جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « divine justice » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

One of the most important principles in theology, laying the foundation for many rules and issues in this field, is the principle of "rational goodness and badness." Acceptance of this principle significantly influences our perspective on the world, theology, and other crucial theological matters. Muslim theologians have two perspectives on this principle. The Adlīyah (including Mu'tazilites and Imamis) accept it, believing that the goodness and badness of actions are intrinsic, and human reason and nature comprehend them without considering anything else. On the other hand, the Ash'aris deny its rational nature, asserting that the divine law specifies the goodness and badness. In this paper, we aim to analyze and explore this principle from the perspective of the narratives of the Imāms (peace be upon them) using an analytical-descriptive and library-based approach. We seek to clarify whether the principle itself or its substance is mentioned in the narratives. According to the findings of this research, the Imāms have addressed this issue, and the narratives sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly indicate the rational goodness and badness. This article will elaborate on the explanation of these narratives.

CS Lewis and Motahari are two monotheistic thinkers who have tried to provide a solution to the problem of evil. C.S. Lewis, one of the defenders of Christianity, tried to solve the problem of evil by correcting the meaning of concepts such as absolute power, absolute benevolence and human happiness. He also justifies the existence of evil by presenting the speaker's theodicy, which is based on the educational benefits of evil. Lewis also proposes a practical solution to the problem of evil. Professor Motahari also rejects the objections to divine justice by analyzing the nature of evil and nonexistence and considering it relative, as well as justifying evil by using the educational benefits of evil. He also considers evil to be inseparable from the structure of the world. The findings of the research show that Lewis's theory is generally based on the doctrine of descent. which causes fundamental problems in his theory, hence Professor Motahari's answer is more successful.

Contemporary world is full of religions that have different teachings and adherents. Meanwhile, there are significant differences and commonalities among divine and non-divine, theistic and non-theistic religions. Such a plurality with regarding religions’ geographical and historical spreading and their adherents’ interests to a special religious tradition, is faced us to some questions as follow: What is the relation between divine justice and religious plurality? Does religious plurality, in different times and places, is based on divine will? With regarding appearing some divine religions in the Middle East, can it indicate that divine grace and salvation was/is limited to the people of this region? And what is the duty of those people who have not heard the voice of divine religions or that religions have not properly introduced to them? For answering such questions and doing more research about the relation between divine justice and religions’ plurality, is tried to show that the requisite of divine justice is providing plural ways and paths concerning human beings’ guidance that sending divine Prophets in the form of divine religions are as its’ clear samples. Also, prior to sending Prophets, the most significant path for guiding human beings is relying on internal Prophets that human being’s intellect and innate indicate this aspect. In addition, as human beings live in different cultural, spatial and temporal circumstances, logical requisite of their divine guidance is plurality of guiding’s methods and their justly participation of the divine grace of truth and salvation.

The cancellation and compensation, and in case of the possibility of occurrence, its relation to divine justice  are among the challenging issues in Islamic Theology. The views and perspectives of Mu’tazilite, Ash’ari, and Shi’i theologians vary greatly on the contingency or non-contingency of cancellation and compensation and reckoning of deeds. Mu’tazilites acknowledge the cancellation and compensation in its absolute and balanced form and have referred to the rational arguments and revealed arguments. On the contrary, Ash’arites and Imamiyya theologians with reference to the rational and revealed arguments have attempted to refute Mu’tazilites’ proposition and substantiate their viewpoint. However, the matter of contention is that in light of some verses in Quran indicating the occurrence of cancellation and compensation, in addition to the verses emphasizing the precise retribution of every deed, how can the compatibility of cancellation and compensation with divine justice be interpreted, justified and clarified? By elucidating the viewpoints and arguments of theologians about the occurrence or non-occurrence of cancellation and compensation, the current article is aimed at examining its relation with divine justice.

In this article, through research on what is the meaning of divine justice, we examined the issue of human rights against God. The main question is what meaning of justice can be attributed to God? Given that divine justice is presented in three areas of creation, legislation and punishment, the meaning of justice that covers these three areas is "giving everyone the right to it." There is no problem in imagining the right of non-God to God when this right of God himself is positive. Moral justice is the meaning of justice that has no place in attributing it to God in the works of thinkers, especially our philosophers. Among the meanings of justice according to Shahid Motahhari, the meaning that is doubtful is the one that he considers to be the only appropriate meaning of justice to attribute to God: formative or philosophical justice. Moreover, the design of the discussion of justice in the position of creation, which has not yet been created, is questionable; This meaning of justice does not cover criminal and legislative justice, nor is it a suitable explanation for the verses and hadiths that attribute justice to God in all actions and purify him from any oppression

The question of whether Sharia’h laws should follow or not follow the considerations of common good and depravity is an interdisciplinary issue lying at the intersection of theology and jurisprudence. In this regard, the Shiite thinkers disagree with the Ash'arites, who insist on non-following side of the issue. However, Shiite thinkers themselves are not unanimous in their views on this issue. Some put emphasis on the absolute adherence of the laws to the considerations of common good and depravity, and some believe in the relative adherence of the laws to those considerations. What this article seeks to do is to show the impact of the theological principles on the resolution of this issue. To solve this problem, it seems that we should clarify our position toward the four important theological and intellectual bases: essential and legal good and badness; Divine justice, God's purposefulness in actions and the impossibility of preponderance without there being preponderance. By showing how these principles affect the solution of this problem, the author has ultimately taken side with the theory of absolute adherence of the laws to the considerations of common good and depravity.

God as the creator and lord of humans, and as All-Provider (razzāq), is in charge of providing for human primary basic needs, as in the Qur’an God promises to make basic provisions for everyone. The promise led some people to think that humans have a right to receive provisions from God, expecting that God should optimally and fully provide for human needs. For this reason, the difference in people’s provisions has led to questions concerning divine justice.The problem with which this paper is concerned is why God has allotted different amounts of provisions to different people, instead of giving different people equal shares of provisions. Moreover, if allotment of provisions is attributed to God, why is it emphasized that people try hard to gain provisions?These questions have frequently been raised in religious milieus throughout the history, often with the intention of casting doubts on religious beliefs by questioning divine justice, since different provisions for different people are thought to be at odds with God’s justice.A number of papers in the field of Quranic sciences have been written about this problem, which are based on the views of Quranic exegetes, on which we draw in this paper. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a philosophical consideration of the problem in terms of Avicenna’s philosophy, particularly his essay on provisions (Risāla fi-l-arzāq). It is noteworthy that the problem was not tackled by any other Muslim philosophers. In Islamic philosophy, God’s attribute of All-Provider is mentioned in passing as an attribute of action—it is at most defined and reduced to divine attributes of essence such as knowledge, wisdom, and power. Avicenna deals with the problem of provisions in his Risāla fi-l-arzāq. This is an essay attributed to Avicenna. Over 20 manuscripts of the essay are available in libraries, and its attribution to Avicenna has not been a matter of dispute.The essay is concerned with questions about divine justice and how to treat people’s differences in their provisions in these terms. Avicenna explicitly deals with the problem in terms of a debate. In line with his Peripatetic framework, he considers different aspects and possible results of the question, as illustrated with numerous examples. In this paper, I provide an account of Avicenna’s remarks here given his general theoretical framework as explicated in other works of his. I also offer criticisms of his account. Taking account of the views of Quranic exegetes concerning the problem, I offer my own account of the problem.

In order to reconcile two groups of Quranic verses in one of which the allotment of provisions is attributed to God and in the other the attainment of provisions is conditioned upon the human labor and efforts, one might offer the following account: in a monotheistic view, provisions are ultimately allotted and distributed by God, but this is in terms of unchanging traditions in accordance to the divine wisdom. In the best or optimal order and the dynamics of the universe, human wills and the amount and quality of their labors and efforts play roles in the expansion or diminution of one’s provisions. For obtaining a desirable provision, a set of conditions should be satisfied and certain grounds should be prepared.Given one’s material and spiritual possessions, which are in turn from God, every person tries to obtain provisions by drawing upon one’s insight, intelligence, as well as spiritual and material capitals. The better one performs in utilizing one’s opportunities the more provisions one attains, and the more negligent and indolent one is in using one’s existential and material capacities and the more vulnerable one makes oneself to unpredictable economic circumstances the more deprived one will be and the more futile one’s efforts will turn out to be, in which case one will have a diminished provision. In this way, God the Wise has established laws and traditions in the creation in such a way that everyone can attain his or her own share of provisions with their mental and physical capacities, without there being any injustice.In his “Essay on provisions” Avicenna has dealt with the problem of the difference in people’s provisions and its bearing upon the divine justice. In this essay, he tries to rely on divine wisdom and grace to correct wrong conceptions and establish divine justice in the measurement of people’s provisions. Through an articulation of the contradictions involved in different aspects of the problem, Avicenna shows that the idea of exactly equal provisions leads to an impossibility or the human destruction.

Without doubt, one of the important schools of thought in Islam is the Muʿtazilite rationalism school of thought and, in addition, one of the most challenging historical discussions also revolves around the decision of “determinism (jabr) and delegation (tafwīḍ).” Based on many accounts, the theory of “delegation” meaning human independent power in performing actions has been attributed to the Muʿtazilites as one of the important Islamic sects; a theory that, according to many of the Ashʿarite and Twelver Shiite thinkers without doubt belongs to them. However, nowadays, this attribution has been challenged by some researchers and, in contrast, some have risen in support of it. This article utilizes a library method and through investigation of the intellectual foundations of the Muʿtazilites in the discussion regarding the method of creation of human actions and on one hand, striving to understand their words and on the other, by relying on ancient historical records in the works of sect-researchers and rhetoric tactics in the typology of the terms “delegation (tafwīḍ) and destiny (qadar)” seeks to pass judgment and give fruit to logical contributions in response to the main question of “how the link between the Muʿtazilites and delegation can be evaluated?” Based on this, citing assemblage of that which has passed to understand the relationship between the “Muʿtazilites” and “tafwīḍ,” the following can be mentioned as the main points: 1. The word qadar can mean “ikhtiyār (free will)” and “tafwīḍ (delegation)” and is equivocal. By studying the works of the Muʿtazilites, we can see that the attribution of the qadar to them has mostly been line with the meaning of free will regarding this term. Therefore, it cannot simply be deduced from the attribution of this term that the Muʿtazilites believe in delegation because we would suffer from the fallacy of equivocality. 2. According to experts in the area of sects, and considering the different evidence in historical books, the “qadariyya” and “mufawwida” are different from the “Muʿtazilites” and for this reason they must not be considered as one group. According to some sources, these two even had disputes between themselves. For this reason, it is not right that we consider the Muʿtazilite scholars as “qadariyya and mufawwida.” 3. The philosophical system accepted by most of the Muʿtazilites is based on accepted the linear cause and effect system along with and aligned with the theory of “denial of delegation” and can be evidence of the Muʿtazilites not accepting delegation because the theory of delegation of free will results in the violation of the law of causality by a precise breach of it and this is a serious challenge for this philosophical system. 4. Shiite scholars such as Shaykh Mufid, Syed Murtada, and Shaykh Tusi who lived in the age of development of the Muʿtazilites did not only not approve of the attribution of the theory of delegation of free will to them; rather, in some instances, they considered the beliefs of the Muʿtazilites to be the same beliefs as that of the Twelver Shiites. 5. The evidence that some of the opponents of the attribution of the theory of delegation of free will to the Muʿtazilites have presented such as “denying fate and destiny by the Muʿtazilites” and “accepting the impossibility of the gathering of two powerfuls over a single object of power” are not acceptable because, firstly, the Muʿtazilites do not deny fate and destiny and believe in them and secondly, the aforementioned law is not correlated to the theory of delegation in a correct reading of it in the discussion of the creating actions.

The Research Issue: 

The spread of disease, especially hardly curable diseases, has led to the emergence of emerging spiritual conflicts between patients and families. Meanwhile, the issue of "justice" plays an important role in creating these conflicts. Examine this topic in the form of questions such as "Why I? Why does God do this with me? Why now? "Why my child?" is of a widespread appearance in the field of spiritual health. The method of reviewing the article is qualitative of descriptive-exploratory-analytical. After communicating with patients and extracting their beliefs in the field of "justice", answers are provided by a philosophical analytical method.

The most important answer is that according to the system of causes, each disability exists only through its cause and no disability is an exception to this rule, so the course of the disease will also be included. The authorschr('39') extensive clinical experiences of hardly curable patients indicate comprehensive persuasion and, consequently, transition from spiritual distress to the true realization of the target groupchr('39')s spiritual health.

An examination of the history of the development of the philosophical issues in the West indicates that since the Demiurge (Demiourgos) of Plato in the Timaeus created the sensible world in imitation of the intelligible archetypes, failing at the same time, to overcome some necessities, until the beginning of the seventeenth century and the emergence of the Cartesian anthropocentric conception of reality, the common question most often raised by modern philosophers, in their discussions about the nature of God, man and universes in this: What is Justice? Is God just? Was man created in the best form? Is the existing world, the best among all the possible worlds? The answer to these questions among the Christian thinkers before Leibniz (1646- 1716) was mostly based on the principles of dogmatic theology. Even in the fifteenth century the question as to how God's providence and foreknowledge could be reconciled with the human free choice was the pivot and axis of most philosophical and theological problems. In addition, the progress of natural sciences and the emergence of necessary causal laws in the domain of the various sciences impaired the human freedom of choice.Spinoza and Leibniz, each in his own peculiar way, endeavored to prove that the human free choice is compatible with the causal determinism required. By science. In Leibniz, God wills the most harmonious and compossible worlds. In the present article, prior to Leibniz's rational justifications of the principle of "the best possible World", his conception of the world as based on the principle of the pre-established harmony (in the framework of the monads ), along with some other related issues are analyzed.

One of the religious teachings in the discussion of resurrection is the issue of the obstinate and pertinacious nonbelievers’ immortality in hell suffering. The consensus of all the Muslim scholars (Jurists, theologians and philosophers) is that the immortality of the suffering of these people of hell is explicit in the religious texts. Ibn Arabi, on the contrary, believes that this is contradictory the inclusive divine mercy and justice. Thus, he submitted to ta’wīl (allegorical interpretation) and interpreted the Immortality (khulūd) in the religious texts as “long period of time” and believes that after expiration of some punishment, the people of the hell would be comprehended by the Divine justice and mercy, and hell suffering is removed. As a jurist, theologian, philosopher and mystic, Ayatullah Javadi Amoli does not accept the Ibn Arabi’s interpretation and believes that the eternal suffering not only does not contradict the Divine comprehensive mercy and justice but also is coherent with it. This article critically examines the Ibn Arabi’s point of view from the perspective of Ayatullah Javadi Amoli.

Some of the philosophical teachings of the Qur’an are about God and His Attributes. The Shi’ism has rated justice as one of the Attributes of God on the rank of principles of religion; because it was on the issue of justice that the rational Shi’as have always had disagreement with the Sunnis. Does Divine justice, however, enjoy equal status among different Shi’a denominations? Justice has been studied on different levels in the works of the Twelver Shi’a scholars; but the Isma’ili works have been studied very briefly and implicitly. In this comparative study, it has been attempted to identify and analyze the
status of Divine justice and its peripheral discourses, such as rational good and evil and God in Twelver Shi’ism and Isma’ilism from the
perspective of the influential thinkers. With respect to the intellectual capabilities of Shi’ism, the issue of Divine justice emerges from within the discourse of determinism and free will because there is direct correlation between belief in determinism and justice on one hand and belief in free will and negation of justice, on the other. From a historical point of view, from the period of Fatimid Isma’ilis, in which the status of Imam was exaggerated, until the Alamut Isma’ilis, degrading the concept of Imam caused the degrading of the Isma’ilis’ rationalism; they distanced from the rational good and evil and thus dealt less with Divine justice. Being under the influence of the two main elements of “Anti-rational prestige of education principle” and “association with Sufism”, Isma’ilism places too much emphasis on the role of Imam in the creation system, in education and guidance, in political and social issues, in interpretation of sharia, in his infallibility and being the Lord of Resurrection (Qāʼim al-Qiyāma). One of the most important findings of this research is that because of this very exaggeration in “learning” from the Imam and impressionability from “Sufism” in specific periods, the Isma’ilism has inclined toward legal good and evil and has distanced from the basic teachings of the Twelver Shi’ism based on the principality of justice, reverence for intellect, and human free personality

The problem of death is a much debated and longstanding issue in the history of human thought. The transition from the realm of tradition to modernity and post-modernity, has increased focus on this issue once again. One of the scholars who comprehended the modern world and its needs, was Morteza Motahari. This article both presents and critically analyzes two arguments he has put forth for the immortality of human beings. Divine justice and divine wisdom are two theological foundations used to prove resurrection by Motahari. In the first argument discussed in this paper, he proves resurrection by an argument based on divine justice and identity of acts and punishments. The other argument is based on divine wisdom by using the example of embryo. In this paper, these two foundations and motahari’s arguments are explained and then examined. These doctrines and arguments are criticized for presupposing God’s attributes, unused limbs in the human body and necessary actualization of all human potential capacities.

According to the doctrines of great monotheistic religions, God will fairly judge on the deeds and intentions of all people on the Day of Judgment in hereafter. He will reckon all deeds, even the tiniest ones, will do justice to everyone according to their acts, and will condemn some sinners to eternal punishment. There seems to be at least two important problems about this religious doctrine: First, the eternal punishment is inconsistent with divine justice; second, eternal punishment is inconsistent with divine love. Theologians and thinkers such as Anselm and Jonathan Edwards have tried to prove the consistency of eternal punishment with divine justice. Aquinas has also provided some arguments for the consistency of divine love with eternal punishment. There have also been endeavors in Islamic tradition to argue that the eternal punishment is consistent with divine justice; among the main and recent examples is Motahhari’s view in his book "Adl-e Elahi" (Divine Justice). Examining and comparing the main arguments presented against the two mentioned problems, the present paper argues that all of these arguments fail to provide justified moral answers to the problems, though they differ in terms of their merits and demerits.

The concept of “divine justice,” is one of the important topics of theology which has been the focus of attention of thinkers and philosophers of the East and the West. The extensive research of justice-researchers indicates the serious concern which possessors of illumination and thought have for this issue: ranging from Plato and Aristotle in Ancient Greece, to Alpharabius, Avicenna, and Muslim philosophers, until now, each one of them have been somehow involved in the issue of justice and have devoted a part of their philosophical works to this concept. Meanwhile, the philosophical outlook of Mulla Sadra toward the issue of divine justice has been less attended to by researchers. Owing to this research gap and necessity, the following writing, while analyzing the essence and significance of justice in his thought, has inferred and expounded on three domains of divine justice (genetical, canonical, and penal justice; these have been implicitly and sporadically referred to in different parts of his works). This inference and explanation has been made in a problem-oriented style and by reference to authentic sources as well as by exploring the philosophical and interpretive [tafsīrī] works of Mulla Sadra.

Griffin's divine justice theory is very important among of divine justice theories as attempt to offering of adequate proofs on intelligibility of believe to God and admission of evil at the same time. This article first indicate to Dynamic worldview, kinds of evil, the principles of Griffin's divine justice theory like creativity, encouraging power of God, navigation of creation ex nihilo and law of correlation between power and value. Then analyze relation God and evil on this theory that lead to important elements of dynamic divine justice like admission of real or arbitrary evil, encouraging power of God and as God cant overcome evils unilaterally. Author criticize Griffin's theory: perhaps Griffin's conception can response to atheist that reject God by evil, but that have serious defects like irreparable of occurrence of evil, concomitance correlation between God's availing of Omnipotent and exertion that on world, captured of reductionism, display conception of God that believers of revealed religion or theists arent suitable to worship.

In Allamah Mohammad Hussein Tabatabaii's view, the essence of justice is equality and balance among things, such that everything is placed in its deserved position. He believes that justice is coextensive and concomitant of goodness. On the other hand, in his Al-Mizan Commentary, he bases divine acts on rational goodness and badness. In his view, therefore, divine command and forbiddance are based on justice as well. In philosophical and theological books, he resorts to several transmitted and intellectual proofs to prove divine justice. The present paper attempts to review some of these proofs which Tabatabaii believes can be used to prove divine justice. Some of these proofs are the proof of Necessary Existence by itself, God's being by essence, proof of the Righteous, and proof of Providence.

Many reliable hadiths speak of the differences between inner nature of believers and unbelievers. According to these hadiths, the differences are effective in their prosperity and adversity. Some scholars deemed that these traditions are apparently incompatible with divine justice. They have begun to seek an explanation and interpretation for them. After evaluation of the most important ideas in this area and referring to the total traditions concerning the inner nature and beginning of the creation of the world, the authors of the present paper have concluded that the differences between human creatures do not pertain to the beginning of the creation of the world, but due to complications of human functions in doing divine assignments and tests and it has complete compatibility with divine justice.

Mutazilite and Imamiyyah theologians have negotiated and debated from the very early days. Using a comparative-analytical method, the present paper seeks to analyze and criticize the "idea that Imamiyyah theologians were affected by Mutazilite school in terms of Divine Justice". The schools of Imamiyyah and Mutazilite are known as 'Adliyah because they accepted the idea of intellectual good and evil as the basis of divine justice and other religious teachings. Using this basis, they analyzed the religious teachings in a way that resulted in man's choice, the necessity of grace and observing the best, the necessity of duty, negation of duty beyond one's strength, the necessity of compensations for initial pains and philosophical interpretation of evils. No doubt, they had minor differences on some beliefs and great difference on will and choice. Mutazilites adopted the extreme approach of delegation, but Imamiyyah adopted the theory of "neither determination nor delegation, but intermediate position" by following Imams of right guidance.