جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « خواجه نصیر » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Studying the intellectual foundations and the position of philosophy and theology in the conceptualization of God among philosophers and theologians, can clarify their approach regarding the issue of God. How is the issue of God studied in the view of al-Ṭūsī and ʿAllāma Ḥillī- two "Ḥilla" theologians- according to their intellectual and philosophical-theological foundations and the position of philosophy and theology in their conceptualization of God? To what extent is their approach to the issue of God similar or different? In this article, we will study this problem from two aspects of form and method-content. As for the form, we will deal with the arrangement of the contents in their works according to their philosophical and theological foundations and the perception they have of God accordingly, and as for the method and content, we will discuss the method of knowing and proving God and explaining His attributes (both method and content). Al-Ṭūsī believes in a philosophical God and ʿAllāma Ḥillī, with a more inner-religious perspective, speaks of a religious-philosophical God. Regarding the content, in the method of proving the existence of God in the conceptualization of God, their opinions are similar, while in the formal structure and the issue of knowing God, they are different according to their intellectual foundations.

The situation in Iran at the end of the 8th century of Hijri was accompanied by events that had an impact on the cultural and intellectual issues of that time. With the establishment of the Safavid government, Shiism was declared as the official religion and entered the social currents, and Shiite scholars and intellectuals also came out of the passive state. With the introduction of rational thought into these currents, new opinions emerged among sages and theologians. In the tenth century, divine wisdom faced fundamental changes, and Islamic philosophy, which was based on Shia teachings, was created by Mulla Sadra and inspired by the thoughts of mystics. And the previous sages entered a new era. By introducing new issues in philosophy, Mulla Sadra founded a new school called Hekmat al-Mota'aliyeh, and with this school, the process of making the intellect legitimate was put on a new path and ended the differences between rationalists and esotericists about religion. Mulla Sadra resolved disputes with a new style. Using his philosophical method, he tried to explain, consolidate and defend beliefs and created a kind of philosophical discourse, and in this way, using the reasoning methods of Masha, the personal experiences of mystics, and with new interpretations of the verses of the Qur'an and the foundations of belief. He was able to create a new way of philosophical theology, that is, philosophical theology, after him, his students continued this path. And each of them played an important role in the flourishing of Mulla Sadra's philosophical theology. This research, while examining different approaches and periods of theological science, has pointed out the important position of Mulla Sadra in bringing this approach to its peak and explained this problem with a descriptive-analytical method

Tusi wrote works in the name of Ismaili elders and in those books he praised the elders of this sect. There is also a serious possibility that during his presence in this sect, he wrote treatises confirming their religious beliefs. But tusi, a Muslim scholar, is considered to be one of the twelve Imami Shiites, and based on moral responsibility, he is obliged to protect the correctness of the beliefs of his fellow believers, and morally, he cannot approve and promote the beliefs of other sects. Based on our inference from the method of statistics and analysis and comparison of related data, in addition to his explicit statement in the rewritten preface of Akhlaq Naseri, it follows that freedom in choice and agency in action, which The main conditions of moral responsibility were not there during the time of Khwaja''s presence among this sect. Therefore, he cannot be held responsible for the possible consequences of writing those books in support of the beliefs of this sect.

Throughout the theological thoughts of Khwadjah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, the influence of Avicenna’s wisdom is evident. Adapting the philosophical method he made it  common in Imamiyyah theology. In this article, Avicenna'sinfluence on KhwadjahTusi in two issues of "ontology" and "proofs of the existence of God and His oneness" has been studied and analyzed. The article is divided into two main sections. The first part is devoted to the cases of the influence of Avicenna's wisdom on Khwadjah’s theology and the second part is devoted to the cases of the independence of his view from Avicennain the two mentioned issues, using their most important theological and philosophical works. This research confirms that Khwadjah, while adhering to pure rationality in presenting Imami beliefs, has also used Ibn Avicenna's philosophical method in compiling and structuring his theological worksand some of his arguments on the subject of "proving the existence of God and His oneness" And part of the "ontological foundations" of his view has benefited.However, he has avoided using other views of Avicennaon these issues, whose argument is not strong enough.

Farabi is the first Muslim logician to define conversion in his works. Ibn Sina, by borrowing from him and adding the adverb "survival of falsehood", has defined the conversion as follows: " Displacement of the subject and predicate along with the survival of the quality, truth and falsehood.". The logicians after Ibn Sina, led by Tusi, have found several inaccuracy in this definition and have tried to provide an accurate and consistent definition with the logical system. In this research, while measuring and evaluating these problems and answers, the historical course of definition of conversion by Muslim logicians has been studied. For this purpose, the evolution of the definition of conversion has been studied and by mentioning the problems of the definitions of logicians such as "Farabi", "Akhavan Al-Safa", "Fakhr Razi", "Ibn Sahlan Savi", etc., we have been led to the conclusion that "Khunji" and his contemporaries definition ("Tusi", "Ermoi", etc.) is a suitable and correct definition.

Seeking for Happiness in Islamic Philosophy and its goal, it can be seen a literal and unanimous answer in philosopher words which reflects combination of worldly(secular) and otherworldly(sacred) happiness that it can prepare temporal and eschatological happiness. But in a deeper investigation we can ask: what is the main purpose? mortal or final dimension of happiness? As a result of the text, it seems that from Al- Kendi to Al- Rāzī the otherworldly happiness is considered as a result of worldly happiness. After Al- Farabi to Al- Tusi the flow of thinking tends to combine worldly and otherworldly happiness. After Al- Tusi and under the influence of him in Nasirian Ethics (Akhlaq-i Nasiri), the changed version of philosophical Islamic Ethics supports eschatological happiness and supposes the worldly happiness as a primary and elementary level which must be considered as healing of mortal life. Matching with this view, it seems that worldly happiness is Abolished, because it changes the balance between and worldly and otherworldly happiness, and also it week the social development instead of increasing individual happiness.

The effort of Khaje Nasir al-Din -Tusi was to defend Avicenna against Asharite theologians Gazali and Fakhr Razi and other Anti-Aveciennen movements. He explained Avicenna,'s thought, however, he criticized some aspects of them and made a new paradigm for resolving problems, Many philosophers and theologians after him pursued him and profit by. His solutions were in a number of issues, such as the theory of Emanation (sudur) and knowledge of God. Tusi had solved the problem of how the multiplicity-the universe was generated from the One with the notion of aspects (Etebariat) and designed a model for creations that were based on logical progression and evolved Avicenna's theory. Al Tusi has some new ideas about the intellect realm and identified it with Actual Facts (Nafso-al-amr). In his view multicity in the intellect realm can solve the problem of knowledge in detail. Khaje Nasir with the aspect of shie wisdom emphasized the role of the teacher for achieving abstract knowledge and the necessity of guidance of Imam for it. He believed that somethings in religion are out of reaching intellect and for those things we need guidance and help like the corporal resurrection, he defined some ideas, like spheres and their numbers as an axiom from other sciences.

The main problem of this paper is “Matter mistake” and “Formal mistake” and its result is "Matter mistake is meaningless; what is in principle described as correct and incorrect form". Studies showed Avicenna has no statement or proof about Matter Mistake and his definition of logic can be a start point for Classical logic. By accepting this statement, we need to accept a role for Matter Mistake in the fallacy argument. Nasir al-Din Tusi has used it and neglects all Matter Mistakes in fallacy, but on the other hand, Ghotb considered a place for it and so his argument is not consistent with this statement. Ghotb believes that Matter Mistake has no meaning by comparing it to the real world due to the casual and necessity of foundations of knowledge. This belief also exists in Nasir al-Din Tusi's thought but it is due to premises of syllogism and logical definitions. Now we think since these traditional logical discussions are so general and denotation criteria are not the same, so it has no contradiction to consider mistakes accompanying matter.

Carroll’s paradox calls the most fundamental concept of logic, namely the concept of inference, into challenge, and appears to convey that one cannot pass, in any inferences, legitimately from premises to conclusion. So as to get hold of any possible solution out of their writings, the current article puts the paradox under three giant thinkers’ (i.e. Wittgenstein, Ibn Sīnā, and Tūsī) views. Wittgenstein puts forward an “inexpressible” but “showable” modus ponens in all inferences that leads ultimately to the distinction between “rule” and “premise”. Ibn Sīnā recognizes the logical principles as criterion (“mikyāl”) not as matter (“mādda”) for which the same exactly holds as the above distinction. Also, Tūsī speaks of the necessity of any syllogism to have an “assistant” and “concomitant” modus ponens that can be considered as the iteration of Wittgenstein’s “inexpressible-but-showable modus ponens” leading as before to the mentioned distinction. As a key solution to Carroll’s paradox, one should make a robust distinction between “rule” and “premise”, and bring inadmissibility to converting the former to the latter.

This article is based on a comparative study of moral ideas of Aristotle and Tusi and similar moral views posted. As will be shown, moral values play an important role in achieving happiness. Happiness is the greatest good that everyone just for the sake of happiness, to pursue it.
Nasir such as Aristotle thought that ethics, the basics of their objective But unlike Aristotle, believed that human reason alone was not able to reach all of these principles, And in addition to wisdom should get full knowledge about the features of ethics should law was helping. And religion with the introduction of the hereafter opened our eyes to a life that is ending its details are not known by reason. However, according to Nasir religion to live in such a world , is necessary.
"Justice" as the source of human virtue and happiness, common thought is Aristotle's ethics and Nasir that in both books is emphasized. The source of all virtue and justice in their approach and not be part of it and to justice, prosperity will not be possible.

In this paper, through exploring the problem of equivocal types and its historical roots in Islamic Peripatetic school, we will explain the differences between Khajeh Nasir’s approach to equivocal types and Avicenna’s one; and show that such differences result from Sohrevardi’s criticisms and his belief in the priority of essence.
On the one hand, Khajeh Nasir embraces Sohrevardi’s criticism of Avicenna, and on the other, he never could accommodate modulation and gradation of essence in the framework of Peripatetic school. Thus, he considers the equivocal types as required common accidental of their tokens. In this paper, it has been shown that, firstly, Khajeh Nasir borrows this idea from the matter of the relation of genus and differentia and of accident and Aristotle’s accidental categories. Secondly, to embrace such idea epistemologically results in inconformity between subject and object form Peripatetic point of view. Furthermore, from theological point of view, it paves the way to Ibn Kamooneh’s doubt.

Aristotle’s view regarding the emptiness or non-emptiness of the terms of propositions has been interpreted in two ways. In one of them, the terms of propositions always include an existing individual or some existing individuals and are non-empty. Therefore, in negative propositions, the collection of the individuals of the subject is never an empty collection either. Hence, there is no difference between negative and affirmative propositions regarding the necessity of the existence of individuals for their subjects. According to the other interpretation, in any proposition, whether negative or affirmative, its components should be first conceived and come into being through a mental existence. Then, if the proposition is an affirmative one, in addition to this mental concept, there should be an existing or supposedly existing individual to receive an affirmative judgment. However, in case of a negative proposition, except the mental existence of the proposition, which is necessary for passing judgment, there is no need for an existing or supposedly existing individual to receive the predicate attribute. Hence, there is a difference between affirmative and negative propositions in this regard. In his interpretation of negative propositions, Khwajah Nasir Tusi has paid attention to both aspects and considered each of the two interpretations to be correct in its own right. The first interpretation is ruled as a correct one given the propositions which are used in different sciences – and these propositions always depend on external truths. Moreover, the second interpretation is correct due to the absoluteness aspect of negative propositions, and also because a non-existent entity cannot be qualified with any quality, including the predicate attribute, since it is non-existent.

The philosophical psychology of Muslim thinkers in the sixth and seventh centuries (AH) was influenced by Ibn Sina’s discussions of the soul. However, the difference was that Ibn Sina tried to demonstrate only the immateriality of the rational faculty. Nevertheless, after him, some thinkers focused on interpreting the immateriality of all levels of perception in the soul. Following Ibn Sina, Nasir al-Din Tusi considered the rational soul to be a substance separate from matter as well as a simple and spiritually originated entity which, in the course of its development enjoys an administrative relation to the body. Based on the belief in the concomitance of immateriality and immortality, Tusi demonstrated the immateriality of all the perceptive levels and subsistence of rational souls by employing solid intellectual arguments. He also believes that the soul and body affect each other, and neither the corruption of the body nor any other factor can cause the annihilation of the simple and immaterial rational soul. However, Fakhr al-Din Razi has a dual theory of the nature of the soul and its relationship with the body. Sometimes, like Islamic philosophers, he views the soul as an immaterial substance drawing on Ibn Sina’s arguments in order to demonstrate its immateriality and, sometimes, like most Islamic mutakallimun, he introduces the soul as a subtle entity which dominates the body in the light of the power of Almighty God.

Since according to many philosophers, the human soul is an immaterial and simple entity, the problem of its motion has always occupied the minds of thinkers. Aristotle attributed this motion to many of the philosophers preceding him, which, given their naturalist approach, could be justified. Unlike Plato, Aristotle considers the problem of the immateriality of the soul to be unclear and ambiguous. In his view, the soul is a moving agent; however, he considers its essential motion to be absolutely false and has some unclear and inconsistent ideas concerning its accidental motion. Apparently, the first seeds of the theory of motion in the soul’s substance were planted by Tusi based on one of Ibn Sina’s statements. This theory came to fruition by Mulla Sadra, the great philosopher. He does not consider himself as the innovator of this theory and traces it back to Qur’anic verses and the ideas of gnostics and philosophers. However, he was the first to base this theory on such philosophical and, particularly, ontological principles as principiality, unity, and gradation of existence and introduce it as a foundation for propounding some innovative theories in anthropology and epistemology. In fact, it can be said that this theory is at the center of Mulla Sadra’s psychology and, in the light of its centrality, the fields of anthropology, eschatology, and epistemology have undergone great changes and given rise to some new problems following a different approach. Here, Mulla Sadra presents the art of thinking in the best way possible.

Ibn Sina in most of his logical works has added the stipuliation "remaining of falsity" to the definition of conversion, a stipulation that has been repeated in the logical works of thinkers such as Fakhr Razi and Abhari; but most logicians has challenged this procedure. For example, Khajeh Nasir Tusi believes that the above – mentioned stipulation has been generated by the scribe's mistakes.In this article by emphasis on the existence of above-mentioned stipulation in six logical writings of Ibn Sina it is shown that this stipulation can not be ascribed to the scribe's mistakes. By proposing and evaluating the opposing and favourable reasons of this stipulation it will be evident that the acceptance of above - mentioned stipulation brings about inconsistency in the logical system of Ibn Sina. Within this article two solution have been proposed for resolving this problem. The first solution which has been formed on the basis of elimination of above mentioned stipulation has been offered by khajen Nasir and other logicians in later times, and the other solution which deals with the changing relation of conversion has been proposed by the writers of this article. It has also been shown that each of this two solutions has its own privileges and defects.

Many researchers believe that Averrors is the last philosopher in intellectual history of Islamic civilization. Therefore they did not pay attention to rational heritage in Shiism. Whereas Shiite world was the more paradigm of Islamic intellectual life in philosophy and sciences, but was neglected. This neglection caused the decline theory and thought in Islamic world post 615(AH).This discourse engaged to explain and prove the invalidity of the theory by researching in Nasirodin's role in renewed birth of intellectual life in seventh century. His efforts in philosophy and ethics in the decadence period should be significant.Scientific research will prove Nasirodin's prominence in emerging intelectual schools (Shiraz, Isfehan and Tehran). Akhlaghe Naseri is the first and most important work of him in ethics science. He compiled it as an independent work, considering his reasoning that Tahzib-al-Achlagh has some deficiency, particular in demostic economy and politics. Three fundamental subjects are researched in Akhlaghe Naseri: knowledge of self (Rational faculty), virtues and prosperity, and justice. He believes that prosperity is subject and ultimate object of ethics. This believe caused him to allocate most part of first chapter in pondering salvation sense, perfect and deficiency of nous, and finally good deeds and self-knowledge. His critique on Aristotle and Averroes in counting virtues species and describing rascalities kinds basis on Quranic thoughts, is distinguished.