for existence and non-existence, and its existence is provided by a necessary being outside the chain of possible beings. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz has considered contingency as the possibility of doubt in propositions governing the reality, and the way to get rid of this doubt is to accept a necessary being that has given the world a necessity. When David Hume, considering Leibniz’s exposition, objects ‍the demonstration of necessity and possibility, he states that, firstly, merely possibility of doubt in external beings does not make the necessary being be confirmed because the same doubt applies to the necessary being; and, secondly, the concept of the necessary being is inconsistent: the necessity only describes the analytical propositions, and not the propositions governing the reality; therefore, one can cast doubt on the existence of a necessary being, which is not compatible with its being necessary. In this study, we aim at giving answers to these objections using the analytical-descriptive method by relying on the principles and foundations of Avicenna’s exposition, and state that, firstly, possibility means the lack of inherent necessity of external reality in relation to existence and non-existence, from which existence of necessary being can be understood; therefore, Leibniz has confused probable possibility and essential possibility, and that, secondly, the imputing necessity to an object in the capacity of a mental image and in the orbit of the primary predication does not entail its external realization to make it incompatible with the possibility of doubting its realization.

Nowadays modal logic is one of the important areas of logic, but at the beginning of the emergence of modern logic, there was not much attention to this branch of logic, and even the founders of modern logic, including Russell, had an anti-modal position. One of the factors that led Russell to adopt such a position was the belief that logic is truth functional and extensional, and this is something that the introduction of modality destroys.Of course During the long period of his philosophical work, Russell has taken many and varied positions about modal notions. From the beginning, he did not have an anti-modal position. At first, he considered necessity as a description of an implication, and after some time, he introduced it as a primitive, basic and indefinable concept. Then, in some of his works, following Moore, he considered necessity as a kind of logical priority of propositions, but in the end he took an anti-modal position and tried to completely discard the modal notions. He said that these concepts are properties of propositional functions, not properties of propositions. But Russell has used second-order logic for explaining the modal concepts and explaining the difference between possibility and existence (which declares both of them to be properties of propositional functions), but even with this, he is not able to completely remove the modal notions from language and logic.

Maaref Publishing is responsible for publishing commentary textbooks in Iranian universities. So far, these books have been compiled around famous verses, but the textbook has not been written on the axis of "education”. The aim of the research is to analyze the educational interpretation in Islamic education courses by looking at its methodology, principles and rules

  In this research with descriptive-analytical method according to the educational needs of students in the fields of knowledge, instinct, ethics and behavior on the one hand and looking at the methodology, principles and rules of thematic interpretation of education, on the other hand, the need for this compilation will be shown.

Based on the research finding, in writing educational commentary following factors are considered:  general methods of interpretation, as well as specific methods of educational interpretation such as: explaining verses with regard to the educational process, employing educational sciences to explain verses, paying attention to the educational dimension of the Qur'an in interpretive statements, theorizing Education based on the Qur'an and the need to pay attention to the general principles of interpretation, as well as the specific principles of educational interpretation such as: the existence of educational teachings in the Qur'an, attention to the principle of cultivation and education before education, comprehensiveness of the Qur'an to education and its attention to all human dimensions, harmony The Qur'an with human nature, paying attention to the educational models presented in the Qur'an and using different epistemological tools in understanding education, and considering the general rules of interpretation such as: Ayatollah Maa'refat womb rule, the necessity of writing this interpretation for students, especially science students Reveals training.

The main question of this research is: "What is Ibn Sina's and Allameh Tabatabayi's report on Siddiquin's argument and what are their commonalities and differences with each other?" The purpose of examining this issue is to gain a deeper awareness of the position and value of one of the most important proofs of God in Islamic philosophy. In this article, using the analytical-rational method, an attempt has been made to present a report of Avicenna's speech from Burhan (Argument) Siddiqin by examining his works. Then Allameh Tabatabayi's speech about this argument is presented. By comparing these two speeches, their commonalities and differences are discussed, and at the end, the findings of the research are presented in the form of conclusions. Based on the results obtained from this research, there are three aspects in common between the above two speeches: “demonstration through the cause” (being Lemmi) of both speeches, the absence of the need for both speeches to negate logical turn and sequence, and proving the attributes of Wajib al-Wujud in addition to proving his existence. On the other hand, there are four differences between the two mentioned speeches: in Ibn Sina's speech, the principle of existence is used, while in Allameh Tabatabayi's speech, the principle of reality is used; Ibn Sina's speech is only capable of proving the inherent necessity of wajib al-wujud, but Allameh Tabatabayi's speech also proves the eternal necessity of inherent wajib-ul-wujud. Ibn Sina has used many preliminaries in his speech, but Allameh Tabatabayi has proved the ideal by using the fewest preliminaries in his speech.

Islamic teachings in a common and famous division is divided into three sections of beliefs, ethics and jurisprudence. In the field of jurisprudence with a historical background, ijtihad scientific work has always been considered and considere however, in the two fields of doctrinal and moral knowledge, despite their great importance and impact on the guidance, growth, perfection and happiness of human beings and society, ijtihad and mujtahid scientific efforts have received much. less attention after defining the concept and purpose of ijtihad in doctrinal teachings, this article seeks to prove the necessity of ijtihad and deep inferential work in the field of doctrinal teachings by stating three types of Quranic arguments, narration and reason and after mentioning many narrative and rational arguments, it is concluded that it is very necessary and essential that in the doctrinal teachings, accurate and deep ijtihad and inferential efforts, such as ijtihad in jurisprudence, be done properly and adequately.

In Metaphysics Delta alone, there are five definitions of necessity, and understanding the relationship between these definitions plays an important role in our approach to necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. The way in which the various meanings of "necessity" are shared is reminiscent of the different meanings of Metaphysics Γ, in which Aristotle deals with the category of analogy of attribution or analogy of proportion by giving "medical" and "healthy" examples. In this article, we look at how the various uses of necessity express a single nature for it, and therefore necessity cannot be considered as a purely (irrelevant) equivocal in Aristotle's works. Among the five meanings of "necessary" in Metaphysics Delta, the fourth meaning must be taken as the original meaning of necessity, which is in fact definition of necessary on the basis of possibility. The relation of other meanings of the necessary to this basic meaning is of the kind of specific equivocality or in relation to (pros hen) a thing and origin. Pluralism of the necessary’s definitions indicates an analogy between them, not equivocality or being univocal in the definitions. The division of "necessary" in various senses is not the division of genus into its various species. While all of these are called necessary, one cannot speak of a single general concept of necessity. The analogical theory of necessity requires an understanding of the definition and nature of necessity in a particular way in each of the uses of the word. The relation that each of the meanings establishes with the original meaning determines the metaphysical degree and order of "necessity" in that meaning. For Aristotle, other meanings of the necessary are called necessary by virtue of this meaning and by the logical relation of analogy.

The purpose of this article is to examine and answer this fundamental question: Given that the theory of grace in Ibn Sina's thought means grace and the "necessary" overflow of beings from the Almighty, how does this theory conform to the divine will? In other words, how can one combine "necessity" and "will" in the context of the theory of grace, when in appearance these two categories negate each other? Based on the metaphysical foundations of Ibn Sina's theology, the author has reached the following conclusions First, the theory of grace in Ibn Sina's thought is based on certain metaphysical and theological principles and principles that in some respects have the same principles and principles as Ibn Sina's philosophy. Secondly, for this reason, the theory of grace can be understood only on the basis of the same principles. Thirdly, according to Ibn Sina's view of the principles of beings, the structure of the universe, the essence and attributes of transcendence, especially his objective knowledge and will, the necessity of grace is not only not contrary to the divine will; Rather, it arises from his essence, knowledge, will and obligation. That is, the world is an essential requirement of the obligatory essence according to its essential will; Therefore, no possibility other than the Supreme Being can impose a necessity on him. The difficulty of und

The relationship between modality and time is a complex one; Aristotle's arguments about determinism are mainly focused on time rather than causation. The problem of De Interpretatione can be attributed to Aristotle's considerations on time and truth. From Aristotle's emphasis on the "necessity of something when it is the case (ὑπάρχειν)" and explaining it in the form of the negation of absolute necessity, at least three conclusions can be drawn: 1. The introduction of time into modalities and finally the evolution of The discussion on determinism and singular future events. 2. The importance of the consequences of Aristotle's theory of truth in denying or demanding the determinism based on the relation of truth and time. 3. Aristotle's fundamental distinction between conditional and absolute necessity, which leads to a better understanding of the various spheres of existence and knowledge, including the differences between monde sublunaire and monde supralunaire. The inference of necessity from the truth of one thing shows that just as truth in Aristotle's standpoint depends on correspondence with facts, so the concept of necessity must be understood as a description of reality. The connection between truth, necessity, and actuality suggests that it is not easy to regard unrealized reality of future as the realm of truth, apriori necessity and strict determinism. The aim of this paper is to clarify the boundaries of Aristotle's thought about necessity with determinism and causal determinism in the main question of the article and to seek the necessary evidence to prove this difference in the discussions of the ninth chapter of De Interpretatione.

The adoption of religiosity or non-religiosity can be one of the most important choices of one’s life. When the arguments for religiosity and non-religiosity are equivalent, agnosticism can be selected as the third alternative in theory. However, the third theoretical option is not available in practice. Then, in such situations, a side should be taken that brings about less loss and more gain. Through the quantitative calculation and comparison of the loss and gain claimed by religious and non-religious people, we can see that the overall gain of religiosity is more than non-religiosity. This reading of intelligibility argument that is formed based on Pascal’s wager is called “the expected superior gain,” using which it can be proved that one should select religiosity in practice and live religiously. Despite some similarities, this argument is different from Pascal’s wager in some premises and purpose. In this argument, the limitations of religiosity are taken into account, and otherworldly gain is deemed for some non-religious people. Moreover, the purpose of this argument is to show the preferability of religiosity in practice rather than proving the rightfulness of religiosity. The existence of different religions with various – and sometimes contradictory – claims, sophisticality, dialecticality, incongruence with the principle of “the badness of non-cautioned punishment,” inaccuracy and irrationality of the premises, and the inability to prove the necessity of religiosity are the main rational doubts facing this argument that are answered in this article. Providing a novel formation for the intelligibility argument and using it to prove the necessity of religiosity as well as responding to the main doubts against it are the main contributions of the article at hand.

In Aristotle's philosophy, knowledge begins with the senses, and sensory perceptions bring knowledge to man through the activity of the "nous" faculty. Unlike Plato, Aristotle denies any innate knowledge; but on the other hand, he clearly states that sensory perceptions do not belong to knowledge and one cannot acquire knowledge to the senses. This creates a paradox in Aristotle's philosophy. If sensory perceptions do not belong to knowledge, how does knowledge arise from "what does not belong to knowledge" and because of the lack of which component of "knowledge", these perceptions do not belong to "knowledge"? According to the authors, the solution to this paradox goes back to the definition of "knowledge" and the possible role of sensory perceptions in the emergence of knowledge in Aristotle. Aristotle does not consider knowledge to be merely "justified true belief" but narrows the scope of "knowledge" to other conditions such as necessity and causality. Therefore, although belief in sensations is a true belief, but these perceptions do not belong to "knowledge" due to the lack of the condition of generality and causality.

Perhaps one of the most pivotal ideas of Kant which connects all of the periods of his continuous intellectual work is the idea of the nature as the whole. According to Kant the nature as the whole is equivalent to totality and universality. This is the rule of the fundamental idea: the particulars finally must be under the general in order to be explicable. But it is interesting to note that this general rule which remains unchanged in Kant’s three periods of intellectual work has a special meaning in each period. So we seek to answer the question of how Kant begins with the nature as the objective and then reaches the nature as the ideal of the pure reason and consider it as the necessary totality for the power of judgment and from there reaches the nature as something that has legal requirements. But such a transformation into the legal and historical nature is possible only if we pay attention to the power of reflective judgments which are contained of aesthetic and teleological judgments. Because it is the power of reflective judgment that provides Kant with the necessary tools to view the nature as a totality whose purpose is the realization of rights. In this sense the nature is something that offers hope to the human race.

Philosophical anthropology is one of the important and interesting categories which has attracted the attention of philosophers since the beginning of the history of philosophy. As one of the distinguished philosophers of the world of Islam, Mullā Ṣadrā has paid particular attention to Man and the related problems. One of the important issues in the realm of anthropology is Man’s corporeal dimension and the relevant issues. This paper deals with the necessity of the corporeal dimension of human beings in the view of Mullā Ṣadrā. The authors conclude that this necessity can be demonstrated in the light of some of the philosophical principles of Mullā Ṣadrā such as commensurability, gradation of existence, corporeal origination and spiritual subsistence of the soul, possibility of the lower, Man’s potency for receiving trust, as well as the principle of opposition and some others. They also argue that in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, the corporeal dimension is in fact necessary for developing a human identity and promoting and perfecting human existence.