مهدی شهابی

The application of composite components has significantly increased in the various industries, including oil and gas, aerospace, marine, and automotive sectors. Among these, carbon fiber reinforced polymers (CFRP) are particularly prevalent in the aerospace industry due to their superior properties like high strength to weigh ratio. Given the critical nature of these composites, non-destructive inspection is essential to ensure their integrity and performance. Ultrasonic testing is one of the most widely used methods for inspecting these materials. Recent research has focused on the application of ultrasonic testing for the non-destructive inspection of CFRP parts. This study investigates the feasibility of using through-transmission ultrasonic testing with a water jet technique for inspecting of the CFRP components. Additionally, it examines the relationship between flexural properties and the intensity of transmitted waves in multilayer composite materials. For this purpose, some samples were fabricated from epoxy-carbon fiber using the hand lay-up method. A through-transmission ultrasonic non-destructive testing setup with a water jet system was designed and constructed, and ultrasonic testing was performed to identify defects in these samples. In this set-up, a uniform water column is used to transmit the pressure wave from the transducer to the surface of the samples under test, which replaces the couplant material. Subsequent bending tests were conducted to determine the flexural properties of the samples. The analysis revealed that an increase in the number of layers led to a decrease in both the final flexural strength and the average intensity of the transmitted wave, attributed to the higher likelihood of structural defects in samples with more layers. Subsequent bending tests were conducted to determine the flexural properties of the samples. The analysis revealed that an increase in the number of layers led to a decrease in both the final flexural strength and the average intensity of the transmitted wave, attributed to the higher likelihood of structural defects in samples with more layers.

Genes are implicated in the manifestation of not only physical traits but also behaviours, moods and mental illnesses. Genetic modification enables the alteration of an individual's characteristics. In addition, some diseases have a genetic origin that can be treated using this method.
Genetic engineering is classified into four principal categories: somatic gene therapy, somatic genetic enhancement, germline gene therapy, and germline genetic enhancement. The genetic alterations achieved through somatic gene therapy are confined to the individual undergoing the procedure and are not inherited by subsequent generations. In contrast, the consequences of germline gene therapy persist across multiple generations.
The ethical and legal challenges associated with human genetic modification are manifold, with informed consent being a particularly salient issue, particularly in the context of genetic modification of germ cells.
Genes are implicated in the manifestation of not only physical traits but also behaviours, moods and mental illnesses. Genetic modification enables the alteration of an individual's characteristics. In addition, some diseases have a genetic origin that can be treated using this method.
In this study, we employed an analytical-descriptive methodology to examine this challenge and the perspectives that have been put forth in relation to it.
Modern natural law posits reason as the foundation for legal and moral norms, leading to the term "rationalism." The objective of modern natural law or rationalism is to safeguard individual rights. The individual is regarded as the ultimate end, and the principles of individual freedom and the sovereignty of the will are considered to be of paramount importance. This perspective emphasises the importance of undertaking rational tasks in a manner that is guided by benevolent intentions, and posits that the realisation of perfection is contingent upon this approach. The physical and mental faculties serve as the instruments and preliminary steps in the accomplishment of these tasks. From the perspective of rationalism and Kant's thought, people have a moral obligation to pursue their own perfection and that of others. One proposed method for fulfilling this obligation is through genetic modification. However, several principles have been proposed in this thought which are considered to be the most important rational reasons for opposing human genetic modification. Genes are implicated in the manifestation of not only physical traits but also behaviours, moods and mental illnesses. Genetic modification enables the alteration of an individual's characteristics. In addition, some diseases have a genetic origin that can be treated using this method.
In this study, we employed an analytical-descriptive methodology to examine this challenge and the perspectives that have been put forth in relation to it.
The ethical and legal challenges associated with human genetic modification are particularly pertinent in the context of informed consent, particularly in relation to genetic modifications on germ cells.
The question thus arises as to whether an individual is entitled to make a decision to undergo genetic modification with a view to influencing the traits and characteristics of subsequent generations and thereby determining their future and life prospects in a positive or negative manner. This raises the question of whether the principle of informed consent presents an obstacle to human genetic modification. Alternatively, can it be accepted by reference to other rational principles of Kant's moral philosophy, including deontology and the concept of the human being as an end in themselves? What are the human duty and role in perfecting themselves and others on this basis? Is proxy consent accepted by Kant's rational view and can it replace the consent of the patient or a person who is created in the future or not? Given that the majority of objections to human genetic modification have a Kantian basis, is such an approach correct and complete? If this view is not correct, can a view in favour of genetic modification be inferred from Kant's thought?
The initial stage of the discussion centred on an examination of the fundamental principles, concepts and categories of informed consent. This was followed by an investigation into the constituent elements of the process of informed consent and the circumstances under which the principle of informed consent can be applied. In addition, the potential implications of this principle for the field of genetic modification were considered. Finally, this study analyses the effect of Kantian dutyism and the concept of the human being as an end in itself on genetic modification.
It seems that genetic modification does not necessarily mean violating the rights of individuals, and on the other hand, embryos or even germ cells do not have free will, which can be seen as an obstacle to genetic modification. Moreover, human beings have a duty to the happiness of others, and parents have a duty to their children. Although this duty is in conflict with the duty to respect individual autonomy and informed consent, the way out of the conflict is to emphasise the results orientation and to pay attention to the end of the human being, because there is no basis for preferring one of these two tasks over the other, and therefore Kant's thought is blocked in this respect. In this way, the treatment of diseases of genetic origin and the provision of a better life through the development of the individual's traits is the cause and introduction to other rational tasks, in other words, the positive results of genetic modification are preferable to the obstacle of lack of conscious consent. Acceptance of genetic modification and exit will result from this blockage and conflict, and therefore the duty to fulfil the duties of the parents is superior to the duty to respect the individual autonomy of the foetus, and in the meantime there is a difference in the therapeutic goal or the strengthening goal in germline methods or somatic in children will not be incompetent. Finally, according to Kant's view of duty, genetic modification of human embryos can be accepted.

legal modernity as a value-oriented framework considered the concept of "right" as an abstract and metaphysical concept in the eighteenth century. At the same time, utilitarian theory welcomed the method of empirical observation in legal analysis, and considering the socio-economic functions of right emerged as an independent theory and have challenged how metaphysics interacts with reality. The present study seeks to investigate the relationship between metaphysics and reality and the nature of the concept of right from the perspective of utilitarianism theory. The principle of "achieving the greatest welfare for the greatest number" in utilitarian school of thought can challenge the concept of right drastically. It seems that utilitarianism authorizes sacrificing individuals and their interests (rights derived from the theory of modern natural law) as a necessity for greater happiness and welfare. Further investigation revealed that the theory rejects the subjectivism that exists in modern natural law; in other words, in examining the concept of right, it simply does not reflect the precedence of metaphysics over reality and, therefore, can be consistent with a typical impression of the concept of "right".

Louis Le Fur's thought should be seen as a symbol of the interaction of metaphysics and reality; The duality that finds another interpretation in Le Fur's language, that is, natural law and objective law. The requirement of the mentioned interaction is not to consider Le Fur's philosophical framework as rationalism or Kantian philosophy and to consider Aristotelian philosophy as the origin of Le Fur's thought. However, Le Fur's natural law seems to have taken its validity from the traditional rationality that is based on tainted wisdom; A rationality that can be considered as its inherent spiritual or spiritual illumination. Therefore, Le Fur's enlightenment should not be considered an experimental enlightenment, like the enlightenment of philosophers such as Petrazyski and GényIn his analysis of the basis of the validity of his natural law, Le Fur is so close to his contemporary traditionalists such as René Guénon that he states that man is the God`s Caliph. Any legal concept that does not consider the eternal soul of man in his analysis cannot be evaluated as a correct perception.However, unlike the same traditionalists, Le Fur does not give a role to revelation in the objectification of the concept of natural law and justice. He does not evaluate the transition from Catholic jurisprudence to Protestantism negatively. Le Fur's concern is the synthesis of metaphysics and reality.But, without a doubt, what Le Fur means by this metaphysics is not human metaphysics; rather it considers divine metaphysics. Therefore, one should not think about the transition from Catholic jurisprudence to Protestantism. We know that traditionalists like Guénon consider the transition from Catholic jurisprudence to Protestantism as the meaning of passing traditional rationality.Nevertheless, his belonging to perennial wisdom has not hindered his empirical methodological approach to the compatibility of natural law with the nature of things and has not led to Shari'a voluntarism as an all-round ideology.Apparently, it remains at the level of mere general ideology, and this generality, in addition to opening the way for Le Fur's experimental method, also leaves unanswered the fundamental question that when the divine legislative will has no role in detailing the perennial law, so in which direction perennial wisdom is supposed to guide a person?It seems that Aristotelian philosophy has clarified its task concerning perennial wisdom. By removing the divine legislative will, Aristotle practically accepts that evolution should be left to the hands of history and the passage of time; the approach and result that Le Fur has not been able to get rid of.The fact is that Le Fur's type of law is a symbol of evolutionary experience, and from this point of view, its basis should be sought in the nature of Aristotelian objects. It seems that these types of law fulfill the function of objectifying or objectifying traditional rationality. It plays a role in Le Fur's legal thinking. It is clear that such a position for the nature of things, in order to interact and synthesize with traditional rationality, is not acceptable in traditionalist thought such as Guénon.Interestingly, by adopting the experimental method, Le Fur also comes to the conclusion that there is superhuman rationality that guides the world; and that man is not only the mind; it does not just matter. Man is both material and mental, and for Le Fur, it is surprising why the experimental method of positivists is unable to see and verify such realities.Despite this, the result of the synthesis of Le Fur's metaphysics and empirical reality is very limited, and practically, perennial Le Fur's wisdom, from the perspective of a humanist view, will not seek a different interpretation of the nature of Aristotelian objects. In other words, by relying on it, you cannot be a watcher of Catholic jurisprudence. But, on the one hand, it is possible to avoid falling into the trap of the empirical illumination of philosophers like Petrazyski;The drawback of empirical illumination is that it does not open an evolutionary path for the transition from Sien to Sollen. There is a possibility that he may regress and sometimes evaluate slavery as favorable; it is difficult to separate it from public opinion and it leads nowhere.On the other hand, relying on Le Fur's thought, it is possible to establish a philosophy of law in which law is neither a captive of pure materialism nor is it caught in Kant's subjectivism, which synthesizes the hierarchical system of law with empirical reality does not wantA result can also be achieved in the framework of the nature of Aristotelian objects. According to its evolutionary approach, Aristotelian philosophy cannot deny the law of Le Fur and accepts it. Le Fur's thought in the field of contract does not have a different result compared to Aristotelian philosophy. In Le Fur's contract, like the Aristotelian contract, the principle of the sovereignty of the will is not the rule in order to result in a practically positivist justice.

Justice is one of the most important demands of humanity, and the hope of realizing it is more in the courts than anywhere else. Citizens expect the statute to be implemented fairly and for all people, but it is known among jurists that in many cases, the fair implementation of the statute depends on a fair interpretation. While justice-based interpretation has been a topic of discourse in civil law, this article probes into the possibility of extending its applicability to criminal law.? Despite the superior principles of interpretation in criminal law (such as the principle of narrow interpretation, interpretation for the benefit of the accused, etc.), the question arises: Can justice-based interpretation find a place within the logical framework of criminal law? If the answer is positive, what are the conditions of justice-based interpretation in criminal law? The article hypothesizes that in criminal law and the light of its legal logic, it is possible to have a justice-based interpretation of the relevant statutes, but in this direction, the judge must use fair capacities such as the principles of interpretation of criminal statutes that are in the constitution and ordinary statutes or even doctrine opinions The article asserts that the expression “justice-based interpretation” should not be invoked independently and for a subjective interpretation.

The scientific formulation of positive law is the basis of François Geny's thought. However, Geny is well aware that if the term "scientific" means extreme scientism of the late nineteenth century, it will result in a positive law that lacks a metaphysical element. However, Geny knows that man is not just matter; it is also the Espirit. Geny refers to a human being who is social, rational, and free, the human being who worries about where he came from, why he came, and where he is going, i.e., the same man that Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi also speaks of his inner voice. However, Geny does not want to fall into the trap of liberal metaphysics of modern natural law and conclude positive law based on the ideology of individualism and the liberal positive law of the family.Thus, like the philosophers of law in the first half of the twentieth century, he seeks to pursue the interaction of metaphysics and reality as serious concerns. The natural, historical, intellectual, and ideal foundations of François Geny’s thought, which are inextricably linked, are the framework of the same interaction and result in the scientific formulation of positive Law. Real foundations are a set of facts that take precedence over the human mind and human will: physical nature, moral nature, human psychological construction, religious feelings, social and geographical environment situation, the economic situation, and the political or social forces in society The historical foundation does not mean merely some of the socio-historical foundations that potentially and indirectly influence the formation of the law of the present generation. Rather, it refers to norms that, in addition to being the product of the passage of time, manifest themselves as existing law and are responsible for guiding human behavior. The ideal foundation is based on experimental intuition which senses the heartbeat of a social organism and is aware of the mystery of the rules that guide the organism to its areas. Such intuition is related to pragmatism and, of course, should not be confused with Bergson's intuition, which is based on the opposition of intuition and action, and it is the intuition of reason which connects intuition to metaphysics rather than to reality.Although the rational foundation is more important among these foundations, it does not mean that metaphysics takes precedence over reality; since this reason, on the one hand, is the sole discoverer of the principles derived from the nature of superior objects, and is not intended to replace such nature of objects, which is the basis of the validity of the norm. On the other hand, this intellect is influenced by natural and historical foundations. The empirical nature of intuition also does not negate its guiding role. This intuition is complementary to reason.  However, Geny does not place this foundation at the top of its foundations so that experimental intuition does not pave the way for the passage of the nature of superior objects and spiritual intuition; it is an intuition that interacts with the nature of objects, and for Geny to be sure of this interaction, it attributes an experimental description to this intuition and considers it a complete and, of course, evolutionary experience.Geny’s positive law of the family is based on these four foundations; the point is, however, that intuition of Geny may also result in the socialization of family law if it results in the principle of monogamy and leads to the relative liberation of man from position. In this way, one can critique Geny’s idea, arguing that the end of this evolution is uncertain and does not follow a definite linear path. It should not be forgotten, however, that spiritual intuition prevents this socialization from leading to full institutionalism; both the natural foundation and the historical foundation prevent this spiritual intuition from leading to liberalism and the transition from institution to private contract in the family law system. In any case, the foundations of Geny’s thought are inconsistent with his legalism, which is the result of state positivism. Empirical intuition is also the basis of the ideal foundation, and such a framework neither sees the transition from institution to contract as its ideal in family law, nor does it conclude marriage that ignores the natural proposition of gender difference; the principle does not challenge the strength and continuity of the family, and at the same time, does not prevent the family system from evolving.

Emphasizing the Kuhnian theory of paradigms and applying a transcendental approach focused on the theoretical basis and theory-laden theory will result in a contextual understanding for law and legal propositions. Therefore, this study begins with addressing constitutive elements of Kuhn's doctrine and applying his method to law and legal propositions. By elaborating different ideas regarding the very concept of paradigm, we will conclude that what we mean by legal paradigm is neither a mental context, nor simply epistemological, anthropological, normative, and methodological foundations of the legislator which can be chosen arbitrarily. On the contrary, the legal Paradigm is an epistemological context that has a hidden, vivid, inclusive, influential, and harmonizing reality. Finally, and based on the notion of paradigm, we try to pursue the paradigmatic doctrine in Iranian civil law and specifically in legal contracts. This paper concludes that importing incommensurable modern west's presuppositions and propositions has led to a deficient paradigmatic shift in Iranian civil law and specifically concerning the legal contracts. It shows the sovereignty of two parallel (opponent and incommensurable) paradigms. Emphasizing the semantic system of the paradigm in Cohen's thought, and of course with a transcendental view, focused on theoretical foundations and with a theoretical tone, results in a contextual understanding of law and its propositions.

The essential function of natural law is to be the criterion of justice. And therefore, the relationship of natural law with the positivist approach to law, if it calls into question the said function, can lead to the passage of the theory of natural law. The doctrinal anguish of the first half of the 20th century resided in the development of a theory of natural law based on the interaction of reality and metaphysics. The pre-eminence of metaphysics over reality as the foundation of natural law debauchery on a natural law that has no relation to social realities. We must leave formal justice and we must not fear that this passage means the transition from justice to equity. The main question is how and to what extent the relationship between natural law and social variables exist. Stammbler's natural law with variable content, seems to question the inherent function of natural law; because it depends on contingency. Renard's natural law with progressive content is not, like Dabin's natural law with variable applications, exact. The anguish of having minimal metaphysics and the necessity of the passage from being to having to be requires the natural right to progressive applications.The author tries to substantiate his hypothesis, "natural rights with evolutionary implementations" by comparing the three models proposed by Dabin, Renard, and Stammler for the relationship between natural Law and the variable matter, and criticizing these three models.

Although natural law has a deontic essence and function in the paradigm of modernity, and thus prompted the passage of the traditional structure, the conceptions and analyses reconcilable with tradition are also evoked throughout the history of thought and it seems that Aristotelian natural law thought, the most famous one, is a gaze that reflects natural law based on the nature of things being the symbol of realism. Perhaps Montesquieu belongs to legal historicism and thus one cannot find a relationship between his thought and natural law, but the fact is that Montesquieu is not outside the paradigm of modernity. His concern is natural public law and why is the nature of things in his idea not another expression of spontaneous and social rationality and the freedom based on this rationality? By analyzing and critiquing Montesquieu's various conceptions of natural law, this research tries to present a conception that is reconcilable with Montesquieu's natural public law anxiety and thus makes it possible to understand his thought in the paradigm of modernity.

The history of the evolution of legal thought indicates the contentious process of the interaction between metaphysics and reality. Meanwhile, notions such as law and justice, and in general, natural law, being the criterion for evaluating justice in the legal structure, have a more complicated situation. Petrazyski's idea on intuitive law should be considered as a new framework for the mentioned interaction; as modern natural law is based on the preeminence of metaphysical rule over reality, and classical natural law also seeks static metaphysics to provide the ground for its interaction with reality. Thus, they could not be admissible. Petrazycki endeavors to seek a dynamic metaphysics which he finds it in dynamic subjectivism. Individual intuition is another expression of this type of subjectivism which leads to the intuitive right and intuitive justice. However, one may ask whether this type of metaphysics be the foundation and even superior and evolutionary framework of law?  In fact, Petraziski does not believe in such a foundation, and as a result, his metaphysical interaction with reality cannot be maintained in the framework of idealism.

The basis of the idea of natural law, whether classical or modern, is the existence of a superior norm for law, and this norm is the criterion for judging the validity and correctness or incorrectness of the positive law. It is possible to abandon, as the historical school did, the antinomic approach to law, and replace natural law with positivism and positive law; and thus overcome as much of the pre-eminence of metaphysics over reality as of the anxiety of the interplay of value and reality. Gurvitch does not accept the antinomic approach to law and his concern is the interaction of value and reality. Therefore, he resorts to empirical intuition as the basis for the validity of the law. According to him, this intuition is objective so that he does not fall, like Petrazicky, into the trap of individual intuition; and its pluralism is not borderless. Gurvitch tries to base positive law on empirical intuition which does not necessarily have authority over formal positive law because it is not supposed to be a criterion for evaluating the validity of this positive Law. If so, then Gurvitch's conception of value must be seen as a rejection of the idea of natural law. And yet, the fact is that Gurvitch could not hide his interest in the correctness. He could not pass from correctness and as a result, his claim to deny natural law must be reduced to a terminological claim.

This research, under the influence of a paradigmatic viewpoint in the philosophy of science, seeks to find the roots of paradigmatic legal historiography's constitutive elements. Thus, it offers a methodological discussion through which a researcher can have a better understanding of legal paradigms over time. A legal historiographer, by applying this method and by adopting different mental presuppositions about the law in different eras, would avoid the fatal error of assessing historical legal premises with the contemporary presuppositions. This procedure would place the historiographer in the very context they would intend to recognize. As a result, internal premises of law (principles, institutions, legal doctrines) would be placed and understood in direct relation with external assumptions of law (economic, political, religious, etc.) this process leads us to mix internal and external historiography which is another constituent of paradigmatic approach. Finally, this method would take the temporal discontinuity of law or jurisprudence into consideration and avoid legal evolutionists' negligence. They see legal history as a totality and apply their premises to its whole history.(Scientific research).

If a person purchases a commodity at a higher price than normal or sells it at a significantly lower price than normal as a result of a personal event, such as a spouse's illness, or of a public catastrophe, such as an earthquake or flood, this event can be said to impose the price on him. Under the Iranian law, the critical question is: what is the legal status of contracts based on imposing the price? To address this topic, the authors conducted a positive (descriptive) substantive analysis on laws and regulations, materials from Islamic legal treatises, and legal opinions. Also, following the economic approach used in this study, the authors examined the legal validity of contracts based on the imposition of prices on distressed and crisis-stricken persons from a positive-normative economic perspective. This positive-normative approach is founded on the theory of price and the concept of economic efficiency, respectively. It should be noted that since the history of the economic debate on this matter predominantly comes predominantly from the American literature, this article needs to be comparative.In Iranian law, according to the predominant view of Shi’i Jurists, Article 206 of the Civil Code considers a transaction motivated by the party’s economic need to be valid. However, based on many pertinent articles, most notably Article 178 of the Maritime Law, some jurists have argued that this is an unfair transaction in which products or services are provided at excessive rates to, or at a lower price purchased from, the distressed party. Some held the contract to be voidable, some found it modifiable, and some considered it valid, though with an option for the distressed party to cancel it. However, based on the predominant view among Shi’i jurists and the express or implicit content of the pertinent rules of Iranian law, a contract motivated by a party’s economic need is valid unless it falls in the scope of the Maritime Law, the rule embodied in which cannot be extended to other contracts, or is deemed anti-competitive in the market, in which case it may be terminated by the Competition Council according to the paragraph 1 of Article 61 of the Law on the General Policies for the Implementation of Article 44 of the Islamic Republic's Constitution.In the US law, section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, on which most states have based their respective laws directly or implicitly, a contract based on the imposition of an unconscionable price on the distressed party is deemed changeable. Moreover, contracts based on the imposition of prices on individuals affected by catastrophic disasters and crises, such as floods and earthquakes, can be altered and the imposer will face criminal sanctions and financial penalties . It should be emphasized though that using criteria such as unfairness or unconscionability for altering this sort of transactions may be challenged due to their vagueness and incapability to produce objective, well-structured standard.It is also noteworthy that the rise or fall in the price of commodities or services in a widespread or uncommon emergency is reasonable from an economic standpoint, because such events, on the one hand, often impede the production, resulting in large supply reductions and, on the other, lead to dramatic rise in the consumer demand, particularly for certain products and services. According to the pricing mechanism, whenever a product's supply declines and its demand grows, its price will reach its maximum level. This price rise will encourage present and future manufacturers to expand their output, resulting in lower prices and increased consumer welfare. Furthermore, validating the discount sales of economically distressed parties may be an appropriate economic strategy in recessions. However, government interventions (by regulation) are often inefficient and ultimately detrimental to consumers and should thus be limited to cases when it is necessary for the maintenance of the market activity.

Law has a constructed nature; the one which is distinguished from socio-empirical reality. Nevertheless, one can believe in dualism of contructionality and reality providing constructionality is independently thought to be different from reality and each of which has its distinct area. Furthermore, contract has a constructed nature. The question is whether there is an insist on its separation from reality; or what kind of effects would be followed by this independence? As long as this independence resulted in dominancy of contractual constructionality over reality, would it necessarily eventuate to have a fair contract? What are the challenges of pure dependency of contractual constructionality from reality? On the basis of this dependency, can one believe in the transformational and evolutionary function of law, particularly the contract? Denying both dominancy and pure dependency approaches, it sounds in all likelihood that it is the one and only way to keep the supremacy of will principle beside the principle of equity or the principle of the denial of distress and constriction; moreover, we should just emphasize how influenced the contractual constitutionality could be by the reality.

Patents are considered as investments protected under the International Investment Law. Although, these properties are protected under the principle of territoriality, similar to other investments, they can be expropriated as a result of host states’ regulatory measures inconsistent with protection standards stemming from foreign investment protection regulations and treaties including fair and equitable treatment and legitimate expectations of foreign investors. Considering the fact that few arbitration awards have been issued by arbitration panels in this regard, it is yet difficult to claim there is a strong precedent in International Investment Law. Nevertheless, reflecting the provisions of international regulations, the stance of the domestic law and the most important relevant case, this article provides the most significant elements of indirect expropriation as well as existing doctrines in this respect and further investigates whether invalidation of patents can amount to indirect expropriation. It will also be mentioned that despite the fact that according to several foreign investment protection treaties, invalidation of patents shall not be subject to regulations regarding indirect or creeping expropriation, the final determination lies with the arbitration panel.

There is no doubt that in the field of personal status, including family law, legislator's will is the basis of the validity of legal norms in the Iranian legislative system. However, territory of family has never been secured against government intervention due to social and economic developments. The main question in this research is the analysis of this intervention and its credit effects. Thisintervention can be expressive and thus the law can be regarded as the only instrument for stating this regulation which hasderived from the will of legislator, but, sometimes the law is an instrument for creating a legal ruleand in this case that the relationship between the will of the legislator and the will of the government is of considerable importance and causes some challenges and questions. For example, what effect does the rule of necessity of registering permanent marriage have on marriage? Is the effect of this rule merely positive or should it be considered affirmative? Thisstudy attempts to analyze the four roles of state in the legislative system, namely select of a subject and,recognizingsecondary titles, choice of legal rules,supervision and ensuringand finally establishmentof rules apply to behavior between spouses, how their rules of family are conformed with the social facts and offering some solutions to overcome some of existing legal challenges in this field.

It is certain that Perelman's concern is to go past the formal logic and analogical reasoning. However, his theoretical framework for this transition suffers from a vagueness that seems to be extended to the triad of fairness, rationality and acceptability of the judicial reasoning that Perelman emphasizes. Perelman’s emphasis on practical reason only and the fact that he seeks practical reason independently from theoretical reason have added to this vagueness. Perelman occasionally discusses the sociology of law in his works, and it seems that he is going to move away from analogical reasoning through sociology of law and its realism. Also, he sometimes underscores value judgments, the general principles of law, and the unwritten legal rules as the components of this value judgment. Do value judgments and general principles of law not imply acceptance of a type of natural law by Perelman? A type of natural law that can be considered as the theoretical framework of Perelman's Juridical Logic by denying the duality of theoretical reason and practical reason and, as a result, liberates this logic from the vagueness emanating from the pluralism of the social structure.

From Naseri era until Constitutional Revolution because of lack of Rule of law as a symbol of modern government, voluntarism or king’s volition was one of the most important basis of legal rule validation that had deep roots in traditional and intellectual background of Iranian society. This volition received its legitimation from God’s will and people as  peasants, by accepting this issue, considered this power transformation as a kind of charisma. However, because king’s volition came out of king’s characteristics, it was considered to have a variable basis and their derived rule had characteristics such as unpredictability, lack of equality element, uncertainty, lack of continuity and limitation. These features in contrast by modern legal paradigm could not have structure based on natural justice or legal justice and eventually led to the Constitutional Revolution. The major goal of this research is to analyzing the characters of traditional voluntarism frome the perspective of the modern voluntarism. Therfore, it would be possible to clarifing the structural challenges of the pre-revolutionary legal system.

An attempt to realize the authority of the synthesis of law and economics and stepping into its epistemological realm require thinking of a remedy for and responding to barriers to the methodology of the realization of the economic analysis of law. many experts in the discourses of "economics" and "law” do not tolerate the entry of economics into the realm of other disciplines, such as law, and the analysis of law based on the theories and methods of another discipline, such as economics, as they believe that there is no homogeneity and relevance between the principles of a methodological domain; i.e. economics, and those of a subjective domain; i.e. law. In the present paper, authors on the one hand, adopt a moderate positivist approach by rejecting the pure positivism approach and simply rejecting "the law as it is" and emphasizing the concept of efficiency and the normative approach on the other hand and in response to this question that whether the incorporation of economic standards into the realm of property and contract law is as an acceptance of the heterogeneous theories and methods of economics? by explaining the role of one of the most fundamental concepts of economics; i.e. the concept of “resource scarcity”, in creating the concepts of "property" and "contract," the authors show that the entry of the necessary economic principles of this concept into the realm of property and contract does not mean the acceptance of the heterogeneous theories and methods of economics, but due to the unity of their cause with that of the two latter concepts, we can talk about the homogeneity of method and subject in the economic analysis of property and contract. Given aforementioned discussion, is it essential to apply economic rules in the realm of legal property and contract law? The answer is that if in the analysis of the above rules, the epistemic requirements of the fundamental link between economics and the law of ownership and contract are denied or forgotten, these rules will be alienated from their origin, and will more or less deviate from the path to achieve social interests. The epistemic requirements mean promoting the concept of efficacy; as a criterion for the validation of legal rules, and reducing the role of governments in limiting the principles of private property and contractual freedom.

Law is essentially a social phenomenon, and therefore is in full association with other social sciences. A legal rule must be interpreted to be understood, and for interpretation, we will also have to argue therefore, the relationship between reasoning, interpretation and law is unbreakable. Besides this, the three categories of base, source and purpose of the legal rule are considered as the contributors to each legal system. Which are as a problem, is that if we are to seek social justice and fairness in law, why it takes shape different arguments, sometimes conflicting, in the same subjects? Will this not damage the realization of the order as one of the goals of the legal system? This phenomenon is explained as pluralism of legal argument, which is shaped by various factors, most notably ideology. The mutual relation between law and ideology in legal pluralism is controversial. Depending on what the ideology governing the mind of a legal practitioner is, his kind of argument in the interpretation of the legal rules will be equally different, which will be discussed in detail in this study.

In contractual relationships, the principle is to preserve and continue contractual relationships in order to prevent social and economic losses. This is the basis of the concept of "conversion of contract" analysed by judges by considering the "practical result", that is, economic purposes of the parties within the framework of "social interests". Therefore, the conversion of contract goes beyond the issue of interpretation, since it is justified on the basis of the "socialization of law" approach. In addition, this theory is not in conflict with Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh), because it focuses on the socialization of law at the level of "the purpose of the contract" and does not seek to regain the basis of the validity of the contract in the social conscience. Therefore, it has been recognised as a legal rule in Fiqh and Articles 144 and 618 of the Civil Codes of Egypt and Afghanistan. In Iranian legal system, it has not been recognized despite its practical implications. Since, the conversion of contract has economic and social benefits and is not in conflict with Fiqh, it can be adopted in the Civil Code by putting various instances under one title.

The existence of antinomic currents within the paradigm of modern law, can lead to the crisis and passing that as well. Bruno Oppetit, considers the formation of European law, the elevation of the place of the custom being source, and the elevation of the role of the judges in the legal order, as influencing factors of the legal relativism. He believes that relativism or pluralism is at odds with modern law. However, the theoretical framework of the modern law of Oppetit is only the substantial legal positivism. In rejecting this theoretical framework and insisting on the fact that modern law must be explained, either in the context of metaphysical rationality or within the framework of spontaneous social rationality, this article aims to answer a this question: Are the factors set out by Bruno Oppetit is contradicted to modern law? Or have they come to the resurgence of this Law, after a period of dominance of legal positivism?

There is no doubt that the paradigm of modernity is based on the idea of progress and not compatible with stoicism. However, there is no unanimity on the notion of progress, on its linear nature or its cyclic behavior. The plurality of legal contexts is sign of legal panjurism and the interpretation as the will of meaning is sign of judgmental panjurism. This is a crisis factor in the aim of legal modernity. The explanation of this content is not possible without explaining the nature and meaning of the notion of progress and the nature of modern law; because this is ambiguous in the concept of "progress" and its nature in the discourse of modern law. This research is based on duality of the fields of cognition and norm in the discourse of modernity to present a clear sign of progress and its relationship with modern law.

"Good morals" and "public order" should be regarded as the source of the rule of law and legal propositions so that they have not only a negative role, but also have a positive function. These two sources like other sources are affected by the basis of rules validity in legal system as far as pluralism in legal basis results different types of "good morals" and "public order". Defining the type of hierarchical relationship between "public order" and "Good morals" also depend on the type of hierarchical relationship between the foundations of legal rules validity; so that we can say in Iranian legal system, "religious good morals" and "religious public order" have credit priority.The difference between "Good morals" and "public order" is not a kind of substantive one, but also is phasic. "Public order" is statutory and legal propositions derived from "good morals" are non- statutory. In other words, "Good morals" is a reminiscent of the duality of rights and the law.

There is no doubt that the economic analysis of the law is realistic. The question, however, is whether or not this realism is in conflict with the fundamentalism of legal modernity? If realism, considers interpretation as the will of a concept, economic analysis of law as a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the legal rule, leads to the negation of fundamentalism and to the acceptance of pluralism in validity of the legal rule; as substantial and formal formalism will not be valid. These results denoted the paradigm of legal postmodernity, as a pluralistic one. However, it seems, if that fundamentalism is manifested in spontaneous value, it is a symbol of the interaction of reality and metaphysic. Thus, the economic analysis of the law, based on this type of fundamentalism, is only the resurgence of the modernity as the spontaneous order. Consequently, the interpretation will also be confined to the discovery of meaning, so that information has not fallen in the demise of pluralism. Because the acquisition of economic information requires a minimum of this formalism, the validity of this method of interpretation means the validity of formal formalism.