جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « rationality » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Faith is one of the basic concepts in the philosophy of religion, which forms the foundation of many new issues in contemporary religious epistemology. Untangling issues such as the relationship between faith and rationality is based on understanding faith and explaining its essential elements. Faith, both in religious and philosophical works, covers a range of different meanings from knowledge, belief, acceptance, feeling to trust and act, hence it has an ambiguous and challenging nature. This ambiguity in the quiddity of faith has also spread to secondary philosophical issues, so that some questions about the rationality of faith remain unsolved. It shows the necessity of reviewing the nature of faith and refining philosophical and religious theories. The present article with a critical-analytical approach aims to explain faith based on epistemological and non-epistemological components to show that faith has a multiple nature, and ignoring each of them leads to an incomplete and insufficient understanding of the meaning of faith. According to the results of the present research, faith is a reality made of knowledge and belief, arising from acknowledge and trust, medley of feeling and action, but has an independent nature and cannot be reduced to any of the mentioned components alone. Reductionism in the nature of faith causes the challenge of faith and rationality. In determining the main core of faith, if the epistemological components are the foundation of other components in such a way that the non-epistemological components are based on it, the right relation between faith and rationality is established.

The aim of the present research is to investigate the philosophical foundations of purposefulness and reason-oriented actions with legal consequences in the light of new findings of neuroscience, behavioral economics and contemporary philosophy of mind. In aim to identify these foundations, firstly, the concept of ultimate reason-oriented purpose in human behavior was analyzed from the perspective of philosophers (from ancient Greece till now) and contemporary neuroscientists. Then, the position of purposefulness and reason-oriented behavior with legal consequences has been investigated. The main question of the research is whether or not a human being performs all his voluntary actions (with an emphasis on legal actions) in a purposeful and reason-oriented way? The main hypothesis of the research is that human voluntary actions, including legal actions, are rationally oriented and due to the realization of a purpose. The findings of the research in the position of rejecting such hypothesis indicate that many voluntary human actions, including some actions with legal consequences, are emotional with limited rationality and the influence of environmental stimuli. Accordingly, there would not be judged by the example of a reasonable person with complete rationality in view law. The proposal of the research is to adopt an approach in which, besides the rational and ultimateistic aspects, the limited rationality of man in calculating and analyzing situations the emotional aspects and the nervous system, and the influence of environmental stimuli in the choice of decision, be paved and human beings never be judges through relying on rationality in all situations with an ideal standard. Especially in sudden events and lacking enough time that it is not possible for humans to process accurately and completely rational in calculating all kinds of possibilities and their consequences and referring to the reasons of their beliefs, preferences and information to choose the appropriate behavior.

Ignorance and dogmatism have always existed in various historical periods of epistemological disciplines and revealed their faces in their opposition to knowledge. Ignorance appears through separation from the necessities of knowledge. The spread of ignorance in the culture of social relationships threatens the place of scientific resources and epistemological cradles. Through breaking the idols of ignorance, Mullā Ṣadrā writes about the objective manifestations of such idols in society. He believes that the promotion of social relationships demands the creation of cradles for knowledge, and any kind of ignorance in this regard will result in the dominance of epistemological inefficiency. Through a semantic analysis of ignorance, Mullā Ṣadrā talks about one of its most obvious manifestations, which is dogmatism. He maintains that moral norms and epistemological necessities fade away in a dogmatism rooted in ignorance. The criticism of ignorance and reproach of ignorants in Mullā Ṣadrā’s portrayal of this phenomenon is manifested based on four elements: 1) lack of verification of mental understanding in conformity to reality, 2) lack of derivation of comparative elements particularly in the light of its functional dimensions such as unjust evaluation, 3) mental stagnation, and 4) defective social competition, which refers to the wrong quality of efficiency. When criticizing the culture of his time, Mullā Ṣadrā refers to the rise of ignorance behind the guise of knowledge as an important epistemological pest. In all his criticisms of this stagnant process, he introduces the weakness of true knowledge in society, spread of social foolishness, corruption of social justice, and frailty of the epistemological foundations of society as its most important outcomes. He propounds the treatment of ignorance in the light of a wise method of living while attending to its necessary elements.

The development of rational faculties that distinguish humans from other living beings is a topic of interest to scientists and philosophers from various perspectives. It is also a challenging topic in Foucault's intellectual and philosophical system. Therefore, this study examines the rationality in Foucault's thought using a descriptive-analytical method. In this context, relevant documents and sources related to postmodernism and Foucault's views were specifically selected and analyzed to achieve theoretical saturation. The research suggests that Foucault views rationality and knowledge as products of power. He criticizes partial, superficial, and local rationalities and instead focuses on comprehensive and universal rationality and truth. In addition, he views educational spaces, institutions, and organizations as reproductions and instruments of power. Based on this perspective, it can be said that, from Foucault's point of view, the ultimate goal of education is to cultivate critical, active, and creative students who can recognize power relations through deconstruction and analysis of texts and social practices and discover new meanings and interpretations.

This article aims to reassess the concepts of power, resistance, and subjectivity by examining the ideas of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. At first glance, it seems that these two thinkers, rooted in different philosophical and theoretical foundations, are in opposition to each other, making a dialogue between their perspectives seemingly impossible. However, this article proposes an alternative approach by highlighting the common grounds and commonalities in their deconstruction of power. Moreover, it argues that their political views can be seen as aligned and complementary, leading to a deepening and development of each other's ideas and the creation of new political approaches. Thus, the central questions addressed in this article are: what forms of agency emerge for the contemporary subject as result of the deconstruction of power in thought of Arendt and Foucault? How does power act as a source of resistance while opening up new possibilities for the subject? The main finding of this study is that, in contrast to traditional and modern interpretations, power in the works of these thinkers is seen as a positive, creative, and productive concept. Based on this understanding, resistance and alternative forms of empowerment for the subject emerge. It should be noted, however, that Arendt’s and Foucault’s interpretation of resistance agency and power may differ due to the primacy of political and social issues in their respective theories.

The spiritualist theory of "rationality and spirituality" seeks to obtain inner satisfaction and peace of man. In this theory, Mr. Malekian mentions the "self-divinity" feature of the spiritual man by referring to the category of human modernization. This component is one of the essentials of the monotheistic (monistic) view of "God, man and nature". In this component, man, as the closest window to the consciousness of existence, has the most complete divinity and can experience his union with God and the world through his inner divinity. This research, with a descriptive-analytical method, through library studies, seeks to critically examine monism and the selfdivinity of spiritual man with regard to the foundations of transcendental wisdom and revelation teachings. Being influenced by Hindu mysticism, contrary to previously accepted principles, its conflict with Islamic mysticism (accepted by Malikians), confrontation of self-divinity with spiritual perfection, and its conflict with the goal of spiritualism are some of the most important criticisms of this attribute of spiritual man.

The view of each of the important humanistic schools on the category of "human dignity" is considered one of the important and basic theoretical foundations of those schools and remains in a fluid spirit that is current in each and every belief of these schools. The purpose of writing this research is to explain the criteria of human value. In the world, from the point of view of Islam, it is against the idea of ​​humanism. This article, using library data and documents in a descriptive-analytical method, categorizes the verses of the Qur'an and the hadiths of the Ahl al-Bayt (PBUH) about human dignity and its origin and requirements. The findings of the research show that in the attitude derived from the Qur'an and hadiths, man has a natural (formative) dignity that is related to the type of humanity, and he can also realize his existential talents in the path of truth, from the value (acquired) dignity ) to benefit. As long as the title of human being with the components of natural dignity such as soul, reason and free will is true for man, he will have natural, natural and social rights.

Practical intellect is the source of human actions. This power issues human action with the help of theoretical reason and by forging special rules and credentials related to action such as obligation. According to Allameh Tabatabai, the validity of obligation is the first and most important rule of practical reason in order to issue a definite verb. Credit obligation in relation to some verbs may be absolute and in relation to other verbs. The more this application is, the less disturbing the issuance of the verb will be, but the obligatory obligation will cause the verb to be issued only in certain circumstances. The problem of doubt in practical rationality is explained by the application and restriction on the necessity of the action. Higher application in obligation means more intensity and more restraint means less intensity in issuing the verb. The root of this application and restriction also goes back to the attention of the soul. This application and restriction may be formed around the actions of each of the forces that play a role in the issuance of the verb, the most important of which are Theoretical intellect ,illusion, anger and lust, because the practical intellect in the necessity and issuance of any verb is influenced by one of these forces. The passivity of the practical intellect against the lower powers causes the necessity of a gentle action to be issued with that power with more application and less restraint (less disturbance). The lowest degree of rationality is rationality bound by lust, and practical rationality focused on anger, delusion, and theoretical reason are ranked higher, respectively.

Philosophical proponents of the idea of progress believe that the human condition has improved throughout history and to this day, and will continue to do so in the future. Adorno writes in his writings that man has not progressed to date, but there is a possibility of progress in the future. Adorno's position thus becomes that he is not opposed to the idea of progress, but to the claim that progress has been made in the history of mankind. Our claim in this article is that according to the Dialectic of the Enlightenment, it is not just the catastrophes of the twentieth century that Adorno's reason for not making progress in human history, but he believes in the dialectical rule of rationality and domination of human history. If we accept this claim, then it must be said that such an idea eliminates even the possibility of progress in the future, and therefore there is a contradiction between the dialectic of the Enlightenment and the idea of progress.

Apostasy is cutting off from the old form, beliefs and way of life and inclination towards religious groups, way of life, belief systems and a new way of communicating with divinity. In the Abrahamic religions, "Judaism and Christianity", this concept is used in the form of neo-paganism, heresy and apostasy and its related components. Such a phenomenon has been unpleasant in the eyes of the religious and religious leaders of Judaism and Christianity, and the approach to it has been different.The concept of apostasy is also discussed in the discourse of the Holy Quran, in addition to the imposition of worldly and otherworldly punishments. The concept of apostasy in the narration of the holy text means leaving the circle of faith and its statements are expressed violently by a sentence and the method of execution of apostasy rulings throughout history by readers and religious authorities has been in connection with the hypertextual elements and the component of power. This study examines apostasy in the Abrahamic religions and re-examines its existence in the narration of the Holy Qur'an with the angles of rationality and its components and justifies the rulings of the Holy Qur'an in this regard.

The stable core of the thoughts of Max Weber and Shahid Motahari is rationality. Rationality in Weber's thoughts has built something based on Kantian subjectivism by passing Parsonsian reading. It means that man should not make the reality in accordance with the reality, but should falsify and validate it; Because there is no previous cultural phenomenon in the fields of thought and ethics; Also, rationality in the thoughts of Martyr Motahari includes broad aspects such as being a revelation and a follower of the Sharia, which uses various tools such as experience, revelation, narration, and reason, and from where it has been able to provide comprehensiveness to the various social dimensions of the revolution. It is the ideology of the Islamic revolution. In this article, the qualitative research method is used and the data analysis method is descriptive. The result obtained is that rationality in Weber's thoughts can be understood and analyzed based on credit perceptions and not real perceptions in the intellectual system of Shahid Motahari.

Analyzing the indicators of rationality from Mulla Sadra's perspective is considered to be one of the influential issues in the improvement, modification, and enhancement of the quality of social life. The indicators of rationality, according to its position and nature, as well as the application of rationality, can be explained in three axes: First, avoiding prejudice and stagnation and promoting rational free-thinking; Second, identifying the apparent thinkers and avoiding their thoughts and beliefs; And third, warning against the tendency to autonomous rationality.This paper has found the root of all three axes with a descriptive method and content analysis. The root of the first axis is the lack of analysis of the indicators of rationality. The damage of the second axis lies in neglecting to explain the ratio of value with the components of rationality. But the third axis is rooted in superficiality. The findings show that we can promote and improve social life by relying on rationality coordinates and with the support of Mulla Sadra's two suggestions i.e. attention to the ultimate end of wisdom and avoidance of imitation.

As it is well-known in theology, performing miracles is the main way prophets used to show that they are honest in their claims and are the true messengers of God. In contrast to this famous opinion, some theologians have not considered miracles as proof of the truth of prophecy. Muslim thinkers such as Mullah Sadra, al-Ghazali, Averroes, ‘Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji, and Hiji Mulla Hadi Sabzavari believe that a true believer does not base his faith and certainty on seeing a miracle from a prophet, and the religion which is the result of a miracle is the religion of ordinary people. According to them, miracles cannot bring about intellectual certainty; moreover, it is difficult to distinguish them from magic. In this article, after considering the objections in Islamic intellectual tradition, some other critiques in terms of the role of miracles in proving prophecy are introduced: the reports of miracles are not adequately sequential and multiple; the miracles are exclusively reported by the believers; there is no practical criterion for identifying miracles; the claim that miracles are related to the dominant art and techniques of the prophet’s time cannot be proved, and miracles can be explained in a completely natural –and not supernatural– way. Accordingly, it has been demonstrated that miracles narrated in religions do not serve theological functions desired by theologians. However, the best way for knowing a true prophet is investigating his teachings and experiencing his spiritual aura.

The position of emotions in Aristotle's thought is often identified with his theory of the weakness of the will, but the study of his works shows that emotions play a wider and more complex role in mental activities. For him, there is a deep and mutual relationship between emotions and other mental functions and activities. That is, both emotions affect the rational part functions of the soul and the rational part functions affect the emotions and their intensity and weakness. In this article, for explaining the claim of the reciprocal relationship between emotion and the rational part, after expressing what emotion is and how it works in the mind, on one hand, we will study the influence of emotion on the rational part of the soul and examine its role in the will, power of judgment, and sensory perception. In our view, contrary to popular belief, emotions are not just a dangerous threat to ethics and rationality, rather, they can play a serious role in strengthening rationality. On the other hand, to understand the effect of the rational part on emotions, we will examine the role of some mental activities in the production of pleasure, pain, and emotions such as friendship, compassion, and resistance to the motivational force of emotions. We will also explain that mental functions do not work the same in creating emotions, there is also a direct relationship between the intensity and weakness of mental functions and the intensity and weakness of emotions.

One of the important topics related to religion is its connection with rationality, around which various views have been raised; As today, a group of people talk about pure rationalism as an independent criterion for distinguishing between right and wrong, for this reason, the present study seeks to answer the question, to what extent the theory of rationality can be a suitable criterion for answering, with a comparative study of religious spirituality and rational spirituality. And replace religious spirituality? The research method is analytical-descriptive and data collection has been done using library resources. After examining the origin of rationalized religion, the basics and characteristics of the said topic were discussed and finally the shortcomings of rationalized religion were discussed. The results of the research have shown that rationalized religion relies on the foundations and features such as secularism and humanism... based on which it suffers from deficiencies such as: the lack of clarity in the definition of rationalized religion, failure to achieve the goals of the theory, and contradictions in the nature of faith. ...it has happened that in many cases, not only can it not be a gift for modern man; It has also led to pain and suffering.

The current study examines Plantinga's anti-evidentialist position through the perspective of applied philosophy of religion, illustrating how epistemological positions can have detrimental practical effects. The article's main claim is that entering the postmodern era and distancing thinkers like Plantinga from general rationality and lowering its standards, including the duty to ground claims on sufficient evidence, has eventually caused reason to be excluded from religious dialogue or to talk about a kind of regional rationality. The consequence of this transformation is the obstruction of dialogue between followers of various religions on the one hand, and believers and non-believers on the other, and lastly, the deprivation of human beings of common and agreed-upon criteria for criticizing each other's beliefs. When the issue of obstruction of dialogue and critique is combined with the fact that there is a close link between beliefs and actions, the problem becomes even worse; because without general criteria for criticizing beliefs, it will be impossible to criticize the actions resulting from them, and all groups, including extremist groups, will be able to absolve themselves of responsibility for their actions and justify their possible crimes in practice.

Faitheists consider faith to be self-founded and based on internal components, which derives its validity from sources of knowledge other than reason. Whether faith does not need reason or is in conflict with reason, or whether the epistemological and metaphysical domains of faith and reason are separate. C. S. Lewis proposes another kind of faithism, according to which, although faith is rational based on rational reasoning in the first step, after the realization of faith and person’s devotion to God, he no longer is not interested in reason and evidence against faith, and is right in this matter; Because there, one should listen to the unseen and faith is no longer a part of scientific issues which scientist must always be aware of the agreeable or opposed evidence. The most important challenge of this approach in escape from reason of faith is the failure to explain the two stages of faith, and it is not clear what the essential and existential relationship between faith based on reason and faith based on stubbornness. If the truth of faith is the belief based on rationality, the faith of the second stage does not have an independent truth. If the truth of faith is disregarding the opposite evidence, then its initial rationality is meaningless. This article seeks to explain and analyze Lewis's point of view by rereading his foundations and claims. This research is organized in a descriptive-analytical way and based on the analysis of the theory's internal coherence and its consistency with previous philosophical foundations.

Faitheists consider faith to be self-founded and based on internal components, which derives its validity from sources of knowledge other than reason. Whether faith does not need reason or is in conflict with reason, or whether the epistemological and metaphysical domains of faith and reason are separate. C. S. Lewis proposes another kind of faithism, according to which, although faith is rational based on rational reasoning in the first step, after the realization of faith and person’s devotion to God, he no longer is not interested in reason and evidence against faith, and is right in this matter; Because there, one should listen to the unseen and faith is no longer a part of scientific issues which scientist must always be aware of the agreeable or opposed evidence. The most important challenge of this approach in escape from reason of faith is the failure to explain the two stages of faith, and it is not clear what the essential and existential relationship between faith based on reason and faith based on stubbornness. If the truth of faith is the belief based on rationality, the faith of the second stage does not have an independent truth. If the truth of faith is disregarding the opposite evidence, then its initial rationality is meaningless. This article seeks to explain and analyze Lewis's point of view by rereading his foundations and claims. This research is organized in a descriptive-analytical way and based on the analysis of the theory's internal coherence and its consistency with previous philosophical foundations.