جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « روسیه » در نشریات گروه « جغرافیا »

Ukraine is Russia's strategic depth in Eastern Europe. The Ukraine crisis is the result of Russia's attitude towards Ukraine. The war between Russia and Ukraine is a war between powerful members of the international system and a power conflict between Russia, the United States, the European Union, NATO, and it has shown a new polarization in the international system. As a regional power and a strategic ally of Russia, Iran has been affected by the war between the West and Russia. This article, with the aim of clarifying the hidden and enigmatic dimension of the effect of this crisis, seeks to answer the question that; What are the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the international system in the horizon of 2030? Also, what consequences does it have on the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran? The current research was carried out using descriptive and analytical method and using documentary and library sources. The research findings show that; The war between Russia and Ukraine has affected the political, economic, and military aspects of the international system. It has also affected Iran's political and economic interests as Russia's ally in the region and has caused a change in Iran's foreign policy and a shift towards the East, a halt in nuclear negotiations, and the formation of economic cooperation between Russia and Iran. It has also caused Iran to worry about NATO's presence in the Caucasus, affecting Israel-Russia relations and Iran's interests in Syria, as well as energy security.

Saudi Arabia's military invasion of Yemen has been a turning point in Yemen's internal developments, which have met with a variety of international reactions, including rejection or approval. Examining these positions is not the main subject and purpose of writing this article. This article does not deal with the reasons for these stances and reactions with a normative view, but tries to examine the why and how of alliances and conflicts on the issue of Yemen, the possibility of an alliance between Iran and Russia, with an approach. Explain realistically. Surveys show that each of the three countries, Iran, Russia and the United States, have different positions in the Saudi military attack on Yemen; In a way that the United States has been an ally and supporter of Saudi Arabia, Iran has been an opponent of Saudi Arabia in Yemen and has condemned its military attack. But Russia has not taken any serious support from either side by taking a pragmatic approach. Now, given that Saudi Arabia and the United States share common views on regional issues, including Yemen, the question arises that this relationship can be generalized to Iran and Russia in the case of Yemen? In answer to this question, the hypothesis is that Russia's macro-foreign policy approach and Yemen's strategic position and previous unsuccessful experiences of Russia's interaction with the United States have paved the way for an Iran-Russia alliance. In this article, while using documentary sources, qualitative comparative research method has been used.

The purpose of this study is to address the Geo-economics of energy in Russia, which is interested in penetrating and controlling the consumer markets of East Asia (Japan, China and South Korea) in order to expand its hegemony by formulating the energy strategy in 2035. Therefore, an attempt is made to answer the question by the analytical-descriptive method and using the latest statistical data, as follows: Are Russia’s Geo-economic relations in the field of energy can control the discourse and strategy of consuming countries in favor of Russia’s economic hegemony? To answer this question, the first Russia’s 2035 energy strategy and the amount of Gas and Oil production and exports of this country, and finally the amount of consumption and import of oil and gas in East Asian markets and Russia’s and the cooperation of Japan, China and South Korea with Russia in energy field will be discussed. The conclusion indicates although the territorial proximity of the East Asian markets to Russia can greatly strengthen the Geo-economic relations of Russia with these regions in the economic and energy fields, still the measures adopted by the east Asian countries in order to reduce greenhouse gases and the pressure of traditional energy supplier competitors can reduce the Russia’s energy hegemony and affect the future of cooperation between these Regions. Considering the diverse purposes of supplying energy to East Asian markets and the operationalization of the energy strategy of these countries based on the reduction of greenhouse gases as well as the replacement of renewable energies with oil and gas energy, it seems that Russia is facing obstacles in reaching the goals of the 2035 energy strategy. In this way, Russia’s geo-economic relations with East Asian markets will be influenced by the policy of serious competitors supplying energy to East Asian markets and strategic considerations about the use of renewable energy, as well as their Anti -Russian policies, rather than benefiting the development of Russia’s economic hegemony.

Competition, conflict, and confrontation between the great powers in some parts of the world, which are of considerable strategic importance in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics, are among the salient features of the international system. So that usual in the occurrence of crises in regions and countries that have such characteristics, the effective hand, and role of great powers can be seen in the creation, extension, and management of crises. Ukraine is one of those countries that has always been influenced and competed by Russia and the West due to its unique characteristics. But the competition and confrontation between Russia and the West (the European Union, the United States, and its executive arm NATO) have escalated significantly since the Soviet collapse and Ukraine's independence. Because on the one hand, Ukraine has always been in the spotlight for Russia due to geopolitical, geostrategic, geoeconomic position, as well as its historical, cultural, racial, linguistic, and religious ties with Russian society. On the other hand, from the very beginning of the independence of the former Soviet republics, Western governments and institutions pursued expansionist policies in Eastern Europe, and due to the post-collapse turmoil, tried to membership of Eastern European countries in Western institutions, countries of the region, especially countries located in the Near Abroad region to align with themselves and In this way to prevent regional influence and Russia's use of the position and characteristics of these countries in order to regain lost power. In the meantime, the duo to Ukraine's neighborhood with Russia and its geopolitical, and geo-economic importance, as well as its strong desire to move westward after independence provided an opportunity for the West to accelerate the process of Russia's geopolitical siege, thereby preventing Russia from regaining power. Therefore, these conflicting goals and power struggles have caused Ukraine to always be the scene of competition and confrontation between the West and Russia after independence and to witness serious conflicts and political-security crises such as the events of the 2004 orange revolution, the 2006 blue revolution, and the crises of 2014 and 2022. Therefore, the main purpose of this article is to use the approach of offensive realism to answer the question of what is the importance of Ukraine for Russia and the West, which has always been the scene of competition and confrontation between Russia and the West after independence?

The research method in this article is qualitative which with a descriptive-analytical approach has answered the main question of this article in the conceptual context of the theory of offensive realism. Authors to answer the main question, while describing and analyzing the reasons for the importance of the Near Abroad region in general and the reasons for the importance of Ukraine for the conflicting goals of Russia and the West in particular, Ukraine's western policies have also been analyzed and in this way, we have explained the role of this importance and Ukraine's western policies in the competition and confrontation between Russia and the West in Ukraine. For data collection, reference has been to library resources, including books, articles, theses, documents, and authoritative Internet sources. The data collection tool has been also taking notes.

Ukraine is one of those countries that, due to its unique characteristics, has always been influenced and victimized by Power competitions between different countries and has never been able to determine its own destiny independently. In the 14th and 16th centuries, Ukraine became the scene of competition between Polish and Lithuania. Then in the 17th century, it became a sphere of influence between Russia and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, which continued until the end of the 18th century which Austria replaced the Polish in the western regions of Ukraine. The domination lasted until the end of World War I. With the formation of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's membership in the Union, the country once again became an area of Soviet influence on the one hand and Poland on the other. With the start of World War II, Ukraine was not spared from the fire and was occupied and destroyed by the Nazis. During the Cold War, it was versus the Western bloc due to its membership in the Eastern bloc. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine finally gained its independence; but because of its special position and importance for the conflicting strategic goals of Russia and the West, from then until now have always been the scene of serious competition and confrontation between the West and Russia and various political-security crises. According to the offensive realism approach, the ultimate goal of the great powers is to achieve hegemony, and they try to achieve this goal by maximizing power and preventing rival powers from gaining power. Accordingly, Russia's strategic goal since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been to return to the greatness of the Soviet era and regain lost power, and to achieve this goal it has sought to take advantage of republics in the Near Abroad region. Ukraine is one of these republics that the best way possible can bring Russia closer to this goal due to its identity, geopolitical, geoeconomic, and economic characteristics. On the other hand, the West's understanding of this capability has led the West, especially the United States, as the current hegemon, to make every effort to prevent Russia from regaining power and Reaching the position of hegemony and A rival for this country, to get this country out of Russian influence and put it on its front to prevent Russia from achieving its strategic goal. In this regard, Ukraine's western policies since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its independence have also helped the West to get closer to this goal. Therefore, the findings of the article show that the importance of Ukraine's identity, geopolitics, geo-economics, and economics in achieving the conflicting strategic goals of Russia (regaining power and returning to the greatness of the former Soviet Union) and the West (preventing Russia from regaining power), as well as Ukraine's western policies have caused this country to after independence, always be the scene of competition and confrontation between the West and Russia, and to witness serious conflicts and various political-security crises such as the events of the 2004 orange revolution, the 2006 blue revolution, and the crises of 2014 and 2022.

This study tried to explore the foreign policy of Turkey in the South Caucasus and its impact on the country’s sphere of influence in the region. When the Justice and Development Party dominated in the country in 2002, Ankara’s one-dimensional and Western-oriented foreign policy was replaced with a multi-dimensional, pragmatic and interest-oriented foreign policy regarding the regional and global domain. Currently, attending to the surrounding and neighboring countries and regions to enhance Ankara’s role and position in these regions, including the South Caucasus is a remarkable aspect of the foreign policy taken by Turkish officials. The Caucasus region has been so important for Turkey since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Among the main reasons that Turkey tries to play a significant role in the region are: The region’s huge natural resources, being locted at the crossroad of the rich oil and gas regions of the world, political instability and the existence of constant security threats, and the country’s historical and cultural commonalities with other countries of the region. Ankara seeks its economic and security interests and increasing regional influence and position through constatnt and extensive presence in this strategic region. The main question of this research is: What impcts have Turkey’s foreign policy had on its influence in the South Caucasus in the period 1991-2022? The results showed that the geopolitical significance of the South Caucasus in the foreign policy of Turkey and its historical and cultural connections with other countries of the region drived Ankara to increase its impact on the energy sector of the region and its active presence in the Karabakh conflict. The issues not only have increased Turkey’s influence and boosted its interests of the region, but directly impacted upon Moscow’s regional interests and influence over 1991-2022 period. Qualitative analysis method was applied to analyze the collected data.

The motivation to provide security and maintain territorial integrity is one of the most important dimensions of Russia's geo-economic behavior. Geopoliticians believe that the modern Russian Empire will face three separate border regions. Caucasus and Central Asia, Siberia and Western Europe. In other words, Russia to be able to revive its modern empire, it must be able to play an active role in these three vital regions. In the following, the article will analyze the Russian foreign policy toward Western Europe through geo-economic approach.

The present article is done Through Instrumental Case Study method, and Data collected based on the library one.

In dealing with Germany, Moscow has always considered the variable of its geographical location as a fundamental principle in its foreign policy. This variable has in fact led to Russia having the best relations with Germany. On the other hand, geo-cultural relations with France and Italy have, over the years, strengthened confidence in Moscow in these countries and affected Russia's geo-economic action. However, hostile relations with the United Kingdom have not prevented Moscow from developing economic cooperation with the United Kingdom. Russia is trying, with the help of economic factors, to reduce the level and intensity of British influence on anti-Russian geo-economic equations.

The findings show that Russia's geo-economic action towards Western Europe has been redefined in recent years, and while the main roots of the action in the past were geo-cultural motivations, but inspired by Political variables, todays the geopolitical element plays an organizing role in Moscow's interaction with the four European powers. Differences in the views to and relations with these countries, on the one hand, and their growing need for energy, will cause Russia's foreign policy to require new geo-economic dynamics in the coming years.

The countries of Iran and Russia have long been two important poles on both sides of the Caspian Sea, which are located in the heartland and rimland regions of the world. The geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the mentioned countries compared to other countries in the region has caused them to play a more dynamic role in the political equations of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Since today the factor of geopolitical power and weight has become doubly important in international relations and Russia is considered as a global power and Iran as a regional power; Two countries always use these factors in their relations to apply their policies. Hans Morgenth's theory of realism, which emphasizes the balance of power and the role of the power agent, is proof of this claim. This article tries to analyze the geopolitical relations between Iran and Russia after the Islamic Revolution with a descriptive analytical method and from the perspective of the balance of power theory. Therefore, the results of the research indicate that, just as Morgenth emphasizes the factor of power and national interests as the most important indicator in international relations, Russia always maintains all its political relations with Iran, especially in the issues of the Central Asia-Caucasus-Shamat region. And the JCPOA has been formulated in line with its national interests and has used its tactical relations with Iran based on strategic goals to increase its geopolitical power and weight. But it seems that decision makers in the field of foreign relations pay more attention to these factors.

One of the most important events of the twentieth century was undoubtedly the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which opened a new phase of multidimensional interaction for both successor states and other countries involved in this historical evolution. The post-Soviet countries are confronted with the consequences and legacies of their historical past that have profound implications for the convergence of regional countries. Russia and other post-Soviet countries have inherited similar institutions from the past, including state institutions, political, social and security mentalities, political culture, the style of government-society relations. The newly independent states were trying to solve their domestic problems with the support of foreign powers, but the initial enthusiasm for integration with the Western countries subsided. Similar problems emerged in countries with similar cultural and ethnic structures. It can be argued that the trend toward convergent policies has taken a long time. Shared values and norms and similar mentalities can help Eurasian convergence. In this paper, the concept of social and cultural integration in Eurasia in the post-Soviet era with regard to the soft power of Russia in the Eurasian region is examined by examining the factors of religion, language, media and education to show the social and cultural integration in Eurasia at the level What has been going on within the region and beyond since 1992? It is hypothesized that social and cultural integration in Eurasia, influenced by Russia's soft power, has a clear perspective on political and economic liberalization and the decline of authoritarianism elsewhere in the region and the process of globalization.In this article, Russia is considered a hegemonic power in the post-Soviet space. Developments in the post-Soviet period show that Russia is unwilling to back down from its role as a regulatory player in Central Eurasian affairs. Russia's post-collapse foreign policy is based on a combination of pragmatism and a commitment to the traditional desire to have a plan for a great power. The position of Central Eurasia in Russian foreign policy has not changed. Russia seeks to excel in Eurasian integration, including cultural and social integration. When Putin came to power, he put bilateral relations with countries in the region on the agenda. Although the organization has not been successful in terms of member convergence, favorable areas for convergence among its members are notable, including the Russian Monroe religion, the presence of racists in the former Soviet republics, and the region's energy and military dependence on Russia. The monopoly economies of these countries, which have made each other dependent on exports and imports, make Russian the second language of most of the republics that survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, maintain border security, and cooperate in the fight against fundamentalism and drug trafficking. In this article, after a brief look at the fate of national cultures in the world era and culture, the impact on regional convergence under the cultural and social treatment of the Soviet era and the soft power of Russia in the Yeltsin and Putin eras. Then check the usability of the software including Russian language, religion and education system. The method of writing this article is descriptive-analytical and with boron collecting data from authoritative scientific sources: books, scientific-research articles and licensed websites.In this regard each country achieves the preservation and strengthening of its national, ethnic and religious identity through the better cultural integration of the regions. Thus, cultural convergence is not only a threat to preserve and strengthen the identity of the nations of the region, but also confronts external and threatening factors of national identities, such as extremist currents. While the nations of Central Asia and the Caucasus have many historical, cultural, religious and religious ties, due to negligence, incompetence and unfounded aspirations, today some cultural ties originate. Disagreements have become like disputes over cultural and literary luminaries.The following conditions are necessary to create regional cultural convergence:- Understand the importance of the issue of extremism as a serious threat and common challenge, by all countries in the region- Lack of baseless and destructive synergistic superiorityExplain key and common cultural values among the countries of the region- Group cohesion of the countries of the region and having the spirit of collective work, interaction and cultural synergy- Active participation of all countries in the region in designing and implementing a roadmap to counter extremist currents and consensus of member countries on this solutionAdequate preparation and flexibility for quick decisions and the use of new, creative and innovative approaches, methods and tools against extremism. The cultural system was formed in 1920-1930 and continued until 1980 despite some changes. In the mid-1980s, Gorbachev made major changes in Soviet culture with the performance of Glasnost and Perestroika, which eased ideological and media pressure on the media and administrative control of the country's educational and cultural institutions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin undertook fundamental economic reforms and encouraged integration with the Western world. First, steps were taken to regain control of Russia in the region. However, the Russian elite sought to expand Russian-Western relations. From 1993 onwards, Russian elites began to emphasize the importance of post-Soviet geography and soft power policies in the region. These efforts were initially made by Yevgeny Primakov and the Eurasianists, but the policies implemented for convergence were not successful. With the advent of the Putin era, Russia began to develop soft power tools by pursuing policies to maximize its interests in the post-Soviet space. In the post-Soviet space, Russia strengthened its position in Central Eurasia as part of a policy of soft power. This ability is based on two important tools: language and education. Russia began to develop multilateral and bilateral relations, in a preventive manner, with the former Soviet republics. Russia is developing its soft power capabilities, but many of its problems have not yet been resolved so that it can be considered a powerful soft power. . Both soft power and hard power policies are implemented in parallel with creating a favorable environment for the Russian Federation in post-Soviet geography.

An important issue in this article is the problems in prioritizing security over economic development in Russia. Issues such as Russia's economic decline to 12th in the world, widespread poverty in society, a sharp decline in population growth and its security effects and most importantly, the transformation of the Cold War superpower into a "Third World superpower" due to massive exports of raw materials are important features of Russia that challenge this security priority. Based on these issues, the main question of this article is "why and how has the national security strategy of Russia become broader, more provocative and more aggressive?" The idea that can be put forward in response to this question is that "understanding the interactions of the three variables of environment, attitude and behavior can show a changing trend in Russia's national security strategy. The crisis in the country's geopolitical and environment has strengthened conservative, state-oriented and authoritarian attitudes, and has led to the formation of a broad, provocative and offensive security strategy, which has led to the reproduction of more difficult security conditions".

The research method in this article is "qualitative analysis". The author tries to examine Russia's security strategy, the reasons and factors that shape it, especially focusing on the relationship between the geopolitical environment, political discourse and the thought of the Russian statehood. Then, on the basis of "available documents and data" and, most importantly, the latest official document issued by Russia President called "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation" in July 2021, and of course, as necessary, other state's strategic documents, like the 2015 National Security Strategy, provide a "secondary analysis" of the reasons and factors associated with the development of Russia's national security strategy.

In the text, we discussed Russia's geopolitical implications and national security strategy, and found that the country's security environment is global, regional, and national, with specific geographical and cultural dimensions. And some fixed elements and dynamic geopolitical features of Russia in recent decades by three normative, institutional and strategic elements from the West (Western values, NATO expansion and missile shield deployment), non-governmental actors from the South (extremism and terrorism), and the flow of population from the east (Chinese immigrants), are seriously threatened. Russia's regional geopolitical environment is not limited to the western borders of Norway, Finland, and the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and even Georgia in the Caucasus, or the eastern border with Japan and the Bering Strait with the United States. Rather, with the Arctic as a major security issue over the past decade, Moscow has been placed under a three-pronged fence. Since 2012, as Western security pressures have intensified, reactions in Russia have intensified, leading to the Ukraine crisis and the occupation of Crimea and intervention in the Ukrainian sovereignty since 2014.In a global and national geo-cultural environment, the discourse of liberal democracy and its norms and institutions was first welcomed in the 1990s in the absence of ideology in Russia. But then, with the beginning of Putin era, efforts were made to engage with him, and the strategy of participation and competition of the first decade of the 21st century reflected Russia's limited adaptation and response to liberal democracy. During this period, Kremlin officials still emphasized the concepts of Russian democracy, guided democracy, and sovereign democracy. But gradually, and especially after 2012, indigenous, religious, neo-Eurasian attitudes, especially neo-conservative thought and the re-reading of the works of conservative thinkers such as Ivan Eileen and Alexander Solzhenitsyn began, and their important concepts entered the texts  and training programs and became a dominant trend.Concepts such as powerful state, authoritarianism, Putinism, and constitutional change should be seen as signs of the reproduction of Tsarist and communist Russian government in the 21st century. The government has prioritized security over economic development and Inside Russia, it has addressed the issue of concentration and its requirements for control, personalization of power, and the dismantling of the concepts of democracy, elections, parliament, and public opinion and in the external environment, the use of force as a vital factor in the political and strategic culture of Kremlin history, as in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, will not be neglected.

Thus the geopolitical and cultural environment of Russia and the concerns arising from their problems have made the mentality and attitude of the Russian elite more susceptible to the reproduction of the concepts and ideas of state and authoritarianism. This issue has become a key factor in the national cultural discourse and it has put the security strategy above the agenda of the Kremlin's governing system, a strategy that, on the one hand, has become a broader and more comprehensive umbrella for economic, cultural, social and diplomatic policies, and has placed them in the light of its necessities and requirements, and on the other hand, compared to previous periods, it seems more provocative, violent and aggressive

The concept of strategic culture is of fundamental importance for the foreign policy behaviors of countries today. This concept, developed by Jack Snyder, is at the core of understanding the nature of intergovernmental relations and therefore serves as one of the main foreign policy behaviors of modern nations. The concept of strategic culture has constructivism roots on the one hand, and strikes at "rational choice theory" on the other. This article basically uses the constructivism approach to understand the constructive elements of the strategic culture of Russia and Iran and its potential to establish strategic relations with Iran. This article shows that the roots of Russia's strategic cultures towards Eurasia are mainly based on different historical experiences, the concept of ideology and their leadership beliefs about the region. In addition, the strategic cultures of both countries are also guided by the concepts of “we against others” that form the core of the constructivism paradigm. In this article, it is been argued that, owing to the fact that nature of Russia's strategic culture is based on hard power, there is little potential for strategic relations between the two countries and these two countries compete with each other in many areas such as central Asia, Caucasus and Caspian see on the field of energy. In this research, electronic and written sources have been used and the information is collected in a library method.

Rich energy resources and transit through Russia in Commonwealth of Independent States have attracted the attention of regional and supra-regional power and it created tensions. Thus, the attempt to integrate the geo-economic space and integrate it with geopolitical games is interesting for Russian strategists in order to change the situation in favor of their policies. Considering the volume of energy reserves  of  Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia’s transit line will be extensive and the influence of Russian oil and gas companies on Commonwealth of Independent States is obvious through energy geo-economic strategy while ensuring mutual political economic security. There is a common interests between them, Of course, this issue is a geostrategic and geopolitical importance for Russia’s issue because Russia will achieve its goals, which are the expansion of economic and political hegemony, through oil and gas energy tools It forms a subset of geo-economic thinking.

The research method of this article is analytical-descriptive. The information was collected and translated using valid scientific- specialized articles from academic and research sites, also the concept of geo-economic thinking, the role of oil and gas energy and routes are explained. Transit in this region is assessed, according Russian’s  maintenance and monitoring the region in global level. Monitoring and intervention through geo-economic considerations are discussed too.

Competition over the control and supervision of oil and gas extraction centers and transition lines are an important factor for the hegemony of energy-owning countries. Meanwhile, rivalries and conflicts between Russia and foreign countries, especially those with oil and Gas energy reserves, over capacity building for investment and maximizing national-commercial interests have led to geopolitical conflicts by trans-regional countries and it caused the creation of new structures to improve infrastructure. It will affect trades and the movement of goods and services, as foreign countries in which do not have close access to ports and open waters, this will pave the way for new opportunities for Russia to remove such barriers.

Russia’s approach to foreign countries is nothing more than a fundamental change in its economy ,and it efforts to resolve local-regional problems and  conflicts. In this regard can involve the broad  participation of these countries. Russia and foreign countries are close to each other in economic-trade matters, and membership in alliances such as the shanghai cooperation Organization which has largely allayed Russia’s concerns about foreign influence, but the influence of the United States and its allies in the region couldn’t be ignored. However, it creates a security vacuum that could challenge Russia’s geo-economic goals.

The Middle East has been a place of maturation and organization of Islamic fundamentalist groups since the beginning of the twentieth century due to its heterogeneous political borders, Ba'athist, nationalist attitudes, affiliation and Islamic movements and human conflicts on the one hand, and the presence of trans-regional activists on the other. have been. In this geopolitical and sensitive region, the influence of religion in general and religious fundamentalism in particular is quite evident, and the obvious examples are the events of recent years in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and so on. Given this introduction, the main question of the article is what has been Russia's foreign policy strategy in the Middle East in the light of the spread of religious extremism with emphasis on the four main actors in Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria since the beginning of this century and especially in recent years? The method of doing an article is descriptive-analytical. For the past 10 years, all terrorist attacks in Soviet territory have been carried out by Takfiri Salafis. To provide international. In addition, it is likely that Muslim fundamentalists in Chechnya will once again demand secession from the Russian Federation. Undoubtedly, the growing influence of radical Islam among the Syrian rebel forces has strengthened Russia's determination to support the Assad regime.

Material and geopolitical factors always have been one of the most important factors affecting countries' political relations with energy, but in addition, the way one decision-maker (leader) understands the world, himself or another, is vital to understand why some decisions are made and others are excluded by them. This paper aims to consider the perceptions of leaders, especially the different conceptualization of Russia and EU member states (Germany and Poland) from each other, to understand the duality of conflict/cooperation in the energy sector. Using reliable documentary and internet resources and using deductive strategy and in the framework of neoclassical realism, this article explains the question of how leaders' perceptions have affected Russia-EU relations with geopolitic of energy after the Ukraine crisis and how has it shaped their relations? The hypothesis is that the perception of leaders has played an increasingly important role in the logic of conflict/cooperation in geopolitic of energy, and the other has reactivation of friend-foe in Russian-EU energy relations. In no other case is such a dichotomy as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, clearer. In analyzing the subject, while the present study does not ignore the importance of material and geopolitical factors, it concludes the understanding and perception variable of leaders on both Russia and the European Union (Germany and Poland) as an important and fundamental variable in shaping their relationship with Nord Stream 2.

With the end of the war, the geopolitical structure of the great Eurasian region of Russia, China, the United States and the European Union has engaged in competing for Ukraine and the South China Sea. From the perspective of Moscow and Beijing, the expansion of the United States, NATO and the European Union to the East was aimed at limiting the regional influence of Russia and China. As a result, Ukraine and the South Sea of ​​China have also led to a conflict zone between Russia, China and Western actors over regional influence and even a factor in the disagreement between the United States and the European Union, which is the basis for intensifying tensions and increasing Uncertainty has been created in the Greater Eurasia region. By stating this introduction, the authors suggest that their main question is that the tensions and geopolitical disputes between the United States, the European Union and Russia over the Ukrainian crisis, and the US-China differences with China in the South China Sea and the failure of the European Union with hegemony On the multilateral relations of these countries? The hypothesis of the article is that the disagreements and tensions between the European Union, the United States, Russia and the hegemonic demands in the Ukrainian crisis, the intensification of US-China divisions, and the political, economic cooperation of the EU with the two countries Russia and China, while weakening the European Union's security relations with the United States, have provided the ground for transition from a monopoly to a multi-polar system. The research method in this paper is descriptive-analytical and a tool for collecting library and virtual information

In the early 2010th, there was a tide of discontent first in North Africa and then in the Middle East. Syria led by Bashar Al-Assad did not stay away from the public tide of dissatisfaction. Although people initially expressed their unhappiness with the Syrian government, yet by the interference of regional and international actors starting in August 2011, it turned into an international crisis. Russia is among the most important international actors in Syria. Since the time of worsening of the Syrian crisis, Russia along with Iran made diplomatic and political efforts in order to prevent the direct military invasion of the West to Syria like what happened in Libya. Putin announced repeatedly in press conferences addressing his Western counterparts, that military actions of the West in Libya and earlier in Iraq and Afghanistan is doomed to fail and Moscow is trying to reach to a political solution in the framework Geneva peace initiative and based on a multilateral negotiation between the Assad government and its opponents.However, in September 2015, upon the official request of Bashar Al-Assad, Russia decided to intervene directly in Syria which as a result turned the balance of power in Assad’s favor. Therefore, the question raised here, is why the Putin-led Russia decided in 2015 to start a direct military presence in Syria? In other words, in 2011 through 2015, Russia was striving to find a peaceful solution to Syrian crisis; however, in 2015, it decided for a direct military involvement in Syria, and along with Iran and Hezbollah of Lebanon, support Assad against his opponents. This article`s main argument is that “Russia with its geopolitical influence in the Middle East including Syria, seeks to take control over the main energy transfer lines in the Middle East and become the global energy hegemon”. So, the independent variable is “the geopolitics of energy i.e., Russian policy of becoming the global energy hegemon” and the dependent variable is the “the direct military presence of Russia in Syria since 2015”.

In this line, the authors first mention the original desire in Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union to bring back the Russian Federation to its initial place in international system and turn it to a argue that it is first stated that after the collapse of Russia the leaders in Kremlin were after the return of Moscow to its initial place in the international system; however, the approach and view of the Russian leaders to how become an internationally recognized superpower were different. Yeltsin, the first Russian president, with his Atlantic aids hoped with a cordial relation with the West especially the United States, could achieve this goal. However, the result was nothing but the collapse of the Russian economy; in a way that in the late 1990s, observers suspected that the Russian economy is no more capable of recovering. But, since Putin became president and following his rule over Russia for several years, all political equations changed. Putin emphasizing on Russia’s comparative advantage, saw energy as an important factor in Russia’s power. Consequently, since 1999 when Putin came to power, he tried to make Russia take control over energy transfer routes and energy exporting countries in Central Asia and even the Middle East. To this end, during the 2000s, when projects such as Nabucco and Trans Anatolian pipeline came underway by the Western (mainly European) countries aimed at reducing their oil and gas dependence on Moscow, Russia, on the other hand, started the construction of alternative pipelines and also prevented countries such as Turkmenistan to join the Nabucco and Trans Caspian pipelines.

At the onset of a new crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Europe sought to break dependence on Russia; so, it seemed that the Middle East with its huge gas and oil resources, was a good alternative for Russia. Therefore, countries such as Turkey and Syria as energy transfer routes and Iran, Qatar and Iraq as those with energy (especially gas) resources, were considered potential rivals with Russia. In a view to Syrian crisis and Russian military intervention in Syria in 2015, it is understood that with his military intervention in Syria, Putin succeeded to control all his potential energy rivals. In other words, in 2015, while the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah-Iraq axis was in a relative weakness and anti-Syrian rebel fighters on the one hand and ISIS on the other hand, had seized a vast territory in Syria and Iraq, Russia involved militarily in Syria with the goal of fighting terrorism and preventing the collapse of Bashar Assad. This intervention which is said to be encouraged by Iran, succeeded to limit the Islamic Republic`s maneuvering power as the Russian rival in the field of energy policies. Further, Moscow`s support for Iraq against the ISIS kept this country in line of Russian geopolitical and geo-economics interests in the Middle East. Finally, the Russian military involvement in Syria could prevent Turkey, as one of the most important energy transfer routes, become the major player in the Syrian crisis and thus a serious rival for Russia. Further, Moscow succeeded to distance Turkey from its Western allies and bring it to its orbit.

After the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, while aiming to keep the Russians second-guessing, the Americans deeply involved and the Germans neutral, NATO has so far shifted its security priorities twice. The first shift in priority came in 1999 when Warsaw Pact’s priority shifted to identifying new threats and cooperation and association with former enemies, and the second time in 2010 resulting in its concurrent accompaniment by the priorities of collective defense, crisis management, and common security. The recent shift led to the establishment of the third generation of NATO, which leads the organization more than before to attend outside its traditional region. By providing the most comprehensive interpretation of its existence, NATO is present in all parts of the world and engages in various military, security, political, social, cultural, environmental, scientific, and even sports activities with various political units. This trans-geographical presence of NATO, which is accompanied by the creation of formal organizational structures, has led the organization to be directly and indirectly present at all borders of Islamic Republic of Iran; a presence that has irreparable effects on national security and the regional role of Islamic Republic of Iran; not only in the short term but in the future as well. Accordingly, the subject matter of this article is to examine the quality in which the boundaries of this organization are expanding in the geopolitical regions in the far north of Islamic Republic of Iran; where the authors are trying to proceed using the concept of geopolitical territoriality. The main question of the research is “How is NATO expanding their territory in the Baltic region, Black Sea, and Eastern Europe?” Areas in which post-soviet union power vacuum, enormous sources of energy, and racial and ethnic diversity have gained them double-fold significance. In response to the present question, the authors believe that "NATO is trying to preserve and extend the sovereignty of liberal values of democracy and the free market as the driving force of contemporary global order by utilizing the strategies of expanding official political boundaries, expanding unofficial political boundaries, humanitarian missions, defense and security cooperation and the expansion of organizational and administrative offices; further expand its territory through its presence in the Black Sea, Russia and the geopolitical regions of the Baltic Sea and Eastern Europe in the far north of Islamic Republic of Iran.” It is noteworthy to mention regarding the research background, that despite a general lack of geopolitical studies on NATO in domestic literature; a lack of research and studies focusing on its new approaches based on different regions and countries is strongly felt.

The type of research is fundamental. The method of data collection is library resources and documentary research while the data analysis method is deductive reasoning and the data evaluation approach is based on critical rationality.

In a geopolitical clarification, NATO is expanding its territory; in other words, NATO is trying to expand its geographical value outside the region to preserve and expand the sovereignty of liberal values of democracy and the free market; as the driving force behind the contemporary global order and this means territoriality. Accordingly, the review of NATO's documents and performance and its leaders’ speeches show that they have adopted approaches to this end, which include: A: Expansion of official political boundaries B: Expansion of participatory political boundaries C: Defense and security cooperation D: Expansion of organizational and administrative offices Conclusion The planning and operation of NATO's territorialization and territoriality projects as a military-security institution that pursues the protection of liberal values of democracy and the free market, which is in clear contradiction to the slogans and objectives of the Islamic Revolution of Islamic Republic of Iran; communicates the fact that these agendas are manifestly in conflict with the discourse of the Islamic Republic as well as the geopolitical territorialization of our country. It is evident that neighboring this organization, which is not only present on the northern borders of Islamic Republic of Iran, but also on the eastern, southern and western borders, has its consequences for Islamic Republic of Iran's national security. Given these interpretations, the expansion of NATO's sphere of influence in the geopolitical areas of Russia, the Baltic region, the Black Sea and Eastern Europe, although above-mentioned areas do not share a common border with our country, even so, our country’s national security faces serious challenges in different dimensions. - Political consequences - Trade and economic consequences - Military and security implications - Cultural and social consequences Finally, the authors recommend that attention be paid to the national security of the country so that the pertinent authorities show more attention and supervision to the consequences of the organization's geopolitical territorialization and therefore the following operational proposals are presented in this regard: - Bilateral and multilateral talks with NATO official and unofficial members located on the northern borders of Islamic Republic of Iran on the subject of “The damages of NATO’s expansive territorialization to the national security of Islamic Republic of Iran and the challenges lying ahead of the bilateral or multilateral relations”; - Strengthening our security and intelligence presence in the countries of the northern region of Islamic Republic of Iran, in which NATO is active, with the aim of monitoring and observing the activities of this organization; - Holding specialized and international conferences on the issue of the damages of NATO's territorialization in the northern borders of Islamic Republic of Iran and its effect on increasing in the crises of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Caspian region, and further efforts to introduce NATO and its multiple scientific, cultural, political, economical, military, social and artistic elements in Islamic Republic of Iran's scientific and academic literature has been seriously neglected.

Putin and the annexation of Crimea to Russia; geopolitical analysis of Russia's action in annexation of Crimea peninsulaExtended abstract

Appearance of the Ukraine crisis as one of the most important controversies of 21 century, has put Russia in front of the west and became to one of the most controversial issues in international arena. Manifestation of west advocators in the election of 2004 in Ukraine and the next events of it conduced to the extension of tension in the relations of west and Russia. The intensification of these tensions brought to the creation of feeling danger in classical interests of Russia and after the exacerbation of crisis, Russia inserted Crimea peninsula to itself. The annexation of Crimea peninsula to Russia faced with a bitter reaction of the west and Europe and they imposed hard and widespread bans against Russia. This article tries to answer this critical question that what interests does Russia gain by the annexation of Crimea to itself which has caused to the endurance of hard bans of the west and Europe and also what geopolitical element or factors caused to Russian's decision and its action about the annexation of Crimea peninsula to this country and what geopolitical aims does it have about this decision and action?

The research method of this article is analytical- explanatory method and it has studied the problem of research by using library and internet resources with a geopolitical approach and by incorporation of classic and modern geopolitical theories.

The year of 2014 was the important and controversial year for the Russia. The Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea to Russia converted the relation of the west and Russia to the congelation point. In reality, Ukraine is a club for the confrontation of west and Russia and westerns tries to drag Ukraine in to their block to maintain a strategy of geopolitical oppression on Russia. This matter has caused to Russia's fear about its interests in the western and south western borders. Ukraine because of its geostrategic situation as a buffer situation of Ukraine between the Russia and west (NATO) and supplying the security of Russian's navy and the security of black sea and also because of the Sevastopol Island's location in Crimea has a particular importance for Russia. Putin wants to use Ukraine as a buffer region between itself and Europe (especially NATO). This policy from the age of Stalin was a safe policy. In this time, the annexation of Baltic region to European Union and NATO has caused to the failure of creating secure buffer region of Russia. By repetition of the crisis in Ukraine we can see the fear of Russians and Putin's efforts for maintaining Ukraine as a buffer region to protect the Russia's interests. From the geo economical view, Russia pays attention to the Ukraine's market of energy consumption and also regards this country as a pathway of transferring the Russia's energy to Europe. More than 90 percent of Russia's energy exports to Europe by the path of Ukraine. More than this, Ukraine is one of the important importer of energy especially gas from Russia. Besides these existent energy resources in Ukraine, Russia has noted to other mineral resources such as the resources of Manganese, Iron, Phosphate, Uranium, Titanium, and Granite and … and also agricultural products. From the geo cultural view, culture and identity of the Ukraine people is important for Russia because Ukraine more than being one of the soviet's republics and Kiev which now is a political center of Ukraine, from the past centuries has been a center for Russian dynasties and still between the Russian language is called as metropolises of Russia and has cultural and national interests to Russia. So by regarding to the ethnic and linguistic similarities between the populations of Russia and Ukraine, localism and advocation of Ukraine's Russians is a geocultural ends of the Russia. Moreover, Russia pays attention to the protection of culture extension and Russian values in Ukraine.

What is scrutinized in this research was researching this problem that what geopolitical element or factors conduced to Russia's movement and decision to annexation of Crimea peninsula to this country and what geopolitical ends does Russia have to make this decision and action; in the other words, what geopolitical interests and values does Russia describe and appoint for itself which by this action has put itself in front of the west and has accepted the consequences of this action such as the bans of west. An answer that was given to this question is that Russia because of disability to confirm its power in Ukraine completely and feeling danger about leaning of Ukraine to west and loosing its interests in this country, for maintaining its minimum interests in Ukraine, will annex Crimea peninsula to itself in order to use the important geopolitical situation of Ukraine and this island in the geo strategic, geo economic and geocultural forms and protect its interests. Russia after the annexation of Crimea, undergoes the most boisterous bans in financial and economic zones that impose high pressures to Russia's economy; nonetheless, Putin doesn’t accept to condone Ukraine and Crimea because he thinks that his interests depends on the dominance on Crimea. So Putin tried hard to annex Crimea to Russia and despite of European and western bans doesn’t accept to leave Crimea because loosing Crimea is equal to loosing all interests in Ukraine and widely in Europe and its vicinity (black sea, Mediterranean Sea and …) for him. So by regarding to these geopolitical interests that Ukraine has for the Russia, it is unlikely that Russia leaves Crimea unless more important and valuable interests convince it which it is unseemly and impossible. Key words: Russia, Putin, Crimea peninsula, geopolitics, Ukraine, European Union.

Syria is one of the countries that has a particular geopolitical and geo-strategic importance in Russian Middle East policy. Today, with the emergence of the political crisis in Syria, this country has become a geopolitical divide and rivalry between the two countries, the US and Russia, each playing a role in their own interests and goals.The main question of the present research is that the reasons for Syria's strategic importance in Russia's opposition to the United States? And why does Russia support Bashar al-Assad? The main hypothesis of the study is that in the US and Russia's competitions, Syria is the last winner of Moscow to maintain its regional power and stay in the major powers' jirga; therefore, Assad's defeat and overthrow of power decline in Moscow It leaves. According to the geopolitical position of Syria in the region and its strategic importance in international equations, Moscow is trying to preserve the Syrian political system by using various instruments (political, military, ...), play the most role in the future of Syria;In order to maintain the overall structure and order in the region, and to prevent the spread of Western interference and influence, especially in the United States. The preceeding article is formulated using a descriptive-analytic method and within the framework of an invasive realism theory.

Today geopolitics has returned to political analysis and international relations studies with more depth and accuracy in understanding of phenomena and also predicting them. Maybe the best example for geopolitics importance in 20th century is the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 that changed the political boundaries of one of the two superpowers in the global bipolar system. Although Russia has lost the considerable size of its territories, especially as its periphery margins, but yet has remained as a great power in the region. Soviet fall as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century- as in 2005 Russian president, Putin called - has changed the geographic borders and brought a broad nationalistic and geopolitical thoughts and visions, including the necessity of reviving the Eurasian civilization. Here we considers some geopolitical schools and approaches in regards of preserving Russian influence as its history and related Russian identity. In fact the eurasianism approach has constructed and grown based on Russian identity in the unique manner and way. It seems Russian foreign policy is inspired of geopolitical thinking.

This study has been done with analytical and descriptive method. Data gathering mainly are based on primary resources, library information and documentation and also online books and articles in three languages: Farsi, English and Russian. This study is focus on Russian political community and thoughtful contemporary schools and intellectual thoughts. Here the research areas are in the fields of political geography, geopolitics and also international relations.

As mentioned in the text, The Eurasian orientation has been present in Russia for centuries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has undergone a significant change in its foreign policy. Starting from the second half of the 1990s, Russian foreign policy began to reflect more and more on the concept of geopolitics. In spite of the fact that Russia as a successor of the USSR was facing many economic and political problems, Russian foreign policy was and is based on geopolitical thinking.One school of foreign policy thinking in Russia warns against an excessively Eurasian concentration of Russian resources and argues for the country’s pro-Western, rather than merely regional, orientation. This school can be referred to as Westernizers because for many years politicians and intellectuals of this group have been challenging the wisdom of Russia’s regional orientation and developing a special Eurasian strategy. To them, Russia is essentially a European country that must associate itself primarily with the Western world and its institutions. This essay assumes that despite the expectations of some scholars and policy-makers, Russia did not retreat from the Eurasian geographical space and in fact is keenly interested in securing its cultural, political, and economic presence there. Some approaches can be mentioned in the Russian geopolitics thinking in the Russian discourse since the Soviet disintegration among Russian political thinkers and foreign policy including geoeconomism, stabilizing eurasia, expansionists and civilizationists that represent the politically conservative factions of Eurasianist thinking. To supporters of stabilizing Eurasia, the key word in understanding Russia’s security mission in Eurasia is stabilization. Geoeconomism emphasizes the role of geoeconomic over geopolitical factors in the post-cold war world and Eurasia. The emergence of the new geopolitical thinking in Russia is often associated with Eurasianism or the spatial imagination of post-Soviet Eurasia. Eurasianism emphasizes Russia’s geopolitical and cultural uniqueness and distinctiveness from both Western and Asian worlds. To eurasianism, one of the propositions is the notion of the Eurasian continent as heartland of the world and Russia as the heart of the heartland. Following this logic of exclusive geopolitical competition, Russia must take advantage of its strategic location and mobilize its resources, experience, and will for establishing full and single-handed control over Eurasia. For Alexander Dugin as the leader of neo- eurasianism movement, Eurasia spreads far beyond the former USSR. Russia is at the center of this geopolitical struggle and Russia’s main identity is that of Eurasian. Here there are so many questions: If Russia is unable to perform its traditional stabilizing role in the region, who is going to play this vital role? How are analysts to respond to the sudden emergence of new threats when Russia itself is weak and has very limited resources at its disposal? Finally, what exactly is Russia with its new geographical boundaries and how should it reconstruct its traditional geopolitical identity?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its geopolitical hegemony, but it retained the tendency towards regaining its influence in the world. This tendency is supported by the geopolitical thinking which underlies Russian foreign policy, and which contains elements of some geopolitical schools of thought. Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism are basically created as a reaction to external factors, which were, in significant aspects, very similar. That means that the political collapse of the structure of the Soviet state was accompanied by the geopolitical dissolution of the territory into several sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. Today, we can analyze the concept of Neo-Eurasianism which is seen in the development of the contemporary Russian geopolitical thought. Such circumstances have occurred after 2000, with the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s rule started, who, again, tries to position Russia as the dominant geopolitical factor between Europe and Asia. Analyses of Russian schools of geopolitical thought disclose that there is no full use of the concepts, visions and theories of one separate school. Instead, Russian foreign policy is based on some aspects of all schools of geopolitical thought, which reflects on the realistic evaluation of Russian resources, abilities, and capacities. Geopolitical thinking was and remains a key stone in Russian foreign policy. Analysis of Russian schools of geopolitical thought disclose that there is no dominant visions in Russian foreign approach, but somehow geopolitical views including eurasianism and neo eurasianism are reflected on it.