جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « acquired knowledge » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has explicitly stated in his various works that "acquired knowledge reduces and refers back to the knowledge by presence". Based on his different words and statements, two readings of this reduction of acquired knowledge to the knowledge by presence can be presented: 1. According to one reading, the source and origin of the abstraction of any acquired knowledge is considered to be knowledge by presence. 2. According to another reading, it is emphasized that acquired knowledge is figurative and compulsorily subjective, and thus, every acquired knowledge is actually knowledge by presence. In this paper, after explaining both readings, an attempt is made to provide a new interpretation of this theory by reconciling these two statements through finding a common point. In this reconciliation, the second reading is considered primary, and the first one is construed in its light. The result is that acquired knowledge is both subsequent to knowledge by presence (as presented in the first reading) and is in reality the same as knowledge by presence (as presented in the second reading). Although this reconciliation might initially seem contradictory, a closer examination reveals that the subsequence of acquired knowledge to knowledge by presence is of the nature of "subsequence of figurative to denotative."

Intuition is one of the important aspects of the geometry of religious knowledge and one of the sources of acquiring knowledge. The question of objectivity of associate the mystical experience is one of the basic questions raised in this field. In response to this question, some accepted the theory of essentialism and others believe in structuralism (contextualism). The essentialists consider the associate of mystical experience to be the supreme essence and truth. Proponents of the theory of structuralism, while denying the narration of the mystical experience of a single essence, consider these experiences as a result of a person's culture, belief and intellectual background. Studying and comparing the views of Allameh Tabatabai and Fakhr Razi in the field of realism and objectivity of the associate of the mystical experience is one of the goals and the subject of this article. The study method is descriptive and analytical, relying on their works. The findings of the research show that Allameh Tabatabai, by dividing knowledge into two types of presential knowledge and acquired knowledge and returning the acquired knowledge to presential and accepting the principle of unity of the knower and the known, considered mystical experiences to be the type of acquired and presential knowledge that in both types, Essence experience is realized. From Fakhrazi's view, in the shadow of inner cultivation and self-purification, and reaching mystical states and discoveries, a person reaches a level where he understands the truths with direct knowledge. Therefore, these situations are the experience of the essence and cognitive knowledge. In fact, essentialism is the common feature of Allameh and Fakhr

Explaining Ali-Qoli-bin Qarchaghaaikhan's point of view about "acquired knowledge" and "knowledge by presence" with a critical approach Abstract Ali-Qoli-bin Qarchaghaaikhan is among the not so famous philosophers of the Safavid era. Although many of his works have not been undergone the process of correction, his book The Revival of Wisdom, that actually contains many of his philosophical opinions, has been corrected and printed. Among the innovative theories of this sage is the innovative classification that he presented of "acquired knowledge" ('ilm-e-hosuli, علم حصولی) and "knowledge by presence" ('ilm-e-hozuri, علم حضوری). On the one hand, Qarchaghaaikhan introduces different types of acquired knowledge and knowledge by presence, some of which are unprecedented in the history of Islamic philosophy, and on the other hand, he considers the truth of knowledge to be accidental and added to the speaking self (nafs-e-naatteqeنفس ناطقه،). In fact, with the analysis he gives regarding the issue of the union of knowledgeable subject with the reasonable object, he considers knowledge as an attribute that is added to the adjective, namely the speaking self/subject. This essay, at first, expresses his point of view and initiative on this matter in detail, and then criticizes by using an analytical-comparative method. Keywords: accidentality, Ali-Qoli-bin Qarchaghaaikhan, acquired knowledge, Knowledge by presence, the speaking self.

A study of epistemological developments in Islamic philosophy indicates that, although the issues in this philosophical trend have not been independently dealt with and have been generally discussed under epistemological issues, there are other problems in Islamic philosophy that, if organized and classified, can open the door to philosophical approaches to ontological discussions. Perhaps, some of the fundamental ambiguities in epistemology can be clarified based on the outcomes of such discussions. For example, reference can be made to the effects of ontological views of Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī over their epistemology. The main question of this study is how an epistemological approach can be extracted from an investigation and analysis of a collection of problems and demonstrate it with reference to the standpoints and views of Islamic philosophers. In order to achieve this purpose, it must be said that an epistemology based on the sense, reason, and intuition can lead to the development of Islamic philosophers’ epistemology. The Peripatetic philosophy is mainly based on the intellect and reasoning, and the Illuminationist philosophy, although relying on reasoning, basically draws on unveiling and intuition in epistemological analyses. However, logic, as a gateway to epistemology, usually opens the discussion because almost all Islamic philosophers consider the theory of definition as a tool for unveiling the unknown (unveiling the general nature of affairs) relying on acquired knowledge and the five predicables (universals). Nevertheless, Suhrawardī and his followers, while relying on presential knowledge, believe that a genus-differentia definition is not justified and, by criticizing the theory of definition, try to discover the particular unknown through observation and illumination. Accordingly, the problem of vision and imagination in the common epistemological system is usually viewed as one of the sides of acquired knowledge. In contrast, it is explained under presential knowledge in Illuminationist philosophy.

Alongside acquired-conceptual knowledge, intuitive knowledge, as one of the instances of knowledge holds a very important position among Islamic philosophers as well. Allamah Tabatabai also mentions presential knowledge with importance while discussing acquired knowledge, and ultimately, considers presential knowledge to precede acquired knowledge. In this paper, using an analytic method, we have tried to explain his theoretical foundations regarding presential-intuitive knowledge and rationally defending its cognitive validity. An important finding of this paper is that presential-intuitive knowledge, apart from being the base of acquired knowledge, also provides a convincing rational defense regarding cognitive validity. The basis of this validity is that accessing reality is the main goal of knowledge and if we can verify that reality itself is available to us in presentialintuitive knowledge, we would have no further concerns epistemological concerns. According to Allamah Tabatabai, just as sensory intuition creates a certainty of being in accordance with reality in ourselves, presential-intuitive knowledge also contains similar dominance over reality. At the end of this paper, some instances of views that claim to disaffirm the validity of presential-intuitive knowledge have been addressed, analyzed, and explained so that the epistemic validity of presentialintuitive findings is objectively proven.

As a semi-Peripatetist semi-illuminationist philosopher, Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (1200-1273 AC/ 597-672 AH) was well acquainted with Suhrawardī's philosophical thoughts (hikmah al-ishraq) such as idea of intuition and his illumination science; so that some scholars have called him a pure illuminationist. Nevertheless, the influence of Suhrawardī's theory on the issues of perception and cognition is not seen in his works. In other words, Al-Tūsī does not accept illuminative-based knowledge of presence ('ilm hudurī) emphasizing that the acquired knowledge agent is something other than himself. On the other hand, unlike Avicenna's approach (980-1036 AC / 370-428 AH), and also other peripatetic philosophers, in explaining the theory of Absār, Tūsī considers the theory of "radius departure" (khurūj al-shu'ā'), as an autonomous theory. He also introduces rational perceptions through the process of "Impresion" (Inṭibā') rather than "abstraction" (tajrīd). In this article, by examining the various logical and philosophical works of Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, we try to show that in the matter of knowledge and perception, Tūsī has not been an imitating philosopher, either imitating Peripatetic philosophers, or illuminatist ones. Rather, he has taken a new approach in this field. Therefore, his point of view can be examined from two aspects: First, the negative aspect, in which Tūsī denies the "knowledge of presence (al-'ilm al-huzurī)." The second is the affirmative aspect, which expresses the theory of the impression (intibā') of rational perceptions.

AbstractRelying on Fusus al-Hakam, this research deals with the sacred and present, connective and intuitive behavior in the esoteric perceptions and Ibn Arabi's mystical and heart experiences in the application of acquired and present knowledge. In addition, mystical ideas, the originality of grace and attraction to deliberation and effort, liberation from sensory affairs and material interests are presented as a dogmatic and sure way to achieve the true desirable in the view of this precious mystic.Ibn Arabi considers what is a necessary science that is the result of discovery and believes that this science is never subject to doubt, but at the same time it does not violate the path of reason as long as it maintains its limit, and all they say is that The only means of knowing is the "divine definition."According to Ibn Arabi, intellect and superficial knowledge strive within the limits of mental forms and its goal is to achieve perception, but the goal of enlightened science; It is the opening of the eye of insight and perception of the kingdom of the universe and the understanding of truths and the attainment of truth, the true source of which is the inner soul, soul and heart of the perfect man.Keywords: Ibn Arabi, acquired knowledge and presence, esoteric understanding, originality of discovery and intuition

Every philosophy, or more precisely every philosophical system, has a system on which the basic principles of that philosophy are based. Meanwhile, the Philosophy of Illumination is not out of this rule. This philosophy is based on principles, the most important of which is the element of "intellect and intuition". This article intends, after defining philosophy and philosopher, knowing the two is not unrelated to knowing the intellect and intuition, examine the intellect and intuition, according to the content of the article, separately, according to the illumination data in the Philosophy of Illumination, and then explain the position of these two elements that make up the Philosophy of Illumination, based on the works of Master of Illumination’ (shaykh al-ishraq), and then draw the main position of these two elements in philosophy, then I explain how the interaction between intellect and intuition in structuring the Philosophy of Illumination, and briefly examines it according to the capacity of the article.

One of the most fundamental discussions of epistemology is the discussion pertaining to the conceptions and notions. In this article, we are seeking to investigate how we acquire concepts, whether specific or general. This is the main concern of this study. According to the selected view, the theoretical concepts are taken from the self-evident concepts, but all the self-evident concepts are taken from the intuitive knowledge. In the first part of this claim, i.e. taking the theoretical concepts from the self-evident ones, there is no considerable disagreement. The second part, however, is not so and many theories have been presented there. Nevertheless, after explaining the selected theory and stating the scope of the self-evident concepts, we face this fundamental question: "how are the self-evident concepts taken from the intuitive knowledge?" After acquiring the right solution for the fundamental issue of this article, we will investigate and evaluate the way of acquiring the self-evident concepts through the intuitive knowledge and, at the end, the most important difficulties facing it.

Qāḍī Sa‘īd Qumī is one of the greatest philosophers and mystics of Iran during the Safavid era. He was competent in peripatetic and Illumination philosophies, and had mystic tendencies. With regard to the divine attributes, he believes in the negative divinity and believes that what we understand from the existence and attributes of the possible beings cannot be attributed to God. The reasons he gives in for this is that God is the pure Being and has no attribute, and the human intellect does not have the capability to understand God and His attributes. With regard to the ontology of attributes, Qāḍī deems detestable the belief in the addition and sameness of attributes with God, and favors the representativeness of attributes for the divine essence. He extensively discusses the divine knowledge attribute and believes that God’s knowledge is not intuitive, acquired, or differentiated (the views commonly hold by philosophers). This study aimed to adopt a critical view to examine Qāḍī’s viewpoint in the divine attributes’ domain – especially the divine knowledge attribute – and to show that despite its congruence with the outer appearance of some narrations, his viewpoint suffers from some internal weaknesses such as adherence to some questionable principles – such as belief in the overall difference between God and possible beings – and disagrees with some intellectual principles and narrations.

The Philosophers’ opinions on the truth of the acquired knowledge can be divided into two types: some regard it to be the presence of the quiddity of ‘external known’ in the minds; and consequently, the acquired knowledge is reserved for the quiddities. This group has resolved the issue of correspondence of the knowledge with the known using this view. In contrast, other (earlier) philosophers consider the acquired knowledge as the instance and ghost of the external known. The issue of the ‘mode of the knowledge suggesting the known’ has produced these discussions. According to the former view, knowledge of the mental quiddity can be knowledge of the external quiddity; but the view related to the ghost considers suggestion of the suggested as an essential element of knowledge, and regards no need for a relationship and some sort of unity between the knowledge and the known. Here, the discussion of the relationship between the knowledge and the knower is posed, about which there are two basic views: some believe in the existential unity between the knower and the knowledge; and in contrast, the earlier philosophers have depicted a concrete relationship between the knower and the knowledge. In this article, the arguments presented by the adherents of the aforementioned views have been investigated; and finally the views of those who believe that the knowledge is a ghost and that there is a unity between the knowledge and the knower have been defended. According to that view, the acquired knowledge is the very existence of the knower, which is suggestive of the known.

The division of knowledge into “notion” and “assertion” is one of the foundational discussions. Knowledge, in its general sense, is divided into knowledge-by-presence and acquired knowledge. Acquired is either notional that is not judgment or notional accompanied by judgment. The former is “notion” while the latter is “assertion.” The two problems of this division are as follows: 1) “failure to comply with the criteria of rational division” which includes the instances of “unity of the divider and divided” and “lack of contrast between the types; 2) “the contrast of two categories in one quiddity.” Thinkers have replied to the first problem by considering the different validities in division, that is, the divider is unconditioned, notion is negativity conditioned, and assertion conditioned to something. In response to the second problem, they have said that judgment is necessary to assertion and is tantamount to the differentia, and the companionship of notion and judgment is mental. Apart from asserting the composition of assertion and explaining its parts, Fakhr Razi believes in the logical requisites of composition as well. According to him, assertion is the collection of notions of object and predicate and copula and judgment. Its problem is the acquirement of assertion from definition dues to the self-evidence of judgment; or it is from both definition and argument due to the acquiredness of judgment. As it were, the acceptance of the acquirement of judgment is incompatible with Fakhr Razi’s foundation in considering notions self-evidence. Another problem is the incompatibility with the unity and simplicity of knowledge. In his view, we cannot eliminate the first problem by considering the different validities in the divisions and divider because firstly, the type of these conditions is mentally-posited and they cannot be the differentia for real matters. Secondly, these validations explain the manner of presence of the divider in the divisions and their relationship to each other and is not specific to notion and assertion. Similarly, using judgment as the diffrentia of assertion cannot be a reply to the second problem because no differentia has been mentioned to conceive a part of assertion to make it acquired and distinct. Moreover, because Fakhr Razi’s basis has a problem in the composition of assertion, answers and requisites based on it will also be problematic. Therefore, his view does not appear to be successful in solving the problems. In the explanation of the views of the philosophers, Nasir al-Din Tusi considers assertion to be judgment. “Meaning” is the divider of notion and assertion. Notion is really knowledge and assertion is knowledge of it reverts to notion. In reality, assertion is judgment and judgment has two aspects: 1) it is an action of the soul; 2) conceptualization of this action of the soul by the soul. According to the second aspect, judgment is one of the instances of notion. The main point in this view is to consider notion as the basis; however, limiting knowledge to notions results in the denial of the share of argument in the two parts of logic. As it were, the division of knowledge into two parts makes the division figurative and indulgent. However, if one seeks the different in the philosophical and logical aspects in Khwaja Nasir’s view, then from a philosophical perspective, assertion is judgment and reverts to notion and this results in the exclusiveness of knowledge to notions. Therefore, there are essentially no divisions for knowledge. However, the concept of notion and assertion is one of the issues of logic. From this perspective, knowledge is figuratively divided and since it is in the beginning of logic and is in the position of education, such a matter is allowed. Therefore, by defining “meaning” as a divider, Khwaja could answer the first part of the first problem. As it were, considering assertion to be the same as judgment is both its second part and also the second problem which is an existential and ontological discussion would essentially not be applicable.

The principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity are the main bases of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy and his particular theories. On the other hand, he has not provided a clear and accurate picture of these two theories in his philosophical system and has referred to quiddity using different terms. Each of the contemporary commentators of the Transcendent Philosophy have interpreted quiddity and existence in a way based on their own views and theoretical principles and have tried to predicate it on Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory. However, given the fundamental role of quiddity and quiddative concepts in gaining acquired knowledge, disagreement in the interpretation of quiddity will affect the quality of explaining acquired knowledge. Hence, following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study aims to provide a correct interpretation for quiddity from the viewpoint of contemporary commentators of Sadrian philosophy and, then, investigate whether our acquired knowledge of existents, which is attained through quiddative concepts, is positive or negative. Accordingly, the authors have examined and criticized such commentators’ interpretations of quiddity and the way it explains existence. A short answer here is that, apparently, based on the correct view, which belongs to Professor Javadi Amuli, quiddity is the manifestation of determined existence, and quiddative concepts speak of limited existence, which is clearly a positive rather than a negative and purifying statement.

Some of the contemporary advocates of Islamic Philosophy believe that the view of the modern Islamic philosophers regarding knowledge by presence can solve some of the issues present in the theory of knowledge. The origins of this belief are probably two popular theories: Allama Tabatabai’s view that acquired knowledge comes back to knowledge by presence and Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi’s view regarding the reference of basic axioms to knowledge by presence. According to the first view, all acquired knowledge is rooted in knowledge by presence. The main issue is regarding sensory beliefs and the circumstances of the justified relationship between sensory experience on one hand and sensory beliefs on the other; however, in this theory, no explanation has been provided regarding how knowledge by presence can be converted to acquire knowledge which has been derived from it. Therefore, this view does not help in solving that important issue. Similarly, according to Ayatollah Misbah’s view, the guarantee of the validity of basic axioms is because they are based on knowledge by presence. However, various reasons show knowledge by presence cannot provide the validity guarantee for basic axioms.

As a problem statement, it must be indicated that the subject of soul has been the centerpiece of many philosophers’ attention which has led to the creation of diverse concepts about it. In this article, Farabi and Ibn Sina are referred to as the representatives of Masha Philosophy and Suhrawardi as the representative of the Philosophy of Illumination.  This research, in the first part, describes Farabi's and Ibn Sina's views on definitions, and then describes Suhrawardi's critique of the Masha Philosophy in this regard, and at the end he explains the point of view of Suhrawardi; since soul -cognition and its manifestations are the foundations of creatures’ cognition. As a necessity, it can be asked how our soul gains cognition? Mashayeans claim that they are capable of object cognition through its limitations, an idea which is criticized by Suhrawardi, believing such definitions to be incorrect while providing his own point of view regarding world cognition based on the light. In his opinion, soul is a manifestation on its own for its nature of light, and the brighter the light is, the more soul -cognition it will possess. He believes that Reasoning methods are not sufficient enough for gaining cognition and Intuitive knowledge is required instead. He furthermore supports his theory by holding soul and light equal to one another.

Knowledge in Sadra’ philosophy, is merely presence of something near Percipient. The most perfect sense of “presence” under this school, is intuitive knowledge of human being about “self” within which knowing and known have unity. Hence, From Sadra’s view, “knowledge” of “self” has a very high rank position in philosophy. However, what is described as " intuitive knowledge to self" in transcendental wisdom, From Kant’s view is not intuitive knowledge ; but this knowledge is also a kind of our empirical knowledge where is obtained through mediation of “subjective form” which is called “appearance” by Kant. But Kant believes that other than this “empirical ego” assigned to “transcendental ego” He believes that it cannot, as Nomenon, be placed in the center of the human experiential vision. Therefor, he neither believes knowledge of self as an acquired knowledge nor as intuitive one. In this article, we explains this problem of why Mulla Sadra considers intuitive cognition of self. This problem is embedded within a more general problem : Whether that ego which comprehends itself belongs to knowledge ? In this paper, we will show that the “knowledge” of “self”, unlike Kant's conception, cannot be explained except by the existential attitude, because intuitive perception is a kind of presence in existence and for existence.

In the view of some contemporary Sadrian philosophers (‘Allamah Tabataba’i and Murtada Mutahhari), at all stages of the emergence and acquisition of different types of knowledge for human beings, the soul’s presential knowledge is absolutely prior to any kind of acquired knowledge. In other words, any kind of acquired knowledge is realized for Man after the soul attains the presential knowledge of itself. Some contemporary Iranian thinkers believe in the opposite view and claim that the soul’s presential knowledge is the product of some types of acquired knowledge; nevertheless, a careful study of this view demonstrates that, firstly, the adduced arguments for the opposing standpoint is not free from fallacy and cannot prove the mentioned claim. Secondly, this view is in contrast to the necessary and sufficient conditions for the realization of presential knowledge. Accordingly, such a view cannot be confirmed.  

Knowing God is the hiest level of human knowledges. The mode of this knowledge has always been notable and controversial subject. The acquired knowledge is one of the two kinds of knowledge in which by the mental concepts the knowledge of objects can be achieved. In Transcendental theosophy, Knowledge of thing, has been On the basis of criteria such as the existential relationship between Two objects, Perceived thing should be an effect and depends on its existential degree. Accordingly, the basic question is, How is the acquired knowledge to the necessary Being ? Mulla Sadra, by representing different levels of knowledge of God such as essence, attributes and acts, rejects the acquired knowledge in certain levels. In this article, at the first section, three criteria for obtaining acquired knowledge between two objects has been Explained. in the second part, the reasons for rejecting the acquired knowledge to God’s nature such as :God's specific being, essential simpility & his infinity , And the possibility of acquired knowledge of divine attributes and acts has been taken into consideration.

The problem of acquired knowledge is one of the vital and notable issues in the Islamic philosophy. Philosophers and theologians have made a different approach to the knowledge and its nature. Allameh Dawani had a specific doctrine on the knowledge. He in contrast to the others has not regarded the acquired knowledge under the category of quality believing that the philosophers who have considered the knowledge as a psychic quality applied simile and metaphors in philosophical discussion. His doctrine has been criticized by later great philosophers such as Mulla Sadra. In this paper his thought on the basis of Mulla Sadra’s works and its epistemological consequences has been explained. The most important requirements are as following: denial of categorical relation view, existence and necessary of nothings, fallacy of common usage instead of real application, rejection of resemblance idea, denial of regarding knowledge as a category, returning acquired knowledge to the knowledge by presence.

Some precious writings have been produced by scholars on the Divine knowledge. Molla Sadra has elaborately discussed this topic. He has considered the rule of "basit-ol-haqiqah kol al-ahsya' va laisah be kharej menha– the pure simple being is the whole being, and is not out of it" as the main point of this discussion.
Noticing God's knowledge of [his own] essence, Molla Sadra tries to prove God's knowledge of Himself before their creation and after their creation. Although I believe Molla Sadra's view on God's prior knowledge is comprehensive compared with his previous philosophers such as Sohrevardi and Ibn-Sina, but his idea has various problems and needs a more complete expression. Stressing on some introductions, I will try to prove God's prior knowledge of objects is an acquired knowledge; a kind of acquired knowledge that no more complete knowledge may be imagined beyond it.