جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « تئوری نمایندگی » در نشریات گروه « حسابداری »

Studies in the field of corporate governance have tried to formulate a model that is compatible with all companies with different goals by using of agency theory. On the other hand, some researchers emphasize on presenting a contingency perspective. The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between the board structure and corporate social responsibility by considering the role of contingency factors.

The research data includes 128 companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period of 2016 to 2021. Structural equation modeling and SmartPLS3 software were used to test the hypotheses. The three factors of firm size, business strategy and business competition have considered as contingency factors that affect the board structure.

Contingency factors including firm size, business strategy and business competition have a positive and significant effect on the board structure, and the board structure has a significant mediating effect on the relationship between the contingency factors and corporate social responsibility.

Companies with a strong strategy, large size and high business competitiveness have a more efficient board structure. Contingency factors are among the factors affecting the board structure, and the fitting of the board structure with contingency factors lead to improve corporate social responsibility.

Contribution: 

Studies based on agency theory are unable to explain the effectiveness of the board of directors in the field of corporate social responsibility due to having a narrow theoretical lens. By providing a contingency framework, this study contribute to the existing literature, and helps the legislators to formulate new guidelines and laws.

The financial perspective of behavior, which is a combination of psychology and finance, states that psychology plays a role in financial decision-making. Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to present a portfolio selection model with a financial-behavioral perspective of company managers based on agency theory. The present study was conducted in two steps. In the first step, the dimensions of the components of behavioral financial theories based on the theory of representation, the relationships between these variables are explained in the form of a mathematical model. The calculations of this section have been done by Mathematica software. In the second step, using the price index data and cash return of Tehran Stock Exchange for quarterly periods over a period of 10 years from the beginning of 1389 to the end of 1398 to test the proposed behavioral financial model with the theory of representation in the portfolio Optimization and comparison with the classic model are discussed. The analysis of the second step was performed by means of comparison of means with SPSS software. The results of the analysis of two standard and behavioral models in the present study showed that the behavioral model led to the achievement of a portfolio with less risk and the returns of the portfolios are not significantly different.

Several decades ago, economists believed that all group activities of companies were focused for a common goal, but today, conflicting interests between groups affect the common goal. The basis of agency theory is the conflict between the interests of shareholders and management is one of the important issues that have been the focus of researchers in recent decades. The conflict of interests and agency costs that arise as a result of the separation of ownership from management, different risk priorities from the perspective of ownership and management, information asymmetry, and ethical risks. Various researches have been conducted in many countries about the theory of representation, and in each of these studies, a solution has been presented to reduce the problems of representation. (Nakhai et al.) This article is a type of review research and examines the theoretical study of the agency theory in accounting research. First, the theory of agency theory is discussed, then it examines the problems of agency and the available solutions to reduce agency costs.

The goal of this research is to establish a model of paying rewards in holding companies. Using multi-grounded theory and interview approach of data collecting in holding companies, a multi-dimensional model generated for paying rewards. In terms of purpose, this research is a fundamental research. It is also qualitative research according to data nature and the method of recognition is a philosophical empirical research. Moreover, in terms of type of argument, it is both deductive and inductive. To have access to the research goal, various methods of paying rewards and performance measurements methods, agency problems and some other effective factors in rewards paying mechanism have been investigated among holding companies. Through constructive interviews, a total of 247 conceptual codes were extracted. Utilizing MAXQDA software, the extracted codes were analyzed. According to the findings extracted from the interviews, the rewards model in holding companies includes: environmental conditions, bonus schemes, bonus types, performance appraisal, supply and demand, and performance conditions. Through performance condition implementation, some factors such as transparency, maximum and minimum, sensitivity to rewards and agency problems should have been considered

Agency Theory and Signaling Theory, it reinforces the fact that honesty and accuracy have not been observed in the preparation of annual reports, this will lead to agency costs for companies. Thus, the present study aimed to investigate the mediating role of managers' explanatory reports in the relationship between the quality of financial reporting and abnormal audit fees and the effect of unusual fees on the quality of financial reporting in the Iranian Stock Exchange. This study examines research hypothesis by using the panel data of 118 accepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2013-2018. The linear regression and Sobel test are also used to test hypothesis. The results of this study are in line with the opportunistic perspective and agency theory and audit fee pressure. Findings of this study show that motivation of managers for using positive tone in annual reports is increased when the quality of financial reports is low and that tone was directly related to the auditors' unusual pay. Moreover, managers’ reports tone can have the role of mediating in relation between financial reporting quality and abnormal audit fee. Finally, managers can’t use extraordinary audit fees as a tool to cover the low quality of financial reporting.

The purpose of this study is to provide a model for measuring the moral hazard of managers based on financial data. For this purpose, based on the literature, theories, and surveys of experts across the country, 22 variables of the source of moral hazard of managers were extracted and re-exposed to the comments of experts to rate the variables in terms of importance. 9 variables were selected based on the preference of experts and using the group Analytical Hierarchy process (GAHP), appropriate coefficients were assigned to each of the selected variables and the initial model was obtained. Finally, the obtained model was validated through the identified consequences. The information of the final model, which includes the variables of ownership structure, environmental uncertainty, monopoly in the product market, financial constraints, leverage ratio, free cash flows, capital expenditures, internal risk of the company, and life cycle of the company, is collected from Tehran Stock Exchange. The relationship between the number obtained from the model and the consequences of moral hazards was investigated and it was found that there is a positive and significant relationship with information asymmetry and stock price crash risk and a negative and significant relationship with investment efficiency. As a result, the proposed model can be effective for decisions, especially in the capital market. By making it possible to measure the moral hazard of managers, the necessary measures can be taken to reduce it through the establishment of strong corporate governance mechanisms for control and supervision.

The company's most important goal is to maximize shareholder wealth, so balancing social goals with economic concerns (tax costs), which can reduce shareholder wealth, has become an important issue in academic research in recent years, Which has led to the development of a literature on social responsibility and tax avoidance. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of social responsibility and family ownership on tax avoidance according to the framework of agency theory and stakeholder theory.  It also examines the role of family ownership in the relationship between social responsibility and tax avoidance. 

In order to test the research hypotheses, 75 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2011 to 2019 were examined. To test the research hypotheses, multivariate regression with a combined data model was used. 

The results show that corporate social responsibility has a negative and significant relationship with tax avoidance. Nor does family ownership regulate the relationship between social responsibility and tax avoidance.. 

The existence of corporate social responsibility reduced tax avoidance in the companies under study. The results of this section are consistent with Freeman (1984) Stakeholder Theory, which believes in a two-way relationship between companies and stakeholders. On the one hand, companies must create value for their stakeholders, and since the payment of taxes by companies is in the public interest. Companies that engage in social responsibility activities have not paid their share of taxes and are less inclined to avoid taxes. On the other hand, social responsibility activity is a kind of productive investment and helps to attract investors and in the long run will improve the performance and upgrade the social base of companies. Therefore, it can be said that socially responsible companies will improve their financial performance in the future by paying taxes now.Family ownership was an overlap with social responsibility, but its interaction with social responsibility did not strengthen the link between social responsibility and tax avoidance. The reason for rejecting the second hypothesis can be argued that family-owned companies do not take risks because of their last name, and consider the company's name and reputation as a legacy to be passed on to their children. So, in fact, the concept of reputation has created the overlap of family ownership with social responsibility; therefore, its interaction with the social responsibility variable has not strengthened the relationship between social responsibility and tax avoidance.

According to agency theory, managers have much incentive that their audit reports are presented with a favorable opinion. They search for auditors who would comply with their wishes and have fewer professional  skepticism and doubt about their financial statements. Expectations that could lead to the phenomenon of audit opinion shopping and increase the likelihood of fraudulent financial statements, which will entail several adverse consequences for share prices in the financial market. Accordingly, the present study first reviews the causes of opinion shopping, and then analyzes adverse consequences of this phenomenon and its effect on accounting and auditing profession. The results showed that the audit’s specific characteristics can provide an important driver for exacerbating the phenomenon of audit opinion shopping Other results reveal that audit opinion shopping entails adverse consequences such as reduced quality of audit and financial reporting. Furthermore, it compromises the auditor’s independence and leads to fraud in financial statements.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of audit committee chair on the relationship between latency in financial reporting and value communication. When reporting delays occur, investors are reacting negatively. On the other hand, the expertise of the head of the audit committee, through improving the quality of financial reporting, can have an impact on value communication and also reduce the delay in financial reporting. This research is of a causal nature, then an event and an applied one. For this research, a sample of 156 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 2012 to 2016 was selected. Based on combined data analysis and multivariate linear regression analysis, the findings showed that the delay in reporting led to a reduction in value communication. The expertise of the head of the audit committee is positively affected by value communication, but the expertise of the head of the audit committee does not affect the relationship between the delay in financial reporting and value communication.

The review of literature on the theoretical foundations of corporate governance suggests that agency theory has been the dominant theoretical framework in this context. Some scholars, by proposing the argument that this theory has paid little attention to organizational factors, have drawn attention to the use of contingency theory in the study of corporate governance. In this regard, this study aims to provide a contingency model on the effect of board structure on earnings quality. The sample includes 103 firms listed at Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 1390 to 1395. The structural equation modeling approach and Smart PLS software have been used for modelling. The results showed that competition, business strategy and company size as contingency factors have a positive and significant effect on the structure of the board of directors. Also, the board structure has a mediating role in the relationship between contingency factors and earnings quality, and the adaptation between these factors and board structure affects the quality of earnings. Therefore, in Tehran Stock Exchange the effects of the board structure on the earning quality with regard to contingency factors can be explained in the form of a structured model.

Introduction In the research we hypothesize that the way in which performance measurement systems are being used affects organizational performance, and that these performance effects depend on contractibility. The findings have important implications, both for practice and for public policy. Hypotheses research hypotheses developed as follows: H1. contractibility has a positive and significant effect on performance. H2. The incentive-oriented use of performance measurement systems has a significant effect on performance. H3. The contractibility has a significant effect on incentive-oriented use. H4. The exploratory use of performance measurement systems has a significant effect on performance. H5. The contractibility has a significant effect on the exploratory use of performance measurement systems. Methods To test the hypotheses, we using survey data from public sector organizations in the Mashhad Municipality. We sought to identify a model for investigating the relationships between the use of performance measurement systems. Consequently, the structural equations and AMOS software have been used. Results The results showed that contractibility does not affect on the organizational performance. also, we find that Contractibility does positive effect on the exploratory use and incentive performance of the performance measurement system. Conclusion The purpose of this research is to measurement the use of performance measurement systems and detection the type of use of the performance measurement system in public sector. Results recommends that organizations design a system that will provide the best feedback to continuously improve in organization.

TThe purpose of this study is to explain the moderating role of transactions with related party on the relationship between political connections and the delay in the audit report. One of the criteria for financial reporting quality is being up-to-date. On the other hand, in politically-minded companies, managers find incentives for potential benefits, which can lead to a loss of their rights. For this research, a sample of 156 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 2012 to 2016 was selected. Based on the panel data and multi-variable linear regression analysis, the research findings showed that political connections leads to an increase in the delay in the auditor's report. Transactions with related party also increased the delay in the auditor's report, as well as the strengthening of the relationship between the political connections and the delay in the auditor's report, which confirmed that companies with a political relationship with dealers with related party transactions to hide some use transactions they do.

In this article, after reviewing the single index for, we introduce a composite index for measuring this by constructing composite index methodology.

Using standard linear discriminant method, a weighted composite index was introduced. In order to achieve the weight for each criterion, the financial data of 148 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2007 were analyzed in two groups. Also, to check the robustness of the financial data over 2003-2006, cross-sectional analysis was performed.

The findings showed that the composite index was more comprehensive than the signal index due to its larger dimensions. Also, to test the significance of the index, the success ratio test was used. The results demonstrated the introduced index had higher reliability and can accurately classify the firms into two groups with audit opinion shopping and with no audit opinion shopping.

In general, the proposed composite index had more dimensions and, therefore, could better explain the audit opinion shopping. Also, in the proposed composite index, the index of changing the partner auditor firm had the maximum coefficient, suggesting that changing the partner auditor firm could cause less cost and is less visible. On the other hand, the criteria of changing the auditor firm resulted in obtaining the minimum coefficient in the composite index, i.e. changing the auditor firm did not mean that the employer had access to the unqualified opinion of auditor. These findings provided useful information for investors and policy-markers to explain and detect whether any audit opinion shopping has occurred.

Over the years, corporate governance research has been working to develop a model that is compatible for all companies and for various purposes. The focus of these research was minimizing agency conflict between owners and managers. One important characteristic of the traditional agency literature is to search for universal relationships between corporate governance and outcomes based on a “closed systems” logic centered on agency costs. In recent decades, many researchers have focused on the need to provide a view of corporate governance by arguing that agency theory less addresses the context of an organizational environment. The present paper, with descriptive and analytic approach, has explained corporate governance through contingency theory. In this regard, in first step, it explains agency theory and its criticisms and then presents the theoretical foundations of contingency theory and corporate governance literature using this theory. In the end, it will also provide suggestions on the direction of future research in this area.

Cash holdings in the company, despite the benefits of the ability to conduct business transactions, are the basis for creating problems such as the potential increase of non-financial investments due to agency issues. Therefore, conservative accounting practices, due to the efficient use of cash held, can reduce the cost of representing conflicting incentives between shareholders and managers. Therefore, the purpose of this a Study of the relationship between held-to-balance value and conservative accounting with an emphasis on the role of modification Controlling shareholders using a sample of 111 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 2012 to 2016. Also, the test of research hypotheses was tested using multivariable regression. The results show that, in the absence of controlling shareholders, they hold a higher degree of cash conservatism and, in accordance with the results of the second hypothesis of research, the strengthening of the dominant control of shareholders, would reduce the positive effects of conservative accounting activities on cash value To give The third hypothesis also suggests that strengthening the supervisory dimension of controlling shareholders does not increase the positive relationship between cash and conservative accounting.

The managers’ sticky expectations is due to opportunistic behaviors. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to explore relationship between managers’ sticky expectations and earning management with regard to non-executive managers. The analysis is based on pooling data and multiple regression from 131 firms in duration 2012-2018. show that there is a significant relationship between the managers’ sticky expectations and earnings management. Also, non-executive managers effect on relationship between managers’ sticky expectations and earnings management. Managers employed the earnings management owing to their expected goals. Based on agency theory, non-executive managers have considered as a controlling and monitoring mechanism. This role can leads to modifying of relationship between managers’ sticky expectations and earnings management.Contribution: This study tries to fill the theoretical gap between board structure and earnings management literature in Iranian companies. In this regard, due to the potential conflicts between managers and other stakeholders, it is expected that the next enhancement of managers’ monitoring role by increasing the number of non-executive managers may moderate the earnings management.

The purpose of this paper is to philosophically address the issue of managerial opportunism and to describe the paradox of the opportunistic executive, particularly when the CEO could be considered as a “criminal-to-be”. Also, It will be seen to what extent governance mechanisms really contribute to prevent managerial opportunism, particularly through compensation packages (“financial carrots”). Then, Oliver Williamson’s viewpoint will be analyzed on opportunism, as his theory has largely influenced the way agency theories actually define managerial opportunism. The gap in exploring three basic types of opportunism (the Smithian egoist, the Hobbesian egoist and the Machiavellian egoist) will be filled. The results indicate that The Smithian egoist tries to reach equilibrium between self-interest and compassion, while the Hobbesian egoist is motivated by self-interest, desire of power and the attitude of prudence. The Machiavellian egoist is always searching for power and makes followers’ fear arising. The way governance mechanisms and structures should be designed and implemented could be quite different if the CEO actually behaves as a Smithian, Hobbesian or Machiavellian egoist. CEO’s propensity to commit financial crime could largely vary from one type to another: low risk (Smithian egoist), medium risk (Hobbesian egoist) or high risk (Machiavellian egoist). Smith’s, Hobbes’ and Machiavelli’s philosophy was chosen because the agency theory sometimes refers to it, when defining the notion of opportunism. Other philosophies could also be analyzed to see to what extent they are opening the door to opportunism (for example, Spinoza).

The first problem with the agency is the existence of a conflict of interests between the shareholder and the manager that this conflict of interest may even lead to information asymmetry. That is, the shareholder seeks to reach the highest level of investment value and the manager is also looking to increase his wealth according entrenchment theory. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of cash holding adjustments and management entrenchment. This research is an applied research in terms of purpose and is one of the descriptive-correlative researches. The data of 118 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 2009 to 2016 were collected. In this study, for the purpose of measuring management management, two indicators of CEO duality and manaders's shareholding percentage have been used by for entrenchment. The results show that cash holding adjustments affect managerial entrenchment. The speed of cash holding adjustments is also influenced by management fronts. In fact, the results showed that the moderation and the rate of holding of cash on managerial entrenchment in Tehran Stock Exchange is influential.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of political connections on stock price crash risk in 120 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 2011-2016. To test the research hypotheses, a panel data model was used, and to measure the stock price crash risk, two indicators of negative conditional return skewness and down-to-up volatility of monthly returns were used. The results showed that political connections have positive impacts on stock price crash risk. This is because the executives show a good image of the position of firms by hoarding bad news and/or hiding that. This behavior of managers in the long run will lead to stock price crash. The results also showed that the positive impact of political connections on stock price crash risk is more severe in the companies with high information asymmetries. Political companies are more inclined to make opportunistic use of events than the other companies. As a result, it is suggested to investors and users of financial statements to gain more knowledge about company's political relationships than the stock price in a business unit, because political action may be against the ultimate goal of the shareholders.